JUDGMENT
R.G. Deshpande, J.
1. Rule returnable forthwith. Taken up for final
hearing with the consent of the parties.
2. The Respondent No. 2 – Murlidhar Nagulwar,
moved an application under Section 28 of the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971, in Complaint ULP Case No.
1128 of 1990, alleging unfair labour practice on the part
of the present petitioners. This application was filed
on October 30, 1990. During the pendency of the main
Complaint, an application was moved on September 8, 1998
at the instance of the respondent No. 2/employee, seeking
certain amendments, which was allowed by the learned
Member of the Industrial Court. However, subsequent
application for amendment, which was moved on April 3,
2001, that was at the stage of evidence, appears to have
been rejected by the learned Member of the Industrial
Court.
3. The evidence in the matter was recorded and it
was over and the matter was closed for judgment on April
30, 2001. On the date when the Judgment was supposed to
come out, the Respondent No. 2/employee moved an application on the same day, again seeking an amendment as prayed for in the said application, as is clear from
the record, which is definitely material and substantial,
to which the learned Member of the Industrial Court has
referred to in para No. 1 of his order, which is under
challenge.
4. The learned Member of the Industrial Court, in
spite of opposition by the petitioners, allowed the
amendment application, observing that: if the amendment
was not allowed, it would have resulted in
multifariousness of the proceedings. The learned Member
of the Industrial Court further observed that:
Amendment, in ordinary course, should not be disallowed
only on the ground of delay. He further observed that in
the interest of justice, amendment could be allowed at
any stage and, therefore, allowing the amendment at the
stage of judgment or order could not be said to be wrong.
The learned Member has referred to certain judgments
cited before him for reaching to the conclusion.
5. So far as regards proposition that amendment
could be allowed at any stage is concerned, cannot be
disputed. However, that would not mean that any type of
amendment can be allowed at any stage. The presumption
is that, if an amendment has a direct nexus with the
result of the case, then in that case, it could be said
that the amendment could be allowed at any stage.
However, taking into consideration the present dispute,
it is absolutely clear that the reliefs under Item 9 of
Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, were not asked for
in the original Complaint. If the precise amendment is
read, it would show that amended portion is in prayer
clause 1, which is to the effect that: ” allow the
complaint under Item 9 Schedule IV of the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Unfair Labour Practices
Act, as per Kalelkars Settlement Award,”. Besides this,
clause 5 is sought to be added by way of amendment, which
reads as under:
“The petitioner be converted as
Karkoon with effect from 1.5.1987
and difference of salary be
kindly allowed since 1.5.1987
onwards.”
In the opinion of this Court, these are the precise
amendments, as sought for by the respondent/employee,
which definitely need a particular type of evidence to be
adduced by the parties, particularly when the original
prayer clause of the Complaint did not contain these
prayers, and further if the prayer clause is minutely
read, it would clearly show that but for seeking
promotion as Karkoon in a particular scale from lower
scale and that too from 23 April, 1990, is only asked for
with difference in emoluments. In the opinion of this
Court, amendment to clause 1 of the prayer clause, as
also amendment to prayer clause 5, definitely would
change the whole tenor of the dispute itself and such
amendments at the belated stage of proceedings i.e.
virtually at the time of pronouncement of the judgment,
should not have been allowed.
6. It is well established principles of law that
the present type of application could have been
entertained during the course of hearing of the matter.
However, when the matter having been closed for judgment,
after adducing evidence by the parties concerned, and
particularly, when the nature of the reliefs is being
either added or changed, for which there was no evidence
adduced by the parties, should not have been allowed by
the learned Member of the Industrial Court.
7. In the circumstances, I see considerable
substance in this petition. The impugned order passed by
the learned Member of the Industrial Court, allowing the
amendment application, cannot be sustained in the eye of
law. In the opinion of this Court, it virtually amounted
to allowing the Complainant to fill in the lacunas which
were already there in the original Complaint, that too
which is prejudicial to the interest of the present
petitioners.
8. In this view of the matter, the impugned order
of the learned Member of the Industrial Court is hereby
quashed and set aside. The learned Member of the
Industrial Court shall proceed with the matter forgetting
the amendments.
9. Rule is made absolute in the above said terms
with no order as to costs.