ORDER
S.K. Katriar, J.
1. Heard Mr. Sandeep Kumar Said for the petitioners, and Mr. S.I. Majumdar for the opposite parties.
2. The decree-holders are the petitioners. This civil revision application is directed against the order dated 1-3-96, passed by the Execution Munsif, Patria, in Execution case No. 22 of 1990 Ram Briksh Mistri and Anr. v. Mostt. Sakuntala Devi and Ors. whereby the decree-holders’ objection with respect to the Pleader-Commissioner’s report has been over-ruled.
3. Before I enter into the merits of the matter, I must deal with the application for condonation of delay in filing this civil revision application. The impugned order was passed on 1-3-96, and this civil revision application was instituted in this Court on 14-11-96, 24-6-96 being the last date of limitation, there was thus a delay of five months and twenty days in preferring this civil revision application. The petitioners have filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in preferring this civil revision application. The sole ground stated by him in the condonation application is that the petitioners herein are husband and wife. Petitioner No. 1 is aged about 65 years and he was suffering from Infective Hepatitis and Anaemia from 12-5-96 to 7-11 -96. He recovered from his ailment on 7-11-96 and resumed his normal functions on that dale. The period of illness is supported by a medical certificate dated 12-5-96 (Annexure-1) issued by Dr. Akhilesh Kumar. Learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioners are an old couple and there was none else in the family to look after their litigation.
3.1. The opposite parties have filed a counter-affidavit to the condonation application to the effect that the petitioners have two major sons living in Patna who look after the affairs of the family. He has further submitted in the counter-affidavit that the petitioners herein had filed appearance in execution case on 18-5-96. Therefore, the delay was on account of laches and negligence on the part of the petitioners. A false plea has been set up by the petitioners in an effort to explain the delay. It is. therefore, a fit case in which the condonation application ought to be rejected.
3.2. The petitioners have not filed a Rejoinder to the counter-affidavit.
3.3. Having considered the rival submissions on the question of limitation, I am convinced that the condonation application does not inspire confidence. It is undoubtedly true that petitioner No. 2 is a lady and does not appear to be educated and, therefore, she may not be in a position to pursue such matters. It may equally be correct that petitioner No. 1 is 65 years of age and may be suffering from infective Hepatitis and Anaemia i.e. Jaundice. I am nevertheless constrained to take notice of the facts stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioners have two major sons living in Patna who could have easily taken steps to prefer this civil revision application in time. It is equally manifest from paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit that the petitioners had filed appearance in the execution Court on 18-5-96 which is surely corroborative of the fact that the sons were taking steps in the execution Court and also perhaps indicates? that petitioner No. 1 was not as unwell as has been sought to be depicted in the condonation application. It is equally correct to state that the petitioners are residents of Patna, and the execution case is pending in Patna
3.4. In the result, the condonation application is hereby rejected and this civil revision application is held to be time-barred.
4. I have also heard the learned Counsel for the parties on merits and proceed to deal with the same, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Pleader Commissioner did not duly discharge his duties and functions. Firstly, he exceeded the brief which is determined by the judgment and decree in question. Secondly, the decree in question clearly stipulates that the western boundary of the petitioners’ plot bearing No. 1176 ought to have been demarcated with the help of Pucca pillars which has not been done, and instead wooden pillars have been used.
4.1 Learned Counsel for the opposite parties in reply submitted that it is manifest from a bare perusal of the impugned order that the Pleader Commissioner did not exceed his brief in determining the correct position on the spot. He was asked to determine and demarcate 2 Kathas of land owned and possessed by the decree-holders and, secondly, he was required to demarcate the western boundary of the plot, all of which have been done properly. He further submitted that no such distinction is indicated in the judgment and decree as to Pucca pillars in contradistinction to wooden pillars in the hair-spliting sense as is being suggested by the petitioners. In the present context, pucca pillars have to be understood in contra-distinction to pillars of vanishing thing like earth, etc. In any case the entire report of the Pleader Commissioner has bee fully reviewed by the execution Court and upheld by the impugned order. Learned Counsel further relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in AIR 1938 Patna 104 Jugeshwar Singh v. Rijhan Singh.
5. Having considered the rival submissions, I am convinced that the civil revision application has to be dismissed on merits also. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties is right in his submission that the Pleader Commissioner did not exceed his brief which is really determined by the terms of the judgment and the decree in question, according to which he was required to determine 2 kathas of the plot of land owned and possessed by the decree-holders which has been done by him. As to the question of demarcating the western boundary of the plot in question in concerned, no exception can be taken to the same if it has been done with the help of wooden pillars which has to be understood in contradistinction to those of ephemeral or evanescent or melting things like earth. Thirdly, it is manifest from a plain reading of the impugned order that the petitioners did not at all co-operate with the Pleader Commissioner.
5.1. Fourthly, the Pleader Commissioner’s report has been fully reviewed by the execution Court which was in the nature of an appeal.
Therefore, the aforesaid reported judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties applies on all fours to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It has been held therein that the objections to the Pleader Commissioner’s report is really in the nature of a first appeal and the appeal before the next higher Court would really be in the nature of second appeal with the well-known limitations of jurisdiction of the second appellate Court. The Division Bench in the aforesaid reported judgment was dealing with a first appeal, and the case in hand is under the civil revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, the petitioners herein must remind themselves of this Court’s jurisdiction under Section 113, C.P.C.. Only questions of law and principles can be considered. No such question has been raised on behalf of the petitioners before me. The following portion of the judgment appearing at page 105 of the report illumines the position:
…Therefore, a first appeal to this Court from the order of the Subordinate Judge is really in the nature of a second appeal in which only questions of law and principle can be considered. It is quite impossible for the Court to go down to the area in question, inspect the land, hear the various objectors, and in fact review the decision of the Commissioner on facts. The power to review the decision of the Commissioner in the facts is a matter for the Subordinate Judge, and his view of the facts ought to be final as a first appellate decision on fact. The High Court should only interfere when it is shown that the Judge in his decision has gone wrong on some question of principle in making the final allotment and in drawing up the decree, and I think much money and trouble would be saved to parties to partition suits if they realised that principle and they would in the majority of cases refrain from coming before the High Court in an attempt to upset the allocation of the takhtas.
6. In the result, this civil revision application is dismissed as being barred by limitation and is also devoid of merits.