PETITIONER: AHMEDABAD MILLOWNERS' ASSOCIATION & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: I.G. THAKORE, PRESIDENT & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/01/1967 BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA HIDAYATULLAH, M. MITTER, G.K. CITATION: 1967 AIR 1091 1967 SCR (2) 437 ACT: Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 (Bombay Act 11 of 1947), s. 2(3)-Applicability of Act to cotton industry in Ahmedabad-Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 whether repealed by the (Central) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Constitution of India, Art 14-Reference of dispute by Union of Workmen under s. 73A of Bombay Act 11 of 1947-Section in not giving similar right to employers whether violates Art. 14. HEADNOTE: A dispute regarding amendment of rules relating to privilege leave etc. arose between the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association and the union of workmen employed in the textile industry. After conceliation proceedings were declared by the Conciliator to have failed, the union referred the dispute to the Industrial Court under s. 73A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The Industrial Court decided against the Millowners who filed a writ petition in the' High Court and thereafter appealed to this Court. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that (i) s. 73A was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution since it gave a right to the workers union to make a reference but not to the employer (ii) the Act had not been made -applicable to the cotton industry at Ahmedabad under s. 2(4) and it was not applicable under s. 2(3) because the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938 was repugnant to Central) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and must be deemed to have been repealed. HELD:(i) Section 73A was not violative of Art. 14. Whenever any industrial dispute arises the employer can always ensure arbitration of that dispute by making an offer to the union under s. 66 of the Act whereupon a registered and approved union is compelled to agree to submission of the dispute to arbitration. Clearly therefore there was no need to make any Provision empowering the employer to make a reference of the dispute -for arbitration to the Industrial Court. On the other hand if a Union wants a dispute to be settled and even offers that the dispute be submitted to arbitration under s. 66 of the Act, the employer can refuse, whereupon the union would be left without any remedy. It is obvious that s. 73A was enacted to fill this gap and place the union on with the employer so as to enable the union to have any dispute = by arbitration even when the employer does not agree to arbitration. This section, in these circumstances did not at all require that the right granted to the union should also be granted to the employer. [441 G- H] There was no difference in the procedure to be followed by the Industrial Court in a reference under s. 73A and that to be followed when the reference is under s. 66. In both the procedure under s. 92 had to be followed. [443 E-F] (ii)Chapter V of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 was not repugnant to the Central Act of 1947 and therefore continued to be in force, and consequently under s. 2(3) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1947 the latter Act became applicable to the industry of the appellants and did not require a notification- under s. 2(4) to make it applicable [446 G-H; 447 A-B] 438 Ex Parte McLean, 43 C.L.R. 472 Victoria and Others v. The Commonwealth of Australia and Others, 58 C.L.R. 618, Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of Bombay, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 799, Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [1956] S.C.R. 392 and Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, [1959] -Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 490 of 1965.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 30, 1964 of
the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 39
of 1963.
S. T. Desai, P. B. Patwari, and O. C. Mathur, for the
appellants.
Respondent No. 2 appeared in person.
H. R. Gokhale, S. P. Nayyar for R. H. Dhebar, for
respondent No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court, was delivered by
Bhargava, J. The appellants in this appeal are the Ahmedabad
Mill owners Association, of which all the cotton mills in
Ahmedabad local area are members, including the second
appellant, the Nagd Mills Ltd. The third respondent, the
Textile Labour Association, Bhadra, Ahmedabad (hereinafter
referred to as “the Union”) represents the workmen employed
in the various mills which are members of the first
appellant Association. Under Standing Orders ,Settled under
the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act XI of
1947) (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), conditions of
service, including those relating to leave, were prescribed
in view of clause 6 of Schedule 1 of the Act. These
Standing Orders were settled at a time when this clause 6 of
the First Schedule to the Act read as follows:-
“Conditions, Procedure and Authority to grant
leave.” Subsequently, Schedule 1 was amended
so as to read as:
“Procedure and authority to grant leave,” and
simultaneously, clause 11 was added in
Schedule 11 which read as:
“All matters pertaining to leave and holidays,
other than those specified in items 6 and 7 in
Schedule 1.”
Consequent to this amendment in the Schedules, matters
pertaining to leave could, thereafter, no longer be
prescribed by Standing Orders, which were confined to
matters contained in Schedule Iorly.
By a letter dated 21st April,, 1961, the Union gave notice
to the first appellant, desiring that changes be made as
specified in the Annexure to this letter. Those changes
sought in the Annexure related to grant of privilege leave,
sick leave, casual leave, and pay in lieu of privilege leave
to all workers employed in the local textile industry in the
same manner in which, under the earlier Standing
439
Orders, the clerical and some other staff were granted these
benefits. This notice was given by the Union under s. 42(2)
of the Act. The dispute was not amicably settled, and
consequently, the matter was referred for conciliation. The
conciliation proceedings also failed, and, thereupon, the
Conciliator, on 23rd June, 1961, issued a certificate that
he had come to the conclusion from the discussions which the
parties had before him that the dispute’ was not capable of
being settled by conciliation. Thereupon, by the letter
dated 29th July, 1961, the Union referred the dispute to the
Industrial Court under section 73A of the Act. Before the
Industrial Court, various pleas were taken on behalf of the
appellants, and some of these pleas were the subject-matter
of preliminary issues which were decided before the
Industrial Court could proceed to give the final Award.
Though a number of such preliminary issues were decided by
the Industrial Court, we are only concerned with two such
issues, as they were the only two matters pressed before us
on behalf of the appellants in this appeal. One issue
raised was that s. 73A of the Act was ultra vires Article 14
of the Constitution as it granted a right to the Union to
make a reference to the Industrial Court, while no such
right was granted to the employers. The second point urged
was that the Act did not apply to the cotton mills which
were members of the first appellant Association, because it
had not been made applicable to them under s. 2(4) of the
Act, while it could not become applicable to them under s.
2(3) of the Act, because the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act,
1938, was not in force in these industries immediately
before the commencement of the Act. Both these points were
decided by the Industrial Court against the appellants.
Consequently, the appellants moved a petition under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution in the High Court of
Gujarat. The High Court rejected these preliminary pleas
raised on behalf of the appellants and upheld the view of
the Industrial Court that the reference was competent. The
appellants have now come up to this Court under certificate
granted by the High Court against this order of the High
Court.
As we have mentioned earlier, the appellants had raised a
number of pleas which were the subject-matter of preliminary
issues before the Industrial Court and several’ of them were
the subject matter of the petition before the High Court
also. In this Court, however, reliance has been placed only
on the two pleas, mentioned above. The first plea is based
on the language of s. 73A of the Act which, on the face of
it, grants the right to a Union only to make a reference of
an industrial dispute for arbitration to the Industrial
Court and does not grant any such right to an employer. It
was, however, urged on behalf of the respondents that, in
fact, this section was introduced in the Act for the very
purpose of placing the employers and the Union on terms of
equality, and that, instead of creating any discrimination
between them, this section, on the
440
contrary, was necessary to satisfy the requirements of Art.
14 of the Constitution.
To appreciate this submission made on behalf of the respon-
dents, certain features of the Act have to be examined and
their implication taken into account. Section 73A grants a
right of making a reference of an industrial dispute for
arbitration to the Industrial Court only to “a registered
union which is a representative of employees and which is
also an approved union.” Further, under the proviso to that
section, the reference cannot be made if the employer offers
in writing before the Conciliator to submit the dispute to
arbitration under the Act and the Union refuses to agree to
it. Two other conditions attached are that the dispute must
first be submitted to the Conciliator and can be referred
for arbitration to the Industrial Court only when the
Conciliator certifies that the dispute is not capable of
being settled by conciliation, and that no such dispute is
to be referred if, under any provisions of the Act, it is
required to be referred to the Labour Court for its
decision. It is the effect of all these detailed
provisions, laying down limitations for reference under s.
73A, that requires examination.
Under s. 12 of the Act, the Registrar has to maintain
registers of unions registered by him and a list of approved
unions. A Union is entitled to registration only if, during
the whole of the period of three calendar months immediately
preceding the calendar month in which it so applies, the
membership of the Union has been not less than 15 per cent
of the total number of employees employed in the industry,
when it can be registered as a Representative Union. In
case there is no such Representative Union, a Union can be
also registered either as a Qualified Union or as a Primary
Union. But it is clear from the language of s. 73A that
only a Representative Union has been given the right under
that section. Further, section 73A requires that the Union
must also be an approved Union, which means that the Union
must comply with the requirements of s. 23 of the Act and
have its name entered in the approved list. Amongst the
conditions required to be complied with by a Union to be
brought. on the, approved list, the most important is one
which lays down that its rules must provide that every
industrial dispute, in which a settlement is not reached by
conciliation, shall be offered to be submitted to
arbitration, and that arbitration under Chapter XI shall not
be refused by it in any dispute. It will thus be seen that
the right of making reference under s. 73A is only granted
to a Union which is registered as a Representative Union
and, being on approved list, has already made rules laying
down that the Union shall offer every industrial dispute for
submission to arbitration and will also not refuse
arbitration of any dispute if the employers offer to submit
the dispute for arbitration under Chapter XI of the Act.
Section 66 makes provision for submission of an industrial
dispute for arbitration. Sub-s. (1) of that section gives
the power to make a
441
reference to any person chosen by agreement by the disputing
parties, while sub-s’ (2) gives the option that the
submission of the dispute may be made to the arbitration of
a Labour Court or the Industrial Court. Further, sub-s. (5)
of s. 58 requires that before closing the conciliation
proceedings before him, the Conciliator shall ascertain from
the parties whether they are willing to submit the dispute
to. arbitration. These disputes, to which these provisions
apply, can only be those not relating to matters in
Schedules I and III, because, under sub-s. (1) of s. 42, and
employer is given the right to give a notice of change in
respect of any industrial matter specified in Schedule 11,
while, under sub-s. (2) of s. 42, the employee is granted a
similar’. right to give a notice if a change is desired in
respect of an industrial matter not specified in Schedule I
or Ill. In respect of matters covered by Schedules I and
111, provision is made in sub-s. (4) of s. 42 which lays
down that such disputes are to be decided by making an
application to the Labour Court; and, as we have indicated
earlier, s. 73A does not apply to disputes which are
required to be referred to a Labour Court. The result of
all these provisions is that s. 73A of the Act comes into
play only in cases where the dispute relates to matters not
contained in Schedules I and III, the dispute is not
resolved by private agreement or by conciliation, and there
is no submission of the dispute to arbitration under s. 66
of the Act.
It is in this light that the provision which has to be made
by the Union in its rules under s. 23(1)(v) assumes
importance. Whenever a dispute is raised either by an
employer or by a Union which can ultimately take advantage
of s. 73A; of the Act, the Union must invariably offer that
the dispute be submitted to arbitration, and, in the
alternative, if the employer offers to submit the dispute to
arbitration, the Union must not refuse it. The result is
that in respect of any such dispute, the Union has no option
but to offer or agree to arbitration of the dispute under s.
66 of the Act. On the other hand, there is no such
limitation placed on the employer. There is no provision in
the Act making it compulsory for the employer either to
submit the dispute to arbitration or to agree to the
submission of the dispute to arbitration when offered by the
Union. Consequently, whenever any industrial dispute
arises, the employer can always ensure arbitration of that
dispute by making an offer to the Union under s. 66 of the
Act, whereupon the Union is compelled to agree to submission
of the dispute to arbitration. Clearly, therefore, there
was no need to make any Provision empowering the employer to
make a reference of the dispute for arbitration to the
Industrial Court. On the other hand, if a Union wants a
dispute to be settled and even offers that the dispute be
submitted to arbitration under s. 66 of the Act, the
employer can refuse, whereupon the Union would be left
without any remedy. It is obvious that s. 73A was enacted
to fill this gap and place the Union on parity with the
442
employer so as to enable the Union to have any dispute
settled by arbitration even when the employer does not agree
to arbitration. These provisions granting. the rights to
the employers and the Union are, of course, in addition to,
and without prejudice to, the provisions contained in
sections 72 and 73 of the Act, under which the State
Government is given the power to refer any industrial
dispute between employees and employees, and employers and
employees to the arbitration of a Labour Court or the
Industrial Court on the basis of a report made by the Labour
Officer, or even otherwise. These provisions in sections 72
and 73 leave the discretion with the State Government to
make a reference in appropriate cases, so that neither the
employers nor the employees can, as of right, obtain a
reference under these sections from the State Government.
So far as they are concerned, the provisions contained in
the Act require that the disputes between them must first go
before a Conciliator for conciliation, and subsequently,
either party can exercise its option of offering the
submission of the dispute to arbitration when such an
enquiry is made from them by the Conciliator under S. 58(5)
of the Act. Thereafter, if the offer is by an employer, the
Union, under its rules, is bound to accept the submission,
so that whenever an employer desires that a dispute be
decided by arbitration, the Union is compelled to agree to
it. In the reverse case, when a Union wants submission of
the dispute to arbitration, the employer has discretion not
to agree, and then only can the Union resort to S. 73A and
refer the dispute to the Industrial Court. This section, in
these circumstances did not at all require that the right
granted to the Union should also be granted to the employer.
In this connection, two other points were urged by learned
,counsel for the appellants before us. One was that, under
S. 66 of the Act, the offer to submit the dispute for
arbitration can be to any private individual also, and this
did not give the right to the employer to have it decided by
an Industrial Court so as to be equated with the right of
the Union to have it decided by the Industrial Court. We do
not think that the provision contained in S. 66 of the Act
places the employer under any such handicap. Under sub-s.
(2) of S. 66, the employer can straight away offer that the
dispute be referred to the arbitration of the Industrial
Court, and thereupon ‘the Union would be debarred from
refusing to agree to that submission. In any case, even if
the Union were to refuse to agree to it, the State
Government will determine under s.71 of the Act whether the
dispute should be referred to the arbitration of the Labour
Court or the Industrial Court and refer it to that body.
The mere fact that the Union may not agree to .he offer of
the employer to submit the dispute for arbitration to the
Industrial Court whereupon the State Government can direct
that the arbitration be made by a Labour Court or the
Industrial Court does not, in our opinion, place the
employer in any disadvantageous position, and we do not
443
think, therefore, that there was any requirement that the
employer should also be given a right corresponding to the
right of the Union under s. 13A of the Act.
The second point urged by the learned counsel was that if
the dispute is referred to the Industrial Court by a
submission under s. 66(2) of the Act, that Court will
proceed to give its award in accordance with the provisions
of the Arbitration Act, 1940 in view of s. 68 of the Act,
while if the dispute is referred at the instance of a Union
under s.73A of the Act, the Industrial Court will deal with
it as a .judicial Tribunal and will give its decision in
accordance with the regulations made under s. 92 of the Act.
We consider that this submission is based on a
misapprehension of the scope of s. 92 of the Act. The rules
and regulations made by the Industrial Court under s. 92 are
to govern the procedure of the Industrial Court in all
proceedings before it irrespective of the fact whether those
proceedings come up before it by a reference made by the
State Government under. s, 72 or s. 73 of the Act, or by a
reference made by the Union under s. 73A of the Act, or by a
joint submission made by the parties under s. 66(2) of the
Act. Section 68 of the Act is in very general terms, and
lays down that proceedings in arbitration under the whole of
the Chapter XI are to be in accordance with the provisions
of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in. so far as they may be
applicable. The provisions of the Arbitration Act have,
therefore, been made -applicable not only to arbitrations by
submission under s. 66 of the Act, but also to arbitrations
on references made by the State Government under s. 72 or s.
73 or a reference made by a Union under s. 73A of the Act.
If the submission or the reference happens to be to the
Industrial Court, that Court must follow the and regulations
made under s.92, and the provisions of the Arbitration Act
will only apply insofar as they may be applicable in view of
those rules and regulations. Consequently, whether a
dispute is referred for arbitration to the Industrial Court
by submission under s. 66(2) of the Act, or by a reference
under s. 73A of the Act, that Court has to proceed in the
same identical manner and the parties seeking the reference
obtain the award in both cases under identical
circumstances.
In this connection, the regulations made by the Industrial
Court, known as the Industrial Court Regulations, 1947 were
brought to our notice. A perusal of these regulations shows
that, in the matter of procedure of the Industrial Court for
dealing with arbitrations made by submissions under s. 66,
or by references under other sections, there is uniformity
and no distinction is made between references under these
different sections. The Industrial Court is required to
proceed in the same manner in all cases and to give its
decision under s. 87 of the Act. It is significant that s.
87, defining the duties of the Industrial Court, uses
identical language in respect of all arbitrations by the
Industrial Court; under clause (v) the duty
444
of the Industrial Court is laid down to be to decide
industrial disputes referred to it in accordance with
submissions registered under S. 66 which provide for such
reference to the Industrial Court, and under clause (vi),
the duty of the Industrial Court is similarly defined to be
to decide industrial disputes referred to it under sections
71, 72, 73 or 73A. The’ Industrial Court, in all cases, is
required to give a decision on the dispute, and hence, in
all these proceedings, the parties have identical rights in
the matter of procedure of the Industrial Court of, hearing
and of obtaining a decision from it. This makes it clear
that s. 73A of the Act was required only to fill up a gap
which would have existed, leaving no remedy to a Union to
obtain arbitration of a dispute if the employers did not
agree to that arbitration, and that no similar right was
required to be conferred on the employers who, under the
other provisions of the Act, could always obtain a reference
of the dispute to arbitration by making a submission under
s. 66 which the Union -was bound to agree to. The first
point raised on behalf of the appellants has, therefore, no
force and s. 73A of the Act cannot be held to be invalid.
On the second question, it has rightly been urged on behalf
of the appellants that the Act was not applied by the State
Government to the industries run by the appellants, whether
generally or by specifying any local area by issue of a
notification under sub-s. (4) of s. 2 of the Act. On behalf
of the respondents, reliance was placed on sub-s. (3) of s.
2 for urging that the Act became applicable to the
industries run by the appellants, because the Bombay
Industrial Disputes Act, 1938 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Bombay Act of 1938”) was in force in these industries
immediately before the commencement of the Act.
Admittedly, the Bombay Act of 1938 was made applicable to
the entire cotton industry throughout the Province of Bombay
by various notifications issued in the year 1939 under that
Act by the then Provincial Government. Ahmedabad, where the
industries of the appellants are situated, was then a part
of the Province of Bombay. The Bombay Act of 1938 was never
entirely repealed. However, the Central Government enacted
the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947 which received
the assent of the Governor General on 17th March, 1947, a id
was brought into force from April 1, 1947. This Act did
not, in terms, repeal the Bombay Act of 1938, but the
contention on behalf of the appellants is that the Bombay
Act of 1938 and the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
both covered the same field of industrial disputes, and
consequently, it should be held that the Bombay Act of 1938
became void on the ground of repugnancy with the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 under sub-s. (1) of section 107 of the
Government of India Act, 1935. It was urged that the Bombay
Act of 1938 as well as the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
were both enacted under the power conferred on
445
the Bombay Legislature and the Central Legislature under
item 29 of Part 11 of the Concurrent List III of the Seventh
Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. The
principle relied upon by the appellants is that, if two
pieces of legislation cover the same field and each one of
them contains a complete code making detailed provision for
all aspects of the subject-matter of the legislation,
repugnancy must be held to arise, even though one Act may
not, in terms, repeal the other and may not correspond
section by section with the other. For this principle,
reliance was placed on the tests enumerated by Nicholas in
his Australian Constitution, 2nd Edition, p. 303, to
determine inconsistency or repugnancy between a State law
and a Commonwealth law in Australia. The three tests were
enumerated as follows:-
“(1) There may be inconsistency in the actual
terms of the competing statutes;
(2) Though there may be no direct conflict,
a State law may be inoperative because the
Commonwealth law, or the award of the
Commonwealth Court, is intended to be a
complete exhaustive code; and
(3) Even in the absence of intention, a
conflict may arise when both State and
Commonwealth seek to exercise their powers
over the same subject matter.”
This principle was deduced from the decisions in Ex Parte
McLean(1) and the State of Victoria and Others ‘V. The
Commonwealth of Australia and OtherS(2). Reliance was also
placed on decisions of this Court in Zaverbhai Amaidas v.
The State of Bombay(3), Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors. v. The state
of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(4) and Deep Chand v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others(5). In the last of these cases,
after quoting from Nicholas, this Court held: ‘Repugnancy
between two statutes may thus be ascertained on the basis of
the following three principles:-
(1) Whether there is direct conflict between
the two provisions;
(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down
an exhaustive code in respect of the subject
matter replacing the Act of the State
Legislature; and
(3) Whether the law made by Parliament and
the law made by the State Legislature occupy
the same field.”
(1) 43 C.L.R. 472.
(3) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 799.
(5) (1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8.
(2) 58 C.L.R. 618.
(4) (1956] 1 S. C. R. 393.
446
Relying on these principles, it has been urged that the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 intended to lay down an
exhaustive code in respect of settlement of all industrial
disputes, and since the Bombay Act of 1938 was also on the
same subject, it must be presumed that the two statutes are
repugnant, so that the Bombay Act of 1938 became void with
effect from 1st April, 1947 when the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 came into force. It has, however, been rightly
pointed out by the High Court in the judgment under appeal
that the Bombay Act of 1938 did not confine itself entirely
to the subject of settlement of industrial disputes.
Chapter V of that Act, containing sections 26 to 33 deals
with a matter which is not covered by the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 at all. These sections of the Bombay Act
of 1938 lay. down the procedure for prescribing Standing
Orders -regulating the relations between an employer and his
employees, and for making changes therein. The prescribing
of the Standing Orders and making of changes in them may not
involve any industrial dispute at all. In fact, at the
first stage, when Standing Orders are prescribed, no
question would arise of any industrial dispute requiring
settlement. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, did not
contain any provisions at all dealing with this subject of
prescribing Standing Orders and making changes therein.
Consequently, even if the submission made on behalf of the
appellants be accepted that the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, is an exhaustive code dealing with the question of,
settlement of industrial disputes, only those provisions of
the Bombay Act of 1938 can be held to be repugnant and void
on account of the repugnancy which also dealt with the same
subject matter of settlement of industrial disputes. The
provisions contained in Chapter V of that Act, which had
nothing to do with settlement of industrial disputes, could
not, therefore, be affected by the enactment of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and hence, the enforcement
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 did not in any way
affect the applicability of the provisions of Chapter V of
the Bombay Act of 1938 to the industry run by the
appellants. To the extent that Bombay Act of 1938 contained
these provisions in Chapter V, that Act, therefore,
continued in force and also continued to apply to the
industries now in question. It was also urged that the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 did not, similarly, make any
provision for arbitration of industrial disputes and,
consequently, the provisions of the Bombay Act of 1938,
relating to arbitration of industrial disputes, could not be
held to have become invalid. It is not necessary to examine
this further question in view of our decision that at 1 east
the provisions of Chapter V of the Bombay Act of 1938
continued in force. That Act did not stand repealed as a
whole; at best, only a part of that Act can be held to have
ceased to be effective because of the repugnancy with the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But, while another part of
that Act continued to be in force, the Bombay Act of 1938
also continued to be applicable to the cotton industry in
Ahmedabad
447
with which we are concerned. When the Bombay Industrial
Relations Act, 1946 came into force on 29th September, 1947,
therefore, the Bombay Act of 1938 was applicable to these
industries, and consequently, under sub-s. (3) of section 2
of the Act, the Act became applicable to the industry’ of
the appellants and did not require a notification under sub-
s. (4) of s. 2 to make it applicable. This point was also
therefore, rightly decided against the appellants, and the
judgment of the High Court must be upheld. The appeal is,
therefore, dismissed with costs.
G. C. Appeal dismissed-
448