BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED : 02/11/2007 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU Criminal Original Petition No.8157 of 2001 and Crl.M.P.No.10601 of 1999 S.Irudhayam .. Petitioner Vs. The State Represented by The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-corruption, Madurai Detachment, No.24, Kamala Iind Street, Chinnachokikulam, Madurai - 625 002. .. Respondent Prayer This petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to call for the entire records comprised in S.C.No.1 of 1996 pending on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai and to quash the same. !For Petitioner ... Mr.Rupert J.Barnabas ^For Respondent ... Mr.Siva Ayyappan Government Advocate (Crl.side) :ORDER
The petitioner is the sole accused in S.C.No.1 of 1996, on the file of the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. The charges against him are under
Sections 120B r/w 409 & 420 I.P.C., and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(a) & (d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He has filed the present criminal original
petition seeking to quash the said proceedings.
2.Admittedly, the petitioner was working as a Superintending Engineer,
Public Works Department, Madurai Circle and he was holding the Additional charge
of Special Buildings Circle, Madurai between the year 1992 and 26.09.1995. There
is no dispute that he is a public servant.
3.It is stated in the final report that the Government of Tamil Nadu
issued G.O.Ms.No.1492, Health Department dated 22.11.1991 and issued orders for
providing steam Laundries in 16 District Head Quarters Hospitals in Tamil Nadu
at a total estimated capital cost of Rs.8 crores at the rate of 15 lakhs per
hospital. In G.O.Ms.No.381, Health Department 31.03.1992, the Government of
Tamil Nadu accorded administrative sanction for taking up the above work. In
G.O.Ms.No.18, Health and Family Welfare Department dated 06.01.1993, the
Government approved the plan and estimate to be followed for provision of the
steam laundries in Head Quarters Hospitals. Based on the above orders of the
Government, technical sanction for the estimate, each to a cost of Rs.55 lakhs
for the construction of steam laundries in 15 places were accorded by the Chief
Engineer (Buildings), Public Works Department for the year 1992-1993, with
provisions for civil, mechanical and electrical items.
4.The petitioner who was in additional charge of Special Buildings Circle,
Madurai ordered for the work for steam laundry which was a single item of work
was split into 4 items, without recording proper reasons, by restricting each
item to less than Rs.40 lakhs though such splitting up was against the
Government instructions. The petitioner then called for quotations specifying to
provide for 600 kg per hour steam boiler, as against 1000 kg, per hour steam
boiler, provided in the technically sanctioned estimates. The petitioner without
giving wide publicity, called for quotations from selected societies of his
choice. Those four co-operative societies had responded by submitting separate
quotations and after comparing the rates, the petitioner entrusted the work for
the above four societies.
5.The quotation furnished by the above four societies are collusive in
nature and the said societies gave boosted rates and had obtained supply orders
from the petitioner. The petitioner ordered for 90% of advance payment to them
and accordingly, the same was paid. The petitioner had indulged in corrupt
activities in the matter of placing orders for the above four societies thereby
causing huge loss to the Government. The petitioner has committed offence
enumerated above. The trial Court has already framed charges. As a matter of
fact, one witness has already been examined as P.W.1 on the side of the
prosecution. The petitioner has come forward with this petition seeking to quash
the said proceedings.
6.The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following
grounds:-
(i)The complainant himself has investigated the case and he has filed the
final report which is illegal.
(ii)The investigation has been conducted not by any officer authorised
under Section 17 of the Act.
(iii)Registration of the case in a hasty manner without a preliminary
enquiry is irregular and the same vitiates the entire case.
(iv)There was inordinate unexplained delay in placing the report before
the sanctioning authority for securing sanction and the sanctioning authority in
turn had caused unnecessary delay in giving sanction and the said delay vitiates
the sanction order.
(iv)The sanction order suffers from material defects, and it is void for
want of application of mind.
(v)A legal opinion given by one Mr.S.Venkatraman, the then Deputy Legal
Advisor, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madurai, was not placed before the
sanctioning authority and such withholding of vital document vitiates the
sanction order.
(vi)Even the entire allegations found in the papers are admitted, no
offence as alleged against the petitioner has been made out warranting trial.
7.While concluding his argument, the learned counsel submitted that though
the present petition before this Court was pending, the respondent has proceed
with the trial of the case by examining P.W.1 which would amount to interference
with the proceedings of this Court amounting to clear contempt warranting
initiation of action against the Investigating Officer and the Public Prosecutor
for punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act.
8.The learned counsel in support of his arguments, would rely on several
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court which, I would
refer to at the appropriate places of this order.
9.Mr.Siva Ayyappan, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) appearing for
the respondent would submit the following points:-
(i)The grounds raised in this petition are all to be considered only by
the trial Court during trial on evidence and this Court in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot look into these grounds
at this stage.
(ii)There is no legal bar for the complainant to investigate the case and
question of prejudice due to such investigation is to be considered only at the
time of trial.
(iii)The sanction order is valid and the same does not suffer from any
infirmity. He would further submit that under Section 19 of the Act, defects in
the sanction order cannot be a ground even for acquittal and therefore, the same
cannot be a ground for quashing the proceedings.
(iv)The delay in obtaining the sanction order and in filing the charge
sheet are all explainable and on the ground of mere delay, the criminal
proceedings cannot be quashed.
(v)In respect of the contention that no offence as alleged against the
petitioner is made out from the records also cannot be accepted at this stage
since from the materials now available for this Court to go through, there are
materials to come to the cocnlsuion that there is a prima facie case against the
petitioner warranting trial. Therefore, the said contention is also to be
rejected.
(vi)Regarding the request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner,
to initiate proceedings for contempt, the learned Government Advocate would
submit that mere pendency of the proceedings before this Court cannot be
construed to be a bar for the prosecution to proceed with the trial in the
criminal case. Examination of P.W.1 in the case would not amount to any
illegality or irregularity and therefore, the said request made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner for initiation of contempt proceedings is unwarranted
and untenable.
10.The learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) would also rely on number
of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and about which, I will make reference
at the appropriate stage of this order.
11.Now let me consider the rival contentions made by the learned counsel
for both parties.
12.Before adverting to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for
both parties, let me first analyse the scope of the power of this Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the criminal case which is pending trial.
13.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has been repeatedly holding that the power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is an exceptional power and while exercising the said
power, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or as a Court of
Revision. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
14.Following the judgments in R.P.Kapoor v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 866)
and in State of Haryana v. Bhajaj Lal (AIR 1992 SC 604) (Supp (1) SCC 335), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal (AIR 2004 SC 4087) in
paragraph No.10 has held as follows:-
“10.Exercise of power under S.482 of the Code in a case of this nature is
the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on
the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed
before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which
the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an
order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii)
to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to
lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for
all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of
functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds
expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers
of the of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the
absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such
powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice. While exercising powers under the section, the Court
does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under
the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real
and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist.
Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is
made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to
prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In
exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it
finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court
or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When
no offence is disclosed by the complainant, the Court may examine the question
of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.”
15.Keeping in mind the above position of law as declared by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, let me now consider the points raised by the petitioner.
16.The first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that in this case, the F.I.R., was registered by one Mr.R.Venugopal, the then
Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madurai and he himself has
done the investigation in this case. The learned counsel would submit that the
said course adopted by him is irregular and on that ground, the case should be
quashed. The learned counsel relies on two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1976 SC 985) and in Megha
Singh v. State of Haryana (1997 SCC (Cri) 267).
17.In Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (cited supra), bribe was
offered to a Head Constable who later on registered the case and investigated.
In the light of the said facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the
investigation done by the said Head Constable is an infirmity which was bound to
reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case. Whether the prosecution case
is credible or not is a matter of appreciation of evidence which should be
decided only during trial on evidence. Now, to allow the prosecution to go ahead
with the trial, what is required of is only prima facie case. Even in that case,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not held that it vitiates the entire proceedings.
18.It is needless to say that the object of investigation is to find out
the truth and to place all the materials before the Court of law. In the
reported case, since the complaint itself was made by the Head Constable
alleging that the accused in that case offered bribe to him, to test the
veracity of the said allegation made by the Head Constable, according to the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, the investigation should have been done by some other
independent officer. But in the case on hand, the Investigating Officer
collected information from other sources and he registered the case on the basis
of the same. Though technically, he is the complainant, he cannot be equated to
the Head Constable mentioned in the reported case, whose position as I have
referred above is totally different. Therefore, the view expressed in the said
judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
19.The other judgment in Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (cited supra),
also is not applicable to the facts of the present case since, in that case
also, the police officer who lodged the complaint and investigated the case
himself happened to be an eye witness and also a victim of the terrorists
activities of the accused.
20.In State v. V.Jayapaul (2004 (5) SCC 223), while dealing with a case
under the Act, the the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.4 has held as
follows:-
“There is nothing in the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code which
precluded the appellant from taking up the investigation. The fact that the said
police officer prepared the FIR on the basis of the information received by him
and registered the suspected crime does not disqualify him from taking up the
investigation of the cognisable offence. A suo motu move on the part of the
police officer to investigate a cognizable offence impelled by the information
received from some sources is not outside the purview of the provisions
contained in Sections 154 to 157 of the Code or any other provisions of the
Code.”
21.In the instant case also, the police officer namely, Mr.Venugopal,
received certain informations and formally prepared F.I.R., and then started the
investigation. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is no illegality on
the part of Mr.Venugopal, and he did not stand disqualified to investigate and
also to submit the final report to the Court. In view of the settled position of
law, the first ground raised by the petitioner is not tenable and the same is
rejected.
22.The next ground raised by the petitioner is that, the investigation was
not done by the officer duly authorised under Section 17 of the Act. But, the
learned Government Advocate (Crl side) would submit that under Section 17 of the
Act, the Government has issued an Order in G.O.Ms.No.269/1990 dated 04.06.1990
authorising all the Inspectors of Police of the Directorate Vigilance and Anti-
Corruption to exercise the power of investigation including the power of arrest.
The said G.O., came to be considered by this Court in Sebastin, R. v. State
(2002 (4) CTC 200). In the said judgment, the power of the Inspector of Police
attached to Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption to investigate the case
has been upheld in view of G.O.Ms.No.269/1990. So, the said contention is also
rejected.
23.The learned counsel submitted that F.I.R., in this case had been
registered in hasty without any preliminary enquiry and so the prosecution is
irregular and thus vitiated. The learned counsel would rely on the judgment in
P.Srirajuddin v. State of Madras (AIR 1971 SC 520) wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that, normally before lodging F.I.R., against any public servant
under the Act, there has to be a preliminary enquiry held by the authorities.
However, in the case on hand, a perusal of the records would show that
preliminary enquiry was in fact held before lodging the F.I.R., which revealed
commission of offence by the accused and the subsequent investigation also
confirmed the same. On the said report, the trial Court has found prima facie
case against the petitioner to take cognizance. When that be so, the contentions
of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, for want of preliminary enquiry,
the criminal proceedings are to be quashed cannot be accepted.
24.The next ground is in respect of the sanction order. According to the
petitioner, the sanction order was issued by causing inordinate and unexplained
delay. The Investigation Report was issued on 09.09.1998 and the same was placed
before the sanctioning authority only on 25.09.1998. However, the sanction order
was issued belatedly on 25.03.1999 with a delay of about 6 months. The learned
counsel would rely on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramanand
Chaudhary v. State of Bihar (AIR 1994 SC 948) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held that the delay in taking action for 13 years was an infirmity. The
other judgment relied on by the learned counsel is in P.Ramachandra Rao v. State
of Karnataka (2002 SCC (Cri)830), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that inordinate delay is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
But in our case, as stated above, there is no such enormous delay so as to hold
that the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India have been violated.
25.Yet another judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is in V.Venugopal & others v. State, by Inspector of Police, Vellore
(1991 L.W. (Cri) 516). That is also a case where the delay was inordinate.
26.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Seetha Hemachandra Shashittal v. State of
Maharashtra (2001 (4) SCC 525) has held as follows:-
“The delay of two years taken for obtaining sanction from the Government
cannot be attributed to the investigating officers. Though the said time of two
years for the Government to decide the question of giving sanction cannot be
approved, but considering the number of desks over which the matter had to pass
and the voluminous records to be studied at all levels, the said interval cannot
be said to be so unreasonably long as to affect the fundamental right of the
appellants. The charge-sheet was laid within a few days of obtaining the
sanction. Therefore, the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed merely on the
ground of delay highlighted by the appellants.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In view of the said legal position, merely on the ground of delay as contended
by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the proceedings cannot be quashed.
27.The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that, a reading of the sanction order would show total non application of mind
on the part of the sanctioning authority. During argument, the learned counsel
has taken me through the entire sanction order and he has pointed out certain
defects. The question now is whether the criminal prosecution can be quashed on
the ground of certain defects in the sanction order reflecting non application
of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority.
28.The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1997 SC 3400) and in
Charles Waker Devadas v. State by the Inspector of Police, etc., (1993 L.W.
(cri) 346). In those two judgments on the ground of defects in the sanction
order, reflecting non application of mind on the part of the sanctioning
authority, the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court have held that the
sanction order is vitiated. But it is to be remembered that in those two cases,
the trial went on during which, the sanctioning authority was examined. From the
evidence of sanctioning authority, and by reading the sanction order, the Courts
have found that there was non application of mind on the part of the sanctioning
authority and on that ground acquitted the accused. But, in the instant case,
there is no such evidence let in so far. By merely reading the sanction order,
it cannot be now concluded that it is defective for want of application of mind.
29.In State v. T.Venkatesh Murthy (2004 (7) SCC 763) the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as follows:-
“Clause (b) of sub-section (3) shows that no court shall stay the
proceedings under the Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity
in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such
error, omission or irregularity has resulted a failure of justice.
Sub-section (4) postulates that in determining under sub-section (3)
whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction
has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice, the court shall have regard
to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any
earlier stage in the proceedings.”
30.Similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
C.S.Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka (2005 (4) SCC 81) wherein, it has been
held as follows:-
“The sanction order should speak for itself and in case the facts do not
so appear, it should be proved by leading evidence that all the particulars were
placed before the sanctioning authority for due application of mind. But, when
the sanction order itself is eloquent enough, then in that case only formal
evidence has to be produced by the sanctioning authority or by any other
evidence that the sanction was accorded by a competent person with due
application of mind in case the sanction speaks for itself then the satisfaction
of the sanctioning authority is apparent by reading the order. When the
sanction itself is very expressive, then in that case, the argument that
particular material was not properly placed before the sanctioning authority for
according sanction and the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind
becomes unsustainable.”
31.A close scrutiny of the above two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court would make it abundantly clear that normally, the sanction order should be
so exhaustive to reflect the application of mind on the part of the sanctioning
authority. If it is not so exhaustive, to indicate the application of mind, even
then the sanctioning authority, as a witness can speak about the materials
placed before him and about the satisfaction arrived at by him. Therefore,
simply by reading the sanctioning order, one cannot say that the sanctioning
authority had non application of mind while issuing sanction order. Thus, the
prosecution cannot be quashed at its threshold itself on the ground of defects
in the sanction order without affording opportunity to the sanctioning authority
to let in oral evidence.
32.The next point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is also
in respect of the sanction order. According to him, on completing investigation,
the papers were placed before one Mr.S.Venkataraman, the then Legal Advisor,
Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department. On perusing the records,
Mr.S.Venkataraman had opined that it is not a fit case for prosecution and had
further opined that the officers could be dealt with departmentally. A copy of
the said opinion has been duly furnished to the petitioner under Section 207
Cr.P.C. Relying on the said document, the learned counsel would submit that had
the said document been placed before the sanctioning authority, the sanctioning
authority would have taken a different view of the matter and would have
refrained from giving sanction. Therefore, according to the learned counsel,
withholding such a vital document vitiates the sanction order and therefore, the
prosecution case should be quashed.
33.The learned counsel would rely on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in R.Sarala v. T.S.Velu (2000 SCC (Cri) 823), in support of the said
contention. I have carefully gone through the said judgment. In my considered
opinion, at this stage, I cannot hold that the sanctioning authority would have
declined to grant sanction had the legal opinion been placed before him. Even
after looking into the said document, there is possibility that the sanctioning
authority would have granted sanction. Therefore, to test the satisfaction of
the sanctioning authority, in my considered opinion, the sanctioning authority
is to be examined before the Court as a witness so as to afford an opportunity
to explain to the Court as to how he got satisfied and on what materials he has
given sanction.
34.A close scrutiny of the materials available on record clearly shows
that there is a prima facie case against the petitioner warranting trial. The
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no case made
out warranting trial is not tenable and the same is, therefore, rejected.
35.Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that though the present original
petition has been pending, before this Court, the trial Court proceeded with the
trial and has examined the first witness as P.W.1 which according to him,
amounts to an interference with the proceedings of this Court and the same
amounts to clear contempt warranting initiation of action against the
Investigating Officer and the Public Prosecutor.
36.In my considered opinion, the said request is forfetched. Section 19 of
the Act, makes it very clear that the stay of the proceedings can be granted
only in very exceptional cases and in general, there shall not be any stay of
proceedings. When that be so, in my considered opinion, proceeding with the
trial of the case by the trial Court would not amount to any interference to the
proceedings of this Court.
37.In State of M.P v. Ram Singh (2000 (5) SCC 88) while dealing with a
case under Section 13(1)(e) and 13 (2) of the Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
issued guidelines as to how the provisions of the Act, are to be dealt with and
as to how the cases are to be decided. In paragraph Nos.10 and 11 of the
judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
“The Act was intended to make effective provisions for the prevention of
bribery and corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a social
legislation intended to curb illegal activities of the public servants and is
designed to be liberally construed so as to advance its object. Procedural
delays and technicalities of law should not be permitted to defeat the object
sought to be achieved by the Act. The overall public interest and the social
object is required to be kept in mind while interpreting various provisions of
the Act and deciding cases under it.”
38.In the case on hand, as narrated above, the grounds raised are either
on procedural delay or on technicalities of law. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, such procedural delay and technicalities of law should not be permitted
to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the said Act. In paragraph No.15
of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made the following
observations:-
“The High Court was not right in holding that merely because the order of
the Superintendent of Police was in typed proforma that showed the non-
application of mind or could be held to have been passed in a mechanical and
casual manner. The order rather clearly indicates the name of the accused, the
number of the F.I.R., the nature of the offence and power of the Superintendent
of Police permitting him to authorise a junior officer to investigate. The time
between the registration of the F.I.R., and authorisation in terms of the second
proviso to Section 17 shows further the application of mind and the
circumstances which weighed with the Superintendent of Police to pass the
order.”
39.In the instant case also, the sanction order contains all these details
and therefore, it cannot be held at the preliminary stage itself that the
sanction order was issued in a mechanical and casual manner reflecting the total
non application of mind. In paragraph No.8 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as follows:-
“Corruption in a civilised society is a disease like cancer, which if not
detected in time, is sure to maliganise (sic) the polity of the country leading
to disastrous consequences. It is
termed as a plague which is not only contagious but if not controlled spreads
like a fire in a jungle. Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS, being
incurable. It has also been termed as royal thievery. The socio-political system
exposed to such a dreaded communicable disease is likely to crumble under its
own weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social order, being not only
anti-people, but aimed and targeted against them. It affects the economy and
destroys the cultural heritage. Unless nipped in the bud at the earliest, it is
likely to cause turbulence – shaking of the socio-economic-political system in
an otherwise healthy, wealthy, effective and vibrating society.”
40.Keeping all the above guiding principles and the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, having considered all the points raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner, I am of the clear view that this is not a fit case
to quash the proceedings. However, the petitioner is at liberty to raise all the
points raised in this petition before the trial Court at the appropriate stage
of the trial of the case.
41.In the result, the criminal original petition is dismissed. It is made
clear that the trial Court should not get influenced by any of the observations
made in this order while deciding the case on trial. The trial Court shall
dispose of the case strictly in accordance with law as expeditiously as
possible.
jbm
To
1.The Inspector of Police,
Vigilance and Anti-corruption,
Madurai Detachment,
No.24, Kamala Iind Street,
Chinnachokikulam,
Madurai – 625 002.
2.The I Additional District Judge cum
Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Madurai.
3.The Additional Public Prosecutor,
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court,
Madurai.