JUDGMENT
Hari Nath Tilhari, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. K. Prabhakar as well as Mr. T. Seshagiri Rao, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and Mr. H.G. Ramesh, learned counsel for respondent No. 2.
2. This appeal had been filed, delayed by 2145 days, along with the application for condonation of delay. The occurrence in this case had taken place on 5.10.1989. Considering this period which has passed away since the date of occurrence, at the request of the learned counsel for the parties, I thought it better not only to consider the matter relating to I.A.I., i.e., application for condonation of delay, but to hear the learned counsel for the parties on the merits of appeal as well and to dispose of the appeal, if I condone the delay.
3. As regards the appeal which is barred by 2145 days, it would be just and proper to mention here that the Tribunal passed the award dismissing the claim petition on 30.11.1991. According to the appellant-applicant, as advised by her counsel in the court below the claimant who is a village rustic woman got the review filed on 7.12.91. The review application was disposed of and allowed by the Tribunal by order dated 2.5.1992. Feeling aggrieved from the order of the Tribunal allowing the review application under Order 47, the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. filed M.F.A. No. 2489 of 1992. That appeal came to be disposed of finally on 4.2.1998 by this court (Hon’ble B. Padmaraj, J.) with the finding that review was misconceived and the proper course for the present appellant, i.e., the claimant was to file an appeal challenging the order rejecting the claim petition vide its order dated 4.2.1998. Six weeks’ time was also granted by this court to the appellant to file the appeal in this court from the award dated 30.11.1991 with expectation that delay in filing the appeal in the circumstances may be condoned, if appeal is filed within six weeks. The present appeal has been filed on 17.3.98. The delay has been tried to be explained on the ground and on the basis that the appellant had been pursuing remedy bona fide as advised by the counsel and the review was filed. But this court finally held that review was not maintainable. As such, delay could be condoned.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that delay may not be condoned as the claimant had been pursuing the process not in accordance with law by filing review without any bona fides. It was further contended even if delay in filing is condoned, there is no explanation explaining the delay in filing the petition.
5. I have also gone through the judgment of the court below where the claim petition had been dismissed on the ground of limitation. After having gone through the matter, I wish to dispose of both by one and common judgment. As regards present appeal and delay therein is concerned, delay can be taken to be bona fide because in the present case delay has been caused because of the bona fide mistake of the counsel. A bona fide mistake can be committed by the learned counsel and the error of counsel can furnish a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. When I so observe that it is bona fide mistake of the counsel, I may give reason. In some cases earlier, without considering Section 110-F of the Act of 1939 analogous to which is Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 as well as Sub-section (2) of Section 110-D of old Act, 1939 which is analogous to Section 173 of Act of 1988 and without taking into consideration the provisions of Section 169 itself which reveals prima facie that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is not a civil court and Section 169(2) per se provides that only for the limited purpose of Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code and Chapter XXVI, Criminal Procedure Code only, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be civil court, but view had been expressed and entertained that Claims Tribunal is a civil court. The mistaken view prevailed for good long period and taking that into view, the learned counsel appears to have advised that, as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a civil court, under provisions of Civil Procedure Code including in particular those of review, the review petition could be filed and the claimant might having been advised to file a review, filed the review application. But, no doubt, this court has changed its view later on and found that Tribunal is only a Tribunal and not a civil court. When there was such a difference of opinion and position not being very clear, if the learned counsel advised the claimant to file a review petition, and the poor claimant acted under misapprehension, which misapprehension or doubt was made clear and became clear and this court in appeal held that review petition was not maintainable. But, now the position is and has become very clear that review is not maintainable. When this was the position, no mala fide can be fastened on the learned counsel who and when advised the present applicant to file the review petition. Acting on the advice of the learned counsel, the claimant-appellant pursued those proceedings. She was successful in getting the review petition allowed. Finally, this court held review was not maintainable. Now, therefore, till the date of decision of the appeal, the claimant was bona fide pursuing the remedy and was entitled to benefit under the principle and spirit of law under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. This court had granted six weeks time. Appeal had been filed on 17.3.1998 well within time. So, in this case, delay has been sufficiently explained. The delay in filing the appeal, as such, has to be condoned on the ground that the present appellant had been acting bona fide on the mistaken advice of the learned counsel. There is a good catena of cases in which bona fide mistake of the counsel and actions of party based on mistaken advice of counsel has been taken to be a sufficient cause even if it is based on sheer negligence, but that furnishes sufficient good cause for condoning the delay. So, delay in filing the appeal is condoned.
6. It will serve no purpose if appeal is kept pending. So, as mentioned earlier, I heard the learned counsel for the parties on merits. I have also been taken through the order passed by the Tribunal. It has to be taken note of that concept and motto of justice has always dominated over the entire scheme of our Constitution and our legal system. An obligation has been fastened on the State which may include all the institutions of the State including judiciary to see that no person is denied the course of remedy and relief on account of disability like social, economic and Ors.. Article 39-A may be reproduced here, which reads as under:
Article 39-A. The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.
(Emphasis added)
This Article 39-A fastens a liability and duty on the instrumentalities of the State which may include even the judiciary as well that it has to see that the operation of legal system is such that it promotes justice. It has further been provided that it shall not deny a person of an opportunity of getting justice because of disability, economic or other disability like illiteracy, or economic or social disability, mental disability or the like. Looking to the preamble of the Constitution which assures every citizen justice, socio- economic and Ors., and the provisions of Article 39-A, the interpretation of law has to be given keeping in view these very objects as well. Under the Constitution an obligation has been imposed on the State including the judiciary that justice between the parties may be done. It means where the court has to examine whether or not there are definite circumstances justifying the cause for delay, and if there is sufficient explanation showing sufficient cause for delay, the courts are expected to adopt justice oriented approach, but keeping in view that principle of statute law, the Constitutional law, its spirit and with further vigilant to that nobody should be allowed to take undue advantage of the liberal approach and we have to decide the case keeping in view the facts of each case.
7. In the present case, the occurrence had taken place, as mentioned in the judgment, on 5.10.1989. The deceased was dealing in areca-nut. Illiteracy prevailed no doubt. The explanation which she has given for the delay was to the effect, as per her statement, that after the death of her husband, she was mentally shocked. Due to mental shock and ill health, she lost her remembrance to certain extent. One should not forget the Indian conditions and the ladies in India being too much affectionate and attached towards their husbands and at times treating their husbands as gods. When husband dies, definitely it would be a shock to wife which at times affects adversely on their mental health, particularly ladies in Indian villages do suffer from this psychology. There is an old proverb which is being used that Judge must behave like a Hindu widow with full devotion towards the object of love and object and duty should be dear to him as the husband was dear to her. Keeping this psychology of Indian women in view, it could be that the lady applicant might have been mentally shocked and disturbed. Apart from that she is an illiterate village woman having no knowledge of law that even if she has lost her husband, she may get some compensation in the form of money. But vexes of life and consultation with the people could have disclosed that she can claim compensation, then she must have consulted her lawyer and thereafter she must have filed the claim petition, then she might have tried to arrange for money. Irrespective of the fact that she has not filed any medical certificate, I think her statement should be relied. I put a question to myself, whether and why and for and with what mala fide intention the claimant would have preferred the claim or appeal and find none. Even when I placed this question before counsel for respondent and he failed to show any such intent on the part of present appellant. She could not have gained any benefit by filing delayed claim or delayed appeal. There being no mala fide intent shown on the part of the claimant-appellant. In my opinion, the fact deposed by her before the Tribunal as well as before this court in above circumstances have to be held to show sufficient cause for delay in her part in filing the claim petition. When I so opine and approach question, I find support from the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Krishna Bai v. B.S. Desai 1981 ACJ 263 (Karnataka), where the Bench observed:
Thus, when the object of the said provisions, namely, the provisions of Sections 110 to 110-F, is to enable the victims of motor accidents or their dependants to obtain compensation, the words ‘sufficient cause’ found in the proviso must receive necessarily liberal construction in the hands of the Claims Tribunal as would ensure to the victims of the motor accidents or their dependants, the benefits of the legislation.
There is another aspect of the matter which requires our consideration. The period of limitation for instituting an action before a civil court claiming compensation arising out of a motor accident prior to the coming into force of Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A along with associate provisions, was two years, cannot be overlooked. Besides, the words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the person making the application for excusing the delay, is well settled (vide Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K and Sandhya Ravi Sarkar v. Sudha Rani ).
8. Considering all these aspects of the matter, in my opinion, in this case it should be taken that delay has been sufficiently explained in filing the claim petition. As such, appeal has to be allowed. It is hereby held that delay, if any, in filing the claim petition has been on account of sufficiently explained cause. Exercising powers as an appellate court or authority from the Claims Tribunal as the jurisdiction of appellate court is same as that of the original authority, this court thinks it just and proper to set aside the findings on issue No. 2 as recorded by the Tribunal and it appears just that delay in filing the claim petition be and is condoned and order rejecting the claim petition is hereby set aside. Claim petition is restored to its original number and is held and is to be deemed to be in time.
The Tribunal is directed to decide the matter expeditiously. The respondents are directed to appear on 22.3.1999 and any of them if has not filed written statement, i.e., objection to claim statement may file the same on or before 2.4.1999. Thereafter, the Tribunal may, if there be any further point in dispute, frame the additional issue, if it arises, within a period of 15 days from the date of filing of written statement. The Tribunal, looking to the circumstances, is desired and expected to decide the case at the earliest within a period of not more than six months from the date of framing of additional issues, if necessary, by it. Let a copy of the operative portion of the order be made ready and made available to the learned counsel.
The appeal is allowed with the above directions to the Tribunal. Costs made easy.