JUDGMENT
Mehta, J.
1. The Petitioner herein, Shri Tanaji Shantaram Koli, has impugned in this Criminal Writ Petition the order of detention dated 15-6-1989 passed against him by the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (Act No. 65 of 1980).
2. Shri Chitnis, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the detenu, has challenged the order of detention only on one issue. Shri Chitnis pointed out that a representation made by the detenu to the Central Government on 6-7-1989 had not been considered and disposed of expeditiously, but the same had been disposed of after a delay of about a month. Shri Chitnis pointed out that the explanation proffered by the Respondents was not at all satisfactory and that would render the continued detention of the detenu illegal.
3. Now, in order to appreciate the submission made by Shri Chitnis, it will be pertinent to set out certain facts. The detenu made a representation to the detaining authority and the Central Government on 6-7-1989. The representation was forwarded by the Jail Authorities to the Central Government and the same was received in the Ministry on 11-7-1989. Thereafter the Central Government called for parawise comments from the detaining authority on 12-7-1989. The request for parawise comments was received on 13-7-1989. The parawise comments were sent by the detaining authority on 19-7-1989 and the comments were received by the Ministry on 26-7-1989. Thereafter the representation of the detenu was considered and it was finally rejected on 31-7-1989. A wireless message intimating the rejection by the Central Government was transmitted on 1-8-1989. This wireless message was received by the Superintendent, Nasik Central Prison on 2-8-1989. The Jail Authorities informed the detenu on 3-8-1989. The detenu was informed by a written communication on 7-8-1989. The above facts are incorporated in the affidavits in-reply of the Respondents, and certain facts have been furnished by Shri Page, the learned Public Prosecutor, from the file of the detenu in his possession. Shri Chitnis has taken exception too the delay involved between 1-7-1989, the date on which the parawise comments were called for by the Central Government, and 7-8-1989, the date on which the detenu was informed of the rejection of his representation by the Jail Authorities by a written communication. Shri Chitnis contended that the affidavits-in-reply did not at all explain the delay which spanned over twenty-two days between 12-7-1989 and 7-8-1989. Shri Chitnis described the explanation proffered in the affidavits-in-reply as an eye-wash.
4. Now, it is pertinent to point out that the parawise comments, which were called for by the Central Government on 12-7-1989, had been replied to and furnished to the Central Government on 26-7-1989. There is, therefore a time gap of about fourteen days between the time the parawise comments were called for and the same were received by the Central Government. It is, however, pertinent to point out that 14th, 15th and 16th of July 1989 were holidays and so were 22nd and 23rd of July 1989, being Saturday and Sunday. It is also pertinent to point out that the parawise comments had been prepared and forwarded to the Central Government on 19-7-1989. However, the parawise comments were received by the Central Government on 26-7-1989. The explanation, therefore, proffered by the Respondents in their affidavits-in-reply appears to be satisfactory.
5. Shri Chitnis relied on a recent ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Dhondu Borade v. V. K. Saraf, , wherein their Lordships observed :-
“True, there is no prescribed period either under the provisions of the Constitution or under the concerned detention law within which the representation should be dealt with. The use of the words ‘as soon as may be’ occurring in Article 22(5) of the Constitution reflects that the representation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with due promptitude and diligence and with a sense of urgency and without avoidable delay. What is reasonable despatch depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in that regard. However, in case he gap between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the authority is so unreasonably long and the explanation offered by the authority is so unsatisfactory, such delay could vitiate the order of detention.”
6. Now, Shri Chitnis pointed out that the facts appearing in Rama Dhondu Borade’s case and in the instant case were almost similar. In Rama Dhondu Borade’s case also, there was delay of fourteen days in passing the information required from the State Government to the Central Government. The Supreme Court, however, found that the explanation offered in the affidavit-in-reply was utterly unsatisfactory. Relying on the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, Shri Chitnis wants us to adopt the same conclusion as the Supreme Court. We may only reiterate the words of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the same case, that what is reasonable dispatch depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in that regard. Each case must be considered on its own facts. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission made by Shri Chitnis that we must adopt the same conclusion as arrived at by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the facts with regard to the delay when the facts of that case and the facts in the instant case are dissimilar. In the instant case, the Respondents have given an explanation with regard to the delay from 12-7-1989 to 7-8-1989. We have already set out the facts heretofore.
7. We may also here cite the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Raisuddin v. State of U.P., , to the effect (Para 4) :-
“In this context we consider it necessary to emphasise that the question whether the representation submitted by a detenu has been dealt with all reasonable promptness and diligence is to be decided not by the application of any rigid or inflexible rule or set formula nor by a mere arithmetical counting of dates, but by a careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of each case; if on such examination, it is found that there was any remissness, indifference or avoidable delay on the part of the detaining authority / State Government in dealing with the representation, the Court will undoubtedly treat it as a factor vitiating the continued detention of the detenu; on the other hand, if the Court is satisfied that the delay was occasioned not by any lack or diligence or promptness of attention on the part of the party concerned, but due to unavoidable circumstances or reasons entirely beyond his control, such delay will not be treated as furnishing a ground for the grant of relief to the detenu against his continued detention.”
8. Now, in the instant case, Shri Chitnis has taken exception to the delay spanning from 12-7-1989, the date on which the Central Government called for parawise comments, to 7-8-198, the date on which the detenu was informed about the rejection of his representation by the Central Government. Now, we may only State that the request for parawise comments was received by the detaining authority on 13-7-1989 and the same were forwarded to the Central Government on 19-7-1989, i.e., after a period of six days. Of these, 14th, 15th and 16th July 1989 were holidays. The parawise comments were received on 26-7-1989, i.e., after about seven days of which 22nd and 23rd July 1989 were Saturday and Sunday. The representation was considered by the Central Government between 26-7-1989 and 31-7-1989, on which day the representation was rejected. Thereafter a wireless message was sent to the Jail Authorities on 1-8-1989, which was received on 2-8-1989. The detenu was informed on the next day, i.e., on 3-8-1989.
9. Shri Page, the learned Public Prosecutor, has placed before us the file of the detenu which contained an acknowledgment of the fact that he had been informed of the rejection of the representation by the Central Government on 3-8-1989. The detenu was informed by a written communication on 7-8-1989. On these facts, we are fairly convinced that the explanation proffered by the Respondents is plausible and reasonable. We do not find any tardiness or lethargy in dealing with the representation. That being the case, we cannot accept the submission of shri Chitnis that the representation had not been treated with the necessary alacrity that the law requires.
10. In the result, Rule stands discharged and the Criminal Writ Petition dismissed.
11. Order accordingly.