JUDGMENT
Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.
1. By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the Award dated 05.10.1996 whereby Industrial Tribunal III, directed the petitioner to place the workman Shri Devi Dutt Tiwari in the pay scale of Rs. 260-400(old) from the date of his being promoted as E.M.D, as per office order dated 21.10.1975, give equivalent pay scale as recommended by the 4th Pay Commission and pay arrears within three months or pay 12 % interest per annum after three months for the entire period.
2. Briefly the facts are that respondent joined MCD as Electric Beldar in 1963. He was regularised on that post in the year 1968. In the year 1975 he was promoted to the post of Electric Motor Driver (E.M.D) on the pay scale of Rs.200-250. Workman alleged that he was entitled to pay scale of Rs. 260-400 on being promoted since that was the pay scale being given in the CPWD to E.M.D. The following dispute was referred for adjudication to the Tribunal:
Whether Shri Devi Dutt Tiwari is entitled to be regularised in the pay scale of Rs. 260-400 instead of Rs.200-250 w.e.f. 1975 and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?
3. The stand of the MCD before the Tribunal was that workman was promoted to the post of E.M.D which carried a pay scale of Rs.200-250. The workman was not entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 260-400 which was in the next promotion pay scale for Grade-I. The pay scales applicable in CPWD were not applicable in MCD.
4. The Tribunal after considering arguments of both sides observed that CPWD was paying pay scale of Rs.260-400 to its employee working as E.M.D. On 6.1.1978 it was agreed that pay scale of E.M.D and Wireman Grade-2 being paid by CPWD to its employee shall be paid to the employees of the petitioner. E.M.D was a post of skilled workman and it should in pay scale of Rs. 260-400 and not in pay scale of, Rs. 200-250 as being given to the workman on his being promoted as E.M.D. The Tribunal, therefore, ordered for grant of pay scale of Rs.260-400.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the office order dated 12.7.1982 relied upon by the Tribunal. The Office Order reads as under:
Office Order
The Commissioner, M.C.D. exercising the powers of the Corporation, vide decision No. 2340/DW/Corp. dated 11.6.1982 has been pleased to approve of implementation of award given by the Board of Arbitration (J.C.M) revising the pay scale of skilled workers of the following categories from Rs. 260-350 to Rs. 260-400/- w.e.f 1.1.1973 notionally to the categories of skilled workers, as stated below, in position on or before 1.3.1973.
S.No. Category 1. Mason 2. Carpenter 3. Painter 4. Fitter 5. Black Smith 6. Operator 7. Molder 8. Turner 9. Welder 10. Wireman-Grade-I 11. Machine Setter 12. Electric Mistri 13. Electric Motor Mechanic The actual benefit in terms of arrears of pay etc. would accrue to them only w.e.f 1.3.1973. This benefit may also be given to such Municipal employees who have entered in Municipal services after 1.3.1973. ASSTT. COMMISSIONER (ENGG.)
6. A perusal of the above Office Order shows that E.M.D was not in the category of skilled workman. Only skilled workmen were entitled to the pay Scale of Rs.260-350 upgraded to 260-400 as mentioned in the Office Order. I have also gone through the CPWD pay scales. Even in CPWD, E.M.D falls in two categories, first Assistant Operator in the pay scale of Rs.85-2-95 and second Operator in the pay scale of Rs. 110-3-130. It is obvious that even in CPWD the two scales were provided so that there was avenue of promotion available for E.M.D( Driver/ Operator).
7. The Tribunal in this case has granted pay scale of CPWD to the employees of MCD without any comparison of the work of two departments. In the case of State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh 2006-I-LLJ- Supreme Court observed as under:
17. Having considered the authorities and the submissions, we are of the view that the authorities in the case of Jasmer Singh (supra), Tilak Raj (supra), Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology (supra) and Tarun K. Roy (supra) lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of equal pay for equal work has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases make a difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are valued by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justified a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of equal pay for equal work requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference. Thus, normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ Court can lightly interfere. Normally, a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this regards. In any event the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court, the Court must first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof. If the High Court, is on basis of material placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfillled it may direct payment of equal pay for the date of the filing of the respective writ petition. In all these cases, we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors.
8. I find that the Tribunal has not acted in accordance with law. The respondent was promoted in the pay scale of Rs.200-250 which was the promotion scale in MCD. The Tribunal by its order directed the next pay scale to be given to him which could be given to him only on next promotion. There was no dispute that the Tribunal had no authority to give promotion to the respondent.
9. Doctrine of equal pay for equal work cannot be applied on mere allegations of equal work. Person who claims his work was equal to someone else work, has to prove the same by cogent evidence. The constitutional scheme postulates ‘equal pay for equal work’ for those who are equally placed in all respects. Two different organizations can have different pay scale for same post. The same post in different department may carry different responsibility and require different experience and dedication to work.
10. I find that the Award of the Tribunal is perverse and is hereby set aside. The writ petition stands allowed. No order as to costs.