ORDER
Devinder Gupta, J.
1. The petitioner-landlord has come up in revision under Section 16(8) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (Act No. 25 of 1987) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) against an order passed by the Rent Controller (4), Shimla on 14th August, 1992 dismissing his petition seeking eviction of tenant-respondent under Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act.
2. On 21st August, 1990, a petition under Sub-section (2) of the Section 15 was filed by the petitioner seeking tenant’s eviction from the upper flat No. 27/1, Boileauganj, Shimla, comprising three rooms, kitchen, bath, latrine and a glazed verandah. It was alleged that the petitioner was due to retire from the post of State Vocational Guidance Officer in the Labour and Employment Directorate of the Government of Himachal Pradesh on 31st July, 1991. The petitioner being a ‘specified landlord’ within the meaning of word as defined in Section 2(i) of the Act, was entitled to seek respondent’s eviction since the premises in question are the only suitable accommodation available to him for his residence after retirement. It was alleged that the petitioner was already in occupation of one room, kitchen, verandah, bath and latrine in the grpund floor of the building in question, In addition to it, there was one
shop attached to the set occupied by him, where his wife Pritama Gupta was running a type-writing training centre. His family consists of himself, his wife and one son, who was also posted as Refractionist in the Rural Health Centre at Arki and was staying with him. The two married daughters keep on visiting him along with other family members. As such, the accommodation with him was wholly inadequate. The son of the petitioner is of marriageable age. The petitioner and his wife were not owning and possessing any other suitable accommodation within Shimla, where he wanted to reside and start his business after retirement. It was alleged that the petiioner had not taken or come in possession of any other accommodation within the last five years of the filing of this petition.
3. On putting an appearance, the respondent sought leave of the Court to contest the eviction petition by filing an application supported with his affidavit. The requisite leave to contest was granted to the respondent by the Rent Controller on 24th October, 1990. Number of grounds were taken by the respondent in reply, filed in answer to the eviction petition. It was alleged that the petitioner had in the recent past got spacious residential sets vacated on the ground of his personal bona fide use and occupation, which fact had been suppressed in the eviction petition. The petitioner came in possession of a vacant spacious set in the ground floor of building, initial rent whereof was Rs. 13/- per month. The same had been thereafter let out to one Shri P.N. Kambhoj on a rental of Rs. 500/- per month. Another set got vacated by him for his personal bona fide use and occupation was earlier let out on Rs. 17/- per month, but now another tenant had been inducted from whom the petitioner was realising Rs. 600/- per month as rent. It was alleged that the accommodation in petitioner’s occupation was more than sufficient and he was not in need of any additional accommodation. He had been occupying and residing in the ground floor since December, 1977 along with his three children and mother. Children were brought up, educated in the same set and now two daughters have
been married. The size of family had reduced. The married daughters are residing outside Shimla. Even the mother of the petitioner is not residng with him. The respondent alleged that the accommodation in the ground floor was almost identical with the accommodation in his possession, as such, seeking his eviction under summary jurisdiction was highly mala fide on the part of the petitioner, who had a commercial bent of mind. The respondent initially had been paying Rs, 27.50 per month as rent, which was enhanced by the petitioner to Rs. 60/- and presently the respondent was paying a sum of Rs. 88/- per month as rent. The intention of the petitioner was to coerce the respondent and pay an exorbitant rent at the rate of Rs. 500 per month.
4. On the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed the following issues:
1. Whether the petitioner is specified landlord and he is entitled to get possesison of the premises in dispute, as prayed OPP.
2. Whether the petition is ‘not maintain
able? OPR.
3. Whethuer the petition is mala fide?
OPR
3A. Whether the petition is pre-mature, as
alleged? OPR
4. Relief.
5. First part of Issue No. 1 was decided in the affirmative by holding that the petitioner is a ‘specified landlord’. On Issue No. 2, the Rent Controller held that the petitioner was already in occupation of a residential set in the ground floor, as such was not entitled to gel possesion of the premises in occupation of the tenant, under Section 15(2) of the Act. According to the Rent Controller, in case the accommodation in the petitioner’s occupation was insufficient, he had other remedy available to him in seeking tenant’s eviction by filing a regular petition under Section 14(3) of the Act. Consequently, second part of Issue No. I was held in negative and Issues No. 3 and 3A were not decided. As a result of the findings, petition was dimissed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred the instant petition as also challenge the same by filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority.
6. After the tenant put in appearance on notice pending admission was served upon him, a preliminary objection was raised regarding maintainability of the revision against an order passed by the Rent Controller, refusing to pass an order for recovery of possession under Section 15(2) of the Act. The petitioner, as noticed above, had also by way of abundant precaution preferred an appeal agains the impugned order, in view of the two judgments of this Court in 1992 (1) Sim LC 343 (R.K. Sood v. Roshan Lal) and Civil Revn. No. 213 of 1988 decided on 25th April, 1989 (Shiv Ram v. M.M. Bhattacharji). The learned single Judge, before whom the preliminary objection was raised noticed the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Chowdhry v. Narain Devi Taneja (AIR 1980 SC 2012) and doubted the ratio of the judgment of the two decisions of this Court noted above, consequently, reference to a larger Bench on the question as to whether an order passed by the Rent Controller dismissing an application for recovery of possession by a specified landlord would be subject to revision under Section 16(8) of the Act or can it be challenged only by filing an appeal under Section 24(1)(b) of the act was sought. The Division Bench has answered the Reference in this case on 4th December, 1991, which is now reported as B.N. Gupta v. Ganga Ram, 1992 (1) Sim LC 322. It has been held that even an order by which the Rent Controller has dismissed an application for recovery of possession of a specified landlord or of a landlord covered by Section 14(3)(a)(iii) of the Act would be subject to revision and no appeal under Section 24(1)(b) or further revision under Section 24(5) of the Act would lie against such an order. Consequently, the revision preferred by the petitioner was held maintainable.
7. At the time when revision came up for hearing on 30th April, 1993, it was noticed that though the Rent Controller had framed issues of law and facts, but findings on all the issues had not been recorded. Later part of Issue No. 1 had not been decided in view of findings on Issue No. 2, wherein it was held that the petition was not maintainable since the petitioner was already in occupation of one residential set. In order to decide the questions raised during arguments, it was
thought fit and proper to call for the findings of the Rent Controller on the following point, on the basis of the evidence already adduced by the parties:
“Whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it stands proved that the petitioner or his spouse does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation within the Municipal limits of Shimla, other than the premises in occupation of respondent where he intends to reside and start business.”
8. TheRentControlleron31stMay, 1993 recorded his findings and submitted the same to the Court. It has been held that the petitioner got vacated on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement two residential sets in the same building and shifted to one of such sets and later two another set and finally to the accommodation in the ground floor. Only four days prior to the filing of eviction petition, petitioner got registered part of the ground floor as a shop but there was no convincing evidence on record that petitioner’s wife had been running a Typewriter Training Centre in the said part of ground floor. It has also been held that earlier the petitioner’s family was large and the present accommodation in his occupation was sufficient and suitable for his requirement. The two daughters have since been married. His mother was also not residing with him. There has been no further change in the circumstances for any additional require-ment. To the contrary change, which has taken place is against the petitioner. Consequently, it has been held that the accommodation with the petitioner is suitable, since the petitioner owns and possess another suitable and adequate accommodation in the same building and even his requirement is not genuine. The petitioner has filed objections to the finding recorded by the Rent Controller.
9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties in length. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken me through the entire oral and documentary evidence and has challenged the impugned order as well as the findings recorded on 31st May, 1993 contending that the terms ‘suitability’ and ‘sufficiency’ are the same. While deciding a petition under
Section 15(2) of the Act, the Rent Controller is required to be satisfied that the specified landlord or his spouse does not own or possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area and while recording his satisfaction, it would also be permissible for the Rent Controller to see whether the other accommodation in occupation of the specified landlord or his spouse was or was not a sufficient accommodation for his requirement. It is not necessary while deciding such a petition to enter into the question of bona fide or otherwise of the requirement. Intention of Legislature has been made clear when similar words as are contained in Section 14(4) of the Act have deliberately been omitted from Section 15. When eviction of a tenant is sought under Section 14 of the Act, the Controller is required to satisfy himself that the claim of the landlord is bona fide but while deciding a petition under Section 15 of the Act, there was no such requirement. It was urged that the entire approach of the Rent Controller has been erroneous since he has misdirected himself, while appreciating the evidence, by entering upon the question of bona fide of the petitioner’s claim, which findings are vitiated. As a matter of fact, it stood established that the petitioner, after retirement intends to settle down and start his business. The only suitable accommodation is the one in occupation of the respondent.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent while refuting the submissions made by the petitioner’s counsel urged that in view of the limited scope of the revision under Section 15(8) of the Act, findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller, which are supportable on the evidence on record are not liable to be interferred with and moreover, keeping in view the scheme and object of the Act, it is incumbent for the Rent Controller, even while deciding a petition under Section 15(2) of the Act to examine the bona fides of the claim of a specified landlord.
11. In order to appreciate the submissions made on behalf the counsel for the parties, it will be necessary to make a reference to some of the provisions of the Act.
12. Specified landlord has been defined in
Clause (i) of Section 2 of the Act to mean a person, who is entitled to receive rent in respect of a buidling on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in public service or post in connection with the affiars of the Union or of a State,
13. Section 14 of the Act is the general provision specifying therein various grounds available to landlord to seek eviction of a tenant(s). Section 15 deals with the right to recover immedaite possession of the premises, which is available to certain categories of landlords. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 enables a person, who being in occupation of a residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government, State Government or any local authority to seek eviction of his tenant immediately, in case by any general or special order, he is called upon to vacate the allotted accommodation or in default to incur certain obligation on the ground that he or his spouse or dependent child owns, within the urban area concerned a residential accommodation. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 reads as under;
“15(1} Where a person who being in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government, the State Government or any local authority is required by, or in pursuance of, any general or special order made by the Central or State Government or local authority, as the case may be, to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that he or his spouse or dependent child owns, within the urban area, residential accommodation there shall accrue; on and from the date of such order, to such a person notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied), custom or usage to the contrary, a right to recover immediately the possession of any premises let out by him:
Provided that nothing in this section shall be construed s conferring a right to the person, who himself or whose spouse or dependent child owns, within the urban area, two or more dwelling houses, to recover the possession more than one dwelling house, and
it shall be lawful for such person to indicate the dwelling house, the possesion of which he
intends to recover.”
14, Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act confers a right on a specified landlord to recover immediate possession of one residential set for his own occupation, which right can, be exercised by him at any time within one year prior to or within one year after the date of retirement, in case, he or his spouse does not own or possess any other ‘suitable accommodation’ in the local area in which he intends to reside or start his business. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 reads:
“(2) Where a specified landlord, at any time within one year prior to or within one year after the date of his retirement or after his retirement but within one year of the appointed day whichever is later, applies to the Controller, along with a certificate from the authority competent to remove him from service indicating the date of his retirement and his affidavit to the effect that he or his spouse does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside or to start his own business, to recover possession of one residential building for his own occupation, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such application to such specified landlord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether expressed or implied), custom or usage to the contrary a right to recover immediate possession of such residential buidling or any part or parts of such building if it is let out in part or parts:
Provided that in case of death of the specified landlord, the widow or widower of such specified landlord and in the case of death of such widow or widower, mother or father or a child or a grandchild ora widowed daughter-in-law who was dependent upon such specified landlord at the time of his death shall be entitled to make an application under this section to the Controller–
(a) in the case of death of such specific landlord before the appointed day, within one
year of the said day;
(b) in the case of death of such specified landlord after the appointed day, but before the date of his retirement, within one year of the date of his death;
(c) in the case of death of such specified landlord after the appointed day and the date of his retirement, within one year of the date of such retirement;
and on the date of such application the right to recover the possession of the residential building which belongs to such specified landlord or his spouse at the time of his death shall accrue to the applicant:
Provided further that nothing in this section shall be so construed as conferring a right, on any person to recover possession of more than one residential building inclusive of any part or parts thereof if it is let out in part or parts:
Provided further that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the specified landlord or, as the case may be, the widow, widower, child, grandchild or widowed daughter-in-law in possession of the residential building and may extend such time not exceeding three months in the aggregate.
Explanation — For the purposes of this section, the expression “retirement” includes the voluntary retirement but does not include resignation, discharge or dismissal from service.”
15. Section 16 of the Act prescribes the special procedure applicable for the disposal of applications, where eviction is sought under summary provisions, namely, Section 14(3)(a)(iii) by a landlord, who is a member of Armed Forces and under Section 15 of the Act. Sub-section (8) of Section 16 says that no appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possessing of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with this summary procedure. It further says that the High Court may, for the purposes of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such orders in respect thereto as it thinks fit.
16. In order to satisfy that the order passed by the Controller is or is not in accordance with law, it will be now necessary to first state the admitted factual position, which is based upon the evidence available on record.
17. The petitioner purchased the building in which premises in question are located in its top floor, in the year 1973. It is a four storeyed building with one room in its sub-basement, which is admittedly a Godown. Two floors of the building are below the level of main Boileauganj bazar, which are referred to as basement-I and basement-II. The floor facing the Boileauganj bazar is the ground floor and there is also one floor above that, which is the top floor of the building and is in occupation of the tenant from which his eviction has been sought.
18. Prior to and at the time of purchase of the building, the landlord was residing in a rented accommodation in Kaithu area within the Municipal limits of Shimla. The petitioner sought eviction of one of his tenants, namely, Siri Ram from the residential accommodation located immediately below the gound floor, referred to above, as basement-II on the ground that accommodation was required by him for occupation of his family consisting of himself, his wife and three school going children and his old mother. In addition to this, eviction was also sought on some other grounds. The ground that the building was required by the petitioner for his own occupation was upheld by the Rent Controller. Tenant’s appeal before the Appellate Authority failed and even the Civil Rvision carried to this court by the tenant was dismissed, which decision is reported as Siri Ram v. B.N. Gupta, ILR (1976) Him Pra 212. It is admitted by the petitioner that on vacation of the residential accommodation by Siri Ram tenant, the same was occupied by him in the month of June, 1976.
19. Eviction of another tenant Balak Ram, who was in occupation of the ground floor was also sought on the ground that the accommodation was required bona fide by him for his own occupation, that the premises were originally leased out for business pur-
pose, but the tenant had rendered himself liable for eviction because after commencement of the Act, he had used the premises for residential purposes, namely, a purpose other than that for which premises were originally leased out, and that the tenant had carried out some alterations and additions and that the premises require substantial additions and alterations, which could not be carried out without tenant vacating the premises. The Rent Controller ordered the tenants eviction on some of the ground. The tenant’s appeal before the Appellate Authority also failed and ultimately tenant’s revision was dismissed on 21st December, 1976 by a Division Bench of this court. The decision is reported in Balak Ram v. B.N. Gupta, ILR (1976) Him Pra 802. The Division Bench held that the character of the suit premises should be determined with reference to the actual user found on the date of institution of eviction petition. In view of the evidence on record, it was held that the tenant had rendered himself liable for eviction also on the ground of bona fide personal requirement of the premises by landlord.
20. It is the petitioner’s case that on vacation of the entire ground floor by Balak Ram, it was occupied by him as his residence
in the month of January, 1977 and eversince he has been residing in this residential set.
21. The residential set vacated by Siri Ram came in his occupation in June, 1976 and the petitioner remained in its occupation till 1979 whereafter, it was let out to one Shri D.C. Katoch, who continued occupying it as a tenant till 1984 and in October, 1984 one Shri Balwant Kumar was inducted as a fresh tenant. The ground floor on vacation by Balak Ram has remained in petitioner’s occupation since 1977. Basement–I is in occupation of another tenant. Initially, one Mr. Vaidya was a tenant, who vacated it in June 1985 and thereafter it is in occupation of one Shri P.N. Kambhoj. The top floor has continued in occupation of the respondent, who is in its occupation before purchase by the petitioner. A bare reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 would show that the right has been conferred on a specified landlord to seek eviction of a tenant in certain eventualities.
Within one year prior to or within one year after the date of retirement, a specified landlord has to apply to the Controller along with a certificate from the competent authority indicating the date of his retirment along with an affidavit to the effect that he or his spouse does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside or start his business. Right, which accrues on and from the date of filing of petition, to a specified landlord is to recover immediate possession of one residential building for his own occupation. Second proviso to Sub-sections (2) of Section 15 of the Act says that a specified landlord has not been conferred a right to recover possession of more than one residential building.
22. For the adjudication of the question raised that whether a specified landlord, who or whose spouse is already in occupation of a residential accommodation within the local area, where he after retirement intends to reside or start his business is entitled to seek possession of another residential set in summary jurisdiction under Sub-section (2) of Section 15 or will it be permissible for the Rent Controller, while determining the suitability of the accommodation of the specified landlord or his or her spouse, to also examine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the residential accommodation in occupation of the specified landlord or his/her spouse, reference has been made by the learned counsel for the parties on the decision of Supreme Court in Narain Khamman v. Parduman Kumar Jain, (AIR 1985 SC 4). Eviction of the tenant in that case was sought by the landlord on the ground that he was an employee in Posts and Telegraphs, Audit and Accounts Department of the Government of India and in January, 1975, he was sent to Union Pubic Service Commission on deputation and he retired on 1st May, 1978. During the service, he was allotted Government accommodation. By a general order issued by the Ministry of works and Housing, all Government servants having their own dwelling houses at the place of posting within the local limits or adjoining municipality were required to vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them within three months from October, 1975
or in default to pay market rent in respect thereof. Consequent to this general order, it was alleged by the landlord that he was required to vacate the allotted accommodation by 31st December, 1975 or to pay market rent in resepct thereof w.e.f. 1st January, 1976. It was also alleged that he vacated the Government accommodation and went to reside in other premises belonging to him adjacent to the premises in occupation of the tenant. Eviction of the tenant now was sought under Section 25B of the Delhi Rent control Act, 1958 (Act No. 59 of 1958) on the ground as specified in Section 14A(1) of the said Act. The tenant was granted requisite leave to contest the eviction petition and the Rent Controller recorded a finding that the landlord’s family consisted of himself, his wife, married sons and their wives, 8 grand children and two married daughters with their children also and as such the accommodation in occupation of the landlord was not a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Order of eviction was passed. Revision carried to the High Court by the tenant failed. The tenant preferred Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court. One of the points, which was urged on behalf of the tenant was that the landlord’s eviction petition was not maintainable since he was already residing in the premises belonging to him. The general ground of eviction of tenants as contained in Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act as also the right of a specified landlord to recover immediate possession under Section 14A(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, were considered by the Apex Court along with the other relevant provisions and the scheme of the rent control legislations. The submissions made on behalf of the landlord was that after the passing of the general or special order by the Government, the landlord had to vacate the allotted accmmodation and had to move into another premises owned by him, as such this factor does not disable the landlord to seek the tenant’s eviction. Such a contention was repelled by the Apex Court holding (at pp 10, 11):
“….. The object underlying the Act
and the subsequent enactment of Section 14A
would defeated, if this contetion were to be accepted. The act, tike other Rent Acts, has been passed to secure tenants in their ac-commodtion at a reasonable rent. This is apparent from the long title and the provisions of the Act. Various States had enacted Rent Acts in order to prevent landlords from profiteering from the situation brought about as a result of increase in population and shortage of accommodation. By these Rent Acts, the right which a landlord has under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to recover possesion of the property let by him to a tenant on the expiry of the lease or on determination of the tenancy has been taken away and the landlord can recover possession of such premises only on one of the grounds provided by the particular Rent Act. To permit an allottee of residential accommodation belonging to the Central Government or a local authority who owns a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child to file an application to evict a tenant from other premises belonging to him which he has let out would be to permit him to move into one of the permises owned by him and to let out the other premises and thus to profiteer from the general or special order mentioned in Section 14A(1). That he cannot do so is clear from the proviso to Section 14A(1). Under the said proviso, if an allottee of such accommodation owns in the Union Territory of Delhi two or more dwelling houses, either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, which he has let out, he cannot recover possession of more than one of these dwelling houses but he has to select one of them and file an application under Section 14A(1) in respect thereof only. If such a landlord cannot file an application under Section 14A(1) when he owns two dwelling houses which have been let out by him, to recover possession of both these dwelling houses but can do so only in respect of one of them, he equally cannot file an application under Section 14A(1) when he has let out one of such dwelling nouses and the other dwelling house is available to him for his residence or when he has already moved into the other dwelling house.”
23. By the above quoted observations, it
was made clear that the right conferred does not entitle a landlord, who had been allotted Government accommodaion, which he had to vacate, to seek eviction form more than one dwelling house and in case he had already shifted to one of the dwelling houses belonging to him or his spouse or a dependent child, he will not aferwards be in a position to exercise the right in seeking tenant’s eviction on the ground mentioned in Secttion 14A(1).
24. Another submission made on behalf of the landlord that a landlord will be entitled to seek eviction on the ground that the residence in his occupation is not a reasonably suitable was also negatived by observing as follows (at p. 11):
“….. Section 14A(1) does not contain a
condition that a person who has or had to vacate the accommodaion allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority by reason of a general or special order mentioned in Section 14A(1) has ‘no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation’ as Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) does. Under Section 14A(1) such allottee should have no other dwelling house which he owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child for him to move into. If such dwelling house is not adequate or suitable for his residence, he must proceed under Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1)…..”
25. In the light of the aforementioned dicta of the Supreme Court, provisions of Sections 15(1) and 15(2) of the Act may be considered, but before doing so, the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act deserves to be noticed since as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that interpretation put on such provisions by the Apex Court cannot hold good for interpreting the provisions of the Himachal Act. in Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, word ‘suitable accommodation’ has been used, which is missing in the Delhi Act. There is no dispute with the proposition that construction on identical words occurring in two Rent Control enactments need not be same. It would vary depending upon other cognate provisions of and the scheme of each enact-
ment. See: Metalware and Co. etc. v. Bansi Lal Sarma and Co. etc. (1979) 3 SCC 398 : (AIR 1979 SC 1559).
26. Section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 confers a right to recover immediate possession of premises on certain persons and is almost pan materia to Section 15(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act.
27. Section 14B of the Delhi Rent Control Act confers a right to recover immediate possession of premises on members of the armed forces etc., which in the Himachal Pradesh Act can be found in Section 14(3)(iii). In Section 14C of the Delhi Act like Section 15(2) of the Himachal Pradesh Act is the right, which accrues to the Central Government or Delhi Administration Employees to recover immediate possession within one year from the date of his retirement.
28. At this stage, it will be convenient to state the circumstances under which right to recover immediate possession of premises to certain classes of persons, as is enumerated in Section 15 of the Act was introudced in Himachal Pradesh. Prior to the coming into force of the Act, it was the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, which was in force. When enacted 1971 Act did not contain such a right. For the first time, right was conferred by amending the provisions of 1971 Act through the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1978. Though the statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Legislative Bill cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute, it is permissible to refer to the statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill, for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. The statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control (Amendment) Bill, 1977 (Bill No. 26 of 1977), which are at page 1231 of Himachal Pradesh Rajpatra (Extraordinary) are as under:
“In order to tackle the problem of shortage of Government residential accommodation to be provided to the Government employees at the places of their postings, it has been decided that the allotment of houses to the Government employees, who have been allotted Government accommodation at the places of their posting and who also own houses situated in that town or in its vicinity may be cancelled and the accommodation so allotted to them may be got vacated from them immediately. In the event they fail to vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them, penal rent at the market rate may be charged from them. The number of such Government employees is not very much. Such employees whose allotment of Government accommodation has been cancelled feel handicapped in delivering the quick possesion of Government accommodation for the reasons that their own houses where they have to rehabilitate their families cannot be got vacated from the tenants immediately under the normal procedure and as such they have no other alternative than to pay the penal rent. In order to ameliorate the fate of such Government employees, it has been decided to make the provision for a summary procedure for getting such residential accommodation vacated for rehabilitating such Government employees and their families.
This Bill seeks to achieve the aforesaid object.”
29. Section 14A was introduced conferring right to recover immediate possession of the premises on certain categories of persons, which now corresponds to Section 15(1) of the Act. The new ground of eviction provided in Section 14A of 1971 Act appears two have been brought about in order to enable a person, who had to vacate Government accommodation allotted to him to seek relief on urgent basis. This was because of a rule having been introudced in the Allotment of Government Residences (General Pool) in Himachal Pradesh Rules, enjoining upon the person in occupation of allotted Government
accommodation to vacate such residential accommodation or in default to incur some penal obligations, in case the Government servant happens to own in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child a residential accommodation within the same urban area. Section 14B, as was introduced by the Amendment Act 1977, detailed a special procedure for expeditious disposal of applications. The special procedure prescribed was to cut short the abnormal delays, which normally occur in case eviction of a tenant is sought under general provisions. After repeal of 1971 Act, an additional category of persons was also included upon whom right to recover immediate possession was conferred, namely, a ‘specified landlord’, who could seek eviction of a tenant on the grounds mentioned in Section 15(2) of the Act for whom also special procedure for disposal of applications is applicable.
30. The necessary conditions, as can be noticed on the bare reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, which a specified landlord is required to satisfy before an order of eviction is passed against a tenant are that :
(a) he or his spouse does not own or possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside or start his business;
(b) possession is not sought from more than one residential building.
31. The words, ‘he intends to reside or start his own business’ cannot be read to mean that the residential premises, in occupation of the tenant, on eviction is intended to be used for the purpose of starting a business. It postulates a situation, where the landlord, after retirement intends to start a business or intends to reside or intends to reside and start a business at a particular place, where the residential building, which is in occupation of a tenant is located and he has no suitable accommodation available to him. For example, in case a Government servant, who during his service is residing outside Shimla might say that after retirement, he intends to settle down at Shimla or intends to start his business at Shimla and at Shimla he or his
spouse has no other suitable accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant. In that case, landlord will be entitled to seek the tenant’s eviction under Section 15(2) of the Act. The provisions cannot be construed to mean that though he is already in occupation of a residential accommodation at Shimla, since he intends to start business in the building, therefore, for that purpose he requires the accommodation in occupation of the tenant or in other words that though he is already in occupation of a residential building, but in a part of the building, he intends to start business, therefore, the same is not a suitable accommodation for him, therefore, he is entitled to seek tenant’s eviction. Suitability has to be seen from the view point of the landlord in the light of his intention to settle down at a place or to start a business or to reside there after retirement and start business, which in any case has to be at a place other than the place where he at the time of filing petition is already residing. Eviction can also be sought under Section 15(2) of the Act by showing that he is not occupying a premises owned by him or his spouse at Shimla but he is residing in an accommodation on rent at Shimla and on retirement the said accommodation will not suit him, since he cannot now pay exorbitant rent of the tenanted premises. It can be demonstrated with another example that where a landlord though during his service has been residing at different places but in a case he expresses his intention that after retirement, he wants to reside or he has intention to start his business, at Shimla and in Shimla he or his spouse does not possess any other suitable accommodation for residence, in that case, a right accrues to him on the date of filing of the application to seek tenant’s eviction.
32. The second proviso to Section 15 has to be ‘ read in such a manner so as to harmonise the provisions contained in Sub-section (2), which says that it shall not be construed as conferring a right to any person to recover possession of more than one residential building. In case a landlord happens to be in occupation of a residential building within the local area concerned, owned and possessed by him or his spouse, it cannot be construed that under
Section 15(2), a right has been conferred on him to seek tenant’s eviction from one more additional residential set in the garb of fulfilling his intention that he intends to reside therein.
33. The right conferred under Sub-sec-tions (1) and (2) of Section 15 is to recover immediate possession, in certain eventualities, namely, when the landlord is asked to either vacate or to incur liability to pay a penal rent or when he is faced with a situation that after retirement at a place where he has to start business or where he intends to reside, he has no other accommodation available to him for his residence. This right conferred cannot mean that though he is already in occupation of a residential accommodation owned by him or his wife but the same is not adequate for his requirement since he wants to have more accommodation for his residence. In that eventuality, the legislature has provided a general right to a landlord under Section 14(3) of the Act, where a landlord has to allege and prove that he requires the residential accommodation for his own occupation; he is not occupying any other residential building owned by him and has not vacated such a building within the last five years of the filing of the petition for eviction. While considering his claim, the Controller has to satisfy himself about the bona fides of the claim.
34. In a case where the landlord is already in occupation of a residential building either owned by him or by his spouse within the local area, he cannot, in view of the second proviso of Section 15 be said to have acquired any right to seek tenant’s eviction and on that ground the eviction petition will not be maintainable.
35. In such like situations, the claim of landlord in seeking additional accommodation over and above the accommodation already occupied by him within the urban area where he or his spouse possess any other accommodation would not be a bona fide act. The fact that there is no reference to the word ‘bona fide requirement’ in Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act does not absolve the specified landlord from proving that this claim for accommodation is bona fide or the tenant
from showing or urging that it is not bona fide. It is absolutely necessary and otherwise also appears to be appropriate and reasonable that every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one. Having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of statute in which the said provision is enacted, the Court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so as to reconcile the relevant provisions and to advance the remedy intended by the statute. See : Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U.P. (AIR 1959 SC 198).
36. In D. N. Sanghavi and Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das (AIR 1974 SC 1026) while dealing with the objects of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the Apex Court held that the construction which fulfils the object of Act should be favoured. It was held that the Act deals with a difficult problem of scarcity of accommodation and seeks to distribute accommodation in a fair way amongst those who need it.
37. In Mat. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan (AIR 1979 SC 272) while upholding the view held in D. N. Sanghavi’s case (AIR 1974 SC 1026) (supra) that a construction which fulfils the purpose should be preferred to the alternative construction, which frustrates it, it was held that the Rent Control Legislation strikes a balance between the landlord and a tenant and should be interpreted in such a way so as to achieve the object of enabling landlord to evict tenant where the statute so provide. When special rights were conferred on certain categories of landlord to seek tenant’s eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Supreme Court in Kewal Singh v. Mt. Lajwanti (AIR 1980 SC 161) held that the Rent Control Act is a piece of social legislation and is meant mainly to protect the tenants from frivolous evictions. At the same time, in order to do justice to the landlord and to avoid placing such restrictions on their right to evict the tenant as to destroy their legal right to property, certain salutary provisions have been made by the legislature, which give relief to the landlord. One of the grounds for eviction, which is
contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord’s bona fide personal necessity. The concept of bona fide personal necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical.
38. In S. Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, 1991 (1) Ren CJ 357 (SC), the Court held that every claim for eviction against the tenant must be bona fide one though there was no reference to the words ‘bona fide requirement’ of a specified class of landlord contained in Section 14B to Section 14D in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
39. The object in conferring right to recover immediate possession under Section 15, as contained in the Act has been introduced with the sole purpose of avoiding unnecessary delay to certain categories of landlords under certain conditions, in seeking eviction of the tenant. Special procedure for achieving the said object has been provided for in Section 16 of the Act. In the absence of Section 15 and Section 16, even a specified landlord, in case of urgent and dire necessity, to seek tenants eviction would have to resort to the general provisions contained in Section 14, for which normally the time required in finalising the proceedings would be sufficiently long. It was in order to mitigate the hardship of certain categories of tenants that provisions were introduced but that action cannot be said to altogether absolve the landlord from proving the bona fides of his claim or in the tenant in urging and showing that the claim is not bona fide. There is enough indication in support of this construction because of the use of the words ‘bona fide requirement’ under Section 16 of the Act, which says ‘special procedure for disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 14(3)(a)(iii) and Section 15’. Thus, even a claim of eviction aginst a tenant under Section 15(1) and Section 15(2) must be a bona fide one. Since the second proviso to Section 15 in clear terms slates that right conferred shall not be construed as conferring a right to recover the possession of more than one residential building. Similar words contained in the Delhi Rent Act were construed in
Narain Khamman’s case (AIR 1985 SC 4) (supra) to mean that if such a person, who has been conferred a special right has other premises which he owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife, which are , available to him for his residential accommodation or into which he has already moved, he cannot maintain an application for eviction under summary remedy. There is no reason why similar interpretation be not put to the right conferred under Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, namely, that if a specified landlord has in his possession other premises, which he owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife, which are available to him for his residence or into which he has already moved, he cannot maintain an application under Section 15 of the Act.
40. The word ‘suitable accommodation’ cannot be read to mean sufficient accommodation, in case ground is made out that accommodation available is not sufficient. In that case, the landlord has to seek tenant’s eviction under Section 14(3) of the Act and not under Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, in view of the second proviso, which postulates within it the requirement that a specified landlord cannot recover possession of more than one residential building.
41. As the petitioner is and on the date of filing eviction petition was already in occupation of the ground floor of the building, it was rightly held by the Rent Controller that petition for eviction under Sub-section (2) of Section 15, though he is a ‘specified landlord’, will not be maintainable. In case he has got any remedy, he can seek tenant’s eviction under Section 14(3) of the Act, by alleging and proving his additional need and requirement.
42. In view of this, I refrain myself from entering into the question raised by the tenant that his eviction has been sought with mala fide object or that the petitioner’s claim is not bona fide for in the past he got two sets vacated for his personal use, but rented out the same to various tenants, since any finding recorded might prejudice either of the parties, in case fresh proceedings are ultimately taken out by the landlord.
43. Resultantly, the revision petition is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.