JUDGMENT
G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. The petitioner has prayed for quashing of the orders Annexure P.2, P.3 P.5 and P.6 passed respectively by the Assistant Estate Officer (exercising the powers of the Estate Officer, Chandigarh), the Chief Administrator and the Adviser to the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh.
2. The petitioner, Smt. Jasbir Kaur, and Shri Jagjit Singh gave the highest bid for Booth Site No. 407, Sector 44 C&D, Chandigarh in the open auction held on 22.2.1987 for allotment of commercial sites on lease hold basis. They deposited 25% of the premium of the site and got the possession of the allotted site. In terms of the allotment letter dated 8.5.1987, the allottees had the option to deposit the remaining amount of premium with 30 days without any interest or to make payment in three equated annual instalments along with interest @ 7 per cent. In terms of para 5 of the allotment letter, the due dates of payment of first second and third instalments were 22.2.1998, 22.2.1989 and 22.2.1990. The last date by which the payment had to be made in order to avoid punitive action were 10.3.1988, 10.3.1989 and 10.3.19.90 respectively. The petitioner and Shri. Jagjit Singh paid two instalments but failed to deposit the third instalment by the due date. Thereupon the Assistant Estate Officer issued notice dated 10.5.1990 under rule 12(3) of the Chandigarh Leasehold of Sites and Buildings Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) requiring the allottees to pay the third instalment along with ground rent and penalty within a period of three months i.e. by 15.8.1990. However, even after receiving the notice the allottees did not pay the amount. This led to the initiation of proceedings for cancellation of the site. The Assistant Estate Officer issued notice dated 4.9.1990 requiring the allottees to show cause why the lease of the site be not cancelled. In all 16 adjournments were granted by the Assistant Estate Officer but the petitioner and her co-allottee failed to avail the same. Rather, neither of them appeared on the last date of hearing. The Assistant Estate Officer considered the facts of the case and held that the default was willful. On the basis of this conclusion, the Assistant Estate Officer cancelled the lease of the site and forfeited 10% of the premium deposited by the petitioner.
3. During the pendency of the appeal filed by the allottees, the Chief Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh took notice of the statement made by the counsel appearing on behalf of the allottees that his clients were prepared to make payment of entire amount of the arrears within a period of three months. The representative of the Estate Officer gave out that a sum of Rs. 1,59,769/- was due from the allottees. The appellate authority gave three weeks’ time to allottees-appellants to deposit the amount notwithstanding the objections raised by the representative of the Estate Officer. Despite this the allottees failed to deposit the amount. Consequently, the Chief Administrator dismissed the appeal vide order Annexure P.5 dated 15.12.1992.
4. After keeping mum for a period of almost four years’ the petitioner and her co-allottee filed revision petition before the Adviser to the Administrator which has been dismissed by the revisional authority vide order Annexure P.6 dated 29.1.1997.
5. The petitioner has challenged the legality of the impugned orders on the following grounds:-
(a) the order passed by the Assistant Estate Officer cancelling the lease of the site is liable to be declared as void because it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice;
(b) the action of the Assistant Estate Officer in ordering forfeiture of a part of the premium is without jurisdiction because he had already imposed penalty on the petitioner;
(c) the imposition of penalty is without jurisdiction because no notice was given to the petitioner or her co-allottee;
(d) the appellate order is also vitiated due to the violation of the principles of natural justice because the appellate authority did not give opportunity of hearing to the allottees or their counsel;
(e) the levy of interest is contrary to the terms of allotment.
6. We have heard Shri R.S. Dass and have carefully perused the record of the writ petition.
7. At the very outset, it is necessary to mention that the revision petition filed by the petitioner and her co-allottee has been dismissed by the Adviser to the Administrator on the ground that there is no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the Assistant Estate Officer and Chief Administrator on the issue of default. Learned counsel for the petitioner made valiant attempt to explain the delay of four years in the filing of the revision petition by stating that the case initiated by the Estate Officer was being pursued by the co-allottee of the petitioner and the petitioner had not knowledge regarding the progress of the proceedings and the order passed by the Assistant Estate Officer as well as the appellate authority and for this reason she could not institute the revision petition within the time limit prescribed by Section 10(4) of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Building Rules, 1952. In our view this explanation is devoid of credibility and, therefore, the same deserves to be rejected. In para 14 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated as under:-
“14. That the order of the Chief Administrator, Chandigarh was not communicated to the petitioner and the petitioner was not aware of the final order passed by the Chief Administrator, Chandigarh. The petitioner was waiting the next date to be communicated but came to know that the Chief Administrator has already passed the order, dismissing the appeal. For above one year there was no regular court of the Chief Administrator, Chandigarh, and even cases prior to the filing of the appeal before the Chief Administrator, arc still pending in the court. The petitioner was waiting the next date and after waiting enquired and came to know that the appeal has already been dismissed, engaged the counsel. The counsel inspected the file and filed the revision before the Advisor to the Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh, which came up for hearing before Sh. Pardip Mehra, Advisor to the Administrator, U.T., Chandigarh and the Ld. Advisor to the Administrator while deciding the revision petition has taken into consideration the delay in filing the revision petition and the petitioner did not deposit any outstanding amount since the year 1990, although after payment of 75% premium of the site, the petitioner deposited Rs. 1,00,000/- which was on the record. Only single opportunity was given and the petitioner deposited the amount and was arranging the balance amount to be paid. The petitioner and the family was affected by the terrorism. The Ld. Adviser by presuming that the petitioner had no intention to pay dismissed the revision petition vide order dated 29.1.1997 issued on 4.2.1997. (Copy of order the Adviser to the Administrator, Chandigarh is attached as Annexure P-60.)”
8. However, a look at the orders Annexure P.5 and P.6 shows that the appeal as well as the revision petition were filed by Jagjit Singh and others. This naturally leads to the presumption that the petitioner was aware of the pending proceedings. Moreover, at one stage Shri Jasbir Singh Brar, Advocate had appeared before the Chief Administrator. It is a different story that the learned advocate did not appear when the Chief Administrator passed the final order. The court has not been apprised of the reasons why Shri Jasbir Singh Brar did not appear before the appellate authority at the time of final decision. But that by itself cannot be a ground to overlook the delay of almost four years in the filing of the revision petition. Even if we were to exclude the statutory period of 30 days specified in section 10(4) of the Act, the revision petition will have to be treated as barred by three years and eight months. The petitioner has no explanation as to why she did not make any attempt to find out the fate of the appeal filed by her against the order of Assistant Estate Officer. She is not an illiterate woman and therefore she cannot feign ignorance about the proceedings of the appeal We, therefore, do not find any reason to upset the finding recorded by the Adviser to the Administrator that the revision petition was barred by limitation.
9. The plea of the petitioner that the proceedings held by the Assistant Estate Officer should be nullified on the ground of the violation of the principles of natural justice deserves to be rejected due to the following reasons:-
(a) The Assistant Estate Officer had issued notice dated 10.5.1990 requiring the allottees to pay the outstanding amount on or before 15.8.1990. This means that more than three months time was given to the allottees to deposit the amount and avoid the consequences of default. However the petitioner and her co-allottee failed to avail this opportunity. Thereafter show cause notice dated 4.9.1990 was served upon the petitioner and her co-allottee. The hearing of the case was adjourned for 16 days. Even this time was not availed of by the petitioner and her co-allottee to pay the dues. Therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to assail the action taken by the Assistant Estate Officer on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice.
(b) The petitioner did not raise the plea of the violation of the principles of natural justice either before the appellate authority or the revisional authority. This is evident from a bare perusal of the orders Annexure P-5 and P-6. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that the plea of violation of the principles of natural justice was neither raised nor pursued before the appellate and the revisional authorities.
(c) Even before this court the petitioner has not produced any evidence to show that the issue of violation of the principles of natural justice was raised before the appellate and the revisional authorities. For the reasons best known to her the petitioner has not produced the copies of the memo of appeal and the revision petition to substantiate her plea regarding violation at the principles of natural justice. Non-production of these documents affords sufficient justification to draw adverse inference against the petitioner;
There is no merit in the petitioner’s plea that the appellate authority has passed the order Annexure P-5 without giving opportunity of hearing to her Advocate. A bare perusal of that order shows that Shri Jasbir Singh Brar, Advocate not only appeared on behalf of the petitioner and her allottee but he also (made) a request for grant of time to deposit the outstanding amount. If the learned counsel did not consider it necessary or appropriate to appear at a later stage, it cannot be said that the appellate authority did not afford opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and her co-allottee.
10. The petitioner’s grievance against the levy of excess interest or the forfeiture of the premium is untenable in view of the express provision contained in Rule 12(3) and (3-A) of the Rules of 193. The amended Rule 12(3-a) empowers the competent authority to levy interest at the higher rate in a case where the al-1 lottee fails to deposit the amount despite notice under Rule 12(3).
11. Before concluding, we deem it proper to notice the argument of Shri Dass that the order of cancellation of lease should not have been passed in the hurry and further time should have been allowed to the petitioner to deposit the amount because the default was due to the circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control. We are not at all impressed with the submission of Shri Dass because even after issuing notice to the petitioner on 10.5.1990 and 4.9.1990 over two years time was given to her and Shri Jagjit Singh to deposit the amount they failed to do so. The appellate authority gave another opportunity to the petitioner amount. However, they did not avail the same. This shows that the petitioner and her co-allottee were not interested in making payment of the amount due. The persistent default committed by the petitioner and her co-allottee is clearly discernible from the fact that the default continued even though the appellate authority accepted the request of the counsel for grant of time to deposit the amount and the representative of the Estate Officer had indicated that outstanding amount was Rs. 1,59,769/-. Thus there is no ground to grant further indulgence to the petitioner. In this connection, we may refer to the observations made by a Division Bench of this court in CWP No. 10937 of 1996 : 1998(2) R.R.R. 536 (P&H). Devinder Singh Pannu and Ors. v. The Chandigarh Administration and Ors., decided on December 20, 1996. In that judgment, the court has, after a detailed analysis of the provisions of the Act and rules and the various decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court including the Full Bench in Ram Puri v. Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh, (1982)84 P.L.R. 388 observed :-
“We respectfully agree with Sandhawalia, J. as he then was, that the power of resumption should not be resorted to lightly. However, we do not find anything in the above quoted observations which may support the cause of the petitioner. Rather we are of the view that the court must take notice of a pernicious tendency which has grown over the years amongst the haves of the society to grab public property by hook or by crook. Those who get lease etc. of public property by allotment through draw of lots or auction have developed the habit of not paying their dues. The Court can legitimately take notice of huge difference between the rate of interest which one is required to pay under the Act of 1952 and the rules framed thereunder and similar statutes on the one hand and the interest which one gets on investment in the market on the other hand. People getting allotment of public land do not pay the instalments of lease, rent etc. “with the hope that ultimately they will pay the dues along with some penalty and interest after many years and thereby make huge profit. Remedies of appeal and revision provide sufficient time cushion to multiply the profits of those who do not pay the instalments money but raise construction over the allotted piece of land and earn substantial rental income. Thus, the gain of individuals is a direct loss to the public exchequer. In our considered opinion the Estate Officer will be fully justified to exercise of power of resumption in cases of persistent default in the payment of instalment money etc. and the Courts will not readily interfere with the exercise or discretion by the competent authority in such like matters. Time has come when the courts must not show any compassion towards those who want to enjoy public property without fulfilling their duty in terms of the conditions of allotment. Indulgence of the Court in such like matters will be contrary to public interest.”
12. The above quoted observations are clearly attracted in the present case. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the challenge to the orders passed by Assistant Estate Officer, the Chief Administrator and the Adviser to the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh.
13. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed. However, liberty is given to the petitioner to make an application before the competent authority under Rule 21-A of the Rules of 1973 for reallotment of the site on payment of the dues and other amounts specified in rule 21-A.