ORDER
Sat Pal, J.
1. These revision petitions (Cr. Misc. Nos. 8960M of 1995, 8966 M of 1995 and 8971M of 1995) are being disposed of by this common judgment as the point involved in all these cases is similar. In all these cases, complaint was filed by the respondent-Bank against the petitioners in respect of offences under Sections 420/ 467/ 468/ 471 /120-B, Indian Penal Code. The learned trial Court vide its order, dated 27th Sept. 1989 summoned the accused including the petitioners to face trial under Sections 467/468/471/ 120-B, Indian Penal Code. The aforesaid order passed by the learned trial Court was challenged by the petitioners by filing revision petitions under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, the Code) before Additional Sessions Judge, Bathinda. The learned Additional Sessions Judge by his judgment, dated 25th January, 1995, held that the order summoning the accused passed by the learned trial Court was an interlocutory order and in view of the provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code, these revision petitions were not maintainable, and as such these petitions were dismissed. The aforesaid orders, dated 25th January, 1995 have been challenged in these petitions. Notice of these petitions was issued to the respondents on the limited point as to whether revision petition against the order of summoning is maintainable under Section 397 of the Code.
2. Mr. Deoli, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the impugned order summoning the accused, even though may not be final; but it is not an interlocutory order so as to attract the bar of Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code. He submitted that such an order must be taken an order of the type falling in the middle course. He further submitted that in case, the summoning order in question was reversed, it would have culminated in cessation of the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners. He, therefore, contended that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was wrong in holding that a revision petition is not maintainable against the order summoning the accused. In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments:
1) Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 : (1977 Cri LJ 1891);
2) Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47: (1978 Cri LJ 165);
3) V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC 962: (1980 Cri LJ 690).
3. Mr. Goyal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, submitted that the order summoning the accused passed by the learned trial Court was essentially an interlocutory order and in view of the bar under Section 397(2) of the Code, the revision petition against such an order was not maintainable. He, therefore, contended that the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bathinda, were perfectly legal and in accordance with law laid down by this Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments rendered by various single Judge Benches of this Court:
(1) Kumalu Din alias Kamal v. Mangal Das, (1994) 2 Rec Cri R 82 (Punj & Har);
(2) Dr. T.N. Chaturvedi v. Karnail Singh, (1994) 3 Rec Cri R 517 (Punj & Har);
(3) Khushal Singh v. Mohinder Singh, (1994) 1 Rec Cri R 506 (Punj & Har).
4. Learned counsel further submitted that though the revision petition against the order of summoning was not maintainable, the accused have got a remedy to challenge such an order before the trial Court itself and the Magistrate has jurisdiction to drop the proceedings on reconsideration. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, (1992) 1 Rec Cri R 232: (1992 Cri LJ 3779).
5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. Before dealing with the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it will be relevant to refer to Section 397 of the Code which reads as under:-
397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision. – (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended and if the accused is in confirnment, that he be released bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation. – All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purpose of this Sub-section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by Sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
6. The main question which falls for determination in these revision petitions is the connotation of the term “interlocutory order” as appear in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code which bars any revision of such an order. The said term “interlocutory order” has been interpreted and explained by the Apex Court in the case of Amar Nath, (1977 Cri LJ 1891) (supra). While explaining the term “interlocutory order”, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows (at pp 1894-95 of Cri LJ):-
It seems to us that the term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.”
7. The above observations were approved by the Apex Court in its majority judgment in the case of V.C. Shukla, (1980 Cri LJ 690) (supra). It was further observed in this case that an order summoning an accused was not an interlocutory order but being a matter of moment it decided an important aspect of the trial and was, therefore, in a sense a final order which could be revised by the Sessions Judge or the High Court under Section 397 of the Code. It was further observed that the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Amar Nath, (1977 Cri LJ 1891) (supra) have to be read in the light of the peculiar facts of that case.
8. In the case of Mohan Lal Maghan Lal Thakar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 733 : (1968 Cri LJ 876) (which was rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court), the majority decision culled out four tests to ascertain as to whether an order is an interlocutory order. One of the tests is “if the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on.” Applying this test, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye, (1978 Cri LJ 165) (supra) observed as under (at pp 171 -172 ofCriLJ):
Applying that test to the facts of the instant case it would be noticed that if the plea of the appellant succeeds and the order of the Sessions Judge is reversed, the criminal proceeding as initiated and instituted against him cannot go on. If, however, he loses on the merits of the preliminary point the proceeding will go on. Applying the test of Kuppuswami’s case, AIR 1949 FC 1: (1948 (49) Cri LJ 625) such an order will not be a final order. But applying the fourth test noted at page 688 in Mohan Lai’s case (1968) 2 SCR 685, AIR 1968 SC 733 at p 738 : (1968 Cri LJ 876 at pp 881-882) it would be a final order.”
In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed as under (1978 Cri LJ 165 at pp 172-173):
Before we conclude we may point out an obvious, almost insurmountable, difficulty in the way of applying literally the test laid down in Kuppuswami Rao’s case, AIR 1949 FC 1: (1948 (49) Cri LJ 625) and in holding that an order of the kind under consideration being not a final order must necessarily be an interlocutory one. If a complaint is dismissed under Section 203 or under Section 204(4) or the Court holds the proceeding to be void or discharges the accused, a revision to the High Court at the instance of the complainant or the prosecutor would be competent, otherwise it will make Section 398 of the new Code otiose. Does it stand to reason, then that an accused will have no remedy to move the High Court in revision or invoke its inherent power for the quashing of the criminal proceeding initiated upon a complain or otherwise and which is fit to be quashed on the face of it? The legislature left the power to order further inquiry intact in Section 398. Is it not then in consonance with the sense of justice to leave intact the remedy of the accused to move the High Court for setting aside the order adversely made against him in similar circumstances and to quash the proceeding? The answer must be given in favour of the just and reasonable view expressed by us above.”
9. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Madu Limaye, (1978 Cri LJ 165) (supra) the point to be examined in the present case is “If the order summoning the accused is reversed, would the action have to go on.” The answer to this question is evident that in case the order summoning the accused is reversed, the complaint would be dismissed and the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused cannot go on and in view of this, the order of summoning will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and revision petition against such an order shall lie under Section 397 of the Code. It would rather be a final order in terms of the test mentioned in the case of Mohan Lai, (1968 Cri LJ 876) (supra) which was reiterated in the case of Madhu Limaye (supra). As regards the judgment rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case, Kamalu Din (supra) and Dr. T.N. Chaturvedi (supra), with respect to the Hon’ble single Judge, it will be sufficient to state that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye (supra) was not referred by the learned counsel for the parties before the learned single Judge. It will also be relevant to point out here that in the case of K.K. Mathew, (1992 Cri LJ 3779) (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the accused can plead before the Magistrate concerned that the process against him ought not to have been issued against him but there is no observation by the Supreme Court that the accused cannot challenge the order of summoning by filing a revision petition.
10. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, I allow these petitions, set aside the impugned orders dated 25th Jan. 1995, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda and remit these cases back to the said Court to dispose of the revision petitions filed by the petitioners on merits in accordance with law. Needless to add, the learned Additional Sessions Judge while disposing of the revision petitions shall keep in mind the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604: (1992 Cri LJ 527) and subsequent decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.