ORDER
1. This revision petition filed by the defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Chandigarh, to entertain an appeal preferred on behalf of the plaintiff respondent.
2. The respondent has filed a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Chandigarh, for recovery of an alleged balance price of Rs. 500/- in respect of a camera sold to the petitioner. It was claimed by him that he had sold the camera for Rs. 1500/- and the balance of Rs. 500/- still remained unpaid. The suit was dismissed and the plaintiff went up in appeal to the District Judge. A preliminary objection was raised that the suit being of the nature of a small cause, an appeal arising therefrom could be heard only by the Senior Subordinate Judge and not by the District Judge in view of the notification No. 306 Gaz. I/ XXI C.-6, dated the 11th October, 1967. The District Judge overruled the objection holding that it was only if a Small Cause Court were established under the Small Cause Courts Act that an appeal would lie to a Senior Subordinate Judge and not when the suit was of a small cause nature. The view taken by the District Judge was that the suit though triable by a Court of Small Causes was actually tried by a Subordinate Judge in the exercise of his ordinary powers to try such suits and the appeal, therefore, lay with him and not with the Senior Subordinate Judge.
3. The relevant extract from the notification referred to above is in the following terms:-
“No. 306 Gaz. I/XXI.C-6-Powers. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of S. 39 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, as amended up to date and in supersession of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore Notification No. 170-Gaz/XXIC.6., dated the 16th May, 1935, and Notification No. 53-Gaz/XXI. C. 6, dated 23rd February, 1940 the Hon’ble Court of Punjab and Haryana, at Chandigarh, are pleased to direct that within the limits of each of the Civil Districts set forth in the Schedule appended hereto, appeals lying to the District Court from decrees or orders passed by any Subordinate Judge.
(a) in a small cause of a value not exceeding Rs. 500/- (five hundred), and
(b) in an unclassed suit of a value not exceeding Rs. 100/- (one hundred),
shall be preferred to the Senior Subordinate Judge of the First Class exercising jurisdiction within such Civil District.
2. It is further directed that the Court of such Senior Subordinate Judge of the First Class shall be deemed to be a District Court for the purpose of all such appeals preferred to it.
SCHEDULE Serial District (Punjab) No. x x x x x x Serial District (Haryana) No. x x x x x x 20. Chandigarh (Union Territory of Chandigarh)
4. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the parties that the suit was of the nature of small causes. Ch. Roop Chand, learned counsel for the respondent, in defending the order overruling the preliminary objection did not rightly pursue the line of reasoning adopted by the District Judge who did not correctly appreciate the true meaning and scope of the notification. In order that an appeal may lie to the Senior Subordinate Judge by virtue of the notification, all that is required is that the decree or order under appeal must have been passed by a Subordinate Judge in a suit of the nature cognisable by a Court of Small Causes and not that the suit itself should have actually been tried by such a Court established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, or a Subordinate Judge exercising jurisdiction under the said Act. The forum for appeal does not thus depend upon the Tribunal which decided the suit but on the character of the suit.
When a suit is tried by a Court of Small Causes, no appeal is in fact competent except in cases provided for in Section 24 of that Act. The decree or order made in a case decided by such a Court can only be revised by the High Court under Section 25 of the said Act and no appeal in the ordinary course is competent. The learned counsel, however, contended that the District Judge did not lose his jurisdiction to hear the appeals even if because of the said notification they could be heard by the Senior Subordinate Judge as well. An other argument of the learned counsel is that the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, as amended up-to-date (hereinafter called the Act), which applied to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, does not recognise any Court being designated as the Court of Senior Subordinate Judge and the notification was, therefore, bad in law. The submission indeed is that the notification should have been issued designating a particular Subordinate Judge by name to act as the Senior Subordinate Judge and empowering him to hear such appeals as are referred to in the notification. I am afraid the approach commended for acceptance by this Court is wholly misconceived.
5. No doubt the classes of Courts as created by the Act are only of a District Judge, Additional District Judge and the Subordinate Judge, but the term “Senior Subordinate Judge” as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Wahab v. Phiraya Lal, AIR 1959 Punj 586, is well known to every one. It is for the sake of convenience that the senior-most of the Subordinate Judges is called the ‘Senior Subordinate Judge’ and not that a new class of Courts not contemplated by the Act is created by the notification.
6. Section 39 (3) of the Act empowers the High Court to direct by notification that appeals lying to the District Court from all or any of the decrees or orders passed in an original suit by any Subordinate Judge shall be preferred to such other Subordinate Judge as may be mentioned in the notification. All that the High Court is, therefore, to notify is which other Subordinate Judge is to hear the appeals specified in the notification and the description is very clear when power is given to the senior-mist amongst them. The object of the notification is not that a particular time alone shall hear the appeals but whosoever amongst the Subordinate Judges is the senior-most at the relevant time will have jurisdiction to entertain the appeals which but for the notification could lie only to the District Judge. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the District Judge still continues to exercise jurisdiction in regard to the appeals directed to be preferred to a Senior Subordinate Judge is not based on a correct appreciation of the scope of Section 39 (3).
It is provided in unambiguous terms that after the notification as envisaged therein has been issued and the High Court has authorised any other Subordinate Judge to hear a certain class of appeals, “the Court of such other Subordinate Judge shall be deemed to be a District Court for the purposes of all appeals so preferred.” The ordinary and clear meaning of the expression “Subordinate Judge shall be deemed to be a District Court” is that the Act will recognise the court of such a Subordinate Judge alone as that of a District Judge so far as those appeals are concerned and that such appeals are to be preferred to such a Subordinate Judge and not to the District Judge. In other words, the District Judge in a case covered by the notification loses jurisdiction to hear appeals which have been directed to be heard by the Senior Subordinate Judge. A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Jiwan v. Sant Singh, AIR 1936 Lah 575, considered it to be a defect of jurisdiction if the District Judge entertains an appeal from the Court of the first instance which under the notification issued under Section 39 (3) lies to a Subordinate Judge of the First Class. The Bench was of the view that in such a situation, the District Judge acted without jurisdiction and not amount of consent and acquiescence of the parties to the appeal could confer jurisdiction on him. Observations to the same effect were made by Tek Chand, J. in Sohna Mal v. Official Receiver Sheikpura AIR 1937 Lah 40)
7. Mr. Roop Chand strenuously urges that these judgments do not lay down correct law and that I should make reference to a larger Bench. I have not been able to persuade myself to find any merit in the contention that the District Judge still continues to retain jurisdiction in the matter of hearing appeals which could, under the notification, be preferred only in the Court of Senior Subordinate Judge. The learned counsel relies on a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court reported as R. Rama Subbrayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal, AIR 1962 Mad 450, in support of the submission that both the District Judge and the Senior Subordinate Judge exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Rama Subbarayalu’s case was under the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873. Section 29 (1) of this Act empowered the High Court to authorise by general or special order any Subordinate Judge to take cognisance of or any District Judge to transfer to any Subordinate Judge under his control, any proceedings under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which could not be disposed of by the District Delegates. Under sub-section (2) of the said section, the District Judge retains the power to withdraw any proceedings taken cognisance of by, or transferred to, a Subordinate Judge, under sub-section (1) and he could either dispose them of himself or transfer the same to a Court under his control competent to do so. In view of the wide language of Section 29 (1) read with sub-s. (2) of the same section of the Madras Civil Courts Act, it was held that by vesting of authority in a Subordinate Judge under notification issued under sub-section (1) of S. 29 the jurisdiction of the District Judge over the matters covered by the notification was not excluded and that both the Subordinate Judge and the District Judge continued to exercise concurrent jurisdiction to take cognisance of contentious applications referred to in the notification. There is not the least semblance or resemblance between Section 39 of the Punjab Courts Act and Section 29 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873. Section 39 (3) specifically ousts the jurisdiction of the District Judge in regard to appeals which have to be preferred to the Senior Subordinate Judge. It must, therefore, in the instant case be held that the District Judge has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal preferred before him by the respondent and that he must return the same for presentation to the proper Court.
8. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and the order of the District Judge overruling the preliminary objection set aside. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
9. Petition allowed.