High Court Madras High Court

P.S.K. Kanagaraj And Ors. vs Kamaraj And Anr. on 30 April, 1997

Madras High Court
P.S.K. Kanagaraj And Ors. vs Kamaraj And Anr. on 30 April, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1997) 2 MLJ 655
Author: S Subramani


ORDER

S.S. Subramani, J.

1. This is a revision filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order of the IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The petitioners herein are not parties to the suit, but according to them, they are affected by the interim order passed by the court and inspite of the fact they have filed an impleading application before that court, the court has not passed any order on their application and at the same time has directed the local police to implement the-injunction order.

2. The material facts which are necessary for the proper disposal of the revision may be summarised as follows:

3. An area of 4 grounds and 1484 sq.ft. of land in Survey No. 4047/1 of Tondiarpet Village originally belonged to one Subramaniya Mudaliar and he sold a portion of the property and retained an area of 2.0240 grounds with him which continued in his possession till his death in the year 1962. It is stated that on his death, he left behind him his daughter-in-law Jeevarathinammal and his two grandsons Vajravelu and Rajavelu as his legal heirs. His only son Vedacahal Mudaliar pre-deceased him.

4. It is further seen that on the death of Subramaniya Mudaliar, three person, by name Duraikannu, Ellappan and Kannappan trespassed into the property and the legal heirs filed 3 suits in O.S. Nos. 3775 of 1967, 3817 of 1967 and 3818 of 1967 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras for recovery of possession. Though the trial court dismissed the suits, in the appeals, the suits were decreed and all the three trespassers were directed to handover the possession to the legal heirs. Ellappan one of the trespassers did not file any appeal against the said decision and he vacated the premises. The other two trespassers Duraikannu and Kannappan filed S.A. Nos. 505 of 1972 and 629 of 1972 before this Court, but, those appeals were dismissed in limine on 12.4.1973. When recovery of possession was sought for by filing E.P. Nos. 42 of 1974 and 1788 of 1974, One Krishna Thevar, who is the appellant in C.M.S.A. Nos. 30 and 31 of 1984 filed obstruction petition. For removal of the obstruction and for taking police aid, applications in E.A. Nos. 4990 of 1974 and 1594 of 1994 were filed by the decree-holders. Without waiting for a decision, Krishna Thevar filed O.S. No. 3292 of 1974 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras alleging that he is a direct tenant under the decree-holders and wanted the execution of decree be injuncted. The decision went against him which became final.

5. After disposal of the suit, the decree-holders again filed E.P. Nos. 1880 of 1980 and 1889 of 1980 for recovery of possession. The original obstructor Krishna Thevar once again offered obstruction and the decree-holders had again to file applications for removal of obstruction. A detailed enquiry was held and found that the obstructor Krishna Thevar was not having any right over the property and the obstruction was directed to be removed. Against the said decision, Krishna Thevar filed C.M.A. Nos. 17 of 1983 and 18 of 1983 which were dismissed. He again preferred C.M.S.A. Nos. 30 of 1984 and 31 of 1984 on the file of this Court. The same were also dismissed on 29.11.1996.

6. While the matter was pending before the execution court to enquire into the obstruction petition, Krishna Thevar filed O.S. No. 6696 of 1983 on the file of the City Civil Court for injunction which also did not succeed. Again after filing the C.M.S.A. Nos. 30 and 31 of 1984, the very same person filed C.S. No. 685 of 1985 before this Court and wanted to obtain stay of execution proceedings. He also moved an application to have the C.M.S.As. withdrawn to be heard along with C.S. No. 685 of 1985. Those applications were also dismissed. He moved an application before the Supreme Court also without any success.

7. In the meanwhile, Krishna Thevar, the obstructor executed a sale deed in favour of minor Saravanan represented by his father Balakrishnan. Both of them impleaded themselves in C.S. No. 685 of 1985. The said suit is now transferred to City Civil Court and renumbered as O.S. No. 3261 of 1996, on the file of the VI Asst. Judge. It is alleged by the petitioners that even betore the sale deed was executed, the decree-holders caused lawyer’s notice about the pending litigation stating that the Krishna Thevar also had not title to convey. It was inspite of that notice, the sale deed in favour of the said Saravanan was executed.

8. The decree-holders Rajavelu and Vajravelu, on the death of their mother Jeevarathinammal, executed a sale deed in favour of the petitioners herein on 23.3.1995 conveying the suit property to them. The petitioners filed applications to get themselves impleaded in C.M.S.A. Nos. 30 and 31 of 1984. Though the same was opposed by the said Saravanan, represented by his father, Balakrishnan and also opposed by Krishna Thevar, the impleading applications were allowed. They also got themselves impleaded in the execution proceedings for which decree has already been obtained by the predecessors. After they got themselves impleaded, the petitioners filed an application to restrain the respondents herein from putting up the new construction. The same was also ordered. After disposal of C.M.S.A. Nos. 30 of 31 of 1984, the petitioners moved execution proceedings to take delivery of the property. Delivery was ordered on 21.2.1997 and the court directed to report the same on or before 31.3.1997.

9. After delivery was ordered, Saravanan filed O.S. No. 1198 of 1997 on the file of the III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras and moved an application in I.A. No. 34 of 1997 for injunction. Since caveat has already entered, which fact was not represented in court, but which came to the notice of the court later, no interim order was passed. The very same Saravanan again made an attempt to obtain injunction in O.S. No. 3261 of 1996 and that also without any success. It is further averred that when the amin visited the property to hand over the property, the respondents accompanied by their advocates prevented the amin from delivering the property, but inspite of the same, the property was delivered over. In the meanwhile, Saravanan filed O.S. No. 1359 of 1997 on the file of the IV Assistant City Civil Judge, Madras, on 28.2.1997 and attempted to obtain an order of injunction. Since there was already a caveat interim order could not be passed in that case. Since so many suits are pending for the same property between same parties, the petitioners filed transfer petition and obtained an order of stay of all proceedings pending before various courts. In the meanwhile, the first respondent herein filed O.S. No. 1422 of 1997 on the file of the IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras alleging that on 18.1.1996, the Saravanan has leased out the property in favour of him and he is in absolute possession of the schedule property. In that suit, he made the second respondent herein alone as sole defendant on the allegation that he is interfering with his possession. The second respondent herein is none other than the only brother of Saravanan who is already a party in the previous proceeding. In that suit, the first respondent herein alleged that the second respondent is interfering with his possession and the second respondent has threatened the watchman of the first respondent’s premises to remove their belongings from the premises. It is further stated in the plaint that even though the matter was reported to the police they did not take any action, and therefore, the plaintiff i.e., the first respondent herein has been compelled to file a suit for injunction. The relief in the plaint reads thus:

(a) For permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his men and agents or any other person on his behalf or any other person on his behalf or any persons claiming to be the owners of the suit property from interfering in whatsoever manner either at the time of opening the main iron gate situated at Door No. 756, T.H. Road, Chennai-81 Or with ingres and egress enjoyment rights of the plaintiff into suit premises No. 755, T.H. Road, Chennai-81 Or at the time of keeping the construction materials and other movable things into the plaintiff premises i.e., suit property Or from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property Or interferring with the peaceful living of the family of the plaintiff’s watchman at any point of time in the suit, premises, Except under due process of law;

Along with the suit, the first respondent also moved I.A. No. 4398 of 1997 for an injunction. The lower court passed an order of injunction on 5.3.1997 till 12.3.1997. On 12.3.1997, the second respondent herein did not enter appearance and fresh notice was ordered and therefore the interim injunction already granted was extended. On 19.3.1997 also, the second respondent herein did not appear, and therefore, the injunction was further extended. In the meanwhile, the petitioners herein filed an application on 17.3.1997 to get themselves impleaded as additional parties to the suit and also brought to the notice of the court that they are the persons who are seriously affected by the order of injunction. The lower court, after hearing the petitioners, directed notice to the respondent and adjourned the case for filing counter. Notice was also directed to be given to the defendant in the suit who is the second respondent herein. Notice could not be served on him, and therefore, the impleading application was also not heard and hence no order was also passed. While the impleading petition is pending, the first respondent herein filed an application to implement the injunction order through police. The lower court has also allowed it. The case of the petitioners is that after prolonged litigation between the predecessors, they have obtained possession, and by virtue of the order of injunction and also directing the same be implemented by the police, they are likely to be driven out of property. It is their case that the present suit O.S. No. 1422 of 1997 is a collusive suit filed at the instance of Krishna Thevar, Saravanan and the defendant in the suit. Being a collusive suit, the defendant will never appear. The injunction prayed is not only against the parties in the suit but the police is also directed to remove the persons whoever he may be. The consequence of the order will result in great miscarriage of justice and they will be compelled to leave the property to the custody of the person with whom they are fighting for decades. Counsel also submitted that the very plaint does not disclose the prior litigation and the plaintiff is only a prudent transferee. The non-disclosure of the earlier litigation and the non-impleading of the petitioners, are fraudulent which can warrant this Court to invoke the power of Article 227 of the Constitution of India and have the impugned order set aside, and also necessary orders be passed by preventing the plaintiff in the suit from further prosecuting the same. In view of the fraud committed by him, it is stated that he is not entitled to be heard and no court will encourage in perpetuating the fraud.

10. When the matter came for admission, I found prima facie, the petitioner has a case before this Court, and therefore, I suspended the order of injunction as well as direction to implement the same by police. Notice of motion was ordered. The counsel for the first respondent entered appearance through advocate Thiru R. Thiagarajan.

11. I heard both the counsel in detail and I feel that it is a fit case where the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India has to be invoked. I find that the impugned order is a flagrant violation of the settled principles of law and the first respondent has committed fraud on court for getting a favourable order in his favour, so as to affect the rights of the original owners over the property. On going through the records, I doubt that this suit is one in a series of litigation and the same is filed at the instance of the plaintiff’s alleged lessor Saravanan and his predessor Krishna Thevar. Before going further into the facts, let me consider what is the claim that is made in the injunction application. In the petition for injunction, even though only the defendant is made as party, the relief that is sought for is not only against that defendant but also “against persons claiming to be the owners of the schedule property from interfering in whatsoever manner….” Even in the application for seeking police aid also, the relief sought for reads, thus:

to pass orders directing the Assistant Commissioner of Police (L & O) Washermenpet Range, Chennai-21 to give Police Aid to the petitioner at the petition schedule mentioned property more fully described hereunder and to see that the orders of this Hon’ble Court should be implemented by way of restraining the respondent/defendant, his men and agents Or any other person or persons claiming to be the owners of the schedule mentioned property from interfering in whatsoever manner….

[Italics supplied]

On 17.3.1997, the lower court has also allowed that application. The effect of this order is not only on the defendant in the suit, but persons claiming to be the owners of the property are prevented from entering into the property and that injunction is directed to be implemented against them also. The persons who claim to be the owners are not made parties to the suit. The consequence of the order of injunction and direction to implement the same with police aid is against person who them to be the owner and they are now asked to leave the property without being heard. The lower court has not read what injunction application is and whether that goes beyond the scope of the suit. The persons claiming to be the owners are not made as parties to the suit but injunction is directed against them. Whether such an order can be justified and whether the plaintiff/first respondent herein is entitled to get such an order are the only matters to be decided in this case.

12. The first respondent is claiming his right on the basis of the lease deed dated 18.1.1996 executed by Saravanan. Saravanan obtained that right on the basis of the sale deed executed by Krishna Thevar against when some litigations were pending between the petitioners’ predecessors. In those proceedings, Saravanan was then a minor and got himself impleaded. In the second appeals C.M.S.A. Nos. 30 and 31 of 1984 also Saravanan himself got impleaded and he was represented by the same counsel who was appearing for the Krishna Thevar. It has been conclusively found that Krishna Thevar did not have any right over the property and his obstruction was directed to be removed. It was pending adjudication of that right, Saravanan obtained title from the obstructor and the present plaintiff, the first respondent herein is also claiming some right from Saravanan. So, it is clear that what the plaintiff claims is a claim under Krishna Thevar, whose right was already adjudicated and the plaintiff was also aware that it is the petitioners who are the real owners, who are also impleaded in the prior litigation. Even before Saravanan obtained some right, the original owners warned him about the lack of title of Krishna owners warned him about the lack of title of Krishna Thevar, but, inspite of that warning, Saravanan purchased the property, i.e., he wanted to enter into a litigation. While narrating the facts, it is clear that the very same persons have been filing suits one after another and all of them wanted only was that the early decree should not be executed. The petitioners were compelled to move a transfer petition before this Court so that all those suits can be heard together. When the matter was pending, the first respondent herein was made a puppet in the hands of Saravanan and Krishna Thevar and their men and an interim order is obtained.

13. The suit filed by Krishna Thevar and Saravanan are all pendjng. In all those cases, an interim injunction was sought for and the same could not be obtained. It was thereafter, the present suit was filed alleging that Saravanan’s brother is interfering with the possession. In that suit, the relief was not only only against the defendant, but also against persons who are owners of the property. That shows that the plaintiff himself is aware that there are persons other than the defendant who are interested in the property. But, at the same time, he did not want to implead them. It is a clear case of mis-representation by the first respondent at the instance of Saravanan and Krishna Thevar to get an order of injunction, against persons who are not parties to the suit. In the decision in the case of Mahadeb Jiew v. B.B. Sen , a question came for consideration whether the plaintiff should be directed to deposit security for cost under Order 25, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure on the presumption that the plaintiff therein is a puppet in the hands of another and he is really filing the litigation for another person. The learned Judge of Calcutta High Court thought that if a person comes to court under a false claim, and under those circumstances, security for cost has to be ordered since his action is in abuse of process of court. But, on facts in that case, the learned Judge found that the plaintiff therein is really interested, and therefore, did not want the security to be ordered. In the decision, the learned Judge held, thus:

It is quite possible that where the court is satisfied that the real plaintiff is not before the court and some puppet is put forward, then that is an occasion for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of the court to “prevent abuse of the process of the court” within the meaning of Section 151 by ordering the puppet plaintiff to give security for costs. (Plaintiff in the present case held not to be a puppet plaintiff.)

14. In the decision in the case of Ramaswamia Pillai v. Krishnammal A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 230. His Lordship has followed a Principle adopted by the learned Judge in the case of Ram Coomar Condoo v. Chunder Cant Mookerjee (1876) 2 Cal. 233, where the learned Lordship stated that:

It is ordinary practice, if the plaintiff is suing for another, to require security for costs, and to stay the proceedings until it is given.

I have already stated that the present plaintiff is really fighting for others and is abusing the process of court.

15. When the person affected by an order is not impleaded, this Court has taken a view that it is also an abuse of process of court. In the decision in the case of Registrar, Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, Tirunelveli v. Suhuru Beevi Educational Trust, etc., and two Ors. (1994) 1 L.W. 235, the learned Judge was concerning the scope of a relief against the person, who is not made a party. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, it was held, thus:

It is preposterous to claim a relief against a party or a relief, in terms, which will directly affect the rights of a party, but yet claim a right also either not to implead such a person or authority who may be directly affected as a party or give up or abandon such a person once earlier made party to the proceedings. In such cases, in the absence of consequential amendment and deletion of the relief prayed and relief sought for as well as the allegations pertaining to such a party, who is not impleaded or given up subsequently the proceedings will suffer the vice of not having before the court the necessary parties and on such ground alone the proceedings will have to fail without there being any enquiry or adjudication on the merits of the claim. The court in such cases cannot also pretend to be either ignorance or oblivious to such potent manoeuvres and manipulations or itself allow it to be made in gross abuse of the judicial process.

16. For somemore reasons, I feel that this is a fit case where the powers of Article 227 of the Constitution of India have to be invoked. So many litigation are pending and it was after a prolonged litigation for decades, the petitioners herein could take possession of the property. In those proceedings, the first respondent predecessor was also a party. None of these are disclosed in the plaint. In the plaint, the plaintiff only refers to the lease deed and that the defendant therein is interfering with his possession. The court is misled by the averments in the plaint as he is filing a suit for his predecessor, he ought to have disclosed every material before the court. The suppression of fact is a fraud committed on court to the disadvantage of the petitioners. In paragraph 5 of the judgment in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath . Their Lordships have held, that:

We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

In paragraph 6 of the judgment, Their Lordships further went on and stated that non-production of a document or a non-disclosure of a material fact is an act of fraud on the court. It was held thus:

A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage.

The said decision was followed in the case of Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust .

In a decision in the case of Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. , it was held as to what is the effect of fraud and how far the courts are entitled to invoke inherent power and to prevent abuse of process of court. The learned Judge further seated that even after the judgment is pronounced, if it is ultimately found that it is due to fraud, the court has power to recall it.

17. In the plaint, there is no allegation against the owners of the property though the relief is claimed against the owners. The court below was misled with the Government in the affidavit to the injunction application where also no statement is made against the owners. But, at the same time, the relief of injunction is sought for against a person who has nothing to do with the defendant in that case. The plaintiff cannot plead ignorance about the prior legislation. If he says that he is ignorant, that only supports the case that he is a puppet in the hands of others to get an injunction order. In view of the suppression of fact and also of fraud committed by the plaintiff, I feel that it is a fit case where the powers under Article 227 have to be invoked. Since, it have already pointed out that the suit is filed at the instance of others, the Plaintiff is not entitled to any remedy in the suit. The injunction ordered by the court below, if allowed to stand will be a miscarriage of the justice. The petitioner has also no other remedy except to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

18. In a Full Bench decision in the case of Pandit Balgobind v. Sheo Kumar A.I.R. 1924 All. 818 (2) the court held, thus:

Section 151 could not be invoked more appropriately than in a case like this, for the purpose of correcting such a miscarriage of justice appearing on the face of the proceedings, and there is abundant authority, which it would be wearisome to cite, there being no case quite analogous to this one, where the courts in India have held themselves justified under this salutary provision, in making such orders in the nature of consequential orders, as may be necessary for the ends of justice, and to prevent an abuse of the process of the court, which we take to include the idle multiplicity of proceedings.

In a subsequent decision of the Allahabad High Court, another Division Bench held that the enactment of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure declares the existence of inherent jurisdiction in all courts to go beyond the legal procedure in the interests of justice. That is in the case of Harnand Lal v. Chaturbhuj A.I.R. 1926 All. 212 where Their Lordships further held, that:

the phrase an abuse of the process of the courts “in Section 151 includes” the idle multiplicity of proceedings.

In the decision in the case of Sundararajulu v. Narayanaswami A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 813 it is held thus:

There is always an inherent power in every court to see that no fraud is allowed to be perpetrated and to prevent any miscarriage of justice by reason of any fraud perpetrated by parties to proceedings.

In a subsequent decision in the case of Meenakshi Ammal v. Rama Ayyar A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 610 the learned Judge held, thus:

Court has got power under Section 151, Civil P.C. when its process has been abused by a party, to direct that party to make good the loss which it has caused by such abuses or to restore to the other side the benefit which it has obtained by getting an order side the benefit which it has obtained by getting an order by misleading the court.

In the case of Venkatacharyulu v. Yesobu A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 263 the learned Judge held, thus:

that the striking off of the defence was within the jurisdiction of the court in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 although it was not the only order which the court could pass under the circumstances of the case.

19. In view of the binding precedents, when a fraud is manifested and abuse of process of court is also brought to the notice of the court and when the plaintiff has obtained unfair advantage at the cost of others, naturally, it is the duty of the court to see that the miscarriage of justice does not survive further. The Plaintiff is only a namelender, who should not take advantage by the fraud and abuse of process of court committed by him.

20. In the result, I allow the C.R.P. I.A. No. 4398 of 1997 in O.S. No. 1422 of 1997 is dismissed. The interim injunction granted stands vacated. In view of my finding that the plaintiff is only a puppet in the hands of others and his initiation of the present suit is also an abuse of process of court, the plaint also stands struck-off the file. The petitioner herein is entitled to his costs.