PETITIONER:
PARMANAND DASS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/09/1978
BENCH:
KAILASAM, P.S.
BENCH:
KAILASAM, P.S.
SINGH, JASWANT
CITATION:
1978 AIR 1745 1979 SCR (1) 792
1978 SCC (4) 32
ACT:
Sanctioning authority for the purposes of Section 6 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act under the Hyderabad
Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 as amended by Act II of
1970-Whether subsequent sanction is invalid since an earlier
sanction was held to be invalid.
HEADNOTE:
The prosecution of the appellant, who was charged for
having received an illegal gratification was held to be bad
by the Special Judge, since the sanction for the prosecution
under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was
granted by the Commissioner instead of the Standing
Committee of the Hyderabad Municipality. He was, therefore,
reinstated in service and when the Commissioner wrote again
for the sanction, the Standing Committee recorded on 17-6-70
to drop the case on the ground that it was an old case and
the appellant had already been reinstated in service.
The Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act II
of 1970 came into force on 27-6-70, under which a provision
was made for the appointment of a special officer to
exercise the powers, to perform the duties and discharge the
functions of (a) the Corporation (b) the Standing Committee
and (c) the Commission under the Act. This provision was to
be in force for a period of two years with effect from 3-8-
70 with a further provision that it shall not be extended
beyond 31-10-75.
After Act II of 1970 came into force, on 29-7-72 a
memorandum was submitted in the nature of a note to the
Standing Committee to take a fresh decision on the issue of
prosecution of the appellant and for granting sanction to
prosecute the appellant. On 15-5-73, the Standing Committee
by its resolution authorised the special officer to sign the
sanction order and to send it to Anti-Corruption Bureau,
Hyderabad. In pursuance of the resolution, a sanction order
was passed on 16-6-73. On 29-11-73 the appellant was placed
under suspension and on 11-12-75, the special judge
dismissed the petitioner's objections to the validity of the
sanction. The appellant filed the appeal by special leave,
as the High Court dismissed his criminal revision petition.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
^
HELD : 1. There can be no legal bar to the sanctioning
authority revising its opinion before the sanction order is
placed before the Court. The validity of the sanction can
only be considered at the time when it is filed before the
Special Judge. Subsequent sanction having been given, in the
present case, by the competent authority, the plea that the
Standing Committee again considered the question but decided
to drop the proceedings on the ground that it was an old
case and the appellant had already been reinstated in
service cannot be accepted. [794D-F]
793
2. The validity of the sanction cannot be upheld, as
the special officer who is entitled under the Hyderabad
Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 as amended by Act II of
1970, has not given the sanction as a special officer or by
himself exercising the powers of the Standing Committee, but
issued the sanction order in pursuance of the sanction given
by the Standing Committee by its resolution dt. 15-5-1973.
[796C-D]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
482 of 1976.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment dated 20-1-
1976 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision
Case No. 18 of 1976.
R. V. Pillai and H. K. Puri for the Appellant.
P. Parmeshwara Rao and G. N. Rao for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KAILASAM, J. This appeal is by special leave against
the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Criminal
Revision No. 18 of 1976 holding that the sanction order
given for prosecuting the appellant is valid and dismissing
his Revision Petition.
The appellant Parmanand Dass, was appointed as a clerk
in Hyderabad Municipal Corporation on 15-1-1951 in the scale
of Rs. 40-50 and was promoted to the scale of Rs. 50-105 on
1-9-1956. A charge of having received an illegal
gratification of Rs. 15/- was brought against him and he was
suspended on 22-9-1966. On 27-5-1967, the Commissioner of
the Municipal Corporation gave sanction for prosecution
under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The
appellant questioned the validity of the sanction on the
ground that the Commissioner was not the competent authority
to grant the sanction. The Special Judge accepted the
contention and found that the Standing Committee of the
Municipality alone can give sanction and as the Commissioner
had no powers, the sanction was not valid. Soon after on 4-
5-1970, the appellant prayed for his reinstatement, and on
12-6-1970, the appellant was reinstated. The Commissioning
on 17-6-1970 again wrote to the Standing Committee seeking
for a fresh sanction. On 27-6-1970, the Standing Committee
resolved to drop the case on the ground that it was an old
case and that the appellant had already been reinstated in
service.
On 27-6-1970, Act II of 1970 came into force. The Act
provided that the special officer appointed under the Act
will exercise the powers of the Standing Committee of the
Municipal Corporation. After the Act came into force on 29-
7-1972 a memorandum in the nature of a
794
note to the Standing Committee was prepared requesting the
Standing Committee to take fresh decision on the issue of
prosecution of the appellant, and for granting sanction to
prosecute the appellant. On 15-5-1973, the Standing
Committee by its resolution authorised the Special Officer
to sign the sanction order and to send it to the Anti-
corruption Bureau, Hyderabad. In pursuance of the
resolution, a sanction order was passed on 16-6-1973. On 29-
11-1973, the appellant was placed under suspension. On 11-
12-1975, the Special Judge dismissed the petitioner’s
objection to the validity of the sanction. The appellant
filed Criminal Revision No. 18 of 1976 before the High Court
against the order of Special Judge and the High Court
dismissed the Revision Petition on 20-1-1976, and this
appeal by special leave is against that order.
It was submitted that having once declined to grant
sanction, a subsequent Standing Committee cannot grant
sanction on the same facts. It was contended that the grant
of sanction by the Special Officer was not bona fide and was
due to ulterior motive. We do not see any merit in any of
these submissions. Sanction given by the Commissioner was
rightly rejected by the Special Judge on the ground that the
Commissioner was not competent to grant the sanction. This
could not prevent a subsequent sanction being given by the
Competent Authority, but the plea of the learned counsel was
that the Standing Committee again considered the question
but decided to drop the proceedings on the ground that it
was an old case and the accused had already been reinstated
in service. There could be no objection to the Standing
Committee again reconsidering its decision. The validity of
the sanction can only be considered at the time when it is
filed before the Special Judge. We find that there could be
no legal bar to the sanctioning authority revising its own
opinion before the sanction order is placed before the
Court.
On a consideration of the record which ultimately
resulted in the order of the sanction, we find however that
the sanction order cannot be held to be in accordance with
the law. It was on 27-6-1970, the Standing Committee
resolved to drop further proceedings. On the same day, Act
II of 1970 came into force. Under section 2 of the Hyderabad
Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Act, 1970, which came
into force on 27th June 1970, it was provided that
notwithstanding anything contained in the Hyderabad
Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, there shall be appointed by
the State Government, by notification in the Andhra Pradesh
Gazette, a Special Officer to exercise the powers, to
perform the duties and discharge the functions of-
(a) the Corporation;
795
(b) the Standing Committee; and
(c) the Commissioner.
This provision was to be in force for a period of two years
with effect from 3rd August, 1970, with a provision that it
shall not be extended beyond 31st October, 1975. It is not
disputed before us that the Amendment Act was not extended
to cover the period in question. After the introduction of
the amending Act, a Special Officer was appointed by the
State Government by notification in the Andhra Pradesh
Gazette. The Special Officer was to exercise the powers and
perform the duties and discharge the functions of the
Standing Committee. After the date of coming into force of
the Amending Act, the Special Officer can himself give
sanction as he is empowered to discharge the functions of
the Standing Committee. What happened in this case was that
on 29-7-1972 a note was prepared and submitted to the
Standing Committee which is signed by one M. Narsing Rao,
for Special Officer. The note requested the Standing
Committee to take a fresh decision on the issue for
prosecuting Shri Parmanand Dass for accepting illegal
gratification under Section 6(1) (c) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act 1947. The Standing Committee on 15-5-1973,
after stating that the Standing Committee of the Municipal
Corporation of Hyderabad is the authority to remove
Parmanand Dass from his office and that after fully
considering and examining the materials placed before it, it
was of the view that the appellant should be prosecuted in a
court of law for the said offence, accorded sanction under
section 6(1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1974. A
draft sanction order was signed by the Special Officer,
Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad with a note that he is
the officer authorised by the Standing Committee of the
Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad to sign the sanction
order. After the coming into force of Act II of 1970, the
Special Officer is entitled to exercise powers, perform the
duties and discharge the functions of the Standing
Committee. If the Special Officer acting as the Standing
Committee had given the sanction there would have been no
flaw in the procedure but in this case what we find is, that
a note is prepared for the Standing Committee by one Narsing
Rao signing on behalf of the Special Officer and the
Standing Committee purporting to act as the Standing
Committee, granting sanction on 16-6-1973. When asked to
explain as to what was the procedure that was adopted by the
Special Officer and the Standing Committee, and whether the
Standing Committee was functioning apart from the Special
Officer, Mr. Parmeshwar Rao, learned counsel appearing for
the State of Andhra Pradesh, submitted that the Special
Officer is himself the Standing
796
Committee and that the note was sent to the Standing
Committee that was Special Officer himself and that he, as
the Standing Committee, gave the sanction. We find it
difficult to accept this explanation, for, the High Court
proceeded on the basis that by the resolution dated 15-5-
1973, the Standing Committee accorded sanction under section
6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and authorised
the Special Officer to sign the order according sanction and
accordingly the Special Officer issued the order dated 16-6-
1973. It appears, before the High Court, the parties
proceeded on the basis that the Standing Committee accorded
sanction on 15-5-1973 and authorised the Special Officer to
sign the order and accordingly the Special Officer issued
the sanction order. The draft order of the Standing
Committee which is signed by the Special Officer states that
he is the officer authorised by the Standing Committee. The
plea of the learned counsel for the State that the Standing
Committee and the Special Officer are one and the same is
difficult to accept in the circumstances. As the Special
Officer who is entitled under the Act has not given the
sanction as a Special Officer or by himself exercising the
powers of the Standing Committee but issued the sanction
order in pursuance of the sanction given by the Standing
Committee, we are unable to uphold the validity of the
sanction. On this ground we accept the appeal, set aside the
order of the High Court and hold that the sanction granted
by order dated 16-6-1973 is not valid in law.
S.R. Appeal allowed.
797