High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

Anil Kumar Modi And Others vs Tarsem Kumar Gupta on 26 August, 2009

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Anil Kumar Modi And Others vs Tarsem Kumar Gupta on 26 August, 2009
RSA No.932 of 2007                                     (1)

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                        CHANDIGARH


                                    Date of Decision: 26.8.2009


(i)    RSA No. 932 of 2007

       Anil Kumar Modi and others                      ......Appellant

            Versus

       Tarsem Kumar Gupta                              .......Respondents

(ii) RSA No. 941 of 2007

Anil Kumar Modi and others ……Appellant

Versus

Tarsem Kumar Gupta …….Respondents

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA.

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to the Reporters or not?

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?

Present: Shri Arun Jain, Senior Advocate, with
Shri Vishal Sharma, Advocate, for the appellants.

Ms. Poonam R. Mehta, Advocate, for the respondent.

HEMANT GUPTA, J. (Oral).

This order shall dispose of RSA No. 941 and 932 of 2007, as

both the appeals raise common questions of law and facts.

The defendants are in second appeal aggrieved against the

judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court, whereby

suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff-respondent was decreed
RSA No.932 of 2007 (2)

and the counter claim filed by the defendants was dismissed.

The plaintiff has claimed decree for permanent injunction on

the plea that open space measuring 62′-6″x10″ between the house of the

plaintiff and the defendant is a private passage, but with the restriction that

the defendants are entitled to open windows with iron rods in their wall.

The plaintiff has put pucca bricks upto the height of 6 feets to prevent the

cattle; stray dogs and trespassers from entering into the personal passage of

the plaintiff, whereas the defendants are threatening to remove the stack of

bricks lying on the said passage, for which they have no right in view of the

previous litigation between the parties. The defendants filed a counter

claim asserting that they have a right to use passage in dispute, sought

direction to the plaintiff to remove the bricks blocking the passage.

Earlier, plaintiff Tarsem Lal, had filed a suit for injunction

against the Municipal Committee, pointing out that there is a passage

towards the eastern side of the building purchased by the plaintiff and that a

latrine is in existence in the passage for the last 10 years, but the Municipal

Committee has served two notices dated 10.1.1976 under Sections 195 and

195-A of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, to remove the said latrine. Since

the Municipal Committee, threatened to demolish the disputed latrine, the

plaintiff filed Civil Suit No. 323 dated 17.7.1976 for permanent injunction.

The predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, namely, Kewal

Krishan, filed a suit for mandatory injunction (Civil Suit No. 403 of

7.8.1976) claiming that the plaintiffs are owners of the property marked by

letters `C’, whereas the defendants are owners of the property marked by

letters `D’. Between the properties of the plaintiff and defendants, there is a

public passage of the width of 10 feet, whereon the defendants have
RSA No.932 of 2007 (3)

constructed a latrine about 10/11 months back. It was thus alleged that no

construction is permissible over the aforesaid passage of 10 feet wide. A

perusal of the judgment Exhibit P.7 in the previous suits, which were

consolidated and a common judgment delivered, would show that issue

No.1 was to the effect whether Tarsem Lal (plaintiff) was entitled to

injunction prayed for, whereas issue No. 6 was whether there exists 10 feet

wide public passage between the property of the plaintiff and the defendant.

Under issue No. 3, the learned trial Court returned the following finding.

“…In view of my aforesaid discussion I feel that the
defendant Municipal Committee is within its rights to
seek removal of the disputed latrine. Moreover, as
already stated above the disputed latrine is in existence
in a passage which is required to be used as such and the
plaintiff had no right to build any latrine in the passage
even if the same be a private one. The existence of latrine
is a permanent source of nuisance to the residents of the
locality and the same has been built by placing a lintel of
the same in the wall of the house of Kewal Krishan and
he is fully justified to seek its removal. The plaintiff is,
therefore, hardly entitled to the discretionary remedy of
injunction from the court. This issue is accordingly found
and decided against the plaintiff.”

Under issue No. 6 a finding was returned that though it is a

private passage of Tarsem Lal and other co-sharers, but Kewal Krishan and

others have a right to open windows and ventilators of their houses with

opening towards the said passage. It was recorded as under:-

“Issue No. 6:-

As discussed above there was to be a passage of 10 feet
width towards the eastern side of the house of Tarsem
Lal and others. Even in the site plan (Ex.PW1/A)
RSA No.932 of 2007 (4)

prepared by Shamsher Singh (PW1), it is evident that the
impugned passage is in existence at the spot. However,
as already discussed above, the disputed passage appears
to be a private one belonging to Tarsem Lal plaintiff and
others but Kewal Krishan and other owners of the
adjoining property have the right to open windows and
ventilators of their houses towards the disputes site. This
issue is decided accordingly.

The appeals filed against the aforesaid judgment and decree

were decided on 12.1.1983 Exhibits D.10 and D.11, wherein it was inter-

alia, observed that rival plaintiff (Kewal Krishan) has also a right in this

passage. The Regular Second Appeals Exhibit D.12 against the aforesaid

judgment and decree were dismissed by this Court on 11.8.1983.

Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that

in the previous proceedings the 10 feet wide passage, has been recognised

between the house of the plaintiff and the defendants. It is contended that

the first Appellate Court has also recorded a finding that the predecessor-

in-interest of the appellants has also a right in this passage. Therefore, the

plaintiff Tarsem Kumar has no right to block the said passage. It is further

contended that the findings recorded in the previous suit, will operate as

res-judicata and the present plaintiff cannot be permitted to re-agitate the

same issue again.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their

assistance gone through the record as well.

A perusal of the judgment and decree passed in the previous

proceedings passed by the trial Court would show that a finding has been

returned that 10 feet wide passage in existence between the houses of the

plaintiff and the defendant is a private passage of the plaintiff Tarsem Lal
RSA No.932 of 2007 (5)

and other co-owners. The latrine constructed by the plaintiff Tarsem Lal

was found to be a source of nuisance as it was adjoining the wall of the

defendant Kewal Krishan. Thus, the plaintiff was directed to remove such

latrine. The defendant (Kewal Krishan) was also permitted to construct

ventilators and windows in the wall, which is opening towards such

passage.

Once, such issue has been decided in the previous proceedings

between the parties, inter-se, the finding thereon operates as res-judicata.

In view of the said proceedings, wherein a categorical finding has been

recorded that it is a private passage of the plaintiff and his other co-sharers,

the defendants cannot restrain the plaintiff from constructing a wall. The

construction of 6 feet wall is neither obstructing the windows nor the

ventilators of the appellants. Therefore, the appellants cannot be permitted

to re-agitate the issue which has attained finality in the previous

proceedings.

Consequently, I do not find any patent illegality or material

irregularity in the findings recorded or that the findings recorded give rise to

any substantial question of law in the present second appeals.

Hence, the present appeals are dismissed.

(HEMANT GUPTA)
JUDGE
26.8.2009
ds