ORDER
1. The petitioner laid this action against three respondents, J. Ramanand, the Joint Collector M. A. Shariff, Excise Superintendent of Cuddapah District and Ekabathula Ramaiah, the arrack contractor, under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act (Act No. 70 of 1971), for short ‘the Act’. The case of the petitioner practically admitted by the Excise Superintendent as R.W. 1 is that the petitioner was the highest bidder for Rs. 9,700/- per month of the lease-hold right to sell arrack in group of shops in Kamasamudram, Komarajupally and Muthukur in Excise Sidhout range of Cuddapah District for the excise year 1986-87. The auction was held in the evening of September 22, 1986. His signature was obtained on the bid register and he was issued Ex. A-1 auction slip. It is his cases that he deposited with the second respondent one month rent of Rs. 9,700/- and Rs. 2338/- earnest money in cash, in total, sum of Rs. 12,028/- and thereafter he left the place. He paid the licence fee on September 24, 1986, under Exs. A-2 to A-4 challans. It was rumoured on 24th that the re-auction is to be conducted on September 25, 1986 due to political pressure of the local M.L.A. and therefore, he came to this Court. He filed W.P. No. 13419/86 and W.P.M.P. No. 17494 of 1986 for stay of re-auction, by lunch motion and was admitted on September 25, 1986 at 2-15 p.m. and interim direction was granted and was communicated by telegraphic orders. According to him, the telegram was received by the respondent at 10-30 p.m. on the same night. He went by bus on September 25, 1986 itself. In the morning of September 26, 1986 he met the Excise Superintendent and informed him personally of the interim order passed by this Court and also filed copy of the Telegram who told him thus (Already the auction was held and the High Court order does not hold good). On the same day, he filed another application before the second respondent and requested him not to re-auction the lease-hold rights of the village and not to take any further action. He did not stop further action. He received the amounts from the third respondent and instructed the Circle Inspector and the Sub-Inspector of Excise to visit the three villages for verification of location of the shops and demarcate the boundaries with a view to enter into the agreement with the third respondent. The petitioner again filed on September 29, 1986, three WPMPs. WPMP No. 17962/86 to implead the third respondent, WPMP No. 17963 of 1986 for injunction to restrain the respondents to open the arrack shops and WPMP No. 17964 of 1986 for a direction to the respondents 1 and 2 to enter into counterpart agreement with the petitioner. The case was posted to September 30, 1986, but did not reach. On October 1, 1986, the first two petitions were ordered and notice was ordered on the third petition. October 2, 1986 was holiday. He could obtain the carbon copy on October 3, 1986 and he went and met the respondents 1 and 2 on October 4, 1986 with the order passed by the Court. But, they did not take any action thereon. He deposited on September 28, 1986 the two months rentals, etc. under Exs. A-6 to A-7. On October 6, 1986, the shops were opened by 3rd respondent and arrack was issued. He approached the first respondent with a written application on October 8, 1986 indicating that if the shops are not closed, he would be compelled to approach this court is Contempt proceedings. But, no action was taken. They refused to receive it. Accordingly, he sent a petition to the first and second respondents, by registered post and they were received by them on October 9, 1986. Equally, he also sent by registered post to the third respondent but, by the date of the filing of the contempt application, he did not receive the acknowledgment. Accordingly, he filed the contempt application on October 16, 1986. Thus the case of the petitioner is that he is the highest bidder and bid was accepted and he complied with the rules and despite obtaining the orders from this Court and having received the orders, the respondents did not stop further action. The carbon copy of the second order was refused by respondents 1 and 2 necessitating him to send by registered post. It is a wilful disobedience of the orders of this Court.
2. The averments in the counter-affidavits filed by respondents 1 and 2 are the same. They admit that the petitioner is the highest bidder for the auction conducted on September 22, 1986. But, before accepting the bid of the petitioner, the third respondent filed the application Ex. B. 3 for re-auction and the petitioner was sent for but was absconding. Accordingly, the auction was not confirmed. Then it was posted for re-auction on September 25, 1986. The re-auction was conducted on that date. The third respondent became the highest bidder. He paid the amounts on October 26, 1986. The telegraphic orders of this Court in WPMP No. 17494 of 1986 was received by the first respondent at 11-30 AM on September 26, 1986 and he transmitted to the second respondent who received it at 2 p.m. and by that time the licences were already issued. Accordingly, they could not have done anything. They deny the allegations that the petitioner approached them on September 26, and October 4, 1986 with the Carbon copy. They received it only on October 9, 1986. The third respondent has already opened the shops on October 3, 1986 and he has also drawn the arrack. There is no direction issued by this court to stop the operation of the supply of arrack to the 3rd respondent. Therefore, they could not do anything and that both the orders have become infructuous. The 3rd respondent pleaded that re-auction was ordered, he became the highest bidder; he paid the entire amount on September 26, 1986 itself and deposited the two months rentals, etc. on the next day. He also obtained the lease deeds from three persons in three different villages for opening the shops. Officers have inspected the places. They found that the premises are suitable. Accordingly, he complied with all the conditions. He also entered into counter-part agreement on September 26, 1986 and thereafter the licences were granted. He has drawn the arrack on October 3, 1986 and he has been doing the business. He received the registered letter sent by the petitioner only long after the opening of the shops. There is no direction to close the shops. Accordingly did not commit any contempt. If this court comes to the conclusion that any contempt is committed, he tendered an unconditional apology and requests this court to accept the same.
3. When the contempt case has come up for hearing, since the facts are in acute dispute, I directed the learned District Munsif, Cuddapah, to record the evidence of the parties and to transmit the same to this court. Accordingly, the learned District Munsif recorded the evidence. The petitioner has examined himself as P.W. 1 and another witnesses as P.W. 2 and marked as many as Exs. A-1 to A-7. The Joint Collector was not examined himself as a witness. The second respondent was examined as R.W. 1, the Assistant Excise Superintendent as R.W. 2. As many as Exs.B. 1 to B. 32 were marked on their behalf. The third respondent also did not examine himself as a witness.
4. Sri Narasimha Reddy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the stand taken by the petitioner and contended that the conduct of the respondents is such that they intend to circumvent the orders of this court so as to nullify the effect of the orders of this Court. Therefore, it is nothing short of wilful disobedience of the orders of this Court. The learned Government Pleader Sri Seetharama Raju, has contended that, on facts, as now brought out on record, it may be a case where the auction was validly conducted on September 22, 1986 and re-auction held on September 25, 1986 and opening the shops may be illegal and is liable to be set aside on merits. But as regards the contempt, the orders were received by the officers after the re-auction was conducted and after the shops were opened. Therefore, they could not give effect to any of the orders. Though the petitioner sought for directions in the contempt case not to continue the running of the shops, this court did not give any direction to close the shops. Accordingly no action could be taken. Thus, he argued that they did not commit any contempt. They have regard for the orders of this court.
5. The only question is whether the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the orders of this court ? The argument of the learned Government Pleader at the first blush appeared to me very plausible and acceptable but the evidence was not recorded by me. So I reserved the case. I have gone through the evidence, which discloses that the case in not as simple or innocent or innocuous as painted and projected by the learned Government Pleader with dexterity but pregnant with well germinated seeds of deliberate acts to see that reauction is effectuated disregard of any order that be passed to thwart it. To unearth it, stereo typed approach is to be eschewed and he angulated from circumstantial evidence. The predominent fact to be borne in mind is that the parties may be prone to speak lies but the circumstances will not. Therefore, on the facts of this case, we have to angulate facts from the perspective of circumstantial evidence, furnished by the conduct of the parties. In the context of corrupt practices in an election petition and excess election expenditure to draw inference from proved or admitted facts, I have held in Ramchandra Reddy v. Ironi Dingiaiah Election Petn. No. 25 of 1983 dt. 13-2-1984 (Andh Pra) thus :
“….. It is also necessary to keep in mind that inferences must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. There can be no inference unless there are objective of facts from which to infer the other facts which it sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inference does not go beyond reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculations or conjectures.”
(1) Election Petn. No. 25 of 1983, D/- 13-2-1984.
6. In my view, this approach would give an unerring assurance to reach at the truth of this case and satisfactory solution, to avoid miscarriage of justice.
7. The Excise Superintendent as R.O. 1. made certain admissions in his evidence which, in my view, would be relevant at the outset to be referred to. He admits that the petitioner became the highest bidder on September 22, 1986 knocked down for a sum of Rs. 9700/-. He signed the bid register and he issued Ex. A-1 auction-slip. He also admits that the successful bidder would not leave the hall unless and until the auction is confirmed and he signs the bid register as final act. He leaves the hall with bid slip given for payment on the conclusion of the auction. At pages 6 and 7, he states thus :
“… The successful bidder must remain in the premises of the auction hall till he signs the bid register and remits the money. I have issued the auction slip to the bidder immediately after the declaration so as to enable him to know the amount he has to remit into the bank/treasury …. On 22-9-1986, the bank was not functioning at the auction hall. The signature of P.W. 1 was obtained in the bid register on the day.”
He admits later of the same procedure adopted in regard to acceptance of the bid of the 3rd respondent. From these facts, it gives me a conclusive assurance that the bid of the petitioner was accepted by the respondents and thereafter the petitioner signed in the register and auction slip Ex. A-1 was issued to him. I have verified the register, the signature of the petitioner was found in the register. This is in consonance with Rule 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, for short, “the Rules”. There emerges a concluded contract. The signature by the auctioning authority is a ministerial act and the petitioner has no part to play. The acceptance order though written by his subordinates, was not signed by the Joint Collector. It is clear from the record that the Joint Collector was present at the time when the auction was conducted but the Joint Collector, for reasons unknown, did not sign on the acceptance of the bid.
8. The next question is whether the petitioner has paid one month’s rent and earnest money immediately after the auction. His case is that he paid to Excise Superintendent who received it as the bank is not working. It is admitted that bank counter did not function on September 22, 1986. The petitioner’s case receives corroboration from the diary of the Sub-Inspector. Sidhout, Ex. B-24 maintained in that office has been produced and R.W. 1 was confronted with that. The relevant portion is marked as Ex. B. 25. He admits the Signature of the Sub-Inspector. He admits thus :
“There is the entry in Ex. B-25 to the effect that the Sub-Inspector has received the cash from M. Pulla Reddy (the petitioner) along with the Challans duly signed by him for one month rentals Rs. 9,700/- plus earnest money deposit Rs. 2328/-, the total Rs. 12,028/-, as per Ex. B. 25 entry. Excise Sub-Inspector or received the amount from P.W. 1 at 11-30 p.m. on 22-9-86. In the entry against, the challan number is mentioned as 3777 dt. 23-9-86. As per the entry dt. 23-9-86 in Ex. B. 25 it is written that the Excise-Sub-Inspector Sidhout, is stated to have met the Asst. Excise Superintendent, Cuddapah, and he was instructed by the Excise Superintendent and the Asst. Excise Superintendent not to remit one month rental and the earnest money deposit of Kamasamudram, Komarajupally and Muthukur into the treasury. Further, the Excise Sub-Inspector continued that he has obtained Challan No. 3777 dated 23-9-1986 only but not remitted as per the oral instructions of the Excise-Superintendent, and the other officers and the Joint Collector, Cuddapah.”
It is the case of the petitioner that he tendered the cash amount with the 2nd respondent and the 2nd respondent had accepted that amount on and the same day i.e. on September 22, 1986. This was further corroborated by entry into the cash register Ex. B. 26 and relevant entry Ex. B-27. The evidence of R.W. 1 (Excise Superintendent) is that in Ex. A-1 there is note that the amount is to be deposited in the bank within 24 hours and the petitioner did not do so. It is not the case that re-auction was done for non-compliance of rule 16. On the other hand, it is admitted that bank counter opened at the auction place did not function on September 22, 1986. The practice of receipt of cash payment is amply demonstrated from entries, relating to cash payments by others and receipt thereof by the respondents in cash register Ex. B. 26. Thus, I hold that the petitioner has paid to the 2nd respondent one month rent and earnest money deposit, in a sum of Rs. 12,028/- in the night of September 22, 1986 at 11-30 p.m. immediately after the bid was accepted, as required under Rule 16 of the Rules and the Sub-Inspector, Siddout, accepted it on behalf of the respondents and entered in Ex. B. 26. Subsequently, under Exs.A5 to A-7, he furnished the two months rentals by way of fixed deposits, as required under Rule 18 within fifteen days. Thus, the case of the petitioner that his bid was accepted and he left the auction hall thereafter is well established.
9. His further case that on 24th it was rumoured that it was sought to be cancelled and accordingly instructions were issued to the Sub-Inspector not to deposit the amount in the treasury, clearly gets full corroboration from the entry Ex. B-25 in the diary maintained by the Sub-Inspector in the regular official routine duty which also further indicates that, on September 23, 1986, the Joint Collector, the Excise Superintendent and the Asst. Excise Superintendent gave oral instructions to the Sub-Inspector of Excise not to deposit the amount of Rs. 12,028/- received from the petitioner at 11-30 p.m. on September 22, 1986. The clinching and unerring evidence clearly established that the bid of the petitioner accepted on September 22, 1986 was not cancelled on September 22, 1986 as professed to be by the first respondent, Joint Collector and the Excise Superintendent (R.W. 1) R.W. 1 admitted in cross-examination at page 11 thus :
“Auctioning authority has no power to cancel and bid if a third party comes and offers for a higher bid amount unless he gets an approval from the Excise Commissioner. I cannot say definitely under what circumstances the auctioning authority cancelled the bid.”
The first respondent did not come into the box and explained the circumstances under which and on what date he cancelled the bid of the petitioner. We have only the entry made in the bid register of non-acceptance of the bid of the petitioner. In that, it is stated thus :
“Just before confirming the bid in writing, an appeal has been made for re-auction. I ordered to call the bidder. He was called and searched for. But he has disappeared with mischievous intentions in his mind, even without remitting the bid amount as required under the Rules under the delegation of powers obtained from the Commissioner on telephone according to Section 8 of the A.P. Excise Act, I have cancelled the auction after ascertaining the objections which were not forthcoming and ordered for re-auction.
Sd/-
…… Joint Collector 22-9-1986.
On that day, number of other shops were also scheduled to be put to auction. Why they were not auctioned, no explanation was given. The recital that the petitioner did not pay one month’s rental and earnest money deposit is an obvious falsehood. After the bid is accepted there is no need for the petitioner to remain there. The Excise Superintendent as R.W. 1 admits that in the counter-affidavit it is not mentioned that the Joint Collector contacted the Commissioner of Excise and obtained his consent for cancellation. On the other hand, the positive case is that on his own accord the Joint Collector cancelled the auction. The question is whether this cancellation is on September 22, 1986 itself or on any other day. The Excise Superintendent as R.W. 1 admits that the Ex. B. 3 filed by the 3rd respondent is ‘undated’ and it bears no initials of the Joint Collector. R.W. 1 was unable to give the time when actually it was received. According to them, it was received at 6-30 p.m. There is no mention of it on Ex. B. 3. The auction was said to have been conducted at 6-00 p.m. It means there is a gap of half-an-hour. It is the case of the respondents and also as per the entry found in the order that the petitioner was absconding before auction was confirmed. It is absolutely incongruous to believe the evidence of R.W. 1 that P.W. 1 should remain in the auction hall after he signs the register. The amount was received from the petitioner at 11-30 p.m. So this order could not be made at 6-30 p.m. as it was professed to be. It must have been made subsequently. Yet another circumstance it that they profess to obtain instruction from the Commissioner on telephone and then cancelled the order. It is absolutely impossible to believe that the Joint Collector contacted the Commissioner on telephone, the Commissioner in Anticipation waiting for the call and has given consent for cancellation. The Excise Superintendent (R.W. 1) admitted thus :
“It is not mentioned in the counter-affidavit that the auctioning authority has consulted the Excise Commissioner for cancellation of the bid. On the other hand, it is mentioned that the auctioning authority has cancelled the bid by himself by virtue of the powers vested in him.”
There is interpolation in Ex. B. 1. There is no letter written to the Excise Commissioners by the Joint Collector seeking confirmation of oral permission or letter of confirmation by the Excise Commissioners. In Ex. B. 1 the recital is that “an appeal was made” for re-auction. It is not the case that Respondent No. 3 filed Ex. B. 3 and that it was cancelled on that basis. It is thereby clear that Ex. B. 3 is non-existing by that date. Why he proceeded to cancel on September 22, 1986 itself. He should have written to the Excise Commissioner and obtained written authorisation and then conducted re-auction after cancellation. Therefore, these circumstances clearly show that this cancellation order is a fabrication subsequently made and, therefore, no credence can be given. From this conduct thus far displayed, we have to pass on to see whether the further conduct of the respondent is an innocent as professed to be or as stated by the petitioner that the respondents have deliberately intended to see that the orders of this court became ineffectual so that the illegal re-auction is given effect to. The hidden motive factor is to be unearthed from the conduct of the parties. It would appear to me that there is a ring of truth in what the petitioner states. The reasons are manifold. According to the pleading of the respondents, the re-auction was conducted on September 25, 1986. They did not state in the counter-affidavit that they conducted the auctions on September 23, 1986 or September 24, 1986. In the register at page 218, it would appear that on September 23, 1986, there was auction for Uppaluru (New). The Government bid is Rs. 850/-. The 3rd respondent became the highest bidder for Rs. 1400/-. Then for Koduru on the same day, the bid was sought to be made. No bidder came. Then Kamalakur shop was sought to be put to bid. Nobody came. Kamasamudram shop was sought to be put to bid. Nobody came. When the third respondent came suo motu on September 22, 1986 and is interested to participate in the auction and at his behest when it was cancelled, would it be acceptable and believable to countenance that he would not have participated at the auction on September 23, 1986 when Kamasamudram was put to auction. Then another bid was sought to be made for Konarajupalli. The 3rd respondent and one Pichi Reddy are alleged to have participated. The bid was for Rs. 3,600/-. Then for Muthukuru also, the same persons have participated and the 3rd respondent became the highest bidder for Rs. 3,000/- and another Rajupalem was sought to be auctioned and one Nageswara Reddy became the bidder for Rs. 4,300/-. Why Kamasamudram group of shops were not put to auction no reasons are forthcoming. Then Chnduvey (9 shops), including those of Muthukuru, Kamasamudram and Konarajupalli were sought to be clubbed and Ramaiah, the 3rd respondent became the highest bidder for Rs. 34,000/-. No reasons have been given as to why this auction was not confirmed. Then comes the auction of 24th September, 1986, Kamasamudram group of three shops was again put to auction and one Gopal Reddy and E. Ramaiah (3rd respondent) are said to have participated and the latter became the auction-purchaser for Rs. 12,600/-. Nothing has been stated why the auction was not accepted on that day. Now they profess that the auction was conducted on September 25, 1986 and the 3rd respondent became the highest bidder for Rs. 13,000/- and it was accepted on September 25, 1986. It is admitted that on September 26, 1986 the re-auction was held at 8.30 p.m. It would appear, that after the bid of the petitioner became final, there must be some political pressure to give the lease to the 3rd respondent and the respondents were unable to wriggle out from the situation, they stopped conducting auction to the scheduled shops on September 22, 1986 and a farce of auction on September 23, 24 and 25, 1986 was fabricated taking advantage of custody of records. If really reaction was held earlier to September 25, 1986 nothing prevented respondents 1 and 2 to finalise and deposits/made on September 25, 1986. When re-auction was done on September 25, 1986 at 8.30 p.m. why the 3rd respondent did not deposit the month rent and 2% Earnest Money Deposit on the night itself when the bank counter was admittedly opened. It is not the case that the counter was not functioning. But, on coming to know that the petitioner approached this court to obtain stay of auction they must have brought on record a farce of re-auction on September 25, 1986 and determined to see that the alleged re-auction should be seen through. This mala fide conduct is amply demonstrable from the narrative of the facts to follow.
10. Though I am not sure to accept the petitioner’s version that the respondents received the telegraphic orders communicated by this Court dt. 10-30 p.m. in the night of September 25, 1986, the evidence of the petitioner at P.W. 1 that on the next day, viz. on September 26, 1986 he met the Excise Superintendent personally and submitted a copy of the telegram appear to be believable. It accords with the normal human conduct. His evidence gets corroborations from the evidence of P.W. 2. Even if we exclude the evidence of P.W. 2, one stark fact remains to be considered and it would be clinching and quite accord with the human conduct is that having obtained orders from this court and having gone of Cuddapah on the same night taking the trouble to meet the officers, would it not be expected that the petitioner does meet them particularly when he obtained the orders not to conduct any re-auction. The case of the respondents that the petitioner did not meet them on 26th is an obvious falsehood. Therefore, I accept the evidence of P.W. 1 that he met the Excise Superintendent on the morning of September 26, 1986 and informed him that he obtained orders from this court not to conduct the re-auction and not to take further action. Telegraphic orders were communicated to both the respondents the Joint Collector and the Excise Superintendent. Now, there is an endorsement Ex. B. 21 made by the Joint Collector under his hand that he received it on September 26, 1986 at 11-30 a.m. for the sake of argument, we accept it on its face value. If the officers are innocent and re-auction was done in a routine way without any oblique motives, one would expect from the Dist. level officials i.e. respondents 1 and 2 to direct the subordinates to stop all further proceedings, instruct the concerned to go over to Hyderabad, meet the Government Pleader, apprise him of the actual situation, seek advice and then to take action according to exigencies. That normal behaviour is a casualty here. On the other hand the endorsement on Ex. B. 21 gives an interesting reading and pre-determined revelation. It reads thus :
“Excise Superintendent. The stay became infructuous. Hence cannot be implemented.
Sd/-
xxx 11-30 a.m." What does it mean ? and what does it indicate of ? It demonstrates pre-concerted action and the absence of the need to relent therefrom. When the same telegram was issued to the second respondent, he does not state when he received it. When the first respondent received it at 11-30, I assume that at the same time the 2nd respondent must have received the telegram and therefore I hold that the Excise Superintendent must have received the telegram at 11-30 a.m.
11. Then the 2nd respondent as R.W. 1 states that he received Ex. B. 21 from the Joint Collector at 2 p.m. It is astonishing to note that the 3rd respondent making deposits, one at Cuddapah and others at Siddavatam, coming back and filing them with the Excise Superintendent at 12 noon, his instructions to the Sub-Inspector of excise to visit the proposed places for location of the shops the officials travelling 50 miles to and from to inspect them and to submit the report and issue of the licence thereafter took one and half hours time. The entire operation was performed between 10.30 a.m. (Official time) and 12.30 p.m. (the time of issue of licence) i.e. two hours, but whereas it took three and half hours to Ex. B. 21 telegram to travel from the Joint Collector to the Excise Superintendent in the town itself, perhaps may be in the same compound or adjacent. Admittedly, the official functions start from 10.30 a.m. The re-auction was alleged to have been done at 8-30 on September 25, 1986. It is the case that the 3rd respondent Ramaiah deposited in the bank at Cuddapah one month rental and earnest money i.e. Rs. 16,120/- on September 26, 1986 under Ex. B. 8. He produced it before the Excise Superintendent. He went to Siddhout, paid licence-fee of Rs. 15/- under Ex. B. 9. He went to Rayalaseema Grameena Bank, Siddavatham (Siddout) and made fixed deposit of Rs. 13,000/- each for two months under Exs. B. 10 and 11 and another sum of E.M.D. under Ex. B. 12 and obtained Fixed Deposit Receipt under Exs. B-10 to 12. He came to Cuddapah and submitted them to the Excise Superintendent at 12 noon. He brought counterpart agreement Ex. B. 13 which they entered into. Before the issue of licences, as per the admission of R.W. 1 at page 12, Excise S.I. should inspect the premises before the issue of licence in favour of the highest bidder. The distance between Cuddapah to Kamasamudram group villages is about 50 miles. After payment of licence fee only the Excise S.I. will inspect the premises. After he inspects the premises and sends his report, we issue licence. In this case the S.I. has submitted the letter of the licence along with his inspection report. At another place, he admits (at page 12) “Between 11-30 a.m. and 12 noon on 26-9-1986. I saw the covering letter and enclosures (Exs.B. 8 to B-12). I am the licensing authority. Around 12-30 p.m. the licence was given to R. 3”. From these admission if the official acts are done in the normal circumstances, the following sequence of events should happen : (1) The respondent should deposit one month rent and 2% E.M.D. He should give fixed Deposits for two months rents and EMD. They are reflected in Exs.B. 8 and B. 10 to B. 12, (2) He entered into counter-part agreement. It is done under Ex. B. 12. The counterpart agreement must have been executed after 12 noon, (3) He produced challan Ex. B. 9 for licence. R.W. 1 should instruct the S.I. of Excise thereafter to inspect the places whereat the shops are to be located and submit the report, (4) The S.I. should Travel 50 miles, make inspection, come back i.e. he should travel 100 miles. He should submit verification report. He submitted Exs. B-14 to B-16 reports. R.W. 1 should see the report and authorise the Asstt. Superintendent of Excise who has admittedly issued the licence at 12.30 p.m. It is possible to make 100 miles journey in one hour 15 minutes time ? In Exs. B-14 to B-16 reports the owner of the premises, under Exs.B. 15 and B. 16 signed them on 27-9-1986 and they were corrected to 26-9-1986. The Asstt. Excise Superintendent examined as R.W. 2 admitted these corrections. He further admits : “Excise Superintendent sent the file at 1.15 or 1.30 p.m. on 26-9-1986. At about 1.45 p.m. R. 3 came to me personally. It would mean that he issued the licence after 1.45 p.m. and from 12 noon to 1.45 p.m. the 3rd respondent was at Cuddapah. The Excise S.I. by himself cannot inspect the places unless somebody accompanies him to the three villages and shown him the places. The 3rd respondent did not choose to come into the box. We do not know who accompanied the Excise S.I. to those villages. The more fundamental question is whether is it believable that the Excise S.I. made 100 miles journey in that short span of one hour fifteen minutes, made inspection, submitted the report and thereon the Asstt. Superintendent of Excise issued the licence. We have seen from the entries Exs.B. 24 to B. 27 that Excise S.I. Siddout is a sincere officer. So the inspection of the places as indicated from the dates mentioned in Exs.B. 15 and B. 16 must be on September 27, 1986 and the report must be thereafter R.W. 2 is not even prepared to speak to the admitted facts. He gives all evasive answers. His evidence does not inspire confidence to accept. The only conclusion that could be reached is that the licence was not issued on September 26, 1986. But, they were antedated and must have been issued after September 27, 1986. If it is to be accepted that it was issued on September 26, 1986, it was done with “Utmost indecent haste without verification etc.”
12. Let us see whether it is bona fide in the interest of the revenue of the State. From the record it is an admitted case that by September 26, 1986, 300 shops were auctioned and none of the licensees either made the deposits, as required under Rule 16, not the licences were given. So it is not in the interest of the revenue. Why then licence was given on 26th itself to the 3rd respondent alone on the date of deposit itself. What does it mean and what does it indicate ? When we read this evidence in the light of the endorsement Ex. B. 21, obviously, the respondents have pre-consorted animation proceeded in an ‘utmost indecent haste’ in helping the 3rd respondent to issue the licences. It is a deliberate and desparate Act so that the legal action taken by the petitioner in filing the writ petition and obtaining any orders from this court to become ineffectual and fiasco.
13. Then the next question is whether the petitioner, as asserted, has made a representation to the respondents not to take any further action. To that assertion, the respondents profess that no such representation has been made. In view of the abnormal and motivated conduct adopted by the respondents, and taking into account of the normal probable human conduct, I am inclined to believe that the petitioner’s version that he made representation to the respondents and requested them not to take any further action and when they did not pay heed to it, he came to this court on 29th, filed the three applications and obtained injunction order granted on October 1, 1986 in W.P.M.P. 17963 of 1986 not to open the shops had a carbon copy of it on October 3, 1986 he took it and met the respondents on October 4, 1986 and requested them not to open the shops. The injunction order becomes effective from the moment it was passed. It is the case of the respondents that he did not approach them at all. Normal human conduct would be that, having obtained an order, he would have met them and that too having obtained the carbon copy. The Excise Superintendent as R.W. 1 has made a deliberate lie when he speaks that the petitioner did not meet him. The first respondent did not choose to examine himself as a witness. I draw an adverse inference against him. Therefore, I accept the statement of the petitioner that he met both the respondents and informed them of the order passed by this Court of issuing an order of injunction restraining them not to open the shops.
14. The question then is when the shops are opened ? In this case, admittedly, except the 3rd respondent, none others have opened any shops as on October 4, 1986. They profess that, since the 3rd respondent has complied with all the formalities as required under law, there is no option for them except to issue the licence. Accordingly, they issued the licence and the 1st respondent has nothing to do with the issuance of the licences. The 3rd respondent started functioning from October 4, 1986. Would it be possible to swallow this statement as a gospel truth ? As I held earlier, the respondents have conducted in “an indecent haste” in issuing the licence to the 3rd respondent and ante-dated them. It would be obvious that the petitioner must have met them on October 4, 1986 and asked them not to open the shops. To prove that the shops were opened on October 3, 1986 no syllable of acceptable evidence has been brought to my notice. The 3rd respondent deliberately held himself back from being examined as a witness. I draw an adverse inference against him. When respondent are determined to concoct the record and in fact fabricated, it is conceivable that Ex. B. 23 and the statement of the Depot S.I. must be the result of the fabrication. The opening of the shops was said to be on October 3, 1986 because the petitioner pleaded that he met the respondents on October 4, 1986. The original arrack issue register of the Depot to show whether subsequent to October 3, 1986 any arrack was drawn is withheld. It is not the case that, from October 3, 1986 till date of filing the contempt case or subsequently, any arrack was drawn. On their own showing the arrack was alleged to have been drawn only on October 3, 1986. In view of the above facts, the abnormal conduct of respondents 1 and 2 and indecent haste with which the respondents have proceeded. I have no slightest hesitation to conclude that the shops must have been opened only after October 4, 1986, and not at any rate, before that date.
15. The question, therefore, is whether the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the orders of this court ? As I said earlier, the conduct of the respondents is unworthy of acceptance and the evidence of R.W. 1 is unworthy of belief and they have deliberately and wilfully intended to see that the orders passed by this court to become fiasco and ineffectual and in that process they acted in an indecent haste in granting ante-dated licence to the 3rd respondent and thereby the 2nd respondent obviously helped him to draw the liquor after October 4, 1986. In the counter-affidavit the 1st respondent states thus :
“My responsibility was only to the extent of conducting auction and I have nothing to do with the actual opening of the shops. Opening of the shops is the responsibility of the licencee himself. Inasmuch as the auction-purchaser was included as the 3rd respondent in the W.P. and the orders restraining the opening of the shops applied only to him, it is 3rd respondents duty to act upon the orders of the High Court. However, then the licensee could not have done it as he already opened the shops much before the receipt of the Honourable Court’s orders.”
To the same effect is the averment of the 2nd respondent, except stating that, after issuing the licences, he has nothing to do with the closing of the shops. In view of the findings recorded hereinbefore it is impossible to believe their version and is not innocuous as professed to impress upon the Court and it is impossible to believe that the shops were opened on October 3, 1986 and the 3rd respondent was functioning by that date and that they have no part to play to prevent it. In K. Satyanarayana Murthy v. J. Ramabhadra Raju, Contempt Case No. 242 of 1986, D/- 10-4-1987. I have considered the scope of Sections 2(b) 13, 12(1) and 12(3) of the Act and held thus :
“That any wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court is a “Civil Contempt”. The court has first to find whether the act or omission is a wilful disobedience or wilful breach of undertaking. Positive finding is a condition precedent to punish the contemnor. By operation of Section 13, the court shall not impose a sentence under sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act for a contempt unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such nature that it substantially interferes or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. If the finding is again positive, the further step required to angulate is whether it is a case to accept the apology. If made bona fide though not unconditionally. If the apology is not tendered or rejected, it is to further consider whether imposition of fine would meet the ends of justice. By operation of sub-section (3) of S. 13 with the aid of non obstante clause if the court records a finding that the wilful disobedience substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice and award of fine alone would not be proper punishment, the Court may sentence the contemnor to simple imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine not exceeding Rs. 2,000/- or both fine and imprisonment. In an appropriate case, sub-section (3) of S. 12 takes out from the purview of sub-section (1) of Section 12 and empowers the court and that if a sentence of imprisonment is necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment direct that he be detained in a civil prison for a period not exceeding six months.”
In this case, in view of the conduct of the respondent and the findings I have recorded earlier, I hold that the respondents have intended to deliberately and wilfully to see that the orders passed by this court to become ineffectual and to be nullified and thereby S. 13 of the act does not apply and they calculatedly and deliberately interfered with the judicial process or due course of justice. Therefore, they have committed contempt of this court as per Section 2(b) of the Act and accordingly they are liable to punishment under section 12 of the Act. The normal presumption that official acts have been done regularly, has been shattered to pieces and it is found that they have deliberately concocted the records and also manoeuvred in such a way that the orders of this court to become ineffectual. The officers are no other than the District Administrative Officers – one is the Joint Collector and another is the Excise Superintendent. Far from being responsible and exemplary in their behaviour so as to set a standard worth of emulation by the subordinates working under them in the district, they themselves conducted in an abominal way to flout the orders passed by this Court. Therefore, no leniency can be shown to them. They did not tender any apology. A ward of punishment would depend upon the gravity of the wilful disobedience. The faith of the people in the efficacy of the orders of the court is succour to rule of law. If a litigant is driven to think that the orders of court are “mere paper tigers” and the whim of the executive alone would ultimately prevail, there would be deep and indelible dent on effectivity of rule of law and arbitrary executive excesses would have their sway. The court would keep these factors in view to award punishment. In their counter-affidavits, they have taken the definite stand that they did not commit any contempt. Therefore, punishment under sub-section (1) of S. 12 with fine or simple imprisonment or both would not meet the ends of justice. The only order that should be passed shall be one under sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act. Though the 3rd respondent has tendered unconditional apology in his counter. I am not prepared to accept his unconditional apology. It is not a bona fide one. It is only an attempt to avoid punishment. In Satyanarayana Murthy’s case (supra) I have held :
“The bona fides have to be tested from the conduct displayed by the contemnor. There cannot be any direct evidence in that regard. The motive is locked up in the mind of the contemnor. Tendering apology must be sincere and contrite with remorse. It alone would meet the test of bona fide one. It must not be a pretext to evade punishment. Mere incantation of professed regard for the orders of the court cannot be swallowed on its face value. It is to be demonstrated from the anvil of conduct displayed by the contemnor. Otherwise, a party could flout the order, etc. with impunity and walk away with a smile. The majesty of rule of law to have supremacy, the propensity to flout the orders of court must be quenched.”
He (the 3rd respondent) is the villain of the piece behind the entire scenario and at his behest the entire thing has been done. The contention of Sri Ramakrishna Raju, the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent that the 3rd respondent wanted to have the pride of being first to take the licence is apparently unacceptable and incredulours to believe. All the three respondents have acted in concert with confabulation. Therefore, he should also fall in like with respondents 1 and 2. The 2nd respondent in his counter-affidavit has shown his threat of taking disciplinay action against the Sub-Inspector of Excise, Sidhout, who has stated candidly in his diary and cash book Exs. B. 24 and B. 26 all that happened as a sincere and devoted public servant. He did not visualise that it would pose peril to his career. He deserves encouragement. It is now found that what has been stated by him is correct one and that the respondents have deliberately and illegally cancelled the highest bid of the petitioner. Far from encouraging him, he is at the brink of disciplinary action. Therefore, if any disciplinary action is taken by the authorities against the Sub-Inspector of Excise, Siddhout, it would be nothing short of mala fide exercise of the power to punish him for sincere discharge of duties. The appealing argument of the learned Government Pleader is not as innocuous as professed to be and if accepted, has its insidious effect on the efficacy of the rule of law. Accordingly all the three respondents are punished for committing contempt of this court under section 12(3) of the Act and I direct them, viz., J. Ramanand, Mohd. Sheriff and E. Ramaiah to be detained in a civil prison for a period of three months and the petitioner shall pay for the first two respondents at the rate of Rs. 1500/- every month and for the 3rd respondent at the rate of Rs. 500/- every month. The contempt case is accordingly allowed no costs. Advocates fee Rs. 400/-.
16. Petition allowed.