High Court Jharkhand High Court

Anil Prasad vs The Chairman, Bank Of India And … on 3 August, 2006

Jharkhand High Court
Anil Prasad vs The Chairman, Bank Of India And … on 3 August, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2007 (1) JCR 258 Jhr
Author: P Kohli
Bench: P Kohli


JUDGMENT

Permod Kohli, J.

1. Petitioner while serving as a Branch Manager at Dimna Chowk Branch, Jamshedpur of the Singhbhum Kshetriya Gramin Bank was involved in two criminal cases, one private complainant lodged a complaint case No. 106 of 2001 in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur. It is stated that under the orders of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, an F.I.R. was registered as TELCO P.S. Case No. 276 of 2001 dated 13th of November, 2001 under Sections 467, 468, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and 13(1) of the P.C. Act, 1998. Petitioner was enlarged on bail. Later a criminal chargesheet was filed in the Court of Central Bureau of Investigation. Simultaneously a chargesheet was served upon the petitioner asking him to file the reply. Enquiry Officer was appointed vide order No. H.O.I.R. 2003-04-173 dated 28th April, 2003 to enquire into the charges against the petitioner. A departmental enquiry was concluded on 13th of June, 2003 and enquiry report with findings prepared on 23rd of August, 2003. Petitioner submitted his representation dated 16th of September, 2003 in respect to the Enquiry Report. The Disciplinary Authority on consideration imposed punishment of dismissal vide his order dated 15th of December, 2003 in terms of Regulation 38 of Singhbhum Kshetriya Gramin Bank Officers Regulations, 2000. Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Board of the Bank against the order of dismissal passed by the Chairman, the Disciplinary Authority. The appeal of the petitioner came to be rejected vide order dated 10th of March, 2004. Petitioner has challenged the order of the disciplinary authority dated 15th of December, 2003 and that of the appellate authority dated 10th of March, 2004 on a number of grounds. From the perusal of the order passed by the appellate authority, it is evident that the appellate authority has not recorded any reasons or grounds for rejecting the appeal. The order of appellate authority is a non-speaking one. It is convenient to quote the order passed by the appellate authority which reads as under:

Ref. No. : – HO: PERS: JNP: 2003-04:2526 Date: 10.03.2004

Sri Anil Prasad,

Ex-Staff Officer

Your Appeal-dated 24.01.2004

Against the order of Penalty

You have preferred the captioned appeal against the order of Penalty dated 15.12.2003.

2. Your appeal letter dated 24.01.2004 was presented for consideration before the Board of Directors of the Bank in its meeting held on 03.03.2004.

3. We regret to inform you that the Board of Directors of the Bank did not consider your appeal favourably.

4. The Board after deliberations confirmed the penalty of ‘dismissal’ inflicted on you.

5. This is for your information please.

General Manager

2. Question needs to be considered is whether the appellate authority was required to pass speaking and a reasoned order. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents has vehemently argued that there is no requirement of rules to pass a speaking or reasoned order. He has further argued that the appellate authority was/is under no obligation to pass a speaking order. According to the Respondents, consideration of appeal against the disciplinary proceedings cannot be termed as judicial in nature requiring a reasoned order.

3. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties.

4. Disciplinary proceedings are conducted in exercise of statutory powers so is the position of the appellate authority. The Enquiring authority is enjoined upon the duty to enquire into the charges. While conducting the enquiry, it has the authority and jurisdiction to take evidence, compel the appearance of witnesses, hear the parties and appreciate the evidence brought on record before it and then make recommendations, which is in the nature of judicial proceedings. The disciplinary authority also performs the duty of an adjudicator. In some cases, the Disciplinary authority himself is an enquiring authority and thus he not only collects the evidence and. conducts all proceedings but also takes decision on the basis of evidence before him. Even the appellate authority while considering an appeal, acts as an adjudicatory authority. All the proceedings are conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the statutory Rules either framed under an Act of the legislature or under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The Rules whereunder the functions are performed by the Enquiring authority, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have the statutory force. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Shivdev Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Anr. has held that the proceedings in a departmental enquiry are in the nature of judicial proceedings.

5. In view of the opinion of the Supreme Court that the departmental enquiry are in the nature of judicial proceedings, it becomes obligatory upon the appellate authority to record reasons so as to enable the Court while exercising its power of judicial review to ascertain the thought process of the appellate authority. Whether an authority entrusted with judicial or even the quasi judicial functions has acted fairly, rationally, without any bias, arbitrarily and in accordance with Rules can only be determined if reasons are recorded. Similar view was expressed by the Patna High Court in the case of Bindeshwari Prasad Shrivastava v. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 928 by observing:

Dismissal from service brings about serious consequences to an employee. It has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court that the procedure which brings about the dismissal must be fair, reasonable and just inasmuch as it touches the livelihood of the persons concerned which has been accepted to be a part of the right under Article 21 of the Constitution. So while dealing with Part III rights of a citizen, the appellate authority who has to decide whether his right has been infringed or not cannot, in my considered view, act in an administrative capacity. An authority deciding such question must act in a quasi judicial manner as has been held quite clearly by the Apex Court in Ram Chander (supra). In Bachhitar Singh v. State of Punjab , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court affirmatively held “it is thus wholly erroneous to characterize the taking of action against a person found guilty of any charge at a departmental enquiry as an administrative order”. The Apex Court held that a departmental proceeding against a Government Servant is judicial in nature.

6. Concurring with the above-mentioned judgment and in view of the ratio of the Constitution Bench Judgment of the apex Court in the case of S. Shivdev Singh and Ors. (Supra), I find that the impugned order is not sustainable in law and is liable to be quashed. Since the order of the disciplinary authority has merged with the order of the appellate authority, consequently the order of the disciplinary authority is also liable to be quashed, however, I declined to quash this order till the matter is reconsidered by the appellate authority. The case is, accordingly, remitted to the appellate authority for reconsideration and for passing a fresh and speaking order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The appellate authority shall pass a speaking and a reasoned order on the appeal preferred by the petitioner and arrive at its own independent findings of fact and law on the basis of the materials available with the disciplinary authority. The appellate authority shall pass the order within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Petitioner is also at liberty to serve the copy of this order upon the appellate authority. If the appellate authority fails to pass the fresh order, the order imposing the punishment shall cease to exist and petitioner will be entitled to be reinstated forthwith on expiry of a period of two months. In the event, the appellate authority passes any adverse order against the petitioner, he shall have the liberty to seek appropriate available remedy against the same.