JUDGMENT
S. Swamikkannu, J.
1. This is an appeal by respondent Nos. 3 and 2 before the Tribunal below, against the award dated 30-3-1981 in Claim Petition No. 42 of 1980 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Judge), Tirunelveli, on a petition under Section 110-A (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, claiming a compensation of Rs, 45,000/- for the loss of life of one Kasi Mooppanar in a motor vehicle accident, finding that the accident took place only due to the rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the car, TNI 2000, and that the claimants are entitled to a compensation of Rs. 33,800/-. The award was passed in favour of petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 before the Tribunal, who are respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein, and the amount of compensation was made payable by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 before the Tribunal who are appellant Nos. 2 and 1 respectively before me. The Tribunal also directed payment of interest on the amount of compensation awarded at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the petition till the date of payment.
2. The case of the claimants was: On 31-8-1978 at about 9.30 a.m., deceased Kasi Mooppanar was going on a cycle from south to north near Meenakshi Higher Elementary School at Keela Ambur on Tenkasi-Ambasa-mudram road, keeping to the left side of the road. The car of the fourth respondent herein (1st respondent before the Tribunal) bearing registration number TNI 2000 was driven fast by its driver and in a rash and negligent manner, was coming from north to south. It came on the wrong side of the road and hit against Kasi Mooppanar who sustained serious injuries. The driver of the car left the car and ran away. One Sudalaimuthu Nambiar, who witnessed the occurrence, took the injured Kasi Mooppanar in the same car to Ambasamudram hospital, another person driving the car. Kasi Mooppanar died in the hospital. The deceased was aged 35, hale and healthy. But for the accident, the deceased would have lived beyond 75 years. He was engaged in doing grocery business, earning Rs. 600/- per month and was the sole bread-winner of the family. He was contributing Rs. 500/- every month to the family. Hence the total loss of earning would be Rs. 2,40,000/- but however, the claimants restricted their claim to Rs. 45,000/-. The first claimant (first respondent herein) is the widow of Kasi Mooppanar, while claimant Nos. 2 and 3 (respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein) are his children. Since the fourth respondent contended that the first appellant was the owner of the vehicle, the latter was impleaded in the claim petition as third respondent. The vehicle is insured with the second appellant insurance company. The claim was directed agaiast all the respondents before the Tribunal, i.e., appellant Nos. I and 2 and the 4th respondent herein.
3. The first respondent before the Tribunal (4th respondent herein) contended in his counter that the vehicle in question is not registered in his name and that he has been wrongly impleaded in the claim petition and that he is not liable to the claim for compensation. The second respondent before the Tribunal (2nd appellant) contended that the deceased was driving his cycle carelessly and negligently and the accident was purely due to the negligence of the deceased and that the car was being driven with proper care and caution. He also disputed the claim as being excessive. The third respondent before the Tribunal (the 1st appellant) contended in his counter that there was no rashness or negligence on the part of the driver of the car which was driven with proper care and caution, that it was the cyclist who dashed against the car and was responsible for the accident and that it was up to the claimants to strictly prove the other allegations in their petition.
4. The Tribunal framed the following points for consideration:
(1) Whether the accident was due to rashness or negligence on the part of the driver of the car ? and
(2) Whether the petitioners are entitled to the compensation amount, and if so, to what amount and from whom ?
5. The claimants examined the first claimant as PW 2 and Sudalaimuthu Nambiar, the witness to the accident, as PW 1. The driver of the car was examined as RW 1. The claimants marked in evidence, Exhs/ A-1 to A-5, the certified copy of the first information report in C.C. No. 428 of 1979 on the file of the Anibasamudram police station, certified copy of the post-mortem certificate in relation to the deceased, Kasi Mooppanar, certified copy of the report of the Motor Vehicles Inspector, and two notices sent to the respondents, one by the first claimant by herself and one through her lawyer. The respondents before the Tribunal marked in evidence on their behalf, the certified copies of a portion of the deposition of Sudalaimuthu Nambiar as PW 1 as well as the judgment in C.C. No. 300 of 1980 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate’s Court Shencottah,l aunchei by the police in relation to the accident in question.
6. On a consideration of the above oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal held on point (1) that it was due to the rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the motor car that the accident bad taken place. On point (2) the Tribunal held that the net amount of compensation payable to the claimants would be Rs. 33,800/-. Since there was no dispute that the vehicle in question was insured with the second appellant (second respondent before the Tribunal) and the first appellant (3rd respondent before the Tribunal) was the owner of the car, the Tribunal held that the second and third respondents (the appellants herein) are liable to pay the compensation amount. The Tribunal apportioned the compensation amount in equal shares among the three claimants and directed the shares of the minor claimants to be deposited in baak till they attained majority. Aggrieved by this award, the third and second respondents before the Tribunal have preferred this appeal, against the findings of the Tribunal.
7. Mr. K. Ranganathan, learned Counsel for the appellants, inter alia, contends that the Tribunal had wrongly saddled the responsibility to pay compensation as determined by it, on the appellants herein and this decision, arrived at by the Tribunal, is not correct and in accordance with law. It is further contended that the Tribunal failed to see that the evidence of PW 1 was full of contradictions as seen from Exh. B-1 and therefore, it was quite unsafe to rely on it in coming to the conclusion that ths driver of the car was at fault. It was also contended by the appellants that the Tribunal ought to have held that the maximum that the claimants would be entitled to by way of compensation was on the basis of a maximum of 15 years’ purchase price as has been held in a series of decisions rendered by this Court.
8. Mr. P. Fernando, for the respondents-claimants, on the other hand, submits that the liability in this case has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt by letting in positive evidence and that the multiplier employed by the Tribunal for arriving at the quantum of compensation, viz., 30 years, is not at all wrong or incorrect and that only applying judicial discretion the Tribunal had employed the said figure of 30 years as the proper multiplier.
9. The points that arise for determination in this appeal are:
(1) Whether the claimants have proved that the occurrence took place only due to the rash and negligent driving of the car TNI 2000 by its driven ? and
(2) What is the just and adequate amount that is payable by way of compensation to the claimants, and by whom ?
10. Points 1 and 2: It admits of no doubt that the occurrence did take place on 31-8-1978 at about 9.30 a.m., when the deceased Kasi Moop-panar was going on his cycle from south to north near Meenakshi Higher Elementary School, and he met with an accident. The car was admittedly driven by RW 1 Chelliah, at the time of the occurrence. The evidence of RW 1 does not, in any way, help the contentions of the appellants being upheld.
Even the contention of the fourth respondent herein (the first respondent before the Tribunal) is not proved by the evidence of RW 1 or the contents of Exhs. B-l and B-2. On the other hand, the oral evidence adduced through PW1, an independent witness, and PW 2, the first claimant, together with the contents of Exhs. A-l to A-5. clearly proves that it was the driver of the car in question who drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and hit against the deceased, as a result of which the deceased sustained injuries and later died in the hospital. Therefore, the Tribunal was correct in having come to the conclusion that it was only due to the rash and negligent driving of the car by its driver that the deceased had been hit, as a result of which he sustained injuries and later died in the hospital.
11. Now, the main question that is very much argued before me by either side is with respect to the multiplier that had been employed by the Tribunal in arriving at the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. With respect to this point, Mr. K. Ranganathan, learned Counsel for the appellants, referred to the following decisions, namely, A. Munirathinam v. Perundevi 1980 TLNJ 348, where 20 years was employed as the multiplier, and P.T.C. Limited v. I.D. Sohanra] 1986 TLNJ 321, where even 12 years has been employed as the multiplier. He also cited Manjushri Raha v. B.L. Gupta 1977 ACJ 134 (SC), to show that ’30 years’ employed by the Tribunal as the multiplier, is on the high side. On the other hand, Mr. P. Fernando, learned Counsel for the respondents (claimants), referred to the following decisions, namely, Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baldeo Prasad 1986 ACJ 91 (Allahabad), where 22 years was employed as the multiplier, Suman v. General Manager, Madhya Pradesh State Road Trans. Corporation 1970 ACJ 280 (MP), where the multiplier adopted was 23 years, Polavarapu Somarajyam v. Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation 1984 ACJ 18 (AP), where 25 years was the multiplier employed, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Supyar Kanwar 1986 ACJ 207 (Rajasthan), where 29 years was the multiplier employed, Rajinder Singh Jasbir Singh v. Urmil 1987 ACJ 35 (P & H), where 30 years was employed as the multiplier, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Jhami Bai 1987 ACJ 496 (Rajasthan), where 28 years was employed as the multiplier, A P.S.R.T. Corporation v. Ch. Narasava 1987 ACJ 419 (AP), where 36 years was the multiplier employed, and Lalita v. Devi Sahai 1987 ACJ 241 (Rajasthan) and Nanda v. M.A.C.T., Tonk 1986 ACJ 201 (Rajasthan) in both of which even 40 years was employed as the multiplier. He referred to the above decisions to substantiate his contention that the multiplier of 30 years employed by the Tribunal is not on the high side but is quite in conformity with the evidence available in the case.
12. With respect to the adoption of the ‘multiplier system’, certain principles have to be noticed and adhered to. When a person is in the threshold of his career and in his twenties, his income is less and consequently, his contribution to the family is lesser, but he has a longer period to serve and as such, a higher multiplier is called for in case of his death in a motor accident. As he grows old, his income and contribution to the family increases and he has lesser period to serve and a lower multiplier is justified. This principle is not only understandable, but a very wholesome principle. Once this principle is adopted, the court has to first find out the income of the deceased and the amount that he was spending on the family members (dependents) per month. Thereafter, the amount spent per year could be easily arrived at by multiplying the monthly amount by 12. It is this sum to which the multiple is to be invoked to arrive at the amount to be awarded as compensation. The multiple of 16 has now been accepted as just and proper. The only exception would be that if the age of the deceased was beyond 30 or beyond 40, the multiple would progressively get reduced. In a case therefore, where the deceased was 30 years old, was in government service and had 28 years to reach the age of superannuation, the multiplier of 16 was adopted. [Vide: Krishna Kunari Gupta v. Gurbux Sheesh Singh 1985 ACJ 457 (Allahabad)]. Where the deceased was 31 years old at the time of the accident, a multiplier of 18 was held to be adequate and proper. [Vide: Divisional Manager, L.I C. v. Raj Kumari Mittal 1985 ACJ 179 (Allahabad)J, Where the deceased was aged about 27 years and was employed in the Air Force, a multiplier of 15 was adopted by the Tribunal and the same was affirmed by the High Court. [Vide: Fateh Singh v. State UP. 1985 ACJ 363 (Allahabad)]. The long span of precious life of a cyclist aged about 30 years was brought to an abrupt end by rash and negligent driving of motor vehicle. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in that case, viz., Polavarapu Somarajyam v. Andhra Pradesh Read Trans. Corporation 1984 ACJ 18 (AP), held as follows:
In view of the catena of decisions both by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, House of Lords and the other High Courts, we are inclined to apply 25 years’ multiplier to the facts in this case.
13. In another case in Chairman, A.P.S.R.T. Corporation v. Shafiya Khatoon 1985 ACJ 212 (AP), where the deceased died at the age of 22, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court considered that a multiplier of 16 would be reasonable. In a case in C. Venkatesham v. General Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Trans. Corpn. 1977 ACJ 536 (AP), where a young lady of 21 years died at an accident, compensation was granted to the claimant on the basis of 15 years’ purchase. In the case of United India Fire and Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. S Saraswathi Bai 1978 ACJ 43 (AP). the Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed that the court has first to take into account the probable incone the deceased would have earned in course of time as well as the estimate of his liability which he would have incurred towards the members of his family after the marriage and then should try to find out the appropriate multiplier. It was further observed that in the case of a deceased who was unmarried, the age of the parents should be seen to determine how long, in normal course, the parents would survive and how long the deceased would, from that point of view, have been required to contribute towards their maintenance, and where the parents of the deceased were aged 40 years, it was held that the deceased would have made contribution towards their maintenance for a period of 20 or 25 years and in view, of the parents getting a lump sum payment, the reasonable multiplier was fixed at 12.
14. In the case of the Union of India v. Sugrabai Abdul Majid 1968 ACJ 252 (Bombay), where the deceased victim was of the age of 31, who had left seven dependents behind, the multiplier was held to be 20, by the Bombay High Court The same court, in another case in which the deceased victim was aged 27, held the multiplier to be 20 while assessing the compensation [Vide: Kisan Waman Sasane v. Maharashtra State Road Trans Corporation 1984 ACJ 488 (Bombay)]. In Malan Hanumant Meher v. Balkrishna Vishnu Jadhav 1985 ACJ 141 (Bombay), where the deceased was 40 years old, the same High Court held that the proper multiplier would be 15 years. In the case of Maharashtra State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Babalal Daud Mulani 1985 ACJ 282 (Bombay), where the Tribunal held 25 to be a proper multiplier when the deceased was aged 25 at death, the High Court held the same to be just and fair. In the case of Oriental Fire & Gent. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Suman Navnath Raj guru 1985 ACJ 243 (Bombay), where the deceased, aged 21 years, was engaged at the time of the accident in the business of manufacture of footwear, the multiplier of 20 years fixed by the Tribunal was upheld by the Bombay High Court.
15. In British India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Khagesh Devendraprasad Jani 1977 ACJ 416 (Gujarat), where the deceased victim, a technical assistant, was aged 29 years at death due to an accident, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court applied the multiple of 15 years’ purchase factor. In the case of Shakurmiya Imammiya Shaikh v. Surendra Singh Rup Singh 1978 ACJ 130 (Gujarat), the deceased, a constable by profession, was aged 34 years. In Jam Shri Sataji Digvijay Singhji v. Baud Taiyab 1978 ACJ 443 (Gujarat), the deceased victims were, an unmarried labourer aged 23 years, another unmarried labourer-cum-cleaner aged 22 years and a buffalo-keeper aged 45 years, the same court determined the compensation on 15 years’ purchase factor.
16. In the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Pushpa Devi 1979 ACJ 403 (J&K), the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir fixed the compensation, in the case of a deceased victim aged 35 years who was employed, by adopting the multiplier of 20, being the gap between the age at death and the age of superannuation. In another case, United India Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi Shori Ganjoo 1982 ACJ 470 (J&K), the same court held that the multiplier to be adopted was 1 in the case of a deceased aged 31 years on the ground that the deceased, but for the accident, would have supported bif dependent, a six year old daughter, for at least 15 years till she got married.
17. In a case, Ganga Ram v. Kamalabai 1979 ACJ 393 (Karnataka), where the deceased was 39 years old at death, and in another case, Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd v. M.C. Shashidhara 1984 ACJ 622 (Karnataka), where the deceased victim was aged 38 years, the Karnataka High Court held that in both these cases, the proper multiplier would be 12 years. In another case, in Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd v. B. Parvathamma, 1 84 ACJ 680 (Karnataka), where two victims were involved in an accident, of whom one was 42 years and the other 39 years, the same High Court adopted a multiplier of 10. In the case of a coolie aged 35 years who died in an accident, a multiplier of 12 was adopted by the said High Court. In the case of Deputy General Manager, K.S.R.T. Corporation v. Gopal Mudiliar 1983 ACJ 128 (Karnataka) and in Vinobabai v. KS.R.T.C. 1979 ACJ 282 (Karnataka), the Karnataka High Court applied the multiplier of 12 where the age of the deceased in both the cases was 35 years.
18. Tn the case of Sushila Devi v. Ibrahim 1974 ACJ 150 (MP), where the deceased victim was aged 49 years and in the case of Maheshwari Transport Co. v. Pritam Kaur 19P0 ACJ 157 (MP), where the deceased victim was aged 45 years, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the multiplier of 15 would be just and proper In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Kutnwar 1983 ACJ 629 (MP), where the deceased victim was 32 years of age at the time of death due to accident, the same High Court held that there was no reason to depart from the normal practice of adopting 15 as a conventional multiplier and fixed 15 years’ purchase factor in the place of 10 as fixed by the Tribunal In another case, Leelabai v. Mahavir Prasad 1983 ACJ 423 (MP), where the deceased was 24 years of age and left behind his widow, children and parents, the same High Court held that the proper multiplier would be 18. In the case of Lajwanti v. Keshav Prasad Soni 1984 ACJ 664 (MP), the deceased was aged 23 at the time of the accident. The court fixed compensation based on the multiplier of 15. In Fateh Narain Hajela v. Rawal Singh 1978 ACJ 345 (MP), where the deceased was aged 20 years, his father, the only heir, was granted compensation based on the multiplier of 15. In Ramesh Chandra v. Madhya Pradesh Slate Road Trans. Corpn. 1983 ACJ 221 (MP) also, where the deceased was 19 years, his mother was granted compensation based on the multiplier of 15.
19. In Bihar State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Chandreshwar Mishra 1983 ACJ 631 (Patna), the deceased was a lady of 30 years and was a lecturer in a college. In Agya Kaur v. General Manager, Pepw Read Trans. Corporation 1980 ACJ 306 (P&H), the deceased was aged 35 years In Hoshiarpur National Transporters Pvt. Ltd. v. M.A.C.T, Hoshiarpur 1980 ACJ 83 (P&H), the deceased was aged 41 years. In another case, Aha Rani v. Union of India 1983 ACJ 52 (P&H), the deceased was aged 45 at death. In yet another case, Kanwaljit Singh v.Santokh Singh 1983 ACJ 470 (P&H), the deceased was below 50 years of age. In all these cases, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has awarded compensation to the claimants fixing the multiplier as 16. A Full Bench of the same High Court awarded compensation employing the multiplier of 16 as suitable in a case where the deceased was aged 23 years and was a cultivator when he was murdered. The Full Bench also observed there-in that the method of multiplier was sound and equitable. [Vide: Lachman Singh v. Gurmit Kaur 1979 ACJ 170 (H&H)]. This decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the same High Court in Asha Rani v. Union of India 1983 ACJ 52 (P&H), where it was observed that though the normal multiplier is 16, it can rise to a maximum of twenty virtually as the outer limit. That was a case where the deceased was 36 years old at death and his wife was aged 21. The case was being decided after about 16 years, and the widow had not remarried. The Division Bench held that the appropriate multiplier must be taken as 18 In Haryana Roadways v. Shakhunt la Devi 1983 ACJ 66 (P&H), a single Judge of the same court justified a departure from normal multiplier of 16 and applied the multiplier at 20 and awarded compensation to a widow aged 25 years for the death of her husband who was a doctor by profession and aged 29 years at the time of death.
20. The Rajasthan High Court fixed the multiplier at 18 and awarded compensation in a case where the deceased, who was aged 21 years and an unskilled labourer, died due to injuries sustained by a girder falling on him. [Vide: Immamudin v. Khatoon 1978 ACJ 103 (Rajasthan)]. In another case in Mohanlalv. Shanti Devi 1985 ACJ 205 (Rajasthan), the deceased was a young man of 29 years and was a teacher in the Education Department. The Rajasthan High Court held that he would have lived and earned for another 25 years till his superannuation but for the motor accident. The court fixed a multiplier of 18.
21. In H.P. Road Trans. Corpn. v. Jai Ram 1980 ACJ 1 (HP), the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that the amount of interest which the award amount if invested would fetch should also be taken into consideration in choosing a proper multiplier and if so, only that rate of interest can be taken into account which ensures the safety of the invested amount and which is not likely to suffer fluctuations in the market. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in Padmadevi Shankarrao Jadhav v. Kabahing Gormilsing Sardarji 1985 ACJ 382 (Bombay) and Maharashtra State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Babalal Baud Mulani 1985 ACJ 282 (Bombay), after reviewing the case law on that aspect, held as follows:
There is a good interest rate only for long term investments. Meanwhile, there is increase in prices and cost of living and consequent fall in the value of rupee. This outweighs the rate of interest, even on long term investment. Further, because of illiteracy and ignorance, prudent investment itself is an exception and not a normality Therefore, it is not possible to lay down a general rule that while finding just and fair compensation, it should always be based on the basis of the interest which will be derived or received if the lump sum is prudently invested.
22. We have set out the principles regarding multiplier, as held by various High Courts. Therefore, bearing these principles in mind, this Court holds that the system of multiplier in arriving at a quantum of compensation in motor accident claims entirely depends upon the discretion of the Tribunal and the appellate court and the said discretion, vested with the Tribunal or the appellate court is to be exercised judicially, and not arbitrarily. In each case, the multiplier has to be chosen as one quite in accordance with law, justice, equity and good conscience and applied in the case, neither to the advantage of the claimants nor to the detriment of the persons liable, whether the owner of the vehicle involved or the insurance company, but the determination should be just and legal. In this view, this Court finds that the multiplier of 30 years as employed by the Tribunal in this particular case is not, in any way, on the high side and cannot be considered as excessive assessment of compensation. Only after considering the evidence available on record in so far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, the Tribunal has fixed the quantum. Therefore, both with respect to liability to pay compensation as well as the quantum of the compensation, this Court finds no impropriety in the award. The appeal, being devoid of merits, is dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.