JUDGMENT
Rabin Bhattacharyya, J.
1. The petitioner, Karunaketan, has hit upon the writ application for issuance of Mandamus and for other collateral reliefs which fielded amongst others the quashing of charge-sheet dated July 5, 1984, annexure-A.
Thus, I begin :-
2. The petitioner while acting as Branch Manager, Dunlop Bridge, Allahabad Bank made advances, loans, overdrafts etc., with the approval of the authority between February 28, 1983 and May 21, 1984. Ultimately it turned to be a sore in his official career. Administrative functions of the said branch bore the dent as it was starving for the staff about which the respondents are in an inhospitable look. He did not receive feedback from the head office. The respondents charged him with misconduct for unwise and unauthorised acts of his contrary to Banking Rules, norms and procedures, namely Rules 3(1), 3(2), 3(3) and 3(4) of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regn., 1976. The misconduct had left him writhing in agony.
3. Needless to repeat the unbecoming conduct of the petitioner, according to the charge-sheet tosses its head by the reason of flouting the banking principles and procedures of lending in regard to making of a pre-credit appraisal, ensuring post credit verification and follow-up action, the object being to safeguard the interest of the bank. The initiation of disciplinary proceedings was visited with illegalities as it offended fair hearing, natural justice and reasonableness. The above does not provide any avenue for the respondents to explore relief and the disciplinary proceedings, accordingly, is exploded.
4. The respondents have consistently denounced the claim of the petitioner on all counts by their affidavit-in-opposition. It is manifest from the affidavit-in-opposition of the re-spodents Nos. 1,2,3,4, & 5 dated August 10, 1985 duly sworn in by Regional(sic) Lawrens Lewis and the affidavit of Gopal Mukherjee dated September 9, 1989 to contend that the disciplinary proceedings is not leaky but hole proof. The court is not clothed with jurisdiction to entertain the prayer of the petitioner. The approval, spoken to by the petitioner, about the loans and advances granted to parties is a ruse, which, according to the respondents, is a convenient plea to wriggle out of the impasse. In all the affidavits-in-opposition dated August 10, 1985 and September 9, 1987 respectively, the respondents refuted the claim of the petitioner that Shri. R.C. Srivastava gave any permission to the petitioner to extend financial accommodation to different parties. The disciplinary proceedings cannot be blown off on the frivolous allegations of closeness of mind, bias by violation of natural justice. It is no good to cry over the spilt milk when the petitioner himself submitted to the jurisdiction who took inspection of the documents, cross-examined the management witnesses and argued in detail to ground the claim of the petitioner. The petitioner has exaggerated the claim out of proportion.
5. The writ petition, according to the writ petitioner, is an attempt to keep the respondents at bay. He is guilty of suppression of Facts which dominate the field disentitling him to any relief. The supplementary affidavits of the petitioner are the reproduction of his claim as reflected in the writ petition.
6. It is upon these premises, the parties have exchanged their blows with each other to knock down the right of his opponent.
7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner while stirring the claim has submitted with all emphasis that the language employed in the charge-sheet are revelation of close mind of the disciplinary authority who is bent upon to hook the petitioner with the fragile allegations of misconduct. The approach of the authority from the very inception of the proceeding is to rope in the charged Officer which is unholy. The facts become wrong track more overwhelming, as argued, that the contents of the charge-sheet expressed without any ambiguity, the framing of mind of the authority before the commencement of the proceedings about the guilt of the charged Officer, the petitioner which is a foregone conclusion. There is colourable exercise of power by the authority which dominates the field when the petitioner was rejected from the quarter suggesting immaculately the frame of mind of the respondents. The authority has landed on a wrong shore, thus.
8. The claim of the adversory, as highlighted in his argument, is that the infringement of natural justice and reasonableness is patent. The documents namely Annexure-D were not supplied to the petitioner to stall the claim of the respondents as the decision making process was absolutely vitiated for non-observation of natural justice, and for non-compliance with the Rules and Regulations by which the parties are governed. Even Mr. Srivastava was not examined who is a material witness as the official action of the petitioner followed from the approval of R.C. Srivastava for loans and advances made to its customers. The approach of the authority is mechanical. The Enquiry Officer is a stooge in the hand of the disciplinary authority, who danced in tune with the respondents. He was partisan, for which, the proceedings has no mooring in law.
9. Further, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is vocal in his submission that the AGM should not act as disciplinary authority in this case. According to the learned counsel that the initiation of the proceedings at a belated stage of a stale charge is not permissible as the disciplinary authority cannot shrieve its I iabi I ity for the wrong committed. The disciplinary authority suddenly woke up from its long slumber to deprive the petitioner of his legitimate dues of having recourse to disciplinary proceedings on an imbecile plea of misconduct.
10. The learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Mullick has refuted the claim of the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the count that the close mind theory, as spoken to by him, melts thin in the air. The petitioner submitted himself to the jurisdiction where opportunities to the satisfaction of the petitioner to contest the proceedings were given. There was no hush but reasonableness everywhere. There is no shred of obscurity in the claim of the petitioner that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were ever erroneous. The recovery of loans and advances from the different customers without due sanction and approval of the authority, as claimed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is more fictitious than real. Procedure was duly complied with in conducting the proceedings. The petitioner maintains an unnatural silence about the procedure to be followed in conducting or pursuing the disciplinary proceedings. The final order is not devoid of reasoning and fair-play. The claim of bias, in the background of the above, fades out.
11. The gamut of the whole question is as to whether the petitioner got a fair and reasonable opportunity to contest the proceedings.
12. Before embarking on an enquiry to examine the viability of the claim with reference to the principle of natural justice, fairness, reasonableness and doctrine of bias, it emerges from the order dated August 17, 1989 that the Hon’ble Court gave liberty to the respondent to pass a final order and serve the same upon the petitioner along with the enquiry report by August 25, 1989. But the order if adverse to the petitioner shall be kept in abeyance until further orders of this Court. The Court also accorded liberty to the petitioner to file supplementary affidavit in order to incorporate his grievances that may be adjudged in the writ application. Now, the matter has come up before me for a decision.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner in assailing the disciplinary proceedings has laboriously researched in his argument at the very threshold that non-examination of Sri. R.C. Srivastava, denial of inspection of documents, an-nexure-D, and inordinate delay have spelt out disastrous consequences in the disciplinary proceedings, as there was overwhelming failure of the authority to dispose of the disciplinary proceedings, having regard to the principle of natural justice. The above has made a mess of the whole show and the entire disciplinary proceedings is bristled with abject failure of justice and illegalities.
14. The authorities, as argued, indulged in hostility being oblivious of the fact that the loans and advances were duly approved by Sri Srivastava. The same would reveal upon examination of Sri Srivastava and the documents relied on by the petitioner. The entire disciplinary proceedings is not only a travesty of justice, but also a travesty of truth.
15. To sustain the potency of the contention, I have gone through the disciplinary proceedings, which for moment does not show that the petitioner has suffered for non-examination of Sri Srivastava, nor the petitioner’s claim could be harboured for the alleged denial of inspection of the documents.
16. Turning myself to the orders of the disciplinary proceedings, it is manifest from the orders dated January 9, 1985, January 10, 1985 and also from other dates that the denial of inspection has been conjured up by the petitioner to steal a march. It is notorious to find from the order sheets of the disciplinary proceedings that the petitioner alongwith his Defence Assistants inspected the documents at Dunlop Bridge Branch dwelling on grant of overdrafts, drawal of loans and advances to the new born customers of the said branch of the bank.
17. More so, the evidence of the witnesses, in the context, does not foreshadow that he was prejudiced by the alleged denial of inspection of the documents. The due observance of natural justice surrounding the disciplinary proceedings, in my view, has not been flouted as the petitioner (CO) got adequate oportunities to present his case, which at any rate does not offend the principles of natural justice, where fairness and reasonableness formed the very core of it.
18. It is the legitimate right of the disciplinary authority to refuse inspection, if any, of the documents which are not relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the misconduct. The order passed by the Enquiry Officer dated March 21, 1995 supports such view. Incidentally, I leave on record that the petitioner got the copy of the order sheets soon after the conclusion of the day to day proceedings.
19. The petitioner to detain the hearing to its dangerous and embarrassing length has cultivated numerous pleas which are manifestly insubstantial . He was aware of the charges that become patent, who made serious endeavour to contradict them as evident by the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings. It is nothing but a cry in despair. It is an attempt to thwart the disciplinary proceedings on the pretext of infringement of natural justice, fairness and reasonableness.
20. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted with all emphasis that the petitioner is deeply wounded for the recalcitrant approach of the disciplinary authority when the examination of Mr. Srivastava did not find favour with it. The examination of Mr. Srivastava would reveal considerable material which was to aid the relief as sought for by the petitioner. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Srivastava was working in the tandem, for which this catastrophe(sic). Heaven would not fall, if he would have been examined in the case. Non-examination of Mr. Srivastava, on behalf of the disciplinary authority, as sought for by the petitioner, has significantly crippled the disciplinary proceedings which has lost its force and momentum. As it appears from the writ application and the supplementary affidavits that one of the reasons for his examination, as demanded by the petitioner, was for securing an answer from him who it is alleged gave verbal permission and sanction for the loans and advances in advance. But rumour is a great traveller.
21. The claim of the petitioner is exploded for the fictitious plea of violation of natural justice since devoid of substance. It is notorious to find from the record of the order sheets and the affidavits that the petitioner granted facilities to Manorama Electronics, Yasoda Devi Mundra, Anita Mundra, V.K. Mundra, Lavish Jem, Raja Chakraborty and Ors.. It stands out that lacs and lacs rupees were allowed to be drawn, loans sanctioned, overdrafts allowed and advances made shortly after opening of their accounts. Doubt hangs on his honesty and integrity. It is merely illustrative but not exhaustive. He has tried to iron out the crease in vain.
22. Lavish Jem opened its account on Janunary 13, 1984 and on the same day, he allowed the party to withdraw Rs. 5 lacs causing debit balance of Rs. 4,98,899/- in the above account, in absence of any limit. So far, Yasoda Devi Mundra and Anita Devi Mundra are concerned, it is manifest from the order sheets that over-drawings were allowed in absence of any limit being sanctioned by the bank. More so, when a cheque for sum of Rs. 5 lacs were returned unpaid on January 6, 1984, a further withdrawal was allowed by the petitioner. Anita Mundra opened her account on November 14, 1983, November 16. 1983 and November 17, 1983 and she drew a sum of Rs. 3 lacs plus 4 lacs in the account as on November 17, 1983. The above actions are not the lone instances, but there are many more which indicate with accuracy, the official lapses committed by the petitioner. It is an inglorious conduct of a Bank official holding high position.
23. In the context, the approval, sanction and permission, as alleged to have been given by Sri-vastava, worn out thin. It appears from the record of the disciplinary proceedings that he wanted to meet the need of immediacy of his new born customers without having due regard to the norms and banking procedure. It is a matter of bewilderment that approval, sanction and permission, as alleged, were granted before opening of the account by the new born customers. Such huge amount was allowed to be withdrawn by the customers named in the charge-sheet immediately after their opening the accounts. The above exposes the infirmity of his claim that Mr. Srivastava was aware of the loans and advances. I cannot but say that, as if, the Ramayana was written before Ram was born, He becomes the prisoner of his own claim when the surrounding circumstances belie the approval of Mr. Srivastava. No fool on the earth will accord sanction or approval for loans and overdrafts before opening of the accounts. Therefore, non-examination of Mr. Srivastava is a convenient plea to knock out the disciplinary proceedings as it verges on the false pretext of non-observance of natural justice. It is merely an allegation on paper beyond which, there is no truth. The sanctity of the disciplinary proceedings is sought to have been polluted under the pretence of violation of natural justice, reasonableness, fairness and denial of opportunity. I can say…… that one lie makes many.
24. In the context, I am afraid that a bank could grant and allow loans, advances and overdrafts on informal application, which none but the petitioner alone realised the immediacy. He has not disclosed the material facts behind such loans and advances as it was granted immediately after the opening of the account, for which, he cannot claim any relief in the writ application. He has not made the clean breath of the facts and the writ Court being a Court of equity cannot come to his aid. It is an acrobatic feat of the petitioner to pull wool over the eyes of the Court, the object being to secure relief at a cheaper cost. What lionised him to grant such advances, loans and drawings without verification of the credibilities of the new born customers? His heart wept much for the new born customers. Despite his best endeavour, he could not go back to the saddle to ride on the back of natural justice.
25. The learned Counsel for the respondents has vehemently submitted that the conduct of the petitioner is inexplicable which suggests a secret deal between the petitioner on one hand and the new born customers on the other detrimental to the interest of the bank. But this Court refrains from answering the same as it is not the subject matter of the enquiry. As a Judicial C.I.D., I am to unearth as to whether fairness, reasonableness and natural justice have been maintained in the proceedings. The Court is not to enter in the scenario to detect any secret deal between the petitioner and the customers.
26. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended in the next breath that the language employed in the charge-sheet indicate the closeness of mind projecting on the determination of the authority to hold the petitioner guilty. It, according to him, is a formation of an opinion before the commencement of the disciplinary proceedings. I have gone through the charge-sheet meticulously. But I do not find that there is any framing of mind by the authority. Charge Sheet has made a disclosure of the misconduct perpetrated by him in discharge of official duties, while he was the Manager of the Dunlop Bridge Branch. There is nothing to find from the charge-sheet that the disciplinary authorities have committed themselves to any view in advance of enquiry. The approach of the authority is impartial at every stage of the proceedings, which is predominant.
27. Incidentally, the petitioner was thrown out from his quarter cannot be interpreted as bias, nor the same attributes to the theory of close mind. In fact, the petitioner had used natural justice and fair play to whip up prejudice against the respondents, the disclosure of which has proved more than embarrassing. The allegation has not been bridged by realities. It is a serious impact which has produced cracks in his claim. He has charged the battery of writ to its sufficient frenzy to disguise the bruises, of which he is the author. But the bruises are incurable for which this distorted propaganda about violation of natural justice.
28. The learned Counsel for the respondents in refuting the contention has repeatedly urged that the petitioner was in suspension, and, therefore, there is no obligation for the bank to accommodate him in the quarter at the bank premises, as there must be some official in his place to be accommodated who is to act as Branch Manager of the bank. This cannot be a bias, nor the same could come within the fold of close mind theory.
29. In the context, the bias is a slogan. The Supreme Court in analysing and defining bias in Secretary to the Govt. Transport Dept., Madras v. Muniswamy Mudaliar came to the conclusion that a predisposition to decide for and against one party without proper regard to the true merit of the disputes is bias. The test for bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man fully appraised of the circumstances would feel a serious apprehension of bias. The petitioner has laboured under misapprehension as the proceeding preceded by charge-sheet neither suggested nor proved any such apprehension as the record shows that fair hearing and reasonableness were worshipped and the postmortem state of affairs in the proceedings, was cool and healthy.
30. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that loans, overdrafts and advances were recovered to the fullest extent and the present proceeding is a coercive measure by the disciplinary authority to inflict punishment. But the record does not reveal that loans, advances and overdrafts were recovered. None of the witnesses cited and examined by the petitioner came to the rescue of the petitioner about the recovery of loans, overdrafts and advances etc. A man may lie but the documents will speak for itself.
31. Thus, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the loans and advances were recovered which were wisely granted by him is illusory. I refuse to accept, in the context, that the disciplinary proceeding was perfunctory and that it went against the canons of the fundamental principle of natural justice, fairness and reasonableness.
32. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has time and again submitted that the report of the Enquiry Officer was mechanically accepted by the disciplinary authority. I have gone through the entire order sheet of the disciplinary proceedings, but, I do not find any material worth the credit that the Enquiry Officer took any mechanical approach in the matter of conducting the disciplinary proceedings. On the contrary he carried the entire proceedings through the flexible procedure keeping in view on the fair hearing, reasonableness and natural justice. Therefore, the contention about the mechanical disposal of the proceeding withers away.
33. I reject also the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner who has argued that initiation of the proceeding after lapse of time is illegal. He has laid blame at the door of the respondent-opposite party for the alleged delay of initiation of proceedings, but the factual exposure of the case does not support the claim of the petitioner. I may say that the respondent- opposite parties are not guilty of any wrong. On the contrary, they tried to discover the culpable wrong, of which the petitioner was the author. Further, it appears from perusal of the “Allahabad Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976” that the parties are governed by the said Regulations about which, there cannot be two opinions. It appears from Regulation 17 that provision for appeal is being made, if any penalties imposed specified in Rule 4 or against the order of suspension referred to Regulation 12. The appeal shall lie to the appellate authority, thus.
34. In the background of the provisions for appeals being made in the Regulation, the writ Court cannot act as a substitute for the appeal Court. When the alternative remedy is provided, a party aggrieved or entitled to relief cannot give up the Regulation by which he is governed and rush to the writ Court. The remedy provided for in Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ, if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. The Regulation 17 of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulation, 1976 are quite adequate where relief can be harvested by the party. Even Regulation 18 provides for review. In my view, both the Regulations are complete in themselves in the advent of which the present writ application is not maintainable. If it is allowed, the provisions for appeal under the regulations would be infructuous. It does not indicate that the remedies available under the regulation are entirely ill-suited to meet the demand of extraordinary situation as for instance where the vires of the regulation is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably connected and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse must be had to the writ jurisdiction.
35. In the background of the above principle of law, relief under Article 226 cannot be availed of as it is not meant to short circuit or circumvent the regulations having the force of statute. It appears that the regulations were made in exercise of powers conferred by Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. So long it remains legally alive, he is a prisoner to it. The learned Counsel for the petitioner at any stage of the proceedings or hearing never challenged the vires of the regulations.
36. I am tempted to cite a few decisions but not many to indicate that the writ Court should not ordinarily invoke its jurisdiction de hors the statute when there is a provision for appeal. Titagarh Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, , Shyama Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1279 and United Bank of India v. Hirak Mukherejee and Ors., 1995 (1) Cal LJ 124 and Biswanath alias Deb Kumar Pathak v. Shyamal Kumar Pathak and Ors. 1995 (1) Cal LJ 139.
37. The decisions cited above inspire confidence. The writ Court can make judicial review to arrive at a conclusion as to whether, the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority in conducting the disciplinary proceedings or awarding penalties is in consonance with natural justice, fair play and reasonableness. There is no material on record which could afford irresistable conclusion that they were violated.
38. In the back-train, the provisions for appeal under the law should be explored, if a party is aggrieved. There is no slender material in the affidavits-on-record that the regulations will not come to the aid of the petitioner. In that view of the matter, the writ is not maintainable.
39. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to a large number of decisions A.L. Kalra v. Project & Equipment Corporation, (1984-II-LLJ-186 (SC); Union of India v. J.Ahmed, (1979-II-LLJ-14(SC); S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supplement SCC 87; Kanwarlal v. Amarnath, ; Union of India v. S.K. Chatterjee, 1981 Lab IC 751; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors., (1988-I-LLJ-256) Export Inspection Counsel of India v. K.K. Mitra, 1987(2)CLJ 344, Kasinath Dikshit v. Union of India and Ors., (1986-II-LLJ-468(SC) Nripendranath v. Union of India and Ors., 1981 SLR 533 Sunil Kumar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1977 Cal 1014, Bimal Kanta Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, 1981, SLR 232, Ram Gopal Bhattacharjee v. State of West Bengal, 1987 Lab IC 1617, State of Madras v. Bali Singh and Ors. .
40. The facts of the rulings under reference are not applicable to the facts of the present case for the proceedings never erupted from doctrine of bias, unreasonableness, unfair hearing etc.
41. In my view, the petitioner was given adequate opportunities to contest the disciplinary proceedings, and, therefore, the bias and infringement of natural justice as spoken to by him is a far cry in wilderness.
42. The petitioner, who had begun with high profile campaign on the score of natural justice, bias, fair hearing etc., had been caught with his pants down and despite all his efforts, the nakedness of his claim is not being clothed in the legal arena. He by his deeds and acts constituting misconduct has fallen from the pedestal and landed on the ground with a resounding thud. He was making noises on the above issues, though aware of their outcome.
43. Thus, upon considering the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, I reject the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and accept that of the respondents. With the above order, the writ application is disposed of and, all interim orders stand vacated.