JUDGMENT
A.S. Anand, C.J.
1. This appeal is directed against all award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Sfinagar, dated 29-7-1980, awarding Rs. 10,000/- as compensation to respondent No. 2 in a claim petition filed against the appellant and respondent No.3 arising out of a vehicular accident in which Mohd. Yaqoob, aged 11 years, the son of respondent No. 2, lost his fife. The appeal has been preferred by the Road Transport Corporation of J&K State. During the pendency of the appeal, respondent No. 3 d ed and since the award was not against him, vide order of the court dated 1-8-1985, his name was deleted from the array of the respondents.
2. On 18-9-1976, an accident took place in village Larkipora, tehsil Doru, District Anantnag, in which Mohd. Yaqoob, son of respondent No. 2, was killed The offending vehicle No. JKY 751 was owned by the appellant J&K State Road Transport Corporation and respondent No. 3 (since dead) was its driver. Respondent No 2 filed a claim petition claiming an amount of Rs. 1,55,100/- as compensation. The claim pstition was resisted and both the owner and the driver filed their written objections in which, inter alia, the factum of the accident was denied but it was pleaded in the alternative that the accident, in mv case, had not occurred due to any rash or negligent driving of respondent No. 3 and had been caused due to mechanical defect which was beyond the control of respondent No. 3. The following issues were raised in the case:
(1) Was the accident caused because of the rash and negligent act of the non-applicant No. 1 ? O.P. Applicant.
(2) In case issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative to how much compensation the applicant is entitled and from whom and in what proportion ? O.P. Applicant.
(3) Relief?
3. The claimant, respondent No. 2 examined Gul Mohd. Ganai, Ghulam Ahmad Dar, Gulam Ahmad Rather, Gulam Mohd. Kutey and Gani Rather besides appearing in the witness box himself. The respondents to the claim petition, on the other hand, examined Sarup Narian Kak and Ghulam Mohd. Ganai, respondent No. 3, the driver of the offending vehicle, also appeared as his own witness.
4. The fact that the accident took place on the date and the time alleged in the claim petition at Larkipora has not only been deposed to by the witness produced on behalf of the claimant but has also been admitted by respondent No. 3, the driver of the offending vehicle himself in his own deposition. Ghulam Mohd. Ganai, a witness of the respondent, also admitted the factum of the accident. Meekly, the witness of the contesting respondents, however, feigned ignorance as to whether the deceased had been hit and injured in the accident. It has, however, been deposed to by both the witnesses of the respondents and respondent No. 3 himself that the accident had been caused because of the bursting of one of the tyres of the offending vehicle No. JKY 751.
5. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Srinagar, after a careful appraisal of the evidence decided issue No. 1 in favour of the claimant and under issue No. 2 awarded an amount of Rs. 10,000/- as compensation to respondent No. 2 which was made payable by the appellant. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal.
6. That the appellant was the owner of the vehicle has not been questioned and rightly so. The evidence led in the case by the parties has established that the accident was caused by the offending vehicle and that Mohd. Yaqoob was hit and killed when the said vehicle swerved to one side and hit Mohd. Yaqoob who was walking along with some cattle on the extreme side of the road It is not necessary for me to reproduce the evidence of the witnesses examined in the case because learned Counsel for the appellant did not question and rightly either the factum of the accident or that the deceased, Mohd. Yaqoob, was hit by the offending vehicle and had died as a result of the injuries sustained by him in the accident. The case of Mr. Dulloo, learned Counsel for the appellant, however, which be vehemently argued was that the accident had not taken place due to the rash or negligent driving of the offending vehicle by respondent No. 3 but on account of the bursting of the tyre which was beyond the control of respondent No. 3 and, therefore, no liability could be fastened oa the J&K State Road Transport Corporation in respect of the accident. Mr. Hagroo appearing for the claimant respondent No. 2 on the other hand, seriously controverted the stand taken by Mr. Dulloo and argued that it was the paramount duty and obligation of the appellant to maintain its vehicle in a road worthy condition by proper maintenance and the fact that the appellant had led no evidence to show that it had exercised due care for the proper maintenance of the vehicle and despite that care, the bursting of the tyre took place on account of some latent defect, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant now to say that the accident bad not been caused as a result of the negligence on the part of the appellant.
7. From the material on the record, it transpires that it is an admitted case of the parties that the accident took place due to the tyre burst of the vehicle and that it was on account thereof that the vehicle swerved to one side and the deceased was hit and later on died as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. The question, therefore, that comes up for consideration of this Court is whether this position absolved the appellant of tbe liability to pay compensation and, whether the mere bursting of the tyre was a defence to a plea of negligence. To cases of this type, in my opinion, tbe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is attracted. This doctrine which means “thing speaks for itself” is a rule of evidence affecting the onus of proof. The essence of the doctrine is that an event which, in the ordinary course of things was more likely than not to have been caused by negligence, would by itself be proof of negligence unless proved to the contrary by the defaulting party.
8. In Mela Ram v. Mohan Singh 1978 ACJ 381 (P&H), which was a case of an accident due to a tyre burst, it was held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court that to such a case the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable and the burden was on the respondents to disprove negligence on their part. In that case the truck driver was held negligent because the respondent in the case had led no evidence to establish that the tyre which had burst was in a good condition and had been examined periodically to ensure its roadworthiness.
9. Again, in Govindammal v. Pallavan Trans. Cvrpn 1980 ACJ 193 (Madras), which was also a case of accident occurring due to the bursting of tbe tyre of tbe vehicle, the Madras High Court held:
As it is a public utility service ran for the convenience of the public, it is the paramount duty and obligation of the respondent to maintain buses in a roadworthy condition by proper maintenance and upkeep and devising periodical checks and counter checks by its supervisory staff to ensure its roadworthiness and safety. If the accident had occurred in spite of these precautionary measures and the bursting of the tyre was on account of a latent defect which could not have been discovered by reasonable care and diligence, only then no liability can be fastened on the respondent, ‘and not otherwise’.
10. Thus, it follows that in cases of this type, the onus is on the owner/driver of the vehicle to establish by cogent evidence, that despite taking precautionary measures to check mechanical defects by proper maintenance and periodical checks and counter checks, the defect could not have been discovered by reasonable care and diligence and in case it is not so established, then the allegations of negligence would ipso facto stand established.
11. Turning to the facts of the present case, there is no evidence brought on the record by the appellant to show the total mileage done by the tyre which had burst. No witness has come forth to say on behalf of the appellant that the tyre in question was periodically examined by a mechanic with a view to know its condition. The solitary statement of respondent No. 3, driver of the offending vehicle, who stated that the vehicle had been checked even ons day prior to the accident by some mechanic who had found that the tyre was in a good condition is not sufficient to discharge the onus of negativating negligence. Tbe mechanic, who according to the deposition of the driver had examined the vehicle and the tyres of the vehicle one day prior to the accident, was not examined by the appellant for reasons best known to it. Even his report was not brought on record, an inference would, therefore, be available to be drawn against the appellant that had the mechanic been examined, his evidence would have gone against the appellant. In the absence of any evidence led by the appellant to show that it had taken proper care to ensure the roadworthiness of the vehicle which in the case of a public utility service was its paramount duty and obligation and that the bursting of the tyre took place on account of some latent defect which was not discovered despite reasonable care and diligence having been taken, there is no escape from the conclusion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies and the accident, in the present case, must be attributed to the negligence of the driver and the owner of the offending vehicle. Issue No. 1, in my opinion, was, therefore, correctly decided by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in favour of the claimant and against the owner and driver and I confirm the finding on that issue.
12. Coming now to issue Nos. 2 and 3, so far as the question of compensation is concerned, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal after relying on some decided cases and on the basis of evidence led in the case awarded a sum of Rs 10,000/- as compensation together with interest a,t the rate of 6% per annum from the date of passing of the award to the date of actual payment, besides allowing Rs. 500/- as the costs. In the face of the evidence led by the claimant, respondent No. 2, and pirticularly the practically unchallenged statement of the claimant that he was to a large extent dependent on the income of his son, aged 11 years, who used to tether cattle of his neighbours on remuneration which statement has also been corroborated by the other witnesses examined on behalf of the claimant, no challenge to the quantum of compensation was rightly raised by learned Counsel for the appellant. Mr. Hagroo, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 (the claimant), however, asserted that the claimant, respondent No. 2, had filed cross-objections within time and that the compensation deserved to be enhanced. A perusal of the interim order of 27-1-1982, shows that the appellant had taken note of the cross-objections but bad filed no objections.
13. I have carefully considered the totality of the circumstances of this case and have perused the record with regard to these issues. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal while awarding Rs. 10,000/- as compensation directed interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the award to the date of actual payment. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum to me appears to be too low keeping in view the prevailing bank rates and the forever diminishing value of the rupee. The interest should also have been allowed from the date the claim petition was filed and not from the date of the award. I, therefore, while confirming the amount of compensation at Rs. 10,000/- direct that the same shall be paid with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date when the claim petition was initially filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, i.e., 6th December, 1976 till the entire payment is made by the appellant, J&K Road Transport Corporation. The operation of the award had been stayed vide order of learned single Judge of this Court on November 14, 1980 in C.M.P. No. 236 of 1980 and that stay order shall now stand vacated forthwith.
14. As a result of the above discussion the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The cross-objections are allowed to the extent indicated above.
15. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs in so far as this appeal is concerned.