ORDER
P.K. Balasubramanyan, J.
1. Respondent No.5 in R.C.P. 31 of 1994 on the file of the Rent Control Court , Kuthuparamba is the petitioner in this revision filed under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The landlord of the building, respondent No.1 herein, filed the application for eviction under sub-ss. (2), (4) (i), 4 (ii) and (4) (v) of S.11 of the Act. T he application was allowed by the Rent Control Court by ordering eviction under sub-ss.(2), (4) (i) and 4(v) of S.11 of the Act. An appeal filed by the revision petitioner herein, who was found to be a sub-tenant by the Rent Control Court, was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. It is challenging the decision of the Appellate Authority that this revision is filed by the person found to be a sub-tenant.
2. The building belonged to one Dr. Vijayan. It was l et out by Dr. Vijayan under Ext.A2 Kychit to one Kumaran, the predecessor in interest of respondent 1 to 4 before the Rent Control Court. It appears that the building was sublet by Kumaran to the present revision petitioner, impleaded as respondent No.5 before the Rent Control Court. Dr. Vijayan thereupon issued a notice, Ext.A4, dated 3.10.1986 in terms of the proviso to S.11(4)(i) of the Act calling upon the tenant to evict the sub-tenant. Dr.Vijayan did not initiate any steps as such for eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Act. Subsequently, under Ext. A3, 9.2.1994 Dr. Vijayan assigned the building to the present landlord, who is respondent No.1 before us. That landlord issued a notice in terms of the proviso to S.11(4)(i) of the Act and followed it up by a petition for eviction, inter-alia under S.11(4) (i) of the Act. He impleaded the sub-tenant as respondent No.5 before the Rent Control Court.
3. Respondent 1 to 4 the legal heirs of kumaran, did not seriously challenge the right of the landlord. But, respondent No 5, the alleged sub-tenant, raised a contention that though he was originally let into possession by Kumaran, subsequently he, along with Kumaran, had approached the landlord Dr.Vijayan and Kumaran had surrendered the tenancy to Dr. Vijayan and Dr. Vijayan had orally leased out the building to respondent No.5, the revision petitioner. Therefore, the revision petitioner was a direct tenant under Dr. Vijayan. Necessarily the Rent Control Court looked for evidence of this surrender by Kumaran and a fresh entrustment in favour of the present revision petitioner. Before the Rent Control Court there was no reliable or acceptable evidence regarding the surrender by Kumaran, set up by the revision petitioner, and a fresh lease in favour of the revision petitioner. Thus, the Rent Control Court found that the landlord was entitled to have an order for eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Actin view of the fact the revision petitioner was a sub-tenant and that sub-tenancy was not one authorised by the lease or one created with the consent of the landlord. The Rent Control Court also found that rent was in arrears. It further found, in view of this conclusion, that the sub-tenant was in occupation and that the tenant had ceased to occupy the building for a period exceeding six months. Thus, the Rent Control Court ordered eviction under sub-ss. (2), (4) and (4)(v) of S.11 of the Act.
4. The sub-tenant alone appealed. His right to challenge the order under S.11 (2) of the Act and under S.11(4)(v) of the Act depended upon his establishing that he was no a sub-tenant as found by the Rent Control Court, but he was a direct tenant under Dr. Vijayan, the previous landlord. The Appellate Authority scrutinised the pleadings and the evidence in that regard and came to the conclusion that the Rent Control Court was justified in holding that the revision petitioner, the appellant before the Appellate Authority, was a sub-tenant and not a direct tenant under the landlord as claimed by him. In view of that finding, the Appellate Authority agreed with the Rent Control Court in ordering eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Act. The Appellate Authority also found that there was no reason to interfere with the orders under sub-ss. (2) and (4)(v) of S.11 of the Act. Thus the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal.
5. Challenging the decision of the Appellate Authority, learned counsel for the sub-tenant Mr. Sohan argued that the application for eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Act was barred by limitation. We may notice here that no such contention was raised either before the Rent Control Court or Court could permit such a question to be raised in exercise of its jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act. A question of limitation cannot be said to be a pure question of law in that sense. It is essentially a mixed question of fact and law and the fact that no such point was raised before the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority will stand in the way revision petitioner raising such a question for the first time in revision.
6. In the circumstances of the case, we are not satisfied that we should permit such a question to be raised for the first time in this revision. Since the point was argued before us, we may also deal with for completion. What is argued is that Dr. Vijayan, the prior landlord, had issued a notice under the proviso to S.11(4)(i) of the Act on 3.10.1986 and no application having been filed within three years of that date, the application for eviction must be held to be barred under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. The Rent Control Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for making an application for eviction under that Act. But, it does prescribed a period of limitation for filing an appeal. At the same time it does not prescribe a period of limitation for filing a revision under S.20 of the Act. In Gopalan v. Aboobacker (1995) (2) KLT 205), the Supreme Court held , with reference to S.29(2) of the Limitation Act and the period prescribed for the appeal under S.18 of the Act,that S.,5 of the Limitation Act would apply and hence the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act had the jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing an appeal before it.Mr. Sohan argued that in the light of the provision under S.29(2) of the Limitation Act and the ratio of the decision in Gopalan’s case, it must be held that Art. 137 of the Limitation Act would also govern an application for eviction under the Rent Control Act. As we have noticed, no period of limitation is prescribed by the special law for making of an application for eviction under the Rent Control Act. Therefore, there is no question of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act being attracted.
7. Then the question is whether Art. 137 of the Limitation Act could be applied in a case where in claim for eviction is made under the Rent Control Act by filing an application under S.11 of that Act. Art. 137 of the Limitation Act is a residuary article. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P.Kunhaliumma (1976 KLT 810=AIR 1977 SC 282) that any application to a civil court, whether it be under the Code of Civil Procedure or under a special enactment like the Indian Telegraph Act, is governed by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. The question is whether Art. 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to a Rent Control Court, notified under S.3 of the Act. S.3 provides for appointment for the Rent Control Court by a notification as a person entitled to exercise jurisdiction over a particular local area. There is considerable controversy whether a Rent Control Court is a “Court” or merely “persona designata”. In any event, the Rent Control Court is not a “civil court” in the strict sense of the term on the scheme of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. We are therefore of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in T.P. Kuhaliumma’s case cannot be applied to hold that Art. 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to initiation of a proceeding before the Rent Control Court. Of course, in execution of an order for eviction , in view of the fiction enacted by S.14 of the Act, it is the Munsiff’s Court that is approached ad different considerations would apply.
8. We are also of the view that where a subletting is involved, the landlord gets a cause of action, which can only be described as a recurring cause of action. Every moment the objectionable sub-tenancy continue,s the landlord gets right to apply for eviction under the Act after complying with the requirement of the proviso of S.11(4)(i) of the Act. There is nothing in the Act which provides for the extinguishment of the right, once a notice under the proviso is issued, but is not followed up by a petition for eviction. The objectionable subletting does not become an authorised subletting by that process. The right to apply for eviction will continue so long as the objectionable subletting subsists. Therefore, a merely because Dr.Vijayan issued a notice and did not pursue the same by filing an application for eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Act, it cannot lead to the position that the assignee-landlord cannot initiate action under S.11(4)(i) of the Act, Nor can the objectionable subletting be deemed to be an authorised subletting in the absence of any other conduct or happening. That aspect,of course, is not relevant while considering the question of limitation. Inn this case, the assignee-landlord, in his turn, issued a notice in terms of the proviso to S.11(4)(i) of the Act calling upon the tenant to abate the sub-tenancy. The tenant did not put an end to the sub-tenancy. This gave the assignee-landlord a fresh cause of action for applying for eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Act. There is no case that the assignee-landlord had not filed the application for eviction within three years of the notice issued by him in terms of the proviso to S.11(4)(i) of the Act even if that is necessary. We may notice here that the issuance of a notice under the proviso to S.11(4)(i) of the Act and the failure of the tenant to put an end to the subletting is a condition precedent for applying for eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Act on the ground of subletting. Therefore, a right had accrued to the assignee-landlord on his issuing a notice in terms of the proviso to S.11(4) (i) of the Act and on the tenant failing to put an end to the sublease. In that situation, in any event, the assignee-landlord has made his application within three years of the notice issued by him. Therefore, the contention sought to be raised by Mr. Shohan on the basis of Art. 137 of the Limitation Act does not carry him far in this case. We are, therefore satisfied that the application for eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Act cannot be held to be barred by limitation.
9. Mr. Sohan then argued that a landlord cannot assign a right to sue and Dr. Vijayan, the prior landlord, could not assign a right to evict under the Rent Control Act with reference to S.11(4)(i) of the Act. When the property itself is conveyed by a person to another all rights that are incidental to such transfer, pass to the transferee and that transferee is entitled to work out his rights or seek remedies on the basis of the right over the property and the attendant rights that are conveyed to him by the transfer. This is not a case where Dr. Vijayan merely assigned the right to evict and retained the ownership of the building with himself. This is a case where Dr. Vijayan transferred the property absolutely to the assignee. In that situation , it is not possible to accept an argument that this is merely an assignment of the right to sue. Moreover, as we have observed, having taken an assignment of the property, the assignee-landlord had acquired a right to invoke the Rent Control Act. In that situation, when he found that there was a subletting which was not authorised by the lease, he was certainly entitled to seek eviction on the ground provided for by the Rent Control Act, in that behalf after complying with the statutory requirements. This is what the assignee-landlord has done. We, therefore, overrule the argument of Mr. Sohan that this was a case of an assignment of a right to sue simpliciter.
10. Mr. Sohan could not make much headway in his challenge to the findings of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority that the revision petitioner has failed to prove that there was a surrender of the lease by Kumaran and there was a fresh lease in favour of the revision petitioner after Kumaran had let him into possession. Even if we forget for a moment our limitations in revisional jurisdiction and re-appreciate the pleadings and the evidence, we could not be able t ind that the said finding rendered by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority is in any manner incorrect. In fact, on the materials, it will be impossible to find that there had been a surrender by Kumaran and a fresh lease in favour of the revision petitioner or a fresh attornment by the revision petitioner after he was let into possession by the tenant, Kumaran. The interested oral evidence of the revision petitioner is clearly insufficient to find such a case. It is, therefore clear that the status of the revision petitioner is only that of a sub-tenant. The sub-tenancy having been created not as authorised by the lease or with the consent of the landlord, the order for eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Act is fully justified.
11. Mr. Sohan sought to raise a contention that once a subletting is found, the Rent Control Court not pass an order for eviction under S.11(4)(v) of the Act. That is an interesting aspect which, in fact, has troubled us on more occasion than one. But for the purpose of this case, we find that it is not necessary to go into that question and once an order for eviction under S.11(4)(i) of the Act on the ground of subletting is confirmed, the right of the sub-tenant to question the order for eviction on other grounds becomes highly suspect. In fact, going by the view taken by this Court, he may not be entitled to challenge the order against the tenant on those grounds. In that situation, we do not think it necessary to pursue this aspect further.
Thus, we are satisfied that no grounds are made out for admitting this revision. We, therefore, dismiss the same.