ORDER
C.Y. Somayajulu, J.
1. First respondent filed a petition seeking eviction of the husband of the revision petitioner from its property leased out to him under the provisions of A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (the Act). That petition was allowed after contest. Thereafter, husband of the revision petitioner died. So, first respondent filed an execution petition for enforcement of the order of eviction against the revision petitioner in her capacity as the legal representative of her husband. She opposed that petition inter alia on the ground of limitation and on the ground that a relationship of tenant and landlord is created between her and the respondent due to the first respondent receiving rents from her. Overruling the objections raised by her, the Special Officer ordered delivery of the demised property to the respondent by the order under revision. Hence this revision.
2. The contention of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner is that after the Special Officer passed the order of eviction, first respondent received the entire arrears of rent due from the demised property from the revision petitioner without any protest, and so it should be deemed that it waived the right to seek the eviction of the revision petitioner in view of the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Adapa Abbayi v. Reddipantulu Choultry and Ors. .
3. The decision relied on by the learned Counsel has no application to the facts of this case. In that case the Full Bench was considering the question whether a landlord, who received the arrears before filing of a petition for eviction, can seek eviction of his tenant on the ground that the tenant was in arrears of rent. In this case the Special Officer already passed an order of eviction against the husband of the revision petitioner. In view of the language employed in Section 13 of the Act as soon as an order of eviction is passed against a tenant, on the petition filed by the landlord seeking his eviction, the relationship of landlord and tenant between them ceases. If a landlord seeks eviction of his tenant under the Act on the ground of arrears the liability of the tenant to pay arrears and the rent during the pendency of the proceedings would not cease. It is not as though the landlord has to choose between seeking eviction of his tenant and claiming arrears. Till such time as the Special Officer orders eviction of the tenant on the ground of arrears, the amount payable by the tenant to the landlord would be rent, thereafter it would be damages for use and occupation. So if the first respondent received the amount due from the revision petitioner, as the heir of her husband, such payment would not create the relationship of landlord and tenant between the first respondent and the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner who stepped into the shoes of her husband after his death is bound by the order of eviction passed against her husband.
4. As per Rule 17 of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Rules, 1980 (the Rules) every decision or order of the Special Officer or District Judge passed under the Act has to be executed by an officer authorized by the Special Officer or the District Judge, as the case may be. No period of limitation is prescribed for filing such a petition either by the Act or the Rules.
5. Relying on Article 137 of the Limitation Act the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner contended that first respondent lost the right to execute the order after expiry of three years from the date of order of the Special Officer directing eviction of the husband of revision petitioner. The contention of the learned Counsel for the first respondent is that since period of limitation to file a petition for execution is 12 years as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the E.P. is in time.
6. In view of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the provisions contained in that Act apply to Special Acts also, with the exception that in case the Special Act prescribes a different period of limitation, that period of limitation, but not the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, would be the period of limitation. Since no period of limitation is prescribed by the Act or Rules, period of limitation for execution of the order passed under the Act would be governed by Article 136, because it specifically is made applicable to execution of decrees or orders (other than a decree granting Mandatory injunction) passed by a civil Court. The order of eviction passed by the Special Officer under the provisions of the Act can, or should be, treated as an order akin to the order of the civil Court for the following reasons.
7. There are 137 articles in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 in three divisions. First division containing Articles 1 to 113 relates to various types of suits, second division containing Articles 114 to 117 relates to appeals. Third division, relating to applications, is in two parts. Part I thereof, containing Articles 118 to 136, relates to applications in specified cases. Part 2 thereof relates to other applications.
8. Article 137 of the Limitation Act prescribing three years period of limitation is for
Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division.
So it applies only to such applications for which no period of limitation is prescribed, but not to the applications for which the period of limitation is prescribed.
9. Since ‘Special Officer’ under the Act is defined as a judicial officer not below the rank of a District Munsif (Junior Civil Judge) and since all Junior Civil Judges in single stations and if there are no more than one Junior Civil Judges, the Principal Junior Civil Judges, are designated as Special Officer under the Act, an order of eviction passed by a Special Officer would be akin to an order of a civil Court, and so such order of eviction, when put to execution, can only be governed by Article 136, but not by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. So the order of the Special Officer holding that the period of limitation for executing an order of eviction passed under the Act is 12 years needs no interference and so I find no merit in this revision.
10. This revision is liable to be dismissed on another ground also. As per Section 16(2) of the Act, petitioner has a right to prefer an appeal against the order impugned in this revision to the District Judge within 30 days from the date of the order. So she could have filed an appeal to the District Judge instead of filing this revision. It is well known that when an effective alternative remedy of appeal is available, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not generally be entertained.
11. Hence this petition is dismissed, with costs.