PETITIONER: MADAN LAL PURI Vs. RESPONDENT: SAIN DAS BERRY DATE OF JUDGMENT27/07/1971 BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. RAY, A.N. PALEKAR, D.G. CITATION: 1973 AIR 585 1971 SCR 935 1971 SCC (2) 535 CITATOR INFO : RF 1976 SC2229 (14) RF 1980 SC1253 (4) ACT: Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, ss. 14(1)(e) and 39(2)- Jurisdiction of High Court. HEADNOTE: The respondent, who was the landlord of certain premises, filed an application under s. 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, for the eviction of the appellant, who was the lessee, on the ground inter alia, that the respondent required the premises bonafide for his occupation as a residence for himself and his family members. The Rent Controller found that the requirement of the landlord was not bonafide and dismissed the application. The order was confirmed in appeal by the Rent Control Tribunal. The respondent filed an appeal to the High Court under s. 39(2) of the Act. Before the High Court both parties agreed that the case should be remanded to the Tribunal for a finding on the question whether the premises available with the respondent could be considered to be 'reasonably suitable residential accommodation' as contemplated by s. 14(1)(e). On remand, the Tribunal reported that the premises in the occupation of the respondent were not reasonably sufficient for the respondent and his family. The appellant however contended before the High Court, ignoring this finding of the Tribunal that on the concurrent findings of the two sub- ordinate authorities that the landlord's requirement was not bonafide, there was no question of law involved and so the High Court had no jurisdiction under s. 39(2) to consider the correctness of those findings. The High Court rejected the contention and held, that, in view of the finding on remand the decision of the subordinate authorities dismissing the respondent's application was erroneous. In appeal to this Court, HELD:This Court in Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra, C.A. No. 2150 of 1966 dated 26-9-1969 held that a finding on the issue whether the requirement of a landlord is bonafide is a finding on mixed questions of law and fact and not on facts only. Therefore, it was open to the High Court, when exercising jurisdiction under s. 39(2), to consider in proper cases the correctness of such a finding. [939E-G] JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 848 of 1971.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
December 7, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 110-D
of 1966,
Hardev Singh, K. P. Kapur and H. L. Kapur, for the appel-
lant.
S.K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the res-
pondent.
936
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam, J.-In this appeal, Mr. Hardev Singh, learned
counsel on behalf of the tenant-appellant, challenges the
judgment and order dated December 7, 1970 of the Delhi High
Court in S.A.O. No. 110-D of 1966. Special leave has been
granted by this Court limited to the question whether the
High Court was justified, in view of S. 39(2) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) in
setting aside the decisions of the two subordinate
authorities, dismissing the application filed by the
respondent-landlord for evicting the appellant.
The facts leading up to this appeal may be briefly stated.
The appellant took on lease, the first floor of the premises
in question from the respondent on January 22, 1964 on a
monthly rent of Rs. 250. The respondent who was the owner
of the entire premises was then occupying the ground floor.
The landlord filed an application, before the Rent
Controller on November 26.1964 for eviction of the appellant
from the portion in his occupation as lessee, on two
grounds; (a) that the tenant has sub-let a part of the
premises, and (b) that he required the premises bona fide
for his occupation as a residence himself and his family
members. The latter claim was based under cl. (e) of the
proviso to sub-section (1) of S. 14 of the Act, which is as
follows:-
“that the premises let for residential
purposes are required bona fide by the
landlord for occupation as a residence for
himself or for any member of his family
dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof,
or for any person for whose benefit the
premises are held and that the landlord or
such person has no other reasonably suitable
residential accommodation;”
The tenant opposed the claim of the landlord on both the
grounds. He denied the allegation of sub-letting. He also
contended that the landlord’s requirement for his occupation
was not bonafide. The tenant’s plea was that the portion of
the premises in his occupation was sufficient for his
purpose. The Rent Controller accepted the plea of the
tenant that there was no subletting. He also accepted his
plea that the requirement of the landlord for his occupation
was not bona fide. On these findings, the landlord’s
application was dismissed. These two findings were also
confirmed in the appeal filed by the landlord before the
Rent Control Tribunal. The question. regarding sub-letting,
having been decided against the landlord by both the
Tribunals, no longer survives and it was also not agitated
before the High Court. It may be stated at this stage that
the findings of both the tribunals on the question of
bonafide requirement were recorded against the landlord, on
the sole ground that the landlord must
937
have foreseen his requirement for additional accommodation
even at the time when he let out a part of the premises on
January 22, 1964 to the appellant and therefore he was not
entitled to ask for eviction under cl. (e) of the proviso to
sub-section (1) of s. 14 of the Act. It is the view of both
the Tribunals that when eviction is asked for within about I
I months of the letting, the claim of the landlord cannot be
considered to be bonafide.
The landlord carried the matter in appeal before the High
Court under s. 39 of the Act. That section runs as follows
:-
“39(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-
section (2), an appeal shall lie to the High
Court from an order made by the Tribunal
within sixty days from the date of such order
;
Provided that the High Court may entertain the
appeal after the expiry of the said period of
sixty days, if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause
from filing the appeal in time.
(2)No appeal shall lie under sub-section
(1), unless the appeal involves some
substantial question of law.
Before the High Court, counsel for both parties
made a representation that the Rent Control
Tribunal has not recorded a finding on the question
whether the premises avaiable with the landlord can
be considered to be “reasonably suitable
residential accommodation” as contemplated by cl.
(e) of the proviso to s. 14 (1). Hence they made a
joint request to remand the case to the Tribunal
for a finding on the said question on the basis of
the evidence already on record. Accepting this
joint request, the learned Judge remanded the case
to the Tribunal. The latter, after a consideration
of the materials on record as well as the extent of
the premises in the occupation of the landlord and
also having due regard to the number of family
members living with the latter, held, in his report
dated May 4, 1970, that the portion of the premises
in the occupation of the landlord was not reaso-
nably sufficient for a family consisting of the
landlord, his wife, his son, son’s wife and their
children. On this basis, he recorded a finding
that the premises in the occupation of the
respondent were not reasonably suitable for his
residence.
So far as we could see, the correctness of these
findings recorded by the Rent Control Tribunal, in
favour of the landlord, do not appear to have been
challenged by the tenant before the High Court when
the appeal came up for final hearing. On the other
band, we find that the same contentions that were
raised regarding the bonafide requirement of the
landlord and which found
938
acceptance at the hands of the Rent Controller and
the Tribunal before remand were again raised by the
tenant-appellant before the High Court. That is,
in short, the appellant herein was contesting
before the High Court, the appeal of the landlord,
ignoring the findings of the Tribunal dated May 4,
1970. The main point that was urged by the
appellant before the High Court was that as the two
subordinate Tribunals have recorded concurrent
findings negativing the claim of the landlord
regarding his bonafide requirement of the premises,
the appeal filed by the landlord did not involve
any substantial question of law. On this basis the
appellant pressed for the dismissal of the
landlord’s appeal. On the other hand, the
respondent urged that both the subordinate
Tribunals have not properly considered the question
of the landlord’s requirement; and that the
findings recorded against him were on irrelevant
consideration. According to the landlord the
various material factors which have to be taken
into account for adjudicating upon such a claim,
have not been properly borne in mind by both the
Tribunals. Quite naturally the landlord placed
considerable reliance on the findings recorded on
May 4, 1970 in his favour by the Tribunal.
The High Court rejected the contention of the
appellant that it has no jurisdiction to consider
the correctness of the findings. recorded by the
two subordinate authorities especially when the
relevant matters to be taken into account for
deciding such a question have not been borne in
mind by those authorities. The High Court is of
the view that the rejection by the Rent Controller
and the Tribunal of the claim of the landlord on
the sole ground that he should have anticipated his
requirement for the, next 10 or II months when he
let out the premises on lease on January 22, 1964,
was erroneous. The High Court has further observed
that none of the subordinate authorities have held
that after letting out the premises on January 22,
1964 and before filing the application for eviction
on November 26, 1964, the landlord has made any
demand from the tenant for payment of higher rent.
Finally, the High Court having due regard to the
above circumstances and the size of the family of
the landlord and the findings recorded by the
Tribunal on May 4, 1970 held that the, decision of
the two subordinate authorities dismissing the
landlord’s application was erroneous. On the other
hand, the learned Judge held that the landlord has
made out his claim under cl. (e) of the proviso to
S. 14(1) of the Act. On this reasoning the learned
Judge reversed the decision of the Rent Controller
and the Tribunal and allowed the application of the
landlord for eviction of the appellant. The
appellant was given six months’ time for vacating
the premises.
Mr. Hardev Singh, learned counsel for the
appellant, has very strenously urged that in view
of the concurrent findings”
939
recorded by the two subordinate tribunals, there
was no question of law, much less a substantial
question of law arising for consideration before
the High Court in the appeal filed by the
landlord. Hence he urged that the interference by
the High Court with the concurrent findings so
recorded was not justified. Learned counsel
further pointed out that the landlord has not made
out his claim under cl. (e) of the proviso to s.
14(1) of the Act. Mr. Hardev Singh referred us to
certain decisions of this Court dealing with the
question, under what circumstances it can be con-
sidered that a substantial question of law arises.
We do not think it necessary, in the circumstances
of this case, to refer to those decisions, as in
our opinion they have no bearing on the short
question that arises for consideration before us,
namely, the power of the High Court under s. 39, to
consider the correctness of a finding regarding
bonafide requirement under cl. (e) of the proviso
to s. 14(1) of the Act.
As we have already pointed out, the sole question
that has to be decided by us is whether the High
Court in reversing the decisions of the Rent
Controller and the Tribunal, in the circumstances
of this case, can be considered to have exceeded
its jurisdiction under s. 39(2). We are satisfied
that the High Court has not exceeded its
jurisdiction in any manner.
The argument of Mr. Hardev Singh that the High
Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 39(2)
of the Act when it reversed the finding of the two
subordinate authorities on the question of bonafide
requirement has, in our opinion, no substance. In
Smt. Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra(1), this Court
observed as follows:
“…… Whether on the facts proved the
requirement of the landlord is bona fide,
within the meaning of s. 14(1)(e) is a finding
on a mixed question of law and fact……..
From the above observations it is clear that an inference
drawn by the subordinate authorities that the requirement of
the respondent was not bonafide, could not be regarded as
conclusive. The High Court, in proper cases, has ample
jurisdiction to interfere with that finding and record its
own conclusions on the basis of the materials on record.
We may also point out that in the case before us the
position is made worse for the appellant in view of the
finding recorded by the Tribunal in favour of the landlord
on May 4, 1970. We have already pointed out the
circumstances under which a finding was called for by the
High, Court. The High Court has accepted those findings and
held in favour of the landlord that he has
(1) C. A. No. 2150 of 1966 decided on 26-9-1969.
940
made out a case under cl. (e) of the proviso to S. 14(1) of
the Act.
Mr. Hardev Singh referred us to the decision of this Court
reported in Bhagwan Dass and another v. S. Rajdev Singh and
another(1), wherein it has been observed :
“A second appeal lies to the High Court
against the decision of the Rent Control
Tribunal under Section 39(2) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, only if the appeal involves
some substantial question of law. The Rent
Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal, on a
consideration of the relevant terms of the
agreement and oral evidence and the
circumstances found that a clear case of sub-
letting was established. On that finding no
question of law, much less a substantial
question of law, arose.”
The first part of the above extract lays down the nature of
the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under s. 39(2)
of the Act. In that decision, on facts, it was found both
by the Rent Controller and the Tribunal, on a relevant
consideration of the materials on record, that a case of
sub-letting was established. On such a finding concurrently
arrived at by both the authorities, it was held by this
Court that no question of law, much less a substantial
question of law arose for consideration before the High
Court.
But the facts in the case before us are entirely different.
We have already pointed out that the question that fell to
be considered by the High Court was whether the claim made
by the landlord under cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) of
the Act was bonafide. As already pointed out, this Court,
in Smt. Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra(1), has held that a
finding on such an issue is not one of fact alone but is a
finding of mixed question of law and fact, and that it was
open to the High Court when exercising its jurisdiction
under s. 39(2) of the Act, to consider the correctness or
otherwise of such, a finding. The findings recorded on such
an issue by the subordinate tribunals are not conclusive.
From the above discussion, it follows that the High Court
has not exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 39(2) of the Act.
In consequence, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the
circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own
costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed. (1) A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 986.
(2) C. A. No 2150 of 1966 decided on 26-9-1969.
941