JUDGMENT
T.H.B. Chalapathi, J.
1. In this writ petition, the Haryana Financial Corporation challenges the award passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, in Reference No. 16 of 1991.
2. The 2nd respondent namely Ram Diya was appointed as a Peon on daily wages on 11.6.1987. His services were terminated on 30.9.1989 without following any procedure and without payment of any retrenchment compensation as required Under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the 2nd respondent raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak. On the basis of the material placed before it, the Industrial Tribunal held that the 2nd respondent worked for more than 240 days in one calendar year and his service have been terminated in contravention of the provisions of Section 25-F, G, and H of the Industrial Disputes Act and accordingly ordered the reinstatement of the service of the 2nd respondent.
3. There is no dispute about the fact that the 2nd respondent has been appointed as Peon 11.6.1987 for a period of one month i.e. upto 29.7.1987. Again the 2nd respondent was appointed on 1.7.1987 upto 30.7.1987. He was again reemployed from 16.11.1987 and worked upto 15.12.1987. Again he was appointed from 1.7.1988 and continued till 29.9.1988 with some notional breaks in his service. But it is an admitted fact that the 2nd respondent worked for more than 240 days in a year prior to the termination of his services.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was appointed as Chowkidar to watch the factory which was taken over by the Corporation from a defaulting party and, therefore, the employment of the second respondent was for a specific purpose and for a specific period. Therefore on the expiry of the period mentioned in the contract his services were terminated and, therefore, the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) are attracted to the present case and the termination of services of the second respondent cannot be termed as retrenchment falling within the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside.
5. Annexure P-1 is the first order of appointment of the second respondent. From the perusal of the same, it can be seen that the 2nd respondent was appointed on purely temporary basis on daily wages for a period of 19 days from 11.6.1987 to 29.6.1987. It is also mentioned therein that his services shall stand terminated automatically, but it is not stated in the said appointment letter that the second respondent was appointed only to watch any particular factory which was taken over by the Corporation. Annexure P-2 is another letter of appointment dated 1.9.1989. It shows that the second respondent was appointed as Chowkidar on purely temporary basis for a period of 29 days from 1.9.1989 to 29.9.1989. In this letter too, it is not shown that the second respondent was appointed for any particular work.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to place on record any document which shows that the services of the second respondent have been engaged for any particular work though in the appointment letter the period of appointment was mentioned. It is, therefore, to be seen whether Section 2(oo)(bb) will apply to the case of the petitioner.
7. It has been held in State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, (A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1111) as follows :-
“A brake-down of Section 2(oo) unmistakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. “Termination………..for any reason whatsoever are the key words. Whatever the reason every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is has the employee’s service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the armour of Section 25-F and Section 2(oo) without speculating on possibilities. We may agree that “retrenchment” is no longer terra incognita, but area covered by an expansive definition. It means to end conclude cease.’ In the present case the employment ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of nine days — Automatically may be, but cessation all the same. That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no moksha from Section 25-F(b) is inferable from the proviso to Section 25-F(l) (sic) (Section 25-F(a)?) True the action speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract Section 25-F and Automatic extinguishment of services by effluxion of time cannot be sufficient.”
8. It is no doubt true that Sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) has been added subsequent to the above decision, but I am of the opinion that the principles laid down in the above decision are equally applicable even after the introduction of Section 2(oo)(bb).
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision in Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Ram Krishan, (Judgments Today 1995(6) SC 547). But in that case, the Supreme Court is concerned with the seasonal work employees and it is pertinent to note the following observations of the Supreme Court.
“It would thus be clear that the respondents were not working throughout the season. They worked during crushing season only. The respondents were taken into work for the season and consequent to closure of the season they ceased to work.”
The question is whether such a cessation would amount to retrenchment. Since, it is only a seasonal work, the respondents cannot be said to have been retrenched in view of what is stated in clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act.”
10. I am of the opinion that the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the case.
11. It is not the case of the petitioner that the work ceased to exist. As already observed, the 2nd respondent has not been appointed for any particular work but he has been appointed by the Corporation as a Peon/Chowkidar and wherever the work was existing, he had been deputed to attend the work.
13. In Chennaiah v. Divisional Engineer, APSR Corporation, (1987 LIC 1259 AP), Justice Jeevan Reddi (as his Lordship then was) held that the second part of Sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) contemplated a contract which expressly provides for certain circumstances or situations in which the contract can be terminated. The 2nd part of Sub-clause does not add any unilateral right reserved for the employer to terminate the services of an employee at any time and that too without any notice or without any reason. The learned Judge observed as follows :-
“A literal or liberal interpretation of clause (bb) may result in depriving the workman of the protection by the Act. The said clause has to be read and understood having regard to and in the light of the scheme and object of the Act. I am of the considered opinion that a termination simpliciter purporting to have been made in pursuance of the above nature cannot be termed as a termination under a stipulation contained in the contract within the meaning of clause (bb). It, therefore, follows that the petitioner’s termination amounts to retrenchment and inasmuch as he has admittedly put in a service of more than 240 days he is entitled to the benefit of Section 25-F of the Act.”
It has been held by the High Court of Bombay in Dilip Hanumantrao Shirke, (A.I.R. 1990 Labour I.C. 100), as follows :-
“As stated above, the terminations which are included in Sub-clause (bb) are those which are brought about either because of non-renewal of the contract or because of expiry of time stipulated in the contract of employment. It needs no further explanation, but the probability of the employer exploiting the labour by giving fixed tenure appointments can never be overruled and, therefore, it would be improper and unwise simply to decide the nature of employment on the basis of letter of appointment issued by the employer. The nature of employment has to be determined with reference to the nature of duties performed by the workman and type of job the workman was entrusted with.”
14. In K. Rajendran v. The Director (Personnel) The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Limited, (1992 L.I.C. 909), it has been held as follows :-
“But there is nothing in Sub-clause (bb) which enable an unscrupulous employer to terminate the service of the workers on the ground of non-renewal of their contract even when the work for which they were employed subsists. The exception as contained in Sub-clause (bb) will have to be strictly construed and Clause (bb) should be made applicable only to such cases where the work ceased with the employment or the post itself ceases to exist. Clause (bb) cannot be made applicable to a case when the employer resorts to contractual employment as a device to simply take it out of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act notwithstanding the fact that the work for which the workmen are employed continues or the nature of duties which the workman was performing are still in existence.”
15. This Court in Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited, Kurukshetra v. State of Haryana, (1993(1) SCT 109) held as follows :-
In similar circumstances a Division Bench of this Court to which I was a party, in Haryana State Federation of Consumer’s Co-operative Wholesale Stores v. Presiding Officer, Labour, Chandigarh, 1992(1) SCT 697, held that “the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) are to be read alongwith Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. When the Management allows the workman to continue in service with notional breaks after the workman had put in 240 days of service in 12 months it amounts to unfair labour practice if his services are terminated. In that case Section 25-F(ii) of the Act would cover the case and the workman would be entitled to retrenchment compensation if his services were to be terminated.”
16. In view of my forgoing discussion, I am of the opinion that the termination of services of the 2nd respondent on the ground that the order of appointment provides for termination on the expiry of a particular period and, therefore, the termination in this case does not amount to retrenchment, cannot be accepted. Further the High Court will not interfere with the order of the Tribunal in exercise of its certiorarial jurisdiction unless the orders of the Tribunal are found to be without jurisdiction or in violation of rules of natural justice or where they suffer from an error of law apparent on the face of it. These principles have been enunciated by the Supreme Court in Syed Yakob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477) and also reiterated in Instrumentation Limited v. Rajasthan Mazdoor Sabha, (1993(1) WLC 318).
17. In view of my foregoing discussion, I am of the opinion that the writ petition is/devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed.
18. The result is the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.