JUDGMENT
Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The Petitioner No. 1, Niranjan Singh was appointed as a Constable on 11.1.1981 and the petitioner No. 2 was appointed as a Constable on 27.12.1971, while the petitioner Ram Pal Singh of Writ Petition No. 9701 of 2001 was appointed as a Constable in the year 1973. The services of the petitioners were dismissed by a common order dated 17.1.2001 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Pilibhit, respondent No. 2 exercising the powers under proviso to Sub-clause (b) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 of The Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinfafler referred to as the Rules).
2. Since, the controversy involved in both the writ petitions arc identical, hence, both the petitions are being decided together.
3. Heard Sri R.S. Mishra, the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned standing Counsel for the respondents.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under the proviso to clause (b) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 the services could be dispensed with where the disciplinary authority was satisfied that for some reasons to be recorded by that authority in writing, it was not reasonably practicable to hold such an enquiry, He further submitted, that in the instant case, the services of the petitioner had been dispensed with without holding an enquiry as contemplated in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8. According to the learned Counsel, the disciplinary authority had dispensed with the enquiry on irrelevant grounds. The decision to dispense with the enquiry was based on the ipse dixit of the disciplinary authority i.e. on the whim or caprice of the concerned office.
5. The order of dismissal stated that the petitioners were assigned to guard a convict in the hospital and instead of guarding the convict, one of the petitioners was found sleeping and the other two petitioners had left the hospital. On account of their action the convict escaped from the hospital. This incident resulted in the lowering of the image of the police department and that the public had lost faith in the police. For these reasons the disciplinary authority thought fit to dispense the enquiry.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the reasons, recorded for dispensing with the inquiry was irrelevant and was arbitrary and therefore, the impugned order of termination was invalid and that the petitioners were therefore, liable to be reinstated in service.
7. The services of the petitioner has been terminated under Rule 8 (2)(b) of The Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991. Rule 8 (2)(b) reads as under :
“8. (2)(b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry.”
8. The language of the aforesaid Rule is similar to the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. In Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsimm Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416, the Supreme Court held- “The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311…”
“…Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it. was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability, which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reaonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation.”
“…..The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority……”
“…..A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail.”
9. In Tuisiram Patel’s case (supra) the Supreme Court further held-
“The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional.
It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing the penalty.”
10. The Supreme Court further went on to say–
” If the Court finds that the reasons are irrelevant, then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by clause (b) and would take the case out of the purview of that clause and the impugned order of penalty would stand invalidated.”
11. In Chief Security Officer and othere v. Singasan Rabi Das, 1991 (1) SCC 729, the Supreme Court held that there was a total absence of sufficient material or good ground for dispensing with the inquiry and accordingly held that the order of termination despensing with the inquiry was illegal.
12. In Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., (1991)1 SCC 362, the Supreme Court held-
“It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental inquiry.”
13. The Supreme Court further held-
“The decision to dispense with the departmental inquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of Law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer.”
14. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the impugned order of temination contains sufficient reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. The situation was such that an immediate action was required to betaken.
15. In the instant case the incident took place on 16.1.2001 and the impugned order of termination was passed on 17.1.2001. In the given case, immediate action was required to be taken to punish the delinquent employees in order to put faith in the public. The misconduct committed by the petitioners in allowing the convict to escape shows a clear dereliction of duty and imminent action was required to be taken by the disciplinary authority. The order was passed in the light of the then prevailing situation and judging the matter in that light, the conclusion drawn by the disciplinary authority was just and proper. The disciplinary authority rightly dispensed with the inquiry.
16. In considering the relevancy of the reasons given by the disciplinary authority, the Court will not sit in judgment like a Court of first appeal. The question as to whether the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority are germane to Sub-clause (b), the Supreme Court in Tulsiram Patel (supra) held as follows :
“The Court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary authority and consider what in the then prevailing situation a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way would have done. The matter will have to be judged in the light of the then prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding the question whether the inquiry should be dispensed with or not in the cool and detached atmosphere of a Court-room, removed in time from the sitution in question. Where two views are possible, the Court will decline to interfere.”
17. Accordingly, I find no infirmity in the impugned order. The writ petitions fail and are, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.