Supreme Court of India

Prabhu vs State Of M.P on 3 December, 2008

Supreme Court of India
Prabhu vs State Of M.P on 3 December, 2008
Author: . A Pasayat
Bench: Arijit Pasayat, Mukundakam Sharma
                                                               REPORTABLE

                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

               CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

               CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1956 OF 2008
              (Arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) No. 1418 OF 2008


Prabhu                                                   ...Appellant

                                  Versus

State of Madhya Pradesh                                        ....
Respondent



                             JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the

Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur Bench, holding the appellant guilty

of offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC’). The appellant was sentenced to

undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. By the impugned judgment
three appeals were disposed of being Criminal Appeal No.185 of 1995, 184

of 1995 and 261 of 1993. The appeal filed by accused Nanhe Lal was

dismissed while the appeal filed by the appellant was partly allowed altering

his conviction for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section

34 IPC to one under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC. Similar was the

position in respect of co-accused Jagdish.

3. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:

A few months before the incident dated 28.12.1987, Dropadibai,

daughter of Gayaprasad was molested by accused Prabhu about which he

was facing prosecution in the court. Accused Prabhu Dayal was in this

context trying to pressurize deceased Shankar, brother of Dropdibai, to

amicably settle the matter, but finding that he did not budge, the accused

persons who were related started bearing a grudge against Shankar. On

28.12.1987 at about 9.00 in the morning, Shankar had gone out in the

village. At 11 O’ clock Gayaprasad (PW-5) had gone to call his ploughman

followed by Rishiraj (PW-9). No sooner that they reached Soryana

Mohalla, they heard the call of Shanker that he be saved. Both Gayaprasad

and Rishi Raj rushed to the place and they noticed that the three accused

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were beating Gayaprasad. Accused Nanhelal was armed with Katarna (a

sharp instrument for cutting) while the other two were armed with lathis. It

is alleged that all of them administered several blows with their respective

weapons and caused severe injuries and thereafter ran away towards the

jungle.

The report of the incident Ext.P-12 was lodged by Gayaprasad (PW-

5). Fourteen external injuries were found on the body of the deceased. As

per the opinion of the Autopsy Surgeon, the death of the deceased was

caused due to extensive hemorrhage on account of shock due to injury No.8

mainly and injury Nos. 13 and 14 causing hemorrhage. They were incised

wounds. Since accused persons abjured guilt, trial was held. Each of the

accused persons was convicted as noted above. Appeals were filed before

the High Court. So far as the appellant is concerned, it was submitted that

he could not be convicted in terms of Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC

as only accused Nanhe, according to the prosecution, caused incised

wounds. The appellant was holding only a stick. The High Court relied on

the evidence of two eye-witnesses PWs 5 and 9 and held that the appellant

cannot be held guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 read with

Section 34 IPC. It was held that the prosecution has not proved that each of

the participating culprits had the same intention and each one shared the

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intention of the other. The High Court noticed that the accused Prabhu and

Jagdish had caused lacerated wounds and, therefore, the knowledge which

can be inferred from the said acts is that they intended to cause grievous

hurt. Accordingly, the conviction as noted above was altered.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant cannot

be convicted in terms of Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC. It was

submitted that none of the injuries were grievous hurts and the sentence in

any way is very harsh.

5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand supported

the judgment.

6. Section 325 deals with punishment for voluntarily causing grievous

hurt.

7. Section 326 deals with offence of voluntarily causing hurt by

dangerous weapons or means.

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8. Section 326 provides that whoever, except in the case provided for by

Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument

for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon

of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any corrosive

substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any

substance which is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or

to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with

imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to ten years, and also with a liability to pay a fine.

9. Sections 325 and 326, like the two Sections immediately preceding,

provide the ordinary punishment and punishment under certain aggravating

circumstances of the offences mentioned thereunder. The two latter

Sections apply to the case of causing “grievous hurt” and the immediately

preceding two Sections to the case of `hurt’.

10. “Grievous hurt” has been defined in Section 320 IPC, which read as

follows:

“320 Grievous Hurt – The following kinds of hurt only
are designated as “grievous”-

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First – Emasculation.

Secondly – Permanent privation of the sight of either
eye.

Thirdly – Permanent privation of the hearing of either
ear.

Fourthly – Privation of any member or joint.

Fifthly – Destruction or permanent impairing of the
powers of any members or joint.

Sixthly – Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

Seventhly – Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

Eighthly – Any hurt which endangers life or which
causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days
in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary
pursuits.”

11. Some hurts which are not like those hurts which are mentioned in the

first seven clauses, are obviously distinguished from a slight hurt, may

nevertheless be more serious. Thus a wound may cause intense pain,

prolonged disease or lasting injury to the victim, although it does not fall

within any of the first seven clauses. Before a conviction for the sentence of

grievous hurt can be passed, one of the injuries defined in Section 320 must

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be strictly proved, and the eighth clause is no exception to the general rule

of law that a penal statute must be construed strictly.

12. The expression “any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence,

is likely to cause death” has to be gauged taking note of the heading of the

Section. What would constitute a `dangerous weapon’ would depend upon

the facts of each case and no generalization can be made.

13. The heading of the Section provides some insight into the factors to

be considered. The essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are : (1)

voluntarily causing a hurt; (2) hurt caused must be a grievous hurt; and (3)

the grievous hurt must have been caused by dangerous weapons or means.

As was noted by this Court in State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha

(2000(7) SCC 249) there is no such thing as a regular or earmarked weapon

for committing murder or for that matter a hurt. Whether a particular article

can per se cause any serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to be

determined factually. At this juncture, it would be relevant to note that in

some provisions e.g. Sections 324 and 326 expression “dangerous weapon”

is used. In some other more serious offences the expression used is “deadly

weapon” (e.g. Sections 397 and 398). The facts involved in a particular

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case, depending upon various factors like size, sharpness, would throw light

on the question whether the weapon was a dangerous or deadly weapon or

not. That would determine whether in the case Section 325 or Section 326

would be applicable.

14. The above position was highlighted in Mathai v. State of Kerala

(2005 (2) JT 365).

15. Considering the principles set out above, certainly the appellant was

guilty of offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC.

However, in the peculiar facts of the case, the sentence of 5 years rigorous

imprisonment would meet the ends of justice.

16. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

…………………………………..J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…………………………………..J.
(Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi,
December 3, 2008

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