JUDGMENT
P.K. Deb, J. (Chairperson)
1. This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 14.9.2004 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, DRT, Jabalpur in Review Application No. 5/04, whereby and whereunder the review application filed by the appellant Bank under Section 22(2)(e) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 to review the order dated 14.1.2004 passed in M.A. No. 114/2001 has been rejected.
2. The respondents had filed an application for setting aside ex parte judgment passed in T.A. No. 53/98 dated 16.5.2000 and the said restoration petition filed under Section 22(2)(g) of the DRT Act was allowed by order dated 14.1.2004 mainly on the reference of an order of Hon’ble Single Judge of M.P. High Court in a writ petition No. 6378/2000 (State of M.P. v. DRT and Ors.). The ground of review is that the judgment of M.P. High Court on the basis of which restoration petition namely M.A. No. 114/2001 was allowed has already been challenged before the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court and the same was admitted and was registered as L.P.A. No. 154/2002 and as such the judgment which has been relied on cannot be said to be a final decision of the M.P. High Court, rather by the L.P.A. Court had on merit admitted the appeal and state a further proceeding of the original case pending before the DRT, Jabalpur meaning thereby the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge was stayed virtually by the M.P, High Court. It was further contended that the learned Tribunal in the order dated 14.1.2004 in M.A. No. 114/01 had held that the respondents i.e. applicants in that M.A. could not assign any sufficient ground for setting aside the ex parte decree as well as sufficient cause for condoning the delay.
3. In this appeal respondents had not appeared and this is another example which shows apathy of the M.P. State in fighting out the litigation in proper legal Courts at relevant time. The restoration petition was filed after 15 months of the ex parte decree and there was a condonation petition along with the restoration petition.
4. The submission of Mr. Maindiretta, learned Counsel for the appellants is that the learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate the review application in its proper perspective and has arrived at a wrong finding.
5. At the very first instance, maintainability of the appeal is in question. Review application is being filed under Section 22(2)(e) of the DRT Act and under Section 22(2) of such petitions are being decided by the Tribunal as a Civil Court as per the provision of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. When a judgment and order is passed by the Civil Court, then an option remains of the aggrieved party either to file appeal or to go for review. The aggrieved party has got the option of election in this respect and Apex Court has already held that once an option of review has been elected by an aggrieved party, he cannot have any further remedy by way of appeal against such judgment and order in the review petition, but it has been submitted that under the DRT Act by the judgment of the Apex Court and other High Courts of this country it has been held that any order passed by a Tribunal is appealable before the appellate Tribunal, although specific provisions in that respect are not there under the DRT Act. Now in the present case, against the allowance of a restoration petition, no appeal lies and in that way practically review was the only remedy, if there are proper and sufficient grounds for review. Thus in the present circumstances, it is submitted that the appeal is maintainable. Moreover, it is submitted that for adjudication of grievances of the parties involved under the DRT Act paramount consideration is of principle of natural justice and if it is found that for some reason or other natural justice has been violated, then the Tribunals and the appellate Tribunals may go beyond the scope of the provisions of law to render justice to an aggrieved party. Considering all aspects, I find that the present appeal is maintainable.
6. Now coming to merit of review application, it is the fundamental principle of review that the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. is stringent and cannot be extended for the purpose of considering anything outside the scope and broader principles of appeal. Under the provisions of review Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. which is applicable for adjudicating review application under Section 22(2)(e), the Courts/Tribunals must adhere to the limited scope, such as (1) discovery of new important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the aggrieved party even after due diligence, (2) could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, (3) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient reason.
7. In the present case, it has been strenuously submitted that grounds of review are very much there for entertaining a review application. The order of the LPA Court was not known to the appellant during the course of adjudication of M.A. No. 114/01 which is very much vital as the sole ground on which M.A. No. 114/01 was allowed, was the decision in W.P. No. 6378/2000. On going through the order passed in M.A. No. 114/ 01 I could find that condonation of delay matter for long 15 months, although admittedly not being explained (as observed by the Tribunal himself) was based on some decisions of the Apex Court without considering, whether those judgments on facts are applicable to the present case or not and merit was also considered holding that sufficient cause although not being shown but allowance has been made solely on the decision of W.P. No. 6378/2000. Now the admitted position remains that the order/ judgment as in W.P. No. 6378/2000 has not yet been finalized. The matter is under consideration by the Division Bench in LPA No. 54/2002 and the said order of the LPA Court passed on 18.3.2002 was not within the purview of the parties or Courts/ Tribunals, while the decision was taken in M.A. No. 114/01. Thus the review application has got sufficient force in view of the above position at least for the purpose of entertaining of the same on merit. But the learned Tribunal had not considered that order of the LPA Court in its proper perspective, rather he had stuck to his own order passed in M.A. No. 114/01 and the reasons given for not accepting the order of the LPA Court that the same had not stayed the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge in W.P. No. 6378/2000 is not at all sustainable in the eye of law. The LPA Court has ordered for staying the further proceeding of the original application before the Tribunal, which virtually means staying of the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge as by that order only the original application was revived. So the reasoning given by the learned Tribunal is not at all convincing. He ought to have entertained the review application and considered it in its proper perspective and on merit and sustainability on law. The observation of the Tribunal in paragraph No. 10 of the order dated 14.1.2004 in M.A. No. 114/04 ought to have been reconsidered in the changed circumstances as if there was no decision by the M.P. High Court as yet, but the same had not been done. Hence the decision arrived at in the review application cannot be sustained in the eye of law. More so, when the whole decision in M.A. No. 114/04 had been made on some decision of the High Court and Apex Court without considering whether the facts of the present case fit it in with those rulings.
8. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the order dated 14.9.2004 passed in review Application No. 5/04 is hereby set aside and the learned Tribunal is hereby directed to reconsider the review application in its proper perspective in the light of the observations made above. It is further made clear that on merit of M.A. No. 114/01 this appellate Tribunal did not enter. Send back the records immediately to DRT, Jabalpur and its expected that the review application shall be considered in its proper perspective within two months next positively.