High Court Kerala High Court

M.S.M.Kasim vs A.Sadique on 1 July, 2010

Kerala High Court
M.S.M.Kasim vs A.Sadique on 1 July, 2010
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

RCRev..No. 316 of 2006()


1. M.S.M.KASIM,
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs



1. A.SADIQUE, T.C./38/841,
                       ...       Respondent

                For Petitioner  :SRI.G.S.REGHUNATH

                For Respondent  :SRI.P.A.AHAMMED

The Hon'ble MR. Justice PIUS C.KURIAKOSE
The Hon'ble MR. Justice C.K.ABDUL REHIM

 Dated :01/07/2010

 O R D E R
          PIUS C.KURIAKOSE & C.K.ABDUL REHIM, JJ.
                      ------------------------
                     R.C.R.No. 316 OF 2006
                      ------------------------

               Dated this the 1st day of July, 2010

                            O R D E R

Pius C.Kuriakose, J.

The landlord is the revision petitioner. He sought to evict

the respondent tenant on the ground of arrears of rent and

ground under Section 11(3). It is conceded by both sides that we

in this revision need not be concerned with the ground for

eviction under Section 11(2)(b).

2. The need projected by the landlord in the context of

the ground under Section 11(3) was that the building in question

is needed bonafide by him for accommodating his son Zahir, who,

according to him, was without any employment or avocation for

life. The tenant through his statement of objections disputed

the bonafides of the need. He also contended that the landlord at

the time of filing the Rent Control Petition was possessing other

buildings in the city, town or village and hence the need of the

landlord is not bonafide. The above contention was construed by

the Rent Control Court and also by the Rent Control Appellate

RCR.No.316/2006 -2-

Authority as a contention under which the tenant was taking

protection under the first proviso to Section 11(3). The tenant

further contended that he is entitled to the protection of second

proviso to Section 11(3) as according to him the income derived

from the business carried on by him in the building in question

was his main source of livelihood and since other buildings are

not available.

3. The evidence before the Rent Control Court consisted of

the oral evidence of PW1 the dependent son the defacto claimant

and that of the landlord PW2 as against which there was oral

evidence of tenant, who was examined as RW1. The

documentary evidence on the side of the landlord consisted of

Ext.A1 to A5 as against Ext.B1 on the side of the tenant. The

Rent Control Court on appreciating the evidence came to the

conclusion that the need projected by the landlord in the Rent

Control Petition is not bonafide. It was also concluded that the

tenant is entitled to the protection of the second proviso to

Section 11(3) (though not in so many words). This conclusion

was arrived at assuming that the burden to establish that the

tenant satisfies the two ingredients of second proviso is on the

RCR.No.316/2006 -3-

landlord. The Rent Control Court however, did not enter any

specific finding as to whether the RCP was liable to fail by virtue

of the first proviso to Section 11(3). in the light of the other

findings the RCP was dismissed. The Appellate Authority would

come to the conclusion that the tenant was unsuccessful in

proving that as alleged by him PW1 the defacto claimant was

having some other business of his own and also that “there is

nothing on record to disbelieve the bonafide of the need put

forward by the petitioner”. Thus, the Appellate Authority actually

concluded that the need projected by the landlord under Section

11(3) is a bonafide one. However, considering the operation of

the first proviso to Section 11(3) the learned Appellate Authority

would observe as follows:

“When there is admission to the effect that the

tenant at the shop rooms was evicted through

court, and when there is admission by PW1 to the

effect that there are 4 shop rooms therein and also

the evidence of CPW1 that shop building

No.TC38/842 and 843 are in the vacant possession

of the petitioner himself, materials are to be

scrutinized very carefully.”

RCR.No.316/2006 -4-

Learned Appellate Authority would thereafter refer to the

evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in cross-examination and conclude as

follows:

“Thus it can be seen that when the case is filed the

petitioner or under his command was having shop

rooms. It is true that in Section 11(3) first proviso

applicable if only the landlord has in the possession

of building in the same city, town or village.”

The Appellate Authority would leave the issue of first proviso

there and go on to consider the tenant’s entitlement to the

protection to second proviso observing immediately thereafter as

follows:

“But all the attending circumstances has to be kept

in mind while considering at least the second

proviso.”

The Appellate Authority would then consider the oral evidence of

the parties, particularly the oral evidence of CPW1 the tenant,

and concluded that there is nothing to disbelieve CPW1 in this

regard. On the basis of that conclusion the Appellate Authority

would specifically find that the tenant is entitled for the

protection of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Rent

RCR.No.316/2006 -5-

Control Act. Resultantly the Appellate Authority would dismiss

the RCA preferred by the landlord.

4. In this revision filed under Section 20 the landlord has

raised various grounds assailing the judgment of the Appellate

Authority. It is urged that the burden of proof in the context of

the second proviso to Section 11(3) has been wrongly cast by the

Appellate Authority on the landlord, that binding judicial

precedents governing that aspect of the matter has been ignored

by the Appellate Authority; it is urged that the observation by the

Appellate Authority that the landlord has admitted that he has in

his possession other vacant buildings at the time of

commencement of the litigation is wrong and it is also urged that

the finding of the Appellate Authority that the tenant is entitled to

the protection of the second proviso is clearly erroneous. On the

basis of these grounds it is prayed that the finding of the

Appellate Authority in the context of the second proviso be

reversed and an order of eviction be passed under Section 11(3).

5. Sri.G.S.Reghunath, learned counsel for the revision

petitioner would address strenuous and extensive arguments

before us. The learned counsel drew our attention to the

RCR.No.316/2006 -6-

judgment of the Full Bench in Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar

(2003 (2) KLT 230 (F.B) and submitted that it is trite by that

judgment and by various other judgments of this court and the

Supreme Court that the ingredients of the second proviso are in

the conjunctive and the burden to establish that a particular

tenant satisfies both the ingredients is on the tenant himself.

Inasmuch as the findings by the Appellate Authority that tenant

is entitled to the protection of the second proviso has been

rendered ignoring the law as settled by binding judicial

precedents including Full Bench Judgment in Francis v.

Sreedevi Varassiar (cited supra) the above finding is to be

vacated, according to the learned counsel. Learned counsel

would submit that the observation of the Appellate Authority that

there is admission by the landlord and his son that other vacant

buildings belonging to them were available with them at the time

of institution of RCP is contrary to the evidence on record.

According to him, in spite of that observation of the Appellate

Authority has not entered a specific finding in the context of the

first proviso to Section 11(3).

6. Per contra, Sri.Liju Stephen, learned counsel for the

RCR.No.316/2006 -7-

respondent/tenant would defend the impugned judgment very

strongly. According to him, even in cases where the Court finds

that the need projected by the landlord is bona fide, unless the

landlord is able to surmount the two provisos of sub section(3) of

Section 11, the RCP is liable to be dismissed. Reading over to us

certain portions in testimonies of PWs 1 and 2, wherein those

witnesses admitted that two or three buildings were got evicted

(point of time of getting eviction not stated), counsel submitted

that the observation of the learned Appellate Authority, to which

exception is taken by Sri.G.S.Raghunath, is very correct. The

learned counsel would defend the finding of the Appellate

Authority, that the tenant is entitled to the protection of the

second proviso to sub section (3) of Section 11, even more

forcefully. The counsel submitted that there was no cross

examination and much less effective cross examination on the

version of RW1 in chief examination that he and his family are

depending solely on the income they derived from the business

carried on by them in the petition schedule building and on the

further version that other suitable buildings are not available in

the locality. The learned counsel would place strong reliance on

RCR.No.316/2006 -8-

the judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Sadanandan v.

Kunheen (1991 (2) KLT 628) in support of the proposition that

when there is no effective cross examination, it can be taken that

what was deposed to by a witness has been proved. The learned

counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in Thomas v. Joseph

(1986 KLT 392,) and the judgments of the Supreme Court in

M.M.Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and others ( AIR 1981 SC

1113) and Sudama Prasad v. Ashok Kumar (2007 (15) Supreme

Court cases 554) for various propositions canvassed by him.

7. We have very anxiously considered the the rival

submissions addressed at the Bar. We have gone through the

impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority as

well as the order of the Rent Control Court which was confirmed

by the Appellate Authority. We have also taken due note of the

evidence particularly those items of evidence to which our

attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the parties. This

Court under Section 20 of Act 2 of 1965, which is a revisional

jurisdiction, is concerned essentially with the legality, regularity

and propriety of the findings entered and decision taken by the

Rent Control Appellate Authority which under the statutory

RCR.No.316/2006 -9-

scheme is the final fact finding Authority. As already stated, the

significant aspect of the decision of the Appellate Authority in

deviation from the decision of the Rent Control Court is that the

Appellate Authority has found on appreciating the evidence that

the need projected by the landlord which is for accommodating

his depending son who was examined as PW1 is a bona fide.

This finding is not challenged by the respondent by a separate

revision or even by filing a memorandum of cross objection. In

his submissions also the learned counsel for the respondent did

not make any serious endeavour to assail the above finding. His

endeavour rather was to support the decision of the Appellate

Authority rendered in the context of the first and second

provisos to sub section (3) of Section 11. We are therefore of

the view that our enquiry in this revision need only be confined

to the question whether the decision of the Appellate Authority

that the Rent Control Petition is liable to fail by virtue of the first

and second provisos of sub section (3) of Section 11 is illegal

irregular and improper.

8. We shall refer to the pleadings raised by the tenant.

The tenant has certainly raised specific pleadings claiming

RCR.No.316/2006 -10-

protection of the second proviso to sub section (3) of Section

11. But, as far as the first proviso to sub section (3) of Section

11 is concerned, what is pleaded is only that the landlord has

several other buildings in the landlord’s possession for

accomplishing the projected need. It is not pleaded that the

other buildings allegedly possessed by the landlord belong to the

landlord. If we are construe the pleadings strictly, it will have to

be held that no proper pleadings are raised by the tenant

claiming the protection of the first proviso to sub section (3) of

Section 11. However, it is seen from the order of the Rent Control

Court and the Judgment of the Appellate Authority that both the

authorities and even the parties including the landlord construed

the pleadings raised by the respondent as pleadings claiming

protection of the first proviso to sub section (3) of Section 11.

We are, therefore, of the view that the pleadings raised by the

respondent can be liberally construed as pleadings claiming

protection of the first proviso to sub section (3) of Section 11.

The question that arises now is whether the first proviso does

operate in favour of the tenant in this case. The Appellate

Authority held that if does operate saying that it was admitted

RCR.No.316/2006 -11-

by the landlord and the sons PW1 and 2 in evidence that other

buildings are in their possession and in view of that admission,

it was for the landlord to establish special reasons. We have

gone through the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in full. We did not

notice any unqualified admission from the mouth of either PW1

or PW2 to the effect that the landlord was having in the landlord’s

possession other buildings belonging to the landlord at the time

of commencement of the RCP. At best it can be stated that it is

admitted that at some point of time two or three rooms are got

vacated by the landlord by initiating proceedings against the

tenants in occupation of those rooms. The pertinent question is

whether at the time when the RCP was instituted, the landlord

was having vacant possession of the landlord’s own building in

the same city, town or village. It is clear to our mind that the

evidence on record falls short of holding as the Appellate

Authority and the Rent Control Court did that the landlord had

vacant possession of his own buildings at that time. Therefore,

the findings of the Appellate Authority to the extent it is rendered

on a assumed admission made by the landlord and his son is

improper and irregular. That finding necessarily has to be

RCR.No.316/2006 -12-

vacated. But, we feel that if both sides are given opportunity on

this vital aspect, they may be in a position to adduce evidence

and convince the Court regarding the correct decision to be

taken on this question.

9.Now we shall deal with the correctness of the findings

entered by the Appellate Authority and the Rent Control Court in

the context of the second proviso to sub section(3) of Section 11.

Even though Sri.G.S.Reghunath argued before us by referring to

the cross examination of RW1 that even his version that he is

depending mainly on the income derived from the business

carried on in the building has been challenged, we are in

agreement with the learned counsel for the respondent that as

regards the first ingredient of the second proviso, there is no

effective challenge in cross examination. But we are unable to

agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that there is no

challenge regarding RW1’s version about the second ingredient

of the second proviso to sub section 3 of section 11. We notice

that even in chief examination RW1 did not say that other

suitable buildings are not available in the locality for him to shift

the business. In stead, what was stated was only that in

RCR.No.316/2006 -13-

proximity to the building in question other buildings are not

remaining vacant. “Locality” as envisaged by second proviso to

sub section 3 of Section 11 does not mean the immediate

proximate area of the building in question. It means a larger

local area. Now coming to cross examination, we find that

questions have been asked disputing the correctness of what was

stated by RW1 in chief and also suggesting that there is much

demand for buildings thereby indicating that there is some supply

also. It is trite by various decisions including the judgment of

the Full Bench in Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar(cited supra) that

the burden to establish that tenant satisfies both the ingredients

of the second proviso is that of the tenant. When law cast

burden of proving a particular fact in issue on a particular

person, the law expect him to prove that fact in issue by

adducing the best evidence. We are of the view that whether or

not other suitable buildings are available in the locality is an

aspect of capable of being proved by evidence of better quality

than mere ipse dixit of parties. At any rate, it is very clear to our

mind that the learned Appellate Authority and for that matter,

the Rent Control Court were not at all mindful of the various

RCR.No.316/2006 -14-

decisions of this Court starting from Kochappan Pillai v. Chellapan

(1976 KLT 1) taking the view that the burden to establish that

the tenant satisfies his entitlement to the protection of the

second proviso is that of the tenant. Even then we feel that the

tenant should be given opportunity to adduce evidence and

substantiate his contention that he is entitled for the protection

of the second proviso. Sri.Reghunath incidentally voiced a

grievance that the rent which the respondent is paying for the

building in question, situated in a commercially important area

of the Thiruvananthapuram city Corporation, is ridiculously low.

We find some merit in the above submission of the learned

counsel. Hence, we are inclined to refix the rent payable by the

respondent tentatively even as we are relegating the RCP to the

Rent Control Court.

10. The result of the above discussion is therefore as

follows;

i). The RCR succeeds.

ii). The order of the Rent Control Court

and the Judgment of the Appellate Authority

are set aside to the extent they pertain to the

RCR.No.316/2006 -15-

decision to dismiss the RCP by virtue of the

first and second provisos of sub section (3) of

Section 11.

iii). The finding entered by the Appellate

Authority that the need is bona fide is

confirmed. The Rent Control Court will afford

opportunity to the tenant/respondent to

adduce further evidence in the context of the

first and second proviso to sub section (3) of

Section 11. Once the tenant adduces further

evidence, that Court will afford opportunity to

the revision petitioner/landlord to adduce

evidence in rebuttal of the above evidence.

Once the enquiry is over, the Court will take

fresh decision on the question as to whether

the RCP is liable to fail by virtue of either the

first proviso or the second proviso to section

11(3) and will pass final orders in the RCP

accordingly.

iv). The rent payable by the respondent

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for the building in question is tentatively

refixed with effect from 1st August 2010 at

Rs.1,000/- per month. The respondent shall

pay rent at that rate irrespective of the final

result of proceedings for eviction. However, we

make it clear that the above fixation is

tentative and if either party is aggrieved,

they are free to move the Rent Control Court

by initiating separate proceedings under

Section 5 of the Rent Control Act.

v). The parties will appear before the

Rent Control Court on 26/7/2010. The Rent

Control Court will expedite matters and ensure

that the final order is passed in the RCP at

least by 31/10/2010.

PIUS C.KURIAKOSE,JUDGE

C.K.ABDUL REHIM , JUDGE
okb/dpk

RCR.No.316/2006 -17-