JUDGMENT
H.R. Panwar, J.
1. By the instant writ petition, petitioner seeks quashing the impugned suspension order dated 1-7-2002 (Annex.1).
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that while working as the District Transport Officer, applications were made on 30-9-95 by Mr. Shamsher Khan and Hafix Mohammed for assignment of new registration mark in respect of motor vehicles, i.e. buses. According to the petitioner, all the requisite documents were produced by the applicants and he sent telegrams to the Registering Authority, Delhi for verification of genuineness of the No Objection Certificates stipulating 15 days time for reply but no reply was received and as such, after expiry of 18 days therefrom, he assigned new registration marks to the vehicles. An FIR was lodged in such matters on 3-3-97 against the petitioner and co-accused Sarvashri B.L. Meena, D.T.O., Giriraj Kumar Gupta, Motor Vehicle Inspector, Norat Mal Agarwal, D.T.O. for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 481, 482, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. His grievance is that vide impugned order Annex.1 dated 1-7-2002, he has been subjected to selective suspension as co-accused named above have not been put under suspension. His further grievance is that he had acted in accordance with the rules and there is no legal or procedural error committed by him still he has been suspended for an incident which took place on 30-9-1995 and FIR of which had been lodged on 3-3-97. Hence this writ petition.
3. Refuting the averments made in the writ petition, raising certain preliminary objections and high-lighting the illegalities and irregularities as well as the offences Committed by the petitioner, the respondents have filed a detailed reply. The respondents have also pointed out the conclusions arrived at by the investigating agency throwing light upon the offences committed by the petitioner. A rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the petitioner, by which he tried to rebut the averments made in the reply.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after perusing the documents filed by the applicants, the petitioner sent a telegram to the Registering Authority at Delhi to verify the genuineness of the No Objection Certificates and after expiry of 15 days as stipulated in the telegram, he acted in accordance with rules and procedure and passed the order “May Assign as per Rules.” His further contention is that the petitioner was not expected to make an enquiry as held by a Division. Bench of this Court in Shri Ratan v. State Transport Authority (Appellate Authority), Jaipur (1), wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that Section 31 does not contemplate any enquiry in to the question of transfer by the Registering Authority before recording the transfer and if the registration certificate of the vehicle is produced by a person who alleges to be the transferee, the Registering Authority has no option but to record the transfer. He has also placed reliance upon another Division Bench decision of this Court in Regional Transport Officer and Anr. v. Pradeep Kumar Jain (2), wherein the Division Bench held that if No Objection Certificate has not been issued though six months passed and no objection for non-issuance of new registration mark has been taken then the certificate shall be deemed to have been issued. However, in the instant case, the record reveals that the petitioner had assigned new registration marks without physical verification of the motor vehicles and in absence of any reply to the telegram sent by him to the Registering Authority, Delhi. He was expected to satisfy himself with the genuineness of the documents produced by the applicants but he hurried up in assigning new registration marks on the pretext that no reply was received from the Registering Authority, Delhi after expiry of stipulated period of 15 days. Thus, the decision in Shri Ratan’s case (supra), does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Likewise, the decision in Pradeep Kumar Jain’s case (supra), also, does not come to the help of the petitioner as the investigation revealed that the No Objection Certificates produced by the applicants had never been issued by the Registering Authority, Delhi.
6. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that no such suspension order has been passed against the co-accused named out in the FIR and one Mr. Devi Lal, LDC and as such there is selective suspension which is unsustainable in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Sukhendar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (3), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that selective suspension is impermissible. There cannot be any dispute to this settled legal position. The facts of each case requires consideration on its own merit and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Sukhendar Reddy’s case (supra), is applicable in an identical fact-situation. In the instant case, so far as Mr. Devi Lal, LDC is concerned, his Disciplinary Authority is the respondent Department whereas the Disciplinary Authority for the petitioner is the State. Petitioner has been put under suspension vide Annex.1 after obtaining necessary sanction Annex.2 from the State. Thus, there is no case of selective suspension so far as petitioner and Mr. Devi Lal are concerned.
7. However, so far as other co-accused named out in the FIR are concerned, the question of selective suspension cannot be considered as those persons have not been made party-respondents by name. However, the question of suspension is a matter of discretion of the Competent Authority arrived at after subjective satisfaction. There is limited scope of interference by this court in such matters. Even otherwise, if suspension orders have not been passed against co-accused, petitioner cannot seek relief on this ground because Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate an illegality.
8. Yet another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned suspension order Annex.1 is unreasonable, arbitrary and illegal and as such liable to be quashed. It is settled legal proposition that during suspension, relationship of master and servant continues between the employer and the employee. However, the employee is forbidden to perform his official duties. In certain cases, suspension may cause stigma even after exoneration in the departmental proceedings or acquittal by the criminal court, but it cannot be treated as a punishment even by stretch of imagination in strict legal sense.
9. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. Union of India and Ors. (4), observed that the Authority entitled to appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him during pendency of the departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal case.
10. The scope of interference by the Court with the order of suspension in the case where a delinquent employee faces the criminal charge has been examined by this Court in D.R. Kalla v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (5), and placing reliance on a large number of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court held that even if a criminal trial takes a long time, it is not open to the Court to interfere in case of suspension as it is the exclusive domain of the competent authority who can always review its order of suspension as it is an inherent power conferred upon it by the provisions of Article 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and while exercising such a power, the authority can consider the case of an employee for revoking the suspension order, if satisfied that the criminal case would be concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the employee concerned.
11. In Allahabad Bank and Anr. v. Deepak Kumar Bhola (6), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in case involving serious charges, for which the sanction of the prosecution in a criminal court has been obtained, suspension order should not generally be interferred. However, the decision of the competent authority should be based on material collected during investigation/inquiry.
12. Thus, in view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, the impugned suspension order passed under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, “the Rules, 1958”) does not require any interference as the same has been passed after detailed and thorough investigation by Deputy Superintendents of Police, C.I.D. (CB), Jaipur and after obtaining necessary sanction Annex.2 dated 1-7-2002.
13. Even otherwise, as per Rule 22 of the Rules, 1958, a Government servant may appeal against an order of suspension to the authority to which the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order, is immediately subordinate. Without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal provided under Rule 22 of the Rules, 1958, the petitioner has directly approached this Court for quashing the impugned suspension order Annex.1. It is settled proposition of law that when a statute itself provides an alternative remedy, the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked without first availing the alternative remedy of appeal.
14. a constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. (7), held that if there is statutory remedy of appeal/revision available to a person, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked in such matters.
15. In C.A. Ibraham v. I.T.O. (8), and H.B. Gandhi v. Gopinath & Sons (9), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction.
16. A Division Bench of this Court in Laxman Singh Verma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (10), has considered this issue elaborately and after discussing large number
of judgments of this Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gopilal Teli v. State (11),
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (12), Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v.
State of Bihar (13), and Deepak Kumar Khivsara v. Oil India Ltd. (14), came to the
conclusion that writ should not generally be entertained if statute provide for remedy
of appeal and even if it has been admitted, parties should be delegated to the appellate
forum.
17. In Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh (15), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that if the statute itself provides for a remedy of revision, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked.
18. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in K.S. Rashid & Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and Ors. (16), held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. The said power is limited. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere.
19. Again a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Union of India and Ors. v. T.R. Verma (17), held that it is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to persue that remedy and no invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prorogative writ. The Apex Court held that existence of an another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and where such remedy is not exhausted, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless there are good grounds therefor.
20. Yet another Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in State of U.P. and Ors. v. Mohammed Nooh (18), considered the scope of exercise of writ jurisdiction when remedy of appeal was there and held that writ would lie provided there is no other equally effective remedy.
21. In S.T. Mathuswami v. K. Natarajan and Ors. (19), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot be justified to exercise the power in writ jurisdiction if an effective alternative remedy is available to the party.
22. In Secretary, Minor Irrigation and Rural Engineering Service, U.P. and Ors. v. Sahngoo Ram Arya and Anr. (20), the Apex Court held that where the statute has provided for the constitution of a Tribunal for adjudicating the disputes of a Government servant, the fact that the Tribunal had no authority to grant an interim order, would be no ground to by-pass the said Tribunal.
23. Since the petitioners have got alternative remedy of appeal under Rule 22 of the Rules, 1958, he should have first availed that alternative remedy and in absence thereof, the writ petition is even otherwise not worth entertainable.
24. The last submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the criminal trial may take a pretty-long time and it will lead the suspension of the petitioner for unknown long period and as such a direction may be issued to the trial court to expedite the trial. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Dr. Mohan Lal Menaria v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (21). Accordingly, the trial court is directed to expedite the proceedings in the criminal case and the petitioner is free to avail the remedies against any order that may be passed by the trial court. This will also not preclude the petitioner to approach the Government and the Government to make an appropriate order if the criminal proceedings are unduly delayed and not completed for reviewing the impugned order of suspension and revoke the same. The fate of this writ petition shall not be read to the prejudice of the petitioner while considering his request in this regard.
25. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The interim stay order dated 12.7.2002 is vacated and the stay petition stands dismissed.