JUDGMENT
Mukul Mudgal, J.
1. Rule D.B.
2. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties the writ petition is taken up for final hearing.
3. This writ petition has been listed after the petitioner gave up the challenge to the vires of Regulation 41 of Rules applicable to Boys and Artificer Apprentices (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’) as recorded in the order of this Court dated 18th November, 2004. The petition now is confined to the benefit of leave encashment for the unavailed leave for the period 19th March, 1965 to 31st January, 1970. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anuj Kumar Dey and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., , wherein the following position of law was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court :-
“We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court was in error in holding that the period of four years when the appellant was employed Artificer Apprentice could not be counted for computation of the qualifying period of pension.”
4. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the petitioner has already been granted the benefit of pension which has not been denied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The dispute surviving in this petition thus revolves around the effect of Regulations 41 and 43 of the Rules, in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anuj Kumar Dey’s case. Regulations 41 & 43 read as under:-
“41. Annual leave
(1) The quantum of annual leave admissible in a year shall be thirty days. This may be accumulated up to forty five days at the discretion of the commanding officer of the ship/establishment.
(2) (a) In the case of individuals proceeding to a leave station which necessarily involves a journey of more than two days each way, additional leave in excess of annual leave may be granted to cover the journey period in excess of two days each way. This additional leave shall be admissible once a year irrespective of the period of stay at the leave station.
(b) The above provisions are also applicable to individuals whose homes are located in the union territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the union territory of the Laccadives, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands. Their leave shall be so arranged that they are detained at ports awaiting embarkation for the minimum possible period.
(3) The grant of annual leave shall be subject to the condition that the individual has rendered at least six months service. This limit of six months may be relaxed at the discretion of the commanding officer, to suit training requirements.
(4) Extension of annual or accumulated annual leave up to 15 days may be granted to boys and artificer apprentices by the commanding officer in exceptional and compassionate cases due to natural calamity or any other ex-ordinary circumstances beyond the person’s control provided he is satisfied about the genuineness of the ground of such extension. In case of their sickness, however, extension up to thirty days may be granted. The extension of leave so granted, will be dealt with in the same manner as overstayal of leave under existing rules.
43. Leave admissible to boys and artificer apprentices after being promoted to Man’s rank– Boys and artificer apprentices after being promoted to man’s rank, shall be entitled to sixty days annual leave as admissible to service sailors. The period of leave (other than casual leave) already availed of by them in the same calendar year under regulations 41 and 42, shall be deducted from the sixty days annual leave, and they shall only be entitled to the balance of the annual leave.”
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Vineet Bhagat submits that before the petitioner promoted to the man’s rank, he served as Artificer Apprentice for the period from 19th March, 1965 to 31st January, 1970 and he would be entitled to 60 days leave available to man’s rank as per the mandate of Regulation 43. The same issue was involved in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 26th August, 2003 delivered in CWP No. 2435/2000 titled Ran Singh v. Union of India and Ors., where this issue was decided in favor of the respondent in the following terms:-
“We have gone through the Supreme Court judgment in Anuj Kumar Dey’s case which does not as such deal with the issue of leave accumulation or leave encashment related to the training period in question. It only rules that this training period of four years was computable towards qualifying service for pension purposes. It is also not in dispute that the issue of accumulation and leave encashment for this period was governed by Navy Order 03/84 which provides for a total annual leave of 30 days during the four year training period. Therefore, it becomes difficult to hold that petitioner was entitled to leave encashment for the training period as a sequel to the Supreme court judgment in Anuj Kumar Dey’s case.”
6. In our view, the above Division Bench’s judgment squarely covers the issue raised in the present writ petition and we are bound by and are in respectful agreement with the position of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment. Thus, the petitioner would be entitled to count the period spent by him as the artificer apprentice while computing his pension and this benefit has in fact been granted to him. However, the petitioner cannot ipso facto contend that even the period spent as an artificer apprentice should count as the period spent in the man’s rank so as to claim higher annual leave of sixty days instead of thirty days as provided in Regulations 41. Since the challenge to the vires of regulation 41 has been given up the petitioner can only get the benefit of a boy’s leave of thirty days and not the man’s leave of sixty days in accordance with the said regulations. Accordingly, there is no merit in the writ petition and it is dismissed. However, one grievance was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the position of law was declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1996 in Anuj Kumar Dey’s case and the review petition filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dismissed in March, 1997. The petitioner was nevertheless belatedly granted his pensionary benefits as per the principles of law laid down in Anuj Kumar Dey’s case (supra) only w.e.f. 19th November, 2001. The learned counsel for the respondent in reply submitted that till the review petition was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Government was in doubt as the whether as per the judgment in Anuj Kumar Dey’s case (supra), the period of service of training is entitled to be included in computing the pension. We are of the view that the position of law was settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1996 in Anuj Kumar Dey’s case. Merely because a review petition is filed the position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not lose its efficacy unless and until the Supreme Court has stayed the operation of its own judgment. Even assuming that the pendency of the review petition had the effect of leaving the position of law tenuous, nevertheless by March, 1997 the position of law had been affirmed by the dismissal of the review petition. The petitioner has thus been wrongfully deprived of his pensionary benefits at least from April, 1997 till 19th November, 2001.
7. The position of law in respect of deprivation and delay in payment of rightful dues of an employee and in particular a former employee seeking pension is well settled.
(a) In Devaki Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported as , the following position of law was laid down:-
“10. The State and the subordinate officers responsible for this work are directed by a writ of mandamus to complete this computation by July 31, 1983 and by that date pension payment order correct and consistent with the direction herein given shall be issued without fail to the petitioner. The State is also directed by a mandamus of this court to pay the arrears of pension on the aforementioned computation within the same period with interest at 6 per cent from January 10, 1967. As the officers of the State have harassed the petitioner which we feel is intentional, deliberate and motivated, therefore, we are constrained to award exemplary costs quantified at Rs.25,000 to be paid to the petitioner before July 31, 1983.”
(b) In the State of Kerala and Ors. v M. Padmandabhan Nair reported as , it was held as follows:-
“Pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the Government to its employees on their retirement but have become, under the decisions of this Court, valuable rights and property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest at the current market rate till actual payment.”
(c) In St. of Mysore v. C.R. Sheshadri reported as , it was held as follows:-
“A retired Government official is sensitive to delay in drawing monetary benefits. And to avoid posthumous satisfaction of the pecuniary expectation of superannuated public servant ‘not unusual in Government.”
(d) In the Vijay L. Mehrotra v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported as the following position of law was laid down:-
“3. In case of an employee retiring after having rendered service, it is expected that all the payment of the retiral benefits should be paid on the date of retirement or soon thereafter if for some unforeseen circumstances the payments could not be made on the date of retirement.
4. In this case, there is absolutely no reason or justification for not making the payments for months together. We, therefore, direct the respondent to pay to the appellant within 12 weeks from today simple interest at the rate of 18 per cent with effect from the date of her retirement, i.e., 31-8-1997 till the date of payments.”
(e) In Dr. Uma Agrawal v. State of U.P. and Anr. reported as , the Supreme Court held as under:-
“5. We have referred in sufficient detail to the Rules and instructions which prescribe the time-schedule for the various steps to be taken in regard to the payment of pension and other retiral benefits. This we have done to remind the various governmental departments of their duties in initiating various steps at least two years in advance of the date of retirement. If the Rules/instructions are followed strictly, much of the litigation can be avoided and retired government servants will not feel harassed because after all, grant of pension is not a bounty but a right of the government servant. The Government is obliged to follow the Rules mentioned in the earlier part of this order in letter and spirit. Delay in settlement of retiral benefits is frustrating and must be avoided at all costs. Such delays are occurring even in regard to family pensions for which too there is a prescribed procedure. This is indeed unfortunate. In case where a retired government servant claims interest for delayed payment, the court can certainly keep in mind the time-schedule prescribed in the Rules/ instructions apart from other relevant factors applicable to each case.”
8. From March, 1997 onwards by virtue of the dismissal of the review, the position of law stood no longer in doubt. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the petitioner should be paid interest as his retiral dues were paid belatedly because even though he retired in 1980, inspite of the position of law which had been laid down by the Supreme Court in 1996 and had been affirmed after the dismissal of the review petition in March, 1997 the petitioner was paid only on November, 2001. Thus from 1st April 1997 till 19th November, 2001, the petitioner shall be entitled to interest on the delayed pension, @ 8% p.a. in accordance with the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court as noted above. In view of the and circumstances of the case, interest @ 8% p.a. will serve the ends of justice though in an appropriate case interest can go up to 18% as ordered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay L. Mehrotra’s case (supra). The said payment shall be made on or before 31st October, 2005.
8. In view of the above, the writ petition and all pending applications stand disposed of.