High Court Karnataka High Court

S.A. Ramappa vs State Of Karnataka And Ors. on 1 February, 2002

Karnataka High Court
S.A. Ramappa vs State Of Karnataka And Ors. on 1 February, 2002
Equivalent citations: ILR 2002 KAR 1489, 2002 (2) KarLJ 463
Author: N Patil
Bench: N Patil


JUDGMENT

N.K. Patil, J.

1. This matter is taken up for hearing with the consent of learned Counsels appearing on both sides.

2. The petitioner has assailed the legality and validity of the impugned order passed by the second respondent. He has sought for writ of certiorari quashing the grant certificate granted vide order dated 3-7-1978 in case No. LND.SR. 1439/66-67 granted by the second respondent. He has also sought for quashing the endorsement dated 12-7-2001 in case No. LND:RUC:14:2001-02 issued by the second respondent -Tahsildar. Further the petitioner has sought for a direction directing the second respondent to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of land bearing Survey No. 24 of Dasagondanahalli, measuring 1 acre 34 guntas along with the case of the legal representatives of respondent 3, and to dispose of the same afresh after due enquiry.

3. The petitioner filed an application for grant of lands measuring 1 acre 34 guntas of land situated at Dasagondanahalli, Doddaballapur Taluk, which was granted in favour of third respondent on the ground that he has got adjacent land measuring 4 acres and he is in enjoyment of the same. The validity of this grant was questioned by the petitioner before the Assistant Commissioner in appeal. The Assistant Commissioner set aside the grant stating that the report of the Revenue Inspector and the spot mahazar establish that the petitioner has been in possession and cultivation of the land in question. The Assistant Commissioner directed the second respondent to consider the application of both the parties and to pass orders afresh. Against the order of the Assistant Commissioner, the third respondent filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 23-1-1987, set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner holding that there was no possibility of regularisation of the unauthorised cultivation.

4. Aggrieved by the said order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, the petitioner filed a Revision Petition No. 32 of 1987 before the Kar-nataka Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 21-1-1991 dismissed the said revision and confirmed the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner.

5. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 5580 of 1991 before this Court. This writ petition came to be dismissed by the order of this Court dated 7-11-1997. Against the order of this Court, the petitioner preferred W.A. No. 6427 of 1997. This Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge as also the revenue authorities and directed the second respondent to consider the application of the petitioner in accordance with law.

6. Feeling aggrieved by the order of this Court in W.A. No. 6427 of 1997, the third respondent preferred Special Leave Petition No. 5215 of 2000 before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by its order dated 20-9-2000 allowed the civil appeal and set aside the order passed by this Court.

7. When things stood thus, by virtue of the amendment of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (amended as Karnataka Land Revenue (Amendment) Act, 1997), the petitioner filed an application before the second respondent for regularisation of unauthorised cultivation of the land in question. In pursuance of the said application filed by the petitioner, the second respondent issued Annexure-H endorsement stating that the Regularisation Committee has rejected the application of the petitioner. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the above petition.

8. The principal contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that as the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 was amended by virtue of Karnataka Land Revenue (Amendment) Act, 1997, subsequent to the disposal of the writ appeal by this Court, providing for filing of applications by the persons who were in unauthorised occupation for regularisation, he filed an application for regularisation of his unauthorised cultivation. It is contended by the petitioner that the second respondent ought not to have rejected the said application. It is stated that the second respondent instead of considering the application on merits, have issued impugned endorsement stating that the application of the petitioner has been rejected.

9. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the third respondent contended that at the threshold, the writ petition filed by the petitioner has to be rejected as the petitioner has suppressed the material facts. It is contended that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain a frivolous writ petition before this Court on the ground that the petitioner has no right to file application for regularisation in pursuance to the amendment of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act as the land was already granted in favour of the third respondent. Further it is contended that there is no land available as such, in view of the grant made in favour of the third respondent as early as in the year 1978. The same has been confirmed by the Apex Court as well. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is, when once the land is granted in favour of the third respondent and the land is not available for grant, the question of filing an application by the petitioner for regularisation of unauthorised cultivation does not arise at all. He therefore contended that the second respondent was justified in issuing the Annexure-H endorsement.

10. The learned Senior Counsel also contended that the endorsement issued by the second respondent is appealable before the Competent Authorities. It is stated that the petitioner without exhausting the alternate remedy available to him. has approached this Court for the relief. The contention is that the petitioner has been filing applications after applications and has also filed several writ petitions after writ petitions and suits.

11. The learned Counsel for the third respondent contended that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is abuse of process of Court and the prayer made in the writ petition has to be rejected at the threshold in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajappa Ha-namantha Ranoji v Mahadev Channabasappa and Others, of the said judgment the Supreme Court has stated thus:

“It is distressing to note that many unscrupulous litigants in order to circumvent orders of Courts adopt dubious ways and take recourse to ingenious methods including filing of fraudulent litigation to defeat the orders of Courts. Such tendency deserves to be taken serious note of and curbed by passing appropriate orders and issuing necessary directions including imposing of exemplary costs. As noticed, despite eviction order having become final nearly a quarter century ago, respondent ! still could not enjoy the benefit of the said order and get possession because of the filing of the present suit by the brother of the person who had suffered the eviction order. Under these circumstances, we quantify the costs payable by the appellant to respondent 1 at Ks. 25,000/-“.

12. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Vijaya Bank Employees Housing Co-operative Society Limited i Muneerappa, . Hence, the third respondent has sought for dismissal of the writ petition with exemplary cost.

13. It is to be noted that in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court, the grant made in favour of the third respondent in the year 1978 has been confirmed. The only question for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to file application lor regularisation of unauthorised cultivation before the second respondent.

14. As far as prayer l(a) is concerned, the .same is not maintainable in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 52L5 of 2000 filed by the third respondent. The Supreme Court has confirmed the grant of land made in favour of the third respondent. It would be relevant to extract the following portion of the order passed by the Supreme Court in the case mentioned supra. The relevant portion reads thus:

“Though the Division Bench was of the view that the appellant could not be said to be poor or a landless person, we are of the opinion that this consideration is irrelevant for the present purpose as we have to ascertain whether the appellant is eligible for grant of land under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4. The Revenue Authority on facts held that the appellant has got land adjacent to the disputed land and in fact it was found that the appellant was cultivating disputed land for about 10 years prior to date of grant of land. The appellant also paid market price as fixed by the Revenue Authority for the disputed land. No dispute has been raised regarding eligibility of the appellant under clauses (i) to (iii) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4. In view of the observations of the Division Bench of the High Court that the appellant could not be said to be poor or landless person, we have to consider whether appellant is a sufficient holder of land or not for being eligible under clause (iv) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4. As per the record and as noticed by the Division Bench of High Court, appellant holds 4 acres of land, therefore, he would not come under definition of “sufficient holder” vide clause (15) of Rule 2 as his holding is less than four hectares. Therefore, the appellant has fulfilled all the conditions of Sub-rule (2) including the eligibility criterion No. (iv) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4. According to the revenue authorities the land of the appellant is adjacent to the disputed land and he would require the disputed land for better cultivation. Therefore, we hold that grant of land to the appellant was in accordance with Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 and the land was rightly granted to the appellant”.

As such, in view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, the prayer l(a) made by the petitioner does not survive for consideration. The same is rejected.

15. Insofar as prayer l(b) is concerned, the petitioner has alternate and efficacious remedy before the Competent Authority. Without exhausting the same, he has approached this Court by filing the writ petition. Hence the said prayer is not maintainable under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

16. In view of the order passed by the Apex Court confirming the grant made in favour of the third respondent, the same has become final. When the verdict of the Supreme Court has become final, there is no land available for grant and the petitioner ought not to have filed an application for regularisation. When this being the position, the application filed by the petitioner for regularisation is not maintainable. Therefore. I do not find any error of law or irregularity in the endorsement issued by the second respondent dated 12-7-2001. Hence the second prayer is liable to be rejected.

17. Yet there is another reason, writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be rejected. I have taken the judicial notice of the fact that, instances are rampant, where final orders and decrees of the Courts are not respected and are sought to be frustrated, obstructed or nullified through the restarting of another frivolous litigation. The only reason why this Court is required to take a relatively lenient view in the present instance is because the petitioner being a poor agriculturist and a rustic villager, on the basis of the legal advice obtained by him has filed applications, writ petitions and suit. In my view, the said reason assigned by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is weak and totally untenable because it is tantamount to questioning the validity of the final order passed by the High Court which itself is an act of contempt. No private person or member of the Bar has the authority to contend or conclude that the final order passed by the Supreme Court is not a valid order or that it can be disobeyed. Let it also be very clearly understood by members of the Bar that some wrong notions prevail that lawyers are immune from contempt action, which is a total misnomer. Reading between the lines, I have no hesitation in holding that, in this, as in numerous instances where muscle power resorted to and parties take the law into their own hands, that it is on the basis of legal advice. Had the lawyers been responsible for the contempt in this case, as parties before me, I do not have any hesitation in sentencing them and I take it that this case will serve as a stern warning to all those who have no respect for the Courts and the rule of law.

18. Regardless of this position, and regardless of the fact that the learned Counsel for the respondent strongly opposed and persuaded to dismiss the writ petition imposing exemplary cost and initiate contempt proceedings against the petitioner. In my view, having regard to the age and status of the parties and several other aspects of the litigation, it is advisable to proceed further with the present proceedings, particularly since sufficient amends have been made. I make it clear that I am acting with a degree of reluctance because my magnanimity and benevolence is not to be misunderstood. I am aware of the impression that wrongly prevails in many quarters that howsoever grave the mistake committed by the party, the guilty party will always get away with an apology. The legal position is otherwise and the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that explanations/apologies should not be accepted in gross cases. I need to make it very explicit that since the filing of dishonest, vexatious and frivolous litigation is rather rampant, that this Court will take a very rigorous view in appropriate cases of this type even if necessary by making an example of a few of the culprits, as a deterrent. In my considered view, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be rejected.

19. In view of rejection of prayers l(a) and 1(b), prayer l(c) does not survive for consideration. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to seek any relief before this Court. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.