JUDGMENT
M.P. Chandrakantaraj Urs, J.
1. The only ground urged before us is that the Tribunal below erred in not limiting the liability of the insurer in accordance with the provision made in that behalf in the policy issued to the insured.
2. From the reading of the judgment of the Tribunal, it is clear that no policy as such was produced before the Tribunal in regard to this plea. Nor does it appear to have taken a specific plea that such a term in the policy precluded the insurer from paying more than a particular sum in the event of the accident resulting in injury, damage to the property or death. In that circumstance, in the absence of the policy itself, the court was unable to determine the nature of the contract imposing limitation on the insurer in respect of his liability under the policy. As such award and decree have been passed without any reservation jointly and severally against the respondents.
3. It was first contended by Mr. D.S. Sherry, learned counsel for the appellant, that the award itself proceeded on the erroneous basis for awarding compensation because the persons who suffered injuries or death resulted on account of the accident were all workmen who had died in the course of their employment and as such, the compensation payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should have been paid and the insurer’s liability would, therefore, arise under the said Act. In support of that proposition, he relied upon the decision of this court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rudraiah 1981 (1) Kar LJ 32. We do not see any such proposition of law laid down in that decision. All that the decision states is that the person was a hamal in the employment of the owner of the motor vehicle and as such the Tribunal should have awarded compensation regard being had to the amounts specified in the Workmen’s Compensation Act in Schedule IV of the said Act. The appeal came to be allowed to that extent. In other words, the court did nothing more than fixing the quantum of compensation regard being had to the compensation awardable in Schedule IV of the said Act and no more. It is not the same as stating that the Tribunal which is required to decide the claims arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act with reference to the death of an employee of the owner of the motor vehicle is bound only by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and no other. It was convenient for their Lordships in that decision to find that the compensation awarded under the Workmen’s Compensation Act under Schedule IV thereto was adequate on the facts of the case and no more. Similar is the view expressed by another Bench of this court in the case of Jayavant Yellappa v. Nagesh Yilari 1977 ACJ 401 (Karnataka). Their Lordships after giving cogent reasons and holding that the Motor Vehicles Act particularly the provisions from Sections 110-A to 110-F and the Workmen’s Compensation Act operated in their respective fields distinct and different from each other and one could not therefore contend that Section 110-F acted as a bar for the Tribunal to decide the claim arising out of the death of a workman. Section 110-AA gives option to claim compensation under either of the enactments and not both. With the choice left to the victim or the dependants of the victim in case of death, that choice must be exercised and once so exercised, the Act under which they pursue the remedy must decide the quantum of compensation in accordance with the facts of the case. However, in that case, they found it convenient to award compensation as awardable under Schedule IV of Workmen’s Compensation Act. Then again, it was only a rule of convenience to arrive at a quantum and not laying down the law that Workmen’s Compensation Act should be administered by the Tribunal in cases arising under the Motor Vehicles Act.
4. Similar is the position in another case of this court. In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. H.N. Rama Prasad 1985 ACJ 864 (Karnataka), we find that the Division Bench was clear and did not rule that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be administered by the Tribunal in respect of the cases arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act. It only pointed out that the liability of the insurer would be limited to 60 per cent. It so happened on the facts of that case that liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act was also limited to 60 per cent and the evidence before the Tribunal was also worked out to 60 per cent. Therefore, they referred to the Workmen’s Compensation Act and for no other purpose.
5. We are of the view that none of the cited three decisions support the proposition that in awarding compensation to an employee who suffers injury or death, in the course of his or her employment, in a motor vehicle accident, the Tribunal has to award compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act even though he prefers his claim under the Motor Vehicles Act.
6. In so far as it relates to the other contentions regarding the liability, we are of the view that there was no justification or cause for the insurance company for not producing insurance policy before the Tribunal despite explanation offered in the application under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code before us. If there is a statutory provision restricting its liability, then that liability may be pleaded at any stage of the execution proceedings and on that ground we cannot allow this appeal merely because it is convenient for the insurance company to produce the policy now.
7. Subject to the above observations, we dismiss these appeals.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents have been heard.