High Court Orissa High Court

Manas Kumar Chand And Ors. vs Secretary, Education And Youth … on 18 July, 1996

Orissa High Court
Manas Kumar Chand And Ors. vs Secretary, Education And Youth … on 18 July, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996 II OLR 173
Author: D Misra
Bench: S Chatterji, D Misra


JUDGMENT

Dipak Misra, J.

1. By the time the grief-stricken, job-hungry, anxious for sustenance and believers in the majesty of law, felt that their real and unfortunate odyssey was over, the authorities and benefit-conferring agencies have made them realise the journey to the unseen and unexplored has just begun. To counter such an ingenious method by the opposite parties the petitioners have moved this Court for initiation of contempt because that is the last resource of hope to unveil and uncurtain the factual matrix, and discern in proper perspective whether the commands of this Court are carried out as directed, or there are skilful efforts and adroit attempts to nullify the order of this Court under some guise or other.

2. The case in hand has a sad history. Sripati B. Ed. Training College, Nalagaja was established in January, 1981 in the district of Mayurbhanj to impart B. Ed. training. The institution was continuously being given concurrence till the year 1986-87, but was refused beyond the aforesaid year on the basis of a report of the committee set up to examine the eligibility of the college for grant of concurrence. The said order of refusal was challenged before this Court in OJC No. 2958/87 and by judgment dated 20-4-89 the said refusal was quashed. White setting aside the order of refusal this Court held thus :

“In view of the policy decision of the Government as reflected under Annexure-10 and the petitioner’s college being one which had obtained the necessary concurrence at the point of time when the policy decision had been taken and has been recognised also in the said policy decision has been forwarded to the petitioner’s college, the subsequent refusal of concurrence of the Government so far as the petitioner’s college is concerned on the basis of Annexure-A, must be held to be arbitrary and not in accordance with law.”

The Court declared that the report of the expert committee as per Annexure-A was not sustainable having been based on extraneous consideration and directed the State Government in the following terms :

“We would now call upon the State Government to consider the question of grant of concurrence for the ensuing academic session 1989-90 bearing in mind the observations made by us in this judgment and not being influenced in any manner by the report of the expert committee which has been annexed as Annexure-A to the counter affidavit of the Government, and which has been quashed by us having been held to be based on extraneous considerations, whereafter the University also will consider the question of grant of affiliation in accordance with Statutes 182 and 182-C.”

We may also profitably refer to the anxious observations of this Court over the conduct of the State Government. It is as under:

“We cannot but observe that the State Government after enunciating an educational policy for the State must adhere to the same while considering the question of grant of concurrence to a particular institution and should not dispose of the question of concurrence in any arbitrary or whimsical manner or in a manner contrary to the said educational policy evolved by the State, basing upon some extraneous considerations. The University also should bestow full attention before considering the question of grant of affiliation. Both the authorities should also bear in mind that a particular institution has been running for quite some years, has invested some amount, made some constructions, appointed teachers and all this should not be thrown into the waste paper basket overnight.”

3. While the fate of the institution stood thus there was promulgation of an Ordinance by which Section 7-E was inserted to the Orissa Education Act, 1969 by Orissa Education (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989 by which a ban was imposed on establishment of private training institutions on or after 14th August, 1989 and on recognition of such institutions established prior to that date. However, later on the State Government took a policy decision on 10-1-1990 to rehabilitate the staff of 15 private training colleges, but the name of Sripati B. Ed. Training College did not feature in that list. The present petitioners who are the staff of the aforesaid institution being aggrieved by such denial and discrimination preferred three different writ petitions, namely, OJC Nos. 3271, 2123 and 2148 of 1993. Expressing doubt with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court the matters were not entertained but later on the petitioners fifed Civil Review petition Nos. 25,26 and 28 of 1994 wherein this Court by order dated 8-3-1994 allowed the review petitions and directed the State Government to take a decision within six weeks as to whether Sripati B. Ed. Training College was entitled to concurrence for the year 1988-89 in accordance with the principles laid down in OJC No. 2958/87.

4. The question of grant of concurrence was dealt with by the State Government and it expressed the view that the petitioner’s college could not be considered eligible for concurrence during 1988-89. The aforesaid decision was challenged by the petitioners again in three different writ petitions, namely, OJC Nos 4559, 4560 and 4661 of 1994. In the meantime, one Kanhu Charan Nayak, a similarly situated employee of the institution preferred OJC No. 6748 of 1994 with identical relief. In that case by judgment dated 26-7-95 this Court directed the State Government to consider his case for rehabilitation under the scheme. It is appropriate to quote the relevant portion from the said judgment:

“……The only ground in which the case is rejected is that no application has been filed by the management for concurrence for the year in question. The petitioner however, disputes the fact that no application was filed. We are not inclined to go into the disputed question. However, it is clear to us that the petitioner and other staff of Sripati B. Ed. College have been denied the facility of rehabilitation as per the policy decision of the State Government on the technical ground that their institution did not have the Govt. concurrence for the year 1988-89. It is not disputed before us that prior to the year 1988-89 the institution had been granted Govt. concurrence. The rehabilitation scheme was framed by the Govt. to render assistance to the staff of defunct private institutions who had lost service due to introduction of Section 7-E of the Act. The intent, purpose and spirit of the rehabilitation scheme to have been defeated so far as this institution is concerned on purely technical ground.

7. On consideration of the entire matter, particularly, the time that has elapsed we direct the opposite parties to consider the petitioner’s case for rehabilitation assistance under the scheme as extended to the staff of other similar institutions and render such assistance to him as permissible under the scheme within a period of 3 months of receipt of the writ.”

5. After disposal of the aforesaid writ application the cases of the present petitioners were taken up and this Court by judgment dated 17-10-1995 referring to the case of Kanhu Charan Nayak (supra) held as follows :

“This Court in OJC No. 6748/94 held .that the members of Sripati B. Ed. Training College has been denied the facility as per the policy decision of the State Government on the technical ground that their institution did not have the government concurrence for the year 1988-89. The undisputed position is that prior to the ye3r 1988-89 the institution had been granted Government concurrence. Keeping in view the purpose of the rehabilitation scheme it was held that the benefit should not be denied to the members of the staff.”

The Court while disposing of the writ applications further directed :

“The case of the petitioner is that the facts of the present case are identical and the benefit of the rehabilitation scheme as directed in OJC No. 6748/94, is to be made available to the petitioner in each of the present writ applications. According to the learned counsel for the State, the applicability of the decision has to be considered by the appropriate authority.

On consideration of tie entire matter, we direct the opp. parties to consider the applicability of the scheme, to the petitioners case, as directed in OJC No. 6748/94, and in case, the same is found to be applicable, to extend them the benefits under the schme as extenied to the staff of other similar institutions. Necessary action be taken within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the writ.”

6. As the judgment was not implemented the petitioners have combinedly filed the present contempt application. The opp. parties have filed their show-cause contending inter alia, that a decision has already been taken pursuant to the direction contained in OJC No. 6748/94 that the staff of Sripati B. Ed. Training College are not entitled to the benefit under the rehabilitation scheme as it has been decided at the Government level not to grant concurrence to the said institution beyond academic Section 1985-87 and not to extend the rehabilitation scheme. It is also asserted that independent decision has been taken with regard to the case of the petitioners. The said decision has been brought on record as Annexure-B. The relevant portion of the aforesaid determination is reproduced below :

“In their judgment in Civil Review Nos. 25 to 29 of 1994 including that of the petitioners (Civil Review Nos. 25/94, 26/94,28/94 and 29/94). the Hon’ble High Court modified their earlier direction and opined that Govt. shall determine the question of eligibility of the college to concurrence for the year 1988-89 instead of 1989-90, since on that determination of the question status of the petitioners to be considered for rehabilitation appointment depends. But in the present judgment (O.J.C. Nos. 4661/94. 4662/94. 4560/94 and 4559/94) this aspect has rot been taken into account and it has been directed to consider the petitioner’s case for rehabilitation assistance under the scheme extended to the staff of other similar institutions. The rehabilitation assistance to the petitioners can be extended only if Sripati B. Ed. College, Nalagaja becomes eligible for concurrence during the year 1988-89 which has been opined by the Hon’ble High Court in their judgment dated 8-3-1994 on the Civil Review cases referred to above It is further to mention here that Govt. have extended rehabilitation assistance to the teaching and non-teaching staff of those defunct private B. Ed. Colleges, who had got concurrence during the year 1988-89 on the basis of University application. It is also mentioned that the benefit of this scheme has not been extended to any of the defunct B. Ed. College of the category of defunct Sripati B. Ed. College, Nalagaja. As per the direction of Hon’ble High Court in their Order No. 5 date 17-10-1995 Govt., however, recognised the case of this college and decided that, since Sripati B. Ed. College, Nalagaja neither had affiliation nor concurrence during the year 1988-89, rehabilitation assistance scheme cannot be made applicable to the staff of the said college. In other words, the petitioners’ cases have not been considered for rehabilitation assistance under the scheme as extended to the staff of other eligible defunct private B. Ed. Colleges.”

Relying on the afo esaid decision of the opp. parties a submission has been made by the Government Advocate that there has been compliance with the judgment of this Court and the question of contempt does not arise. It has been further submitted that if the petitioners are still aggrieved with regard to the decision taken in Annexure-B it is open to them to challenge the same by an independent writ application as this relates to different grievance giving rise to a different cause of action.

7. We have anxiously perused the decision of the authorities. We must express our unhappiness in unequivocal terms as we notice that the decision-taking authority has commented on the judgment passed in OJC No. 4:61/94 and the matters analogous thereto. True it is, this Court in the judgment in Civil Review Nos. 25 to 29 of 1994 had directed the State Government to determine the question of eligibility of the college for grant of concurrence for the year 1988-89 but in OJC No. 6748/94, on consideration of the factual matrix and the observations of this Court in OJC No. 2125/93 and taking note of the Civil Review No. 27/94, the Court though did not address itself whether the application had been filed for concurrence or not but categorically held that on the said technical ground alone the intent, purpose and spirit of the rehabilitation scheme could not be defeated. The Court took note of the prior concurrence and directed for consideration under the scheme. The ratio of this judgment was further clarified by a latter Division Bench dealing with the writ petitions preferred by the present petitioners which we have quoted verbatim earlier. The only stand taken by the State Government there that they had to find out whether the cases of the petitioners were covered under the scope and ambit of the direction contained in OJC No. 6748/94. This Court while concurring with the view in OJC No. 6748/94 further explained that the benefits are not to be denied to the members of the staff on the ground of absence of concurrence. This being the position as emerges on close scrutiny of the judgments passed by this Court it is unfortunate on the part of the decision-making authority to comment upon the judgment of this Court, and in a mechanical manner observe that as the college did not have affiliation or concurrence during the year 1988-89 rehabilitation assistance scheme cannot be made applicable to them. Denial of the benefit could have been made, if permissible, on any other ground, but not on the ground of lack of affiliation or concurrence. These grounds have been ignored by this Court as technical grounds and the command was to consider the cases of the petitioners sans the technical ground and take decision under the rehabilitation assistance scheme. Taking a decision according to one’s whim and fancy cannot be regarded as compliance with the order of this Court. Compliance and obedience have to be in terms of the order. Any deviation thereof is not to be countenanced, ingenuity in every sphere cannot have its way into the realm of appreciation. When litigants come to a Court of w and the Court passes orders they are to be obeyed and complied with in all humility and acceptance by one and all. Any violation thereof is not to be tolerated as that affects the majesty of law, the dignity of the institution and corrodes faith of the people. Subterfuges are not to be taken recourse to white dealing with the direction of the Courts, and commands are to be regarded as commands. We expect the authorities to behave and conduct themselves in accordance with the commands of this institution. Courts do not entertain frivolous attitude and do not appreciate any person treating the legal system; to quote Chief Justice Burger ” a laboratory where small boys come to play”. In t his regard we may refer to the decision rendered in the case of J. Vasudevan V. T. R. Dhananjaya, reported in AIR 1996 SC 137 which reads as follows :

“While awarding sentence on a contemner, the Court does so to uphold the majesty of law, and not with any idea of vindicating the prestige of the Court or to uphold its dignity. It is really to see that unflinching faith of the people in the Courts remain intact.”

8. The faith of the people has to be given paramount importance. If orders passed by Courts of law are not obeyed, it is difficult to sustain the faith of people at large in the majesty of law. The problem becomes more grievous when a citizen litigates, and spending his vitality in his crusade against the City Halls obtains the order from the Court of law. It is not expected of helpless litigants to have Job’s patience. In the instant case, we are conscious about the order passed by the opp. parties. Though we do not appreciate the move made but we are inclined to afford an opportunity to the opp. parties to rectify and amend themselves. In this regard, we may refer to the case of Shorilal and Sons and another v. Delhi Development Authority and another, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 320, wherein their Lordships deferred the contempt action. The observations are to the following effect:

“The next question is, whether DDA, which has failed to carry out the specific orders of this Court in holding the enquiry in respect of double allotments and irregularities alleged to have bean committed in making allotment of alternate plots, and making a report thereon, should be proceeded against by taking contempt action against it. Public bodies like DDA, which are trustees of public properties, and are to carry out public functions, in our view, cannot escape their accountability for their failure to carry out the orders of this Court made in public interest. The officers of the DDA, who are guilty of inaction, in our view, should be proceeded against in contempt action. Adoption of such course, in our view, is necessary for the reason that if the officers of the DDA or similar public bodies are directed by this Court to confer benefits on certain ineligible persons either because of such officers’ inaction or because of conferment by such officers of similar benefits on others who were ineligible for them, the same could result not only in public loss but also in providing unwarranted protection to officers from their liability for punitive action on account of wrongs committed by them. However, in the facts of the present case, DDA and its officers concerned, we feel, should be given a further opportunity to carry out the orders or this Court in the matter of constituting an enquiry committee and enquiring into the irregularities or illegalities adverted to in the orders and making a report therefor, before making them liable for inaction, if any. We, therefore, propose to grant as a last chance to DDA and its officers concerned three months’ time to comply with the orders of this Court made on 18-12-1985 and 17-2-1986, and make a report of remedial action taken in the matter, before proceeding to contempt action against them for non-compliance with the orders of this Court. The Registry of this Court shall put up this case for orders in the matter immediately on the expiry of three months from today.”

9. Recently this Court in Original Criminal Misc. No. 13 of 1996 (Pratap Chandra Kar v. Major P. K. Patra and Ors.) has delineated the role of the Court in the matter of contempt. One of us (Hon’ble Sushant Chaiterji, ACJ) speaking for the Court expressed thus :

“No Court should have any sadistic pleasure to hold a litigant being guilty of contempt of Court and punish him. At the same time, if a litigant with his undue arrogance desires to disobey the order of the Court wilfully and purposefully, the Court will have to rise on the occasion and adjudicate the matter and pass such order as law demands and the situation warrants ”

10. While taking serious view of the laches committed by the opp. parties we also keep in mind the submission of the learned Government Advocate who has submitted that there is no deliberate attempt to nullifv the effect of the order of this Court. Under normal circumstances, we would have issued a rule of contempt to the opp. parties to address us with regard to the quantum of sentence, but keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as we are presently persuaded, we afford another opportunity to the opp. parties to take appropriate decision keeping in view the observations made in the present case where we have further clarified the ratio of OJC No. 6748/94 and OJC No. 4559/94 filed by one of the petitioners. We expect the authorities would realise the import and take a decision in proper understanding of the judgments keeping the ratio of the aforesaid decision and cut the Gordian Knot. The decision has to be taken within a period of six weeks from today and report compliance thereof to this Court within the stipulated time.

11. With the aforesaid observations and directions the contempt proceeding is dropped and the application is accordingly disposed of.

S. Chatterji, A.C.J.

I agree.