ORDER
M.A.A. Khan, J.
1. Vide his judgment and order dated April 21, 1990 the Assistant Commandant and Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, 3rd Battalion Cr. P.P. Imphal, Manipur convicted the petitioner of the offences under Section 10(b) and 10(h) read with Section 9(b) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (for short ‘the Act of 1949’) and sentenced him to imprisonment in the Unit Quarter Guard for five days i.e. from 21-4-90 to 25-4-9.0. The period of his judicial custody in Quarter Guard from 17-4-90 to 20-4-90 was directed to be treated as simple Imprisonment. In appeal the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Ajmer did not find the case falling within the purview of Section 9(b) of Act of 1949 and therefore confirmed the order of conviction and sentence of the petitioner for the offences Under Section 10(b), and 10(h) of the Act of 1949. Hence this revision petition Under Section 397, Cr. P.C.
2. The case of the prosecution against the petitioner was that he, being a member of the Force on 16-4-90 at about 8.30 P.M. .Kicked another member, Sh. B. R. Rao, on the face causing him multiple simple injuries on mouth, lips and teeth. On examination of the record of the learned Magistrate I am satisfied that the statements of PW. 1 N. K. Harjindra Singh, PW.2 N.K. Kishan Chand, PW.3 HC/Carp. B. R. Rao injured and PW.4 Dr. K. N. Rao, recorded during the trial of the petitioner fully prove that the petitioner struck, with his boots, N. K./Carp. B.R. Rao on face. Mr. A. I. Verma, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not challenge the concurrent findings of the Courts below on this point. Commission of an offence punishable Under Section 10(b)/10(h) of the Act of 1949 thus stood fully proved against the petitioner and his conviction, therefore, is sustainable on facts.
3. Mr. Verma urged that Mr. G.N. Kabadi, the Assistant Commandant and Judicial Magistrate 1st Class was not competent to try, convict and sentence the petitioner as the powers of a Magistrate of the first or second Class were not Cconferred upon him by the Rajasthan High Court or any other High Court. Reference in this behalf was made to Section 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Cr.P.C. for short). On a combined reading of the relevant provisions of law I am unable to accept this argument of Mr. Verma.
4. Sections 4, 5 and 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read as under :
Section 4 : Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws :-
(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.
(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.
Section 5 : Saving :-
Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.
Section 26 : Courts by which offences are triable:-
Subject to the other provisions of this Code-
(a) any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be tried by-
(i) the High Court, or
(ii) the Court of Sessions, or
(iii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable;
(b) any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in this behalf in such law, be tried by such Court and when no Court is so mentioned, may be tried by-
(i) the High Court, or
(ii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable.
5. The ‘special law’ and the ‘local law’ referred to in Section 5 have been defined as under in Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Penal Code :
Special Law :- A ‘special law’ is a law applicable to a particular subject.
Local Law:-A ‘local law’ is a law applicable only to a particular part of India.
6. A combined reading of the above provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Indian Penal Code makes it quite clear that the Cr.P.C. lays down, the procedure to be followed in the trial of the criminal eases except such cases for the trial of which any special form of procedure is prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. Sub-section (22) of Section 4 mandates that all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provision contained in the Cr.P.C. but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. The word “otherwise” preceding the words “dealing with” used in the phraseology of Sub-section (2) points out at the fact that the expression “dealing with” is quite exhaustive and comprehensive and covers investigation, inquiry or trial which are some of the aspects of dealing with the offences. Section 5, in express terms, excludes the application of the Cr.P.C., (in the absence of a specific provision therein) to any (1) special law, or (2) local law, or (3) special powers conferred or (4) special form of procedure prescribed by any other law. The effect of Section 5 Cr.P.C., therefore, is to render the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 inapplicable in respect of all matters covered by special law [see Ajmer Singh v. Union of India (1987) 3 SCC 340 : 1987 Cri LJ 1877.
7. It was not disputed by Mr. Verma, nor can it be legitimately disputed, that the Act of 1949 is a Special Law within the meaning of the term defined in Section 41 IPC and therefore by virtue of the effect of Section 5 Cr.P.C. the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are inapplicable to the matters covered by the Act of 1949. Section 16(i) of Act of 1949 specifically provides that the Central Govt. may, by general or special order confer or impose upon any member of the force any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed on a police officer of any class or grade by any law for the time being in force. Sub-section (2) of Section 16 starts with a non obstante clause and provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (now of 1973) the Central Govt. may invest the Commandant or an Assistant Commandant with the powers of a Magistrate of any Class for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence committed by a member of the Force and punishable under the Act of 1949 or any offence committed by a member of the Force against the person or property of another member. The proviso under this Section simply provides that (1) when the offender is on leave, or (2) when the offence is not connected with the offender’s duties as a member of the Force, or (3) when it is a petty offence, even if connected with the offender’ duties as a member of the Force, the offence may, if the prescribed authority within the limits of whose jurisdiction the offence has been committed, so directs, be inquired into or tried by any ordinary criminal court having jurisdiction in the matter. In view of the specific provision contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of Act of 1949 read with Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 41 IPC there remains no scope for the argument that Mr. G. N. Kabadi, the Assistant Commandant in the present ease upon whom the Central Govt. could have conferred and in fact did confer the powers of a Magistrate of first or second class was not competent to try the petitioner before me. In this behalf S.O. No. 3041 dated 13th December, 1960 issued by the Central Govt. in the Ministry of Home Affairs. No. F. 19/ 86/59 P. 11 (Gazette of India 1960 Pt. II Section 3(ii) p.3500) may be referred to. I therefore, hold that Mr. Kabadi had all the powers and jurisdiction to try the petitioner for the offences he was charged with.
8. It was next urged by Mr. Verma that the Special Judge, SC/ST Cases, who heard and disposed of petitioner’s appeal had no jurisdiction to hear and dispose of such appeal. The argument of Mr. Verma was that the Special Judge had been appointed by the State Govt. to try and decide the cases relating to atrocities on the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and therefore the learned Special Judge had no jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the appeal of the petitioner which appeal had been preferred to the Sessions Judge and not to the Special Judge. In substance the argument of Mr. Verma was that the Sessions Judge to whom the appeal was made and who was competent to hear and decide the same was not competent to transfer the same to the Special Judge for hearing and disposal. Again, I find the argument misconceived.
9. It is not disputed that the petitioner had made an appeal against the judgment and order made against him by the learned Assistant Commandant and Magistrate First Class, to the Sessions Judge Ajmer and the Sessions Judge Ajmer was legally competent to hear and decide the appeal either by himself or through any of the Addl. Sessions Judges working as such within his Sessions Division. The Judge, who heard petitioners appeal was, admittedly, an Addl. Sessions Judge, exercising the powers of a Sessions Judge, in the Sessions Division of Ajmer. By virtue of his being an Addl. Sessions Judge and in addition to his powers and jurisdiction as an Addl. Sessions Judge, he had also been specified to be a “Special Judge” for purposes of Section 14 of SC/ST (Prohibition of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Act of 1989). It is the settled principle that jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revisions by Sessions Judge is determined by reference to the situation of the Court by which the order appealed against or sought to be revised is passed and not to the place of the offence (see Shori Lal v. State AIR 1952 All 193 : 1952 Cri LJ 387; Rahim Punaji v. Abdul Rahim 1953 Cri LJ 1027 : AIR 1953 Madh Pra 156 and Shyam Singh v. State 1960 Raj LW 620.
10. Now Section 9 Cr.P.C. provides that the State Govt. shall establish a Court of Session for every Sessions Division and every Court of Session Judge shall be presided over by a Judge, to be appointed by the High Court. Sub-section (3) of Section 9 provides that the High Court may also appoint Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges to exercise jurisdiction in a Court of Session. Section 9 thus makes it abundantly clear that there can be only one Court of Session for each Sessions Division and there can be only one judge of that court holding its sitting at different places and manned by a number of Judges. Additional Sessions Judges do not constitute additional Sessions Courts and they simply exercise the powers of the Courts of Sessions subject to limitations prescribed by law. Section 194 clearly provides that an Additional Sessions Judge shall try such cases as the Sessions Judge of the division may, by general or special order, make over to him for trial or as the High Court may, by special order, direct him to try. Section 122(5) Cr.P.C. provides that a Sessions Judge may in his discretion transfer any proceeding Under Section 122(2) or (4) to an Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge and upon such transfer the Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge may exercise the powers of Sessions Judge under that section in respect to the proceeding contemplated by that section. Section 381 provides that an appeal to the court of Session can also be heard by an Additional Sessions Judge if such appeal has been transferred to him by the Sessions Judge. Section 400 confers similar power on the Additional Sessions Judge to hear revision applications under Chapter XXX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A combined reading of all these relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that an Additional Sessions Judge may hear and decide such cases, appeals revisions or other proceedings which are made over to him by the Sessions Judge.
11. The court of Special Judges to try the cases arising under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 were specified Under Section 14 of that Act. Section 14 provides that for the purpose of providing for speedy trial the State Govt. shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for each district a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offence under this Act.
12. It is, therefore, clear that the object of establishing the Special Court to try the offences under the Act of 1989 is for the purpose of providing for speedy trial. It is for that purpose that the State Govt., with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, is required, by notification in the Official Gazette, to specify for each district a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under the Act 1989. Specification of a court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under the Act does not affect the status or the powers of such Sessions Court which it enjoys and exercises by virtue of being a court of Session constituted Under Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In fact the word ‘specify’ used in the language of Section 14 of Act of 1989 presupposes the existence of a Court of Session. It does not take away the powers and jurisdiction of such court of Session which it has under various provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, as pointed out and discussed above. The various provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure and those contained in Section 14 of the Act of 1989 are to be so construed as may promote their smooth and harmonious functioning without causing any damage to each other. A court of an Additional Sessions Judge, exercising the powers as such in a Sessions Division may be specified to be a Special Court for the purposes of Section 14 of Act of 1989 without in any manner adversely affecting its jurisdiction and powers as a Court of Session. Its specification as a Special Court for purposes of Section 14 of the Act of 1989 would be in addition to and not in derogation of its powers and jurisdiction as a Judge/Addl. Sessions Judge. Such a construction of Section 14 of the Act of 1989, in my opinion, advances and promotes the proper and harmonious functioning of various provisions contained in the two statutes and is therefore, quite proper.
13. In view of the discussion made hereinabove it is quite clear that the jurisdiction of the Special Judge, who heard and disposed of petitioner’s appeal in the present case was not excluded by any provision of law or by any specific or general order made by the State Govt./High Court. Since the Sessions Judge Ajmer to whom the appeal was made by the petitioner was legally competent to make over such appeal for hearing and disposal to the Additional Sessions Judge functioning as such within the Sessions Division Ajmer and who was also specified as a Special Judge for purposes of Section 14 of the Act of 1989, the transfer of petitioner’s appeal by him to the Special Judge SC/ST Cases, who was competent to hear and decide such appeal was not bad in law. This view, I think, is in conformity with the view expressed by this court in the case of Shyam Singh (1960 Raj LW 620) (supra).
14. Mr. Verma next urged that Rule 27 of the Central-Reserve Police Force, 1955 (Rules 1955) was violated in as much as proper opportunity to defend himself was not given to the petitioner. Rule 27 deals with disciplinary matters leading to departmental inquiries and is not at all relevant to the issue before me.
15. It has also been urged by Mr. Verma that the trial stood vitiated for the reason that neither the complainant was examined Under Section 200 Cr.P.C. nor any witness Under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Proviso to Section 200 Cr.P.C. clearly provides that when the complaint is made in writing by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses. In the instant case the complaint was made in writing by Officer Commanding HQ 3rd Bn. CRPF in the discharge of his official duties. The case falls within the purview of Clause (a) to the Proviso Under Section 200(1) Cr.P.C. The objection is overruled.
16. Mr. Verma further urged that the petitioner was not properly examined Under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and the trial was completed speedily. I have examined the record of the proceedings taken by the learned Magistrate in this case. This Court records its satisfaction and also appreciation of the pains, taken by the learned Magistrate in making and maintaining a clear, complete and detailed record of the entire proceedings. On 18-4-90 the plea of the petitioner was recorded, and thereafter the statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded. After hearing the prosecution witnesses the petitioner was examined on 20-4-90. The proceedings conducted by the learned Magistrate were thus quite fair and regular. I thus find neither any illegality nor any irregularity in such proceedings. If any irregularity be assumed, which is not there, the same stands cured by the provisions contained in Section 465 Cr.P.C. as no failure of justice has occasioned to the petitioner in this case.
17. In the result I find no substance in this petition and it is hereby dismissed as such.