JUDGMENT
M. M. PAREED PILLAY, C.J. :
The assessments for the years 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88 were completed by the first respondent under s. 18(4) of the Agrl. IT Act, 1950, by separate orders. Admittedly, that was done with a notice to the petitioner. The petitioner filed applications under s. 19 of the Act to reopen the assessments. As the applications were not filed within one month from the service of a notice of demand, the Agrl. IT and STO (the first respondent) rejected the same. Appeals were preferred against the assessment orders before the AAC. The appeals were dismissed. Second appeals were filed before the Agrl. Tribunal (the second respondent). The Tribunal allowed the appeals as per exhibit P-2 order. Thereafter, the Tribunal suo motu rectified the order under s. 36 of the Act. Exhibit P-3 is the order. Exhibit P-3 is challenged in the original petition.
2. Admittedly, the petitioner was served with notice in the assessment proceedings initiated against him. Under s. 19 of the Act, he ought to have filed the applications within one month from the service of the notice of demand of tax as per the assessments made against him. Admittedly, the applications under s. 19 were filed belatedly.
3. The question that arises for consideration is whether s. 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked in a petition filed under s. 19 of the Agrl. IT Act. Sec. 19 provides that where an assessee, within one month from the service of a notice of demand, satisfies the Agrl. ITO that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making the return required by s. 17 or that he did not receive the notice issued under sub-s. (2) or sub-s. (4) of that section or sub-s. (2) of s. 18 or that he had not a reasonable opportunity to comply, or was prevented by sufficient cause from complying, with the terms of any such notice, the Agrl. ITO shall cancel the assessment and proceed to make a fresh assessment in accordance with the provisions of s. 18. Thus, from a reading of s. 19, it can be seen that the time given to an aggrieved person is only one month to prefer an application under that section. In a case where an appeal is filed against an assessment under s. 31, the statute enables the assessee to get the delay in filing the appeal condoned, if he established that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period, viz., 30 days. Sec. 31(3) makes the position clear. So also, when an appeal is filed by an assessee against the order of the Asstt. Commissioner, he can get the delay condoned as provided under s. 32(3). Under s. 36, the period for rectification of mistakes is three years.
4. As the Act is a self-contained one and as s. 5 of the Limitation Act is not made applicable and as the Agrl. ITO is not bestowed with the power to condone delay, the petition filed under s. 19 beyond time cannot be entertained by him. In other words, the assessee has no option but to file the petition within the statutory period. As already noted, with regard to the appeals before the Asstt. Commissioner and the Tribunal, ss. 31(3) and 32(3) empower the concerned authorities to condone the delay in preferring the appeal if they are satisfied that the assessee had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period mentioned in the sections. So far as s. 19 is concerned, no power is conferred on the assessing authority to condone any period of delay. That apart, s. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be relied on for extension of time in respect of the proceeding before the Agrl. ITO.
5. Exhibit P-3 order cannot be assailed as that has been passed under s. 36 of the Act. Sec. 36(1) provides that the authority which passed an order on appeal or revision may, at any time within three years from the date of such order passed by him on appeal or in revision, and the Agrl. ITO may at any time within three years from the date of any assessment or refund order passed by him of his own motion, rectify any mistake apparent from the record of the appeal, revision, assessment or refund, as the case may be, and shall within the like period rectify any such mistake which has been brought to his notice by an assessee. The Tribunal under s. 36 of the Act, having found the fact that the delay in filing the petition under s. 19 cannot be condoned, rectified its earlier order. The Tribunal in the first instance allowed the appeals as per exhibit P-2 order holding that s. 5 of the Limitation Act applies. Having realised the correct legal position, exhibit P-3 order was passed.
6. We see no reason to quash exhibit P-3 order. The original petition is dismissed.