ORDER
1. The prayer in the main writ petition is as follows :
“To issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other writ, order or direction in the nature of a writ directing respondents 1 and 2 to regularise all the casual workers working in the canteen of respondents 1 and 2 at Madras and those who put in 240 days of work during their tenure as casual workers.”
2. While admitting the writ petition, an order of interim injunction was granted by this Court in W.M.P. No. 26150 of 1991 restraining respondents 1 and 2 from recruiting fresh workers as casuals for the canteen. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed W.M.P. Nos. 4215 and 4216 of 1992 for vacating the interim injunction granted in W.M.P. No. 26150 of 1991 on December 12, 1991. A common order was passed in W.M.P. Nos. 26150 and 26151 of 1991 and 4215 and 4216 of 1992 to the following effect :
“Let the petitioners continue in the employment subject to any disciplinary proceedings on the conduct, pending disposal of the above writ petition. If the employer needs to recruit somebody else, it is open to them to recruit over and above the employees who are involved in this writ petition.”
3. W.M.P. Nos. 7621 and 7622 of 1992 were filed by the Air Corporation Employees Union to implead it as 3rd respondent in the writ petition and for vacating the orders made on March 9, 1992 in W.M.P. Nos. 26150 and 26151 and 1991 and 4215 and 4216 of 1992. The Air Corporation Employees Union was impleaded by this Court as 3rd respondent by order dated July 3, 1992 since the same was not opposed by the writ petitioner.
4. When the petition for vacating the interim direction was taken up, Dr. K. P. Krishna Shetty, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, raised an objection that the petition in W.M.P. No. 7622 of 1992 is not maintainable because of the common order passed on March 9, 1992. The learned counsel would place reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar .
5. On the other hand, Mr. A. L. Somayaji, learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent, would submit that the application for vacating the interim direction is maintainable in view of the decision reported in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 1909 and Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar . According to Mr. A. L. Somayaji, the order passed on March 9, 1992 would adversely effect the interest of other casual workers who are similarly situated like the 66 casual workers who are represented by the writ petitioner union. It is further stated that as per the practice obtaining in the Indian Airlines, casual worker is engaged for 90 days at a stretch and thereafter, another casual worker is given work for a period of 90 days. Thus, the work is given to casual workers by rotation. According to the learned counsel by virtue of the interim order dated March 9, 1992, the members of the writ petitioner union alone get work to the exclusion of all other casual workers. There is no controversy between the parties as to the method adopted by the management of Indian Airlines in giving work to the casual workers.
6. Before proceeding to consider W.M.P. No. 7622 of 1992 on merits, I had to deal with the objections raised by the writ petitioner that the petition is not maintainable in view of the earlier order made on March 9, 1992 and the remedy of the impleaded 3rd respondent is to either file an appeal with the leave of the Court or ask for review of the orders made on March 9, 1992.
7. It is well settled principle of law that interlocutory orders are made by Court only to maintain the status quo or by way of an interim arrangement pending disposal of the main matters. Such orders do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation. The principle of res judicata will not come into play when new facts or new situations are brought to the notice of the Court. either by the original parties or by the impleaded parties and it is the duty of the Court to consider such new facts and situations and if necessary, to vary or modify the earlier orders, Interim orders do not confer any absolute right to the party or parties to the litigation. This view of mine is fully fortified by the following dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar :
“It is needless to point out that interlocutory orders are of various kinds; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights or parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the finding on which those orders are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of the court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of court. There are other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fall into a different category. The difference from the ones just now referred to lies in the fact that they are not directed to maintaining the status quo, or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit nor put an end to the litigation.”
8. Reference can also be usefully made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) where the Apex court had laid down that if a decision in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was made in the absence of parties who should have been impleaded. then it would be open to a party aggrieved by the decision to file a second writ petition for rehearing the matter. It has been ruled by the Supreme Court that in such a second writ petition, the High Court can review its previous order at the instance of a person who was not a party to the previous proceedings, and such a review of earlier decision is well within the powers of the court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, which enables the court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it.
9. The following ratio is found in paragraph 8 of the aforesaid decision :
“It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Here the previous order of Khosla, J : affected the interests of persons who were not made parties to the proceeding before him. It was at their instance and for giving them a hearing that Khosla, J., entertained the second petition. In doing so, he merely did what the principles of natural justice require him to do. It is said that the respondents before us had no right to apply for review because they were not parties to the previous proceedings. As we have already pointed out, it is precisely because they were not made parties to the previous proceedings, though their interests were sought to be affected by the decision of the High Court, that the second application was entertained by Khosla, J.”
10. Having regard to the above principle, it is not possible to uphold the contention of Mr. K. P. Krishna Shetty that the vacate direction petition is not maintainable. The contention that the impleaded party’s remedy is only to file an appeal or ask for review of the earlier orders is tenable. The question is, whether the present application for vacating the earlier direction is maintainable or not. It may be that the impleaded 3rd respondent may have other remedies. But, that does not preclude this Court from considering the application for vacating the orders made on March 9, 1992, if a case has been made out for the same.
11. Mr. K. P. Krishna Shetty strongly relied on the decision reported in Udit Narain Singh v. Malpaharia (supra) in support of his contention that the petition for vacating the interim order is not maintainable. That was a case which dealt with the distinction between necessary and proper parties in the context of a writ of certiorari. That decision is not of any assistance in deciding the issue in question. It is not open to the writ petition to raise the question as to whether the impleaded 3rd respondent is a necessary or proper party after having agreed to the impleading on July 3, 1992 in W.M.P. No. 7621 of 1992. Had this question been raised at that stage, it would have been necessary for this Court to go into that question. Since the Air Corporation Employees Union is impleaded, the same not having been opposed by the writ petitioner, there is no need or necessity to go into the question as to whether they are necessary or proper parties.
12. Then comes the question as to whether a case has been made out to vacate the order dated March 9, 1992. Admittedly, the writ petitioner union represents the casual workers who are given work for a period of 90 days at a stretch and are discontinued thereafter. According to the writ petitioner, this process is repeated in the case of every casual worker and as a result of the same, a casual worker is kept as a casual for a number of years. At the time of granting the order on March 9, 1992, the writ petitioner had not disclosed to this Court that there are other casual workers. When the learned counsel for the impleaded 3rd respondent submitted that there are other casual workers who are similarly situated like the members of the writ petitioner union, the same was not disputed by the writ petitioner. It is also not in dispute that by virtue of the interim order, only 66 persons, who were working as casuals on December 9, 1991, will claim work to the exclusion of other casuals. It is a mere accident that 66 persons were working as casuals on December 9, 1991. There are other casuals similarly situated like those who are concerned in the writ petition. Admittedly, there is queue of casual employees. All the employees have similar right to get work depending upon the availability of the work. The right of one casual worker is not subordinate or secondary to the right of other casual worker. As already mentioned, the 66 persons who are concerned in the writ petition happened to work on the date of filing of their writ petition because of their 90 days tenure was not over by then. There are other casual workers who had worked like the casual workers concerned in the writ petition. These are additional new facts and the attention of this Court was not brought to these relevant facts. It is admitted by all the parties concerned that if the order made on March 9, 1992 is implemented, the casual workers concerned in the writ petition will alone get work to the exclusion of others.
13. All casual workers should be treated alike pending disposal of the writ petition and that would alone meet the ends of justice. Mr. N. G. R. Prasad, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 submits that as on the date of filing of the writ petition, the management was rotating the casual workers and thereby distributing the work equitably to all, and because of the orders made by this Court on March 9, 1992, there is no scope at all for rotating the workers and the memebers of the petitioner union alone would get work continuously to the exclusion of all other casuals. Mr. N. G. R. Prasad also stated that the management has no objection to rotate the work among all the casuals as was done before the orders of this Court.
14. To meet the ends of justice and considering all the above facts and circumstances, I modify the order dated March 9, 1992, and in W.M.P. Nos. 26150 and 26151 of 1992 and 4215 and 4216 of 1992 and pass the following order :
(i) Respondents 1 and 2 shall not recruit any casuals.
(ii) All the casuals viz., the members of the writ petitioner-union and the impleaded 3rd respondent union and others who are not represented by either of the union and were working before the filing of the writ petitions, shall be given work in rotation in accordance with practice in vogue before filing of the writ petition.
(iii) This interim arrangement will be without prejudice to the contentions and rights of all parties concerned.
15. There will an order in the above terms.