JUDGMENT
R.S. Mohite, J.
1. Heard Shri Gilda, Advocate for the petitioners, Shri Kankale, AGP for respondent No. 2 and Shri Issac, Advocate for respondent No. 3.
2. This is a writ petition impugning an order dated 5-1-2002 passed by the Second Labour Court, Nagpur, in purported exercise of powers of review and order of the Learned Member, industrial Court, Nagpur, dated 23-7-2002 passed in Revision (ULPN) No. 61 of 2002, by which the order of the Labour Court referred to hereinabove has been confirmed.
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows :
(a) That, on 12-4-1980, respondent No. 3 was appointed by the petitioners as a Mustering Assistant. There was an enquiry against him against charges of insubordination and absentism and after enquiry, by an order dated 14-9-1993, the services of respondent No. 3 came to be terminated.
(b) On 22-9-1993, respondent No. 3 filed a complaint under Section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, before the Labour Court at Nagpur, bearing ULP Complaint No. 589 of 1993, alleging unfair labour practice. In the said complaint, as required to be done, under the directions of the Apex Court, a preliminary issue was raised as to whether the enquiry held by the petitioners was fair, legal and proper as per the principles of natural justice.
(c) On 11-7-2001, the preliminary issue as outlined hereinabove was decided and it was held that the enquiry held by the petitioners was fair, legal and proper and as per the principles of natural justice.
(d) On 26-7-2001, the present respondent No. 3 filed an application before the same Judge of the Labour Court. In this application, he sought modification/ review of the order dated 11-7-2001.
(e) On 9-10-2001, the petitioners filed the reply to Exh. 37 contending that the Labour Court had no power or jurisdiction to review its earlier order dated 11-7-2001.
(f) By the impugned order dated 5-11-2002, the Labour Court entertained the review application at Ex. 37 and allowed the same on merits. It allowed the review application on two grounds i.e. firstly, the documents which had not been proved in the evidence had been referred to in its earlier judgment and order on the preliminary issue and that in the departmental enquiry, the evidence of respondent No. 3 and his witness had been recorded first and the evidence of the employer was recorded thereafter thereby there was an element of unfairness in the enquiry, which had rendered the enquiry illegal.
(g) This order purported to be passed in review was challenged by the petitioner by filing a revision before the Industrial Court at Nagpur. On 23-7-2002, this revision filed under Section 44 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971, came to be rejected on merits.
(h) On 12-9-2002, the present writ petition came to be filed impugning two orders as mentioned hereinabove.
4. Several contentions were raised on behalf of the petitioners including the contention that there was no power of review conferred on the Labour Court under the MRTU and PULP Act. It was argued that an order framing a preliminary issue was not an interim order within the meaning of Section 30(2) of the Act but it was in the nature of final order on the concerned preliminary issue. On behalf of respondent No. 3, it was contended that the order framing preliminary issue was an interim order within the meaning of Section 30(2) of the aforesaid Act and that under the proviso to Section 30(2) of the Act, the Court could, on an application on that behalf, review any interim order passed by it. It was also contended that even assuming without admitting that the order on preliminary issue could be considered to be a final order and not an interim order, yet this Court in the case of Association of Engineering Workers, Mumbai v. A.T.V. Limited Mumbai and Anr., reported in 2002(2) Mh.L.J. 419, had concluded that the powers of review could be exercised by an Industrial Court or Labour Court even against a final order. The requirement of framing a preliminary issue in an industrial adjudication by the Labour Court was laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Cooper Engineering Limited v. P. P.
Mundhe, reported in 1975 SCC (L and S) 443. The direction was contained in para 22 of the said judgment of the Apex Court which is reproduced for the sake of convenience, as under :
“22. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the Labour Court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the Labour Court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue. We should also make it dear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication.”
(Emphasis provided)
5. This requirement of framing a preliminary issue was not expressly provided by the statute or rules but was a procedure directed to be followed through the directions of the Apex Court in order to ensure that Industrial adjudication was speeded up. It was in these circumstances that the Apex Court while giving this direction made it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award.
6. In view of these directions given by the Apex Court, it is clear that once a decision on the preliminary point is given, no review, revision or writ petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India should be entertained against the judgment and order pertaining to preliminary issue. The rights of parties to pursue such remedies have been specifically curtailed by the Apex Court in the interest of speedy justice and because the parties concerned have appropriate remedy after the final and complete adjudication of the industrial dispute in question. Since the very right of the parties to pursue further legal remedy in this regard has been curtailed by the Apex Court, the questions relating to the existence of such remedies necessarily become academic and I do not propose to go into such an academic question at this stage. Suffice to say that issues that have been sought to be agitated by respondent No. 3 through his review application can be agitated if and when he chooses to file a revision application under Section 44 against any adverse judgment in the final adjudication of the dispute raised by him in his main complaint, which is as yet pending before the Labour Court.
7. I may state here that the Single Judge of this Court in the case of Indian Hotels Company Limited v. B. P. Chunera and Ors., reported in 2000(1) Mh.L.J. 469 = 2000 (1) CLR I, entertained a writ petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution after referring to the Apex Court judgment in the case of Cooper Engineering Limited v. P.P. Mundhe (supra). However, another Single Judge of this Court in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Shri Nanuram Verma and Ors., reported in 2001 Lab. LC. 1536, expressly referred to the earlier decision of the Single Judge of this Court in the case of Indian Hotels Company Limited v. B. P. Chunera and Ors. (supra) and held that it would not be proper to subscribe to the view taken by this Court in that case. Relying upon this observation, I was urged to refer the matter to the larger Bench. However, I am not inclined to do so and I am inclined to decide the matter in the light of the settled law contained in para 22 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Cooper Engineering Limited v. P. P. Mundhe (supra) as I find that the law has been laid down with sufficient degree of clarity by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case.
8. In the result, writ petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (i) subject to the clarification that all the issues raised by respondent No. 3 in his review application will be permitted to be raised by him if and when he is required to challenge an adverse order if passed by the Labour Court in his complaint.
9. Since the original complaint is of the year 1993, the Labour Court, Nagpur, will decide the same expeditiously and in any case before the end of June 2003.
10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.