JUDGMENT
B.S. Yadav, J.
(1) It is not necessary to give in detail the facts giving rise to this appeal as the only question urged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant was about Limitation. However, we may give here (he facts in brief as those are necessary for determining the question of Limitation.
(2) The respondent is S.M.N. Consumer Protection Council, Madras through its President R. Desikan. The said Council had filed the complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short the Act) on behalf of Mr.& Mrs. Chidambaram. who are the parents of unfortunate C. Nagarajan, who lost his life in the lift accident on 25.08.1988. The deceased Nagarajan was an Agent of Life Insurance Corporation of India at the time of accident. The appellant herein is the owner of the building known as “Sorrento building”, in Adayar Circle, Madras. A lift is maintained in it by the appellant for the use of the tenants of that building. The office of the Life Insurance Corporation of India has its Branch office in that building on the 3rd floor. On 23rd, 24th and 25th August, 1988. the Lic was conducting a Training Programme for their Agents at that Branch office. C. Nagarajan was a participant in the said training programme. On the 25th August, 1988, the deceased went out during the lunch hour and while he was returning, he got into the lift and got jammed therein and died instantaneously. According to the complaint, the accident was due to the gross negligence on the part of the owner for improper maintenance of the lift. The deceased was at the lime of his death, only 28 years and was earning an average income of Rs.2.500.00 per month..
(3) The appellant, in his counter to the complaint, denied that C.Nagarajan was a “consumer” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. He also denied that the accident was due to his negligence. According to him, there was frequent power failure on the relevant date. The deceased was in the lift when the power failed and it was in between the floors. The deceased started meddling with the lift buttons. Suddenly the power came. The deceased tried to jump out of the lift while it was in motion and his head hit against the floor above resulting in his death. It was also averred by him that the lift was properly maintained and was in good condition, and did not suffer from any defect..
(4) The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Madras before whom the complaint was filed held that Lic being a tenant on the 3rd floor of the house was a hirer of the services of the lift provided by the owner. The deceased was using the lift as a beneficiary of the Lic and with their approval and therefore, he was to be deemed to be a “consumer” as defined under Section 2(1)(d) (ii) of the Act. It was also held that the lift was working in a hazardous manner and the most important safety device of the lift doors and the landing doors closing before the lift moved up or down had failed and caused this accident. There has. therefore, been gross deficiency of service and criminal negligence in the maintenance of the lift on the part of the owner of the building. It was further held that though the complaint was filed in December, 1991,viz. more than two years after the death of the deceased, but it was within time as Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied and not Article 82 as urged on behalf of the owner of the building..
(5) The State Commission granted a compensation of Rs. l,50,000.00 to the parents of the deceased..
(6) Feeling aggrieved against the finding of the State Commission, the owner of the building has filed this appeal. As mentioned earlier at the beginning of this Order, the only point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the complaint filed before the State Commission was time bar. According to him. Article 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the present case. That Article provides a period of two years for filing a claim for compensation for Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The State Commission discountenanced that argument on the ground that the case was governed by Article 82 of the Limitation Act as it was for compensation. for breach of contract, express or implied. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that there was no privity of contract between the deceased or his parents and the appellant and therefore, there is no question of breach of contract in the present case. We do not think it necessary to dwell on this point in detail. Suffice it to say that the present case is not governed by Article 82 of the Limitation Act as the claim has not been filed under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855..
(7) The complaint was filed under the Act and the deceased has been held a “consumer” under the Act by the State Commission and that finding has not been challenged before us. Thus, the claim is in respect of imperfection or shortcoming in the services required to be rendered by the owner of the building, i.e., the appellant. The State Commission has given a firm finding that the lift installed by the owner of the building for the use of the tenants in the building was defective. That finding has not been challenged before us. Even if we accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the present case is not covered by Article 55 of the Limitation Act. It is governed by the residuary Article, i.e.. Article 113 of the Limitation Act. That article relates to a suit for which no period of Limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule appended to the Limitation Act. The period of Limitation provided under that Article is three years and it commences when the right to sue accrues. Thus, in the present case, the right to sue accrued to the legal representatives of the deceased, when his death occurred on account of deficient rendering of services by the appellant. Hence, it is held that the complaint filed before the State Commission was within the Limitation. Consequently, we dismiss the present appeal. We make no Order as to costs.