JUDGMENT
N. Kumar, J.
1. Appellant has challenged in this appeal, the order of the learned Single Judge, directing the appellant-bank to pay the difference of salary to the respondent, during the period of suspension, after he was acquitted by a criminal Court.
2. Appellant is a nationalized bank. At the relevant time, respondent was working at the Ilkal branch of the bank. Against the respondent a criminal case was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3(2)(v) of the S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in case No. 19/1994 before the II Additional Sessions Court, Raichur. Respondent was taken into custody by the police and thereafter he was given to judicial custody. Appellant in terms of regulation 12 of Syndicate Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter for short called as “the regulations”) placed the respondent under suspension. According to the prevailing rules he was paid subsistence allowance during the period of suspension. The criminal case ended in an acquittal, giving the benefit of doubt to the respondent. Thereafter the bank revoked the suspension order and reinstated the respondent into service. Respondent made a representation to the bank for payment of full salary and allowances for the period of suspension. The said request was declined by an order dated 5-9-1996 as per Annexure-F. Respondent preferred a writ petition challenging the said order in W.R No. 7837/1997. Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, quashed the order dated 5-9-1996 and directed the bank to pay the difference of salary to the respondent from the date of suspension, namely 17-8-1993 till the date of revocation of suspension on 15-4-1995, with simple interest at the rate of 6% p.a. by order dated 17-11-2003. Aggrieved by the said order the present appeal is filed.
3. The Learned Counsel for the appellant relying on regulation 15 contends, an employee is entitled to full salary during the period of suspension, only if he is fully exonerated or that the suspension was unjustifiable. In the instant case he was kept under suspension because of the criminal case and giving him the benefit of doubt he has been acquitted; he is not fully exonerated, thus both the aforesaid conditions are not satisfied. Therefore, appellant was fully justified in declining him to grant full salary and the learned single Judge committed a serious error in setting aside the order of the appellant.
4. Per contra, the Learned Counsel for the respondent contends, once an employee is honourably acquitted by a Criminal Court, he is entitled to full salary and therefore the order of the Learned Single Judge is legal, valid and do not call for any interference.
5. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to look at the relevant portions of the regulations.
“Regulation 12 suspensions:
1) An Officer Employee may be placed under suspension by the competent authority: a) where a disciplinary proceedings against him is contemplated or is pending; or b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial 2) An Officer Employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the competent authority- a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding fortyeight hours; b) with effect from the date of conviction, if in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding fortyeight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction". " Regulation 15. Pay, Allowances and Treatment of Service on termination of Suspension:
1) Where the competent authority holds that the officer Employee has been fully exonerated or that the suspension was unjustifiable, the Officer Employee concerned shall be granted the full pay to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended, together with any allowance of which he was in receipt immediately prior to his suspension, or may have been sanctioned subsequently and made applicable to all Officer Employees”.
(underlining by us)
The aforesaid regulations make it clear that an employee concerned shall be granted the full pay to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, if he has been fully exonerated or that the suspension was unjustifiable. Therefore, the question for consideration in the instant case is, whether the respondent was fully exonerated or whether his suspension was unjustifiable.
6. In this regard the Learned Counsel relied on few judgments of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the case of The Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, has held, it is only if an employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of “no work, no pay” and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. As it is even during such period the employee earns subsistence allowance by virtue of the regulations. In the circumstances, the Bank’s power in that behalf is unassailable.
7. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Jaipal Singh, held, if prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the Trial Court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service.
8. Regulation 12 is in two parts. Sub-regulation (1) deals with a case where the competent authority has the discretion to place an officer employee under suspension. Sub-regulation (2) deals with a case where he has no such discretion and the suspension comes into effect by operation of law. In the first case it is not obligatory on the part of the competent authority to place an officer employee under suspension. Where disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or pending or where a case against an officer employee in respect of a criminal offence is under investigation, enquiry or trial, the competent authority has been given the discretion and vested with the power to place such an officer under suspension. If that discretion is not properly exercised and if it was found out that the officer employee is fully exonerated in the disciplinary proceedings or criminal proceedings or placing him under suspension was unjustified, then the officer employee concerned shall be granted the full pay and other allowance. The reason is obvious. By exercising the power of suspension, the officer employee has been kept away from work and in the end of the day when he is fully exonerated, a great injustice has been done to him by the act of the management and, therefore, such an officer employee shall be granted the full pay to which he would have been entitled to, had he not been suspended, together with any allowances of which he was in receipt immediately prior to his suspension. But, if he is not fully exonerated and if the suspension was justifiable, even though the officer employee is let off in a domestic enquiry or acquitted in the criminal proceedings such an employee would not be entitled to the full pay during the period of suspension. That is what is contained in regulation 15(1).
9. However, in the second case, when an officer employee is detained in custody whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding 48 hours or from the date of conviction when he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding 48 hours, then by operation of law he shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension. In a case which falls under sub regulation (2) of regulation 12, if a competent authority passes an order of suspension, it is only in the nature of an intimation to the employee that he has been kept under suspension, as by operation of law the suspension takes effect. The order placing an officer employee under such circumstances is not an act of the management/competent authority. More so if the criminal prosecution is not at the behest of the management. Therefore, when an officer employee is kept under suspension under sub regulation (2) and the criminal prosecution is not at the behest of the management, under no circumstances he would be entitled to payment of full pay and wages on being acquitted in the criminal case. It is immaterial whether he has been acquitted on the ground of giving him the benefit of doubt or he is fully exonerated.
10. The principle involved is, that when the complaint is not at the behest of the management, the management has no role to play in the criminal prosecution launched against such employee. If the case falls under sub regulation (2) by operation of law such an employee is deemed to have been placed under suspension. When he is taken to custody by the police he renders no work during this period. He is absent from work, for reasons of his involvement in the criminal case and the bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from duties. Thus, the principle of “no work, no pay” comes into operation. Otherwise it would be inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. However, by virtue of the regulations such an employee is to be paid the subsistence allowance though management is in no way responsible for such absence from work. Therefore, when an employee is acquitted in such circumstances, he would not be entitled to full wages during the period of suspension.
11. In the instant case, admittedly, the respondent was prosecuted. The said complaint was not at the behest of the management. It was in no way connected with his employment. The respondent was taken into police custody on 17-8-1993 and he was remanded to judicial custody till 1-9-1993. Therefore, sub regulation 2(a) of regulation 12 is attracted and he is deemed to have been placed under suspension with effect from his date of detention. The management did not prevent his from attending to work. He was acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge. The order of suspension was on account of the operation of law and not by the act of the management. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order of suspension is unjustifiable. Even otherwise, the respondent was acquitted of the criminal charge by giving benefit of doubt. Therefore, it is not a case of full exoneration. Therefore, the order of the appellant dated 5-9-1996 is strictly in conformity with regulations 12 and 15 and denial of full salary and allowances during the period of suspension was fully justified. The learned Single Judge was in error in ignoring the aforesaid statutory provisions and in passing the impugned order. Hence, the order of the Learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, we pass the following order:
Writ Appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 7837/1997 is hereby quashed. The order of the appellant dated 5-9-1996 as per Annexure-F is restored.