Madan Lal Sharma vs Punjab And Haryana High Court on 15 July, 1998

JUDGMENT

V.K. Bali, J.

1. In this petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by Mr. M.L Sharma, an Advocate of this Court, the issue raised for consideration by Full Bench is of to whether by the language employed in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) read with Section 340 of the Code, a Court is debarred from taking cognizance and then prosecuting an offender, alleged to have committed the offences described in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. The contention of petitioner is that the Court can take cognizance for an offence and then launch prosecution only with regard to a document that has been forged when the same was in the precincts of the Court, If the document was forged outside the precincts of the Court and then produced in it, only a party to the litigation can launch prosecution and the Court as such is debarred from taking cognizance of such an offence. Whereas it is admittedly learned counsel representing the respondent-Punjab & Haryana High Court that only the Court can take cognizance of the offence described in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) when the forgery has been committed in the Court precincts and a party as such is debarred by the language employed in the said Section to launch prosecution, converse 6f that i.e. when the document is forged outside the court and then produced, court shall have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, is not true and, therefore has been seriously disputed.

2. Mr. Lamba, on the other hand, has vehemently canvassed that the power of the court as such to lodge a complaint, be it regarding a document that has been forged in the court or outside thereof, is hedged around the provisions contained in section 340 of the Code and once the parameters spelled out in Section 340 are out, there shall be no bar for the court to take cognizance and launch prosecution of an accused. In his aforesaid refrain, Mr. Lamba contends that if what is argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the forgeries of documents for which a party as such may not be interested at all to launch prosecution or may have no occasion to come to know, would go totally unnoticed and un-punished and if such forgeries go on un-noticed and unpunished, it would completely pollute the administration of justice. The kind of forgeries that will go unnoticed, according to the learned counsel, in such a situation, would be noticed later.

3. Before, the point raised by Mr. M.L Sharma petitioner herein, which has eventually to be answered by the Full Bench of this court consisting of five judges, is considered and answered it will be useful to give backdrop of the events leading Mr. Sharma to file this criminal misc. and reasons as to why this matter has remained pending in this Court at the very initial stages for over a decade.

4. A bunch of petitions under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act were decided by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, on January 4,1980. Three Regular First Appeal Nos. 658, 659 and 660 of 1982 for enhancement of the compensation were filed in this Court. When the matter in RFA No. 660 of 1982 came up for scrutiny before the office: it raised the objections (i) certified copy of the judgment has not been attested by copy supplying-authority and (ii) any other case ? The same was returned to be re-filed within a week. In the other two RFAs same very objections were raised and the RFAs were returned to be filed within a week. These RFAs were re-filed on April 14, 1982, May 31, 1982 and August 27, 1981. These appeals were filed through Mr. M.L. Sharma, Advocate, petitioner herein. He was, however, superseded by Shri Ravinder Seth, Advocate, who in turn, on August 26, 1982, filed three applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, On August 31, 1982 the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act came up for consideration before I.S. Tiwana, J., as he then was, who was pleased to pass following order:

“It is conceded by the learned counsel that the dates in the copies of the judgment supplied by the office of the District Judge, Chandigarh, have been tampered with by scoring off certain dates and over writing others. This obviously has been done with a view to bring the appeals within the period of limitation. According to the learned counsel all this has been done by Mr. D,S. Sandhu, Advocate, practising in the lower court The learned counsel further states that the appellants had asked Mr. Sandhu to apply for these copies and he not only got these copies from the office but also purchased court fee for the filing of these appeals. Before the consideration of the question of condonation of the delay in these appeals, I deem it proper that an enquiry be held by the District Judge (Vigilance), Haryana, to find out the exact dates on which the applications for these copies had been made and the copies were prepared and supplied. In case the District Judge comes to the conclusion that there has been tampering with the dates as mentioned in the copies, then he would not be hesitate to get a criminal case registered if one is prima facie made out for punishing the culprit whosoever he is. He would send his report to this Court within one month from the receipt of this order. The copies filed in these appeals be sent to the District Judge in original.”

5. Pursuant to the orders, referred to above, the; District Judge (V), Haryana, submitted his report, operative part whereof runs thus:

“A careful analysis of the evidence on record does not clear Shri M.L. Sharma from his involvement in these cases. It cannot be said for a moment that he had no knowledge of the tampered dates on the three certified copies of these RFAS. It was only when the things came to light that he backed out and Shri Ravinder Seth appeared for the petitioners by filing applications for condonation of delay. Shri Ravinder Seth admitted before the Hon’ble Judge that the copies have been tampered with. The statement of Shri Sharma shows that he was in league with Shri Sandhu and allowed himself to be made a party to the deceit aimed to be played on the Court.

As is well known, an Advocate is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the Court, he is a higher in the administration of justice.

In the instant case Shri M.L. Sharma by filing the three RFAs with tampered certified copies had attempted to beguile the court thereby obstructing the interest of justice.

 

In the instant enquiry there is no indication that Shri M.L. Sharma was instrumental in affecting material alteration but there is sufficient material to show that he has been a privy to it and, therefore, liable for the abetment of the- criminal offence committed by Shri D.S. Sandhu, Advocate. Shri M.L. Sharma, has to reply to the charges of abetment, namely, under Section 193/196/465/471 read with Section 109 IPC. ,
 

XX    XX    XX
 

Reverting to the matter in hand, it is prima facie clear that Shri M.L. Sharma advocate had tried to over-reach and mislead the Court. His action has caused obstruction to the interests of justice and amounts to contempt of court as well."
 

6. The District Judge (V), Haryana, submitted the report on January 31, 1983.
 

7. On receipt of the report aforesaid, I.S. Tiwana, J., vide order dated February 28, 1983, observed that it was heartening to note that the learned Judge District Judge (V), had examined the matter from both the angles, i.e., legal as well as moral. Apparently, he had no reason to differ from the conclusions recorded by him. In view of that, he ordered that steps be taken for the prosecution of the culprits held responsible for various offences and notice be sent to Shri M.L. Sharma, Advocate to show cause as to why proceedings for the contempt of court be not initiated against him and a copy of the report was also ordered to be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appropriate action on the administrative side. A copy of the report was also ordered to be sent to the State Bar Council for such action as it may deem necessary and notice of the CM was also ordered to be sent to the respondent-U.T. Administration for March 8, 1983.

8. In view of the orders passed by I.S. Tiwana, J., mention whereof has been made above, a complaint came to be lodged by the Punjab & Haryana High Court through its Registrar against Shri D.S. Sandhu Advocate as also M.L. Sharma, Advocate, before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, under Sections 193/196/465 and 471 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Shri Babu Ram Gupta, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, before whom the matter came up in due course of time, framed charges against D.S. Sandhu and M.L. Sharma, Advocates. Whereas, D.S. Sandhu Advocate was charged under Sections 193/196/465/471 IPC, M.L Sharma, Advocate was charged under Section 109 IPC read with Sections 465 and 471 IPC for abetting D.S. Sandhu, Advocate in the commission of the said offences.

9. After the charges were framed against the petitioner, he filed present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing complaint as also charge-sheet, Annexures P-4 and P-5. This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. came up for hearing before M.M. Punchhi, J., as he then was, for motion hearing on March 13, 1985. A Full Bench decision of this Court in Crl. Misc. No. 5095-M of 1984 decided on May 7, 1986 was cited before the Hon’ble Judge and on the basis thereof, it was pleaded that the complaint be quashed not only for the offences under Sections 471 and 465 IPC but, as a necessary corollary, under Sections 196 and 193 IPC as well. In the interim order dated August 7, 1986, while referring this matter to the Full Bench, it was observed by M.M. Punchhi, J. “that this Court was the complainant itself and should the complaint be quashed in the manner asked for Was fairly complicatory and it was likely to arise in a number of cases in which in the yester years Courts inclusive of this Court, have been making complaints in such like cases in the purported exercise of powers under Section 195 Cr.P.C. In these circumstances, the Hon’ble Judge was of the view that this petition deserved to be heard by a larger bench and preferably by a Full Bench if it may meet the pleasure of Hon’ble the Chief Justice.

10. On a reference made by the learned Single Judge, Hon’ble the Chief Justice constituted a Full Bench consisting of three Judges and consequently the matter came up for hearing before it on February 15, 1990, when following order was passed:

“A Full Bench judgment of this Court in Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 P&H 19 delivered by three learned Judges requires reconsideration. Thus, we direct that the case be placed before a larger Bench.

Papers be placed before Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice for constituting a larger Full Bench.”

11. The complaint sought to be quashed, as referred to above, has been lodged against the petitioner under Sections 193/196/465/471 read with Section 109 IPC. This complaint has been lodged by the Punjab & Haryana High Court through its Registrar. The allegations against the petitioner are that after scrutinising the RFAS, objections were raised by the Registry and the matters were returned to the counsel to be filed within a week. These RFAs were refiled on different dates but were returned with the objection that compliance of the previous objections had not been done. The appeals were again returned on August 27, 1982. The claimants had paid substantial amount to D.S. Sandhu, Advocate for filing the appeals in this Court. It was only on April 14, 1981, i.e., after the expiry of limitation period provided for filing the appeals in this Court, that D.S. Sandhu filed applications for obtaining certified copies of the awards in the three cases decided by the Addl. District Judge. The copies were delivered to him on November 12, 1981 against his signatures on the applications. Mr. Sandhu purchased court fee stamps for the three appeals, fabricated date of applying for copies on the three certified copies in order to bring the appeals within time and in his endeavour he was joined by Shri M.L Sharma, Advocate, petitioner herein, who filed three RFAs in this Court. The enquiry in the matter was got made by the High Court from the District Judge (V), Haryana who after recording evidence came to the conclusion that Shri Sandhu was one of the Advocates in the court of Additional District Judge representing the claimants when the order was announced on January 4, 1980 and that the claimants after about two weeks of the announcement of the judgment by the Additional District Judge paid various amounts to Shri Sandhu for filing appeals in the High Court who applied for certified copies of the judgment on April 14,1981 and got the delivery of the copies on November 12, 1981 and he took into confidence Shri M.L Sharma, Advocate for filing three appeals in the High Court. It was Shri Sandhu who launched, on the pattern of tampering with the record, with a view to dupe the court in apparently making the appeals within time. The aforesaid report of the District Judge was accepted by the High Court and vide order dated February 28, 1983 it was ordered that prosecution against the persons responsible for various offences be launched. Shri Sandhu had fabricated the certified copies of the award by interpolating the date of filing applications for obtaining certified copies from April 14, 1981 to February 14, 1980 in order to bring the appeals within limitation and by filing fabricated copies in the appeals in the High Court through Shri M.L. Sharma, Advocate, Shri Sandhu had committed offences under Sections 193/196/465 and 471 IPC. Shri M.L. Sharma, Advocate, fully knew that the certified copies were fabricated and he filed the same in the High Court in the three appeals in connivance with Shri Sandhu and committed offences punishable under Sections 193/196/465/471 read with Section 109 IPC.

12. In the lengthy petition, running into 28 pages, filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., petitioner, after elaborating the facts and circumstances leading to his prosecution, has given various grounds but what this Court is concerned with is ground pressed into service in paragraph 25 which reads as follows:

“That perusal of section 195 and that of complaint clearly establishes that no offence under section 109 of IPC has been committed by the petitioner. Even the complaint is not in accordance with law. The section 195 categorically bars the court for filing the complaint. Furthermore the offence has been committed, it is outside the court and as such the court cannot file the complaint against the petitioner. It may be pointed out here that the court has not passed the order of filing the complaint during the final disposal of the cases, i.e., RFA Nos. 658, 659 and 660 and as such the Court is debarred from filing the complaint against the petitioner and the complaint filed by the court is illegal, irregular and against the provisions of Cr.P.C. and deserves to be quashed. Similar is the situation of the charge and in case the complaint is illegal, irregular and deserves to be quashed, the charge is automatically quashed. The complaint is against the provisions of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. Section 195 Cr.P.C. is reproduced below:

XX XX”

13. To be precise, the contention of Mr. H.L. Sibal, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code creates a bar for a Court to take cognizance of the offences under Section 463 or punishable under Sections 471, 475 and 476 of the Indian Penal Code when such offences are alleged to have been committed in, or in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding, in any Court. In other words, the concerned party or someone else, may institute proceedings under the offences described in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) when the allegations are with regard to forgery of a document having been committed outside the precincts of the Court and before the document was produced in the Court

14. Before the matter is examined on the anvil of the judicial precedents, that have been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention, noted above, it will be appropriate to examine the provisions of Section 195 as also Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as the same are relevant

“Section 195 : Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence: – (1) No court shall take cognizance

(a) xx xx

(b) xx xx

(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to any proceedings in any court, or

(ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475, Section 476 of the said code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document, produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, or

(iii) xx xx

except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that court is subordinate.

340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195(1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 195 which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary :-

(a) record a finding to that effect;

(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;

(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;

(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and

(e)bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such magistrate.

(2)The power conferred on a court by Sub-Section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that court has neither made a complaint under sub-Section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of Sub-Section (4) of Section 95.

(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,

(a) where the court making the complaint is a High Court-, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;

(b) in any other case, by the Presiding Officer of the Court.

(4) In this Section “Court” has the same meaning as in Section 195.”

15. It may be mentioned here that Section 195(1)(c) of the Old Code, with some difference, which shall be noticed later, was the same as is Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the new Code whereas Section 476 of the Old Code is the same as is Section 340 of the New Code.

16. It shall also be relevant to examine the intention of the legislature in creating a bar of prosecution under Section 195 and as to whether such bar was for a party and others or for the Court as well. The Apex Court in Patel Lalji Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 SC 1934, after considering Section 476 and Section 195(1)(c) of the Old Code observed thus :

“The underlying purpose of enacting Section 195(1) (b) and (c) and Section 476 seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties considering themselves aggrieved by the offences mentioned in those sections to start criminal prosecution on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court’s control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process, in other words the administration of public justice, which is the direct and immediate object of victim of these offences and it is only by misleading the Courts and thereby prevent the due course of law and justice that the ultimate object of harming the private party is designed to be realised. As the purity of the proceeding of the court is directly sullied by the crime the Court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party designed ultimately to be injured through the offence against the administration of public justice is undoubtedly entitled to move the Court for persuading it to file the complaint. But such party is deprived of the general right recognised by Section 190 Cr.P.C. of the aggrieved parties directly initiating the criminal proceedings. The offences about which the Court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved private parties is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that Court, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceeding in that Court so that it can, without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party.”

17. The Supreme Court, while further elaborating the purpose of creating a bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, 1996(3) Recent. C.R. 240 has observed that “the object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution-for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to pressure and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the ‘act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offence relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice demands absolute bar of private prosecution and the power be given to the Court to lay complaint under Section 340 of the Code as per the procedure prescribed therein.”

18. From reading of Section 195 as also the purpose for which the legislature enacted the same, it is quite apparent that the bar created under the said Section operates against a party and not against a Court. The Court alone has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences described in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) to the exclusion of a party to the proceedings or others to launch prosecution if other ingredients of Sections 195 and 340 are also in existence. The only other ingredient where the court may take cognizance of the offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii), as argued by learned counsel for the parties, is that the forgery should be with regard to a document which was lying in the Court. In other words, the forgery should have been committed while proceedings in the matter are pending before a Court. To such a forgery, the Court alone, as mentioned above, has jurisdiction to take cognizance and launch prosecution. A party to the litigation or others are, by the language employed in Section 195(1)(b)(ii), debarred from launching prosecution. What, however, has been argued before us is that if the document has been forged outside the precincts of the Court and has been produced in the Court, the Court shall have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and, thus, no power to launch prosecution. The proposition advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot possibly be either supported on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) or the purpose for which the said Section was enacted by the legislature. Confronted with this situation, learned counsel for the petitioner then exclusively relied upon some observations made in judicial precedents which shall be taken note of. Suffice it, however, to mention here that not a single case has been cited before us where some one might have successfully challenged the bar created under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code for the Court to take cognizance of the offences described therein and then to launch prosecution. The cases cited before us were where the document was forged outside the precincts of the Court and party to the proceedings or others had launched prosecution and the argument was that only the Court could launch complaint. That being the situation, before some observations made in the judicial precedents, as have been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, are noticed, it shall be appropriate to give facts of such judicial precedents. The main reliance of learned counsel for the petitioner is upon Full Bench judgment of this Court in Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab, (1986)13 Cr.LT. 126 (F.B.): AIR 1987 Punjab & Haryana 19.

19. The necessity to constitute the Full Bench resulting into decision in Harbans Singh’s case, (1986)13 Cr.LT. 126 (F.B.) (supra) had arisen as while hearing Crl. Misc. No. 5095-M of 1984, Hon’ble Single Judge formed the view that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983)10 Cr.LT. 129 went against the Supreme Court judgment reported as Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy, AIR 1983 SC 1053. The Full Bench has not given the facts of the case dealt by it. Instead, the facts of Karnail Singh’s case (supra) have been given. The Division Bench judgment in Karnail Singh’s case was held to be correct law. It shall be useful to notice the facts in Karnail Singh’s case. Karnail Singh and Ors. had instituted a civil suit on September 25, 1980 against their brother Jamail Singh that they were owners in possession of the land and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in their possession. The suit was based on the will allegedly executed on April 27, 1977 by Karnail Singh’s father Hari Singh. Jamail Singh, during the pendency of the said suit, made an application before the SSP, Amritsar alleging that the will relied upon by Karnail Singh was forged one and, therefore, he had committed the offences under Section 420/467 IPC. The police registered a case and commenced investigation. Karnail Singh approached this Court for quashing of the FIR and the investigation. The Division Bench of this Court in Karnail Singh’s case (supra) was seized of the question whether the police had the statutory power to investigate the cognizable offences under Section 471, 475 or 476 IPC vis-a-vis the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the new Code with regard to the cognizance thereof by a Court. The Division Bench held that “on principle as also on the sound canons of construction, it is apt to confine Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code to forgeries committed in respect of a document during its custody by the court or its fabrication in the course of the proceedings itself.” The Division Bench also examined the deletion of words “by a party to any proceeding in any court” in the Section 195(1)(b)(ii) which words were there in the old Code, i.e. Section 195(1)(c) and held as follows :

“In view of the wholly settled state of law declared by the Supreme Court under section 195(1)(c) of the old Code, all that now remains is to examine the marginal change in the language of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code by deleting the words “by a party to any proceeding in any court.” There is no indication that in doing so, whilst enacting the new code, the Parliament intended to make any radical change or departure from the settled law earlier. It is well settled that the legislature is presumed to know the existing state of law when making a change of amendment in the statute. The statement of Objects and Reasons and the detailed notes on clauses of the Cr.P.C., 1973 give no indication of materially altering or overriding the earlier precedential construction of the predecessor provision. It, therefore, seems inapt to read more into the marginal change than the plain words thereof would indicate, To my mind the deletion of the words “by a party to any proceeding in any court” in section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code has only the effect of enlarging the protection envisaged by the section to the witnesses, scribes, attestors etc. of the document with regard to which the offence has been committed. This class of persons would now be equally within the ambit of the provision irrespective of the fact whether they are parties to the proceedings or not. Apart from this, I am unable to read any other meaningful change brought in the law in this context. All other considerations authoritatively noticed in the1 precedents referred to above with regard to the larger principles of interpretation, the aptness of the narrower construction, the other provisions of the Code including section 476 etc. remain as much applicable and relevant to section 195(1) (b)(ii) of the Code as they were to its predecessor provision. Consequently, the binding precedent applicable to earlier provisions of section 195(1)(c) of the Old Code would be equally attracted in the case of the present provisions subject to the marginal ‘change noticed above.”

20. The counsel representing the petitioner, besides relying upon some other judgments of the Apex Court and various High Courts, which shall be discussed later, has almost exclusively relied upon some observations made by Full Bench of this Court in Harbans Singh’s case, (1986)13 Cr.L.T. 126 (supra) and by the Supreme Court in Sachidanand’s case, 1981 R.C.R. (Crl.) 823 (supra). Full Bench in Harbans Singh’s case upheld the law laid down by this Court in Karnail Singh’s case (supra). After examining number of judgments on the issue, Full Bench, in paragraph 15, stated that “the deletion of words quoted above, in their view, did not affect the ratio of Patel’s case, 1971 Crl.L.J. 1437 and this omission was matter of no consequence.” The Full Bench summarised .following conclusions which could be deduced from the provisions and judgments cited in support of narrow view :

“(i) The provisions of section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the new code are by-way of an exception -to the general right of a citizen to approach ordinary criminal courts as contained in section 190 of the Code and hence should be strictly construed.

(ii) Sections 195 and 340 of the new Code form part of statutory scheme dealing with the subject of prosecution for offences against the administration of justice and thus have to be read together to ascertain the intention of the legislature.

(iii) The offences about which the Court alone to the exclusion of the aggrieved party has jurisdiction to file complaint in respect of an offence should have a reasonably close nexus with the proceedings in court, so that it can satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its record the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent person.

(iv) The Court while embarking upon an enquiry under Section 340 of the Code should not act as an investigating agency as it would be impracticable for the court to decide about the expediency of launching of prosecution in respect of forgeries committed earlier to the proceedings initiated in that court.

(v) If wider view is taken, the criminal liability can be evaded because the forger by filing a suit in other proceedings in courts can prolong the same to the extent he can manage, and claim protection under section 195 of the Code.

(vi) The restricted view is more in consonance with the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure to provide harmonious interpretation and will not defeat or frustrate any other relevant provision of the Code.

With the aid of these conclusions, different provisions of the Code having connection with each other can be harmoniously worked.”

21. From the conclusions, formed by the Full Bench, as enumerated above, it is apparent that every citizen has a right to approach ordinary criminal Court, but if their complaint is with regard to a document having been forged in the Court, then the Court has the power and jurisdiction to deal with the same. The conclusion enumerated at Sr. No. (iii) is no different from the conclusion enumerated at Sr. No. (i) with the addition that the Court has jurisdiction to file a complaint in respect of offences which could have reasonably close nexus with the proceedings in court so that it can satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its record the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent person. Both the conclusions, as referred to above, deal with the power and jurisdiction of the Court alone when the document has been forged in the Court. Insofaras conclusion drawn at Sr. No. (ii) is concerned the same is with regard to desirability of Section 195 and Section 340 of the Code to be read together so as to ascertain the intention of the legislature. It is conclusion drawn at Sr. No. (iv) which has been relied upon by Mr. Sibal to support his contention that even if the document was not forged in the Court as. such, and, therefore, it had been forged before it was put in the court, the court, while embarking upon an enquiry under Section 340 of the Code should not act as an investigating agency as it would be impracticable for the court to decide about the expediency of launching of prosecution in respect of forgeries committed earlier to the proceedings initiated in that court. Nothing more could be relied upon either from the Division Bench judgment in Karna/7 Singh’s case or Full Bench judgment of this Court in Harbans Singh’s case in support of the proposition that when a document is forged outside and then put in the Court, while embarking upon an enquiry under Section 340, the court shall have no power and jurisdiction to launch a complaint. Conclusion drawn at Sr. No. (iv) primarily deals with Section 340 of the Code. While embarking upon an enquiry under Section 340 of the Code, it was observed that “the Court while embarking upon an enquiry under Section 340 of the Code should not act as an investigating agency as it would be impracticable for the court to decide about the expediency of launching of prosecution in respect of forgeries committed earlier to the proceedings initiated in trial court”. Practicability or otherwise, to decide about the expediency of launching prosecution in respect of forgeries committed earlier to proceedings initiated in Court is entirely within the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance and launch prosecution.” Section 340 of the Code finds mention in Chapter XXVI of the Code dealing with the provisions as to offences affecting administration of justice. When a Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice, that an enquiry should be made into any offence, referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, make a complaint thereof in writing. An opinion has, thus, to be formed as to whether an enquiry should or should not be made and whether making of such an enquiry would be expedient in the interests of justice ? In certain kind of forgeries, whereas it may not be expedient in the interest of justice to make an enquiry, in some other kind of cases, it may be absolutely necessary to make such an enquiry. No bar as such can possibly be spelled out from the language employed in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that by conclusion drawn toy the Full Bench at Sr. No. (iv), as enumerated above, it has to be held that a bar has been placed upon the Court so as not to launch prosecution with regard to a document having been forged outside the precincts of the Court, in section 195(1)(b)(ii), has to be repelled.

22. As mentioned above, the next judgment relied upon by “learned counsel representing the petitioner is in Sachidanand Singh’s case (supra). Before we may deal with the contention of learned counsel based upon some observations made by the Apex Court in the case aforesaid, it shall once again be useful to see the facts of the said case and the question that was before the Supreme Court. A complaint was filed by Lal Narain Singh in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate alleging offences, inter alia, under Sections 468, 469 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code on the facts that appellants had forged a document, certified copy of the Jamabandi and produced it in a court of the Executive Magistrate which was then dealing with proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. The Chief Judicial Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the police as provided under Section 156(3) of the Code. Police registered an FIR on the basis of the said complaint and after investigation laid a charge-sheet against appellants for the said offences. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of those offences and issued process to the accused. Appellants then moved Patna High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the prosecution on the main ground that the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the said offence in view of the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. On the facts, as have been stated above, the question posed by the Supreme Court for its answer was as to whether the prosecution could be maintained in respect of a forged document produced in the court unless the complaint has been filed by the Court concerned in that behalf. Whether the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would apply to such prosecution was a question formed in other words by the Supreme Court. On the facts, as have been referred to above, it was held that “the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code did not apply to case of a forgery committed before production of document in Court.” There could not be any dispute nor the one was raised by learned counsel for the respondents, that a party or Ors. cannot launch prosecution with regard to a document that has been forged when the same had since already been produced in the Court and if a document was forged outside the precincts of the Court and then produced before it, party or Ors. would be free to launch prosecution.

23. After framing the alternative questions, as have been referred to above, the Supreme Court, observed that “the said question, even though ticklish, had received a quietus from the Supreme Court with the pronouncement in Patel Lajibhai’s case (supra) while considering the scope of its corresponding provision in the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. However, a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Menon and Anr. v. D. Raja Reddy and Anr., 1984(4) SCC 240, which struck a different note thereon, seemed to have revived the issue and kept it buoying up in the legal stream. The counsel for the appellants, Mr. Sinha raised the point that decision in Patel’s case (supra) was no longer relevant as the said decision was rendered under the corresponding provision of the old code which has a subtle difference from the new provisions in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code and that difference makes all the change and inasmuch as the decision rendered by the Supreme court in Gopalakrishna’s case (supra) was rendered under the new Code, it is the decision rendered in that case should hold the field. The contention of Mr. B.B. Singh, counsel for the respondent was that the slight change made in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code vis-a-vis the corresponding provision in the old Code was not for deviating from the legal position settled by this Court in Patel’s case. After extracting Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code, the Supreme Court observed that “there could not be any dispute that if forgery was committed while the document was in the custody of a Court, then the prosecution could be launched only with a complaint made by that Court. However, if forgery was committed with a document which had not been produced in a Court, then prosecution would lie at the instance of any person. If so, will its production in the Court make all the difference, was an other question formed by the Apex Court.” If the clause is capable of two interpretations, the Supreme Court held that “narrower interpretation had to be chosen.” The reasons for choosing the narrower interpretation were then given by the Supreme Court. It was then observed that “it was difficult to interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) as containing a bar against initiation of prosecution proceedings merely because the document concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in the Court. Any such construction was likely to ensure unsavoury consequence. For instance, if rank forgery of a valuable document was detected and the forger was sure that he would imminently be embroiled in prosecution proceedings, he could simply get that document produced in any long drawn litigation which was either instituted by himself or some body else who could be influenced by him and thereby preempt the prosecution for the entire long period of pendency of that litigation.” The Supreme Court further observed that “it was settled proposition that if the language of a legislation was capable of more than one interpretation, the one which was capable of causing mischievous consequences, should be avoided.” As Section 340(1) of the Code was inter-linked with Section 195(1)(b), the Supreme Court thought it necessary to refer to that sub-section in the present context. After reproducing Section 340, it was held that “the same puts the condition that before the Court makes a complaint of “any offence referred to in clause, (b) of Section 195(1)” the Court has to follow the procedure laid down in Section 340. In other words, no complaint can be made by a Court regarding any offence falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code without first adopting those procedural requirements.” While dealing with the scope of the enquiry, the Supreme Court observed as follows and it is the extracted portion which has been relied by Mr. Sibal in support of his contention that the Court cannot take cognizance and launch prosecution against the petitioner.

11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in Court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other words, the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodian legis.

12. It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving forgery of document, if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and long before its production in the Court, could also be treated as one affecting administration of justice merely because that document later reached the Court records.”

24. Insofar as paragraph 11, as extracted above and which has been relied by Mr. Sibal, is concerned, it deals with the scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged under Section 340(1) of the Code which is to ascertain whether the offence affecting administration of justice has been committed. The offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in the custody of the Court. The observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 12, extracted above, in our view, only deal with the expediency of launching prosecution by the Court with regard to a document that might have been forged outside the precincts of the Court but ultimately produced on the court records. With regard to some forgeries, as observed by us earlier and as was before the Supreme Court in Sachidanand’s case (supra), it may not be expedient to launch prosecution by the Court but if the document straightaway affects the administration of justice, as in the present case, the enquiry as envisaged under Section 340 of the Code has to be made. It cannot be read from the observations of the Supreme Court, extracted above, that in no case whatsoever, where the document has been forged outside the precincts of the Court and then produced there, it would be inexpedient to hold an enquiry under Section 340 of the Code. If the meaning as suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner is to be given to the observations made by Supreme Court, referred to above, it would result in anomalous situations. In quite a few cases, the offenders would go unpunished. In a given case, an adversary to a party, which has forged a document, may not be interested at all to launch prosecution as it may not affect his substantive rights. Should forgery of a document in such matters go unnoticed and unpunished ? Insofar as the party is concerned, it is not interested in launching prosecution and insofar as the Court is concerned, it has no jurisdiction to launch prosecution. That cannot be the interpretation of Section 340 of the Code. To illustrate, one has not to go far as the facts of this case would demonstrate that if the Court is also not to take cognizance of the offence, then a serious offence, alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, would go unnoticed and unpunished. Insofar as adversary is concerned, it is only the State. A forged certified copy of the award so as to bring the appeal preferred by the claimants within limitation has been produced in the Court. If the Court was not to notice this fact, and take cognizance of the offence, the State, in all probability, would have never come to know about the forgery alleged to have been committed by the petitioner. In a given case, even if the State comes to know about the tampering of a certified copy of the judgment and decree, it may contest the matter only with regard to limitation and it may be wholly un-interested in launching prosecution against the forger. No exhaustive list of illustrations can be given, but to cite some, it may be noticed that if, while procuring an order so as to go on parole on the ground of marriage of his daughter or son, by a convict the invitation cards are forged, there being no marriage to be celebrated, who shall be an interested party to launch prosecution ? In a given case, State may launch prosecution, In the other, it may not at all be interested and rather may choose to contest the prayer for parole on the only ground that no marriage as such has been fixed. Further, an order ‘of grant of bail by the High Court may be forged and then produced before a Magistrate, who would be interested party to launch prosecution. In a given case, neither the complainant nor the State may ever come to know about such forgery having been committed. In Anr. given case, a false birth certificate is made by an employee nearing retirement and produced in a Court in a claim that he cannot be retired on a particular date, who would be interested party to lodge a complaint ? It may be mentioned that in number of cases, kind of forgeries, referred to above, have been noticed by this Court. The illustrations can be multiplied but there is no need to give any other illustration as the facts of the present case perhaps provide the best example where document forged straightaway affects the administration of justice and the forgery was such as could primarily be noticed by the Court and where it does not appear that the State ever thought of launching prosecution against the petitioner. That apart, as to whether the Court is debarred from taking cognizance and launching prosecution with regard to a document which has been forged outside the Court and then produced therein, was not before the Supreme Court in Sachidanand’s case (supra). The observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 12, as extracted above, in our view, do not spell a bar for a court to take cognizance and launch prosecution. Assuming, that the observations made in para 12, to some extent, support the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, in that case, the question that further arises is as to whether the said observations can be said to be law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, The questions for its answer as framed by the Supreme Court have already been noticed above. To reiterate, the question before the Supreme Court was as to whether prosecution could be maintained in respect of a forged document produced in Court unless complaint has been filed by the Court concerned in that behalf. In other words, the question before the Apex Court was as to whether the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would apply to such prosecution. The facts have already been noticed above. Suffice it to say here that a complaint, even though filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate and referred by him under Section 156(3) of the Code, ultimately resulted into registration of an FIR, and presentation of challan by the police before the Magistrate. The facts of the case as also the questions framed by the Supreme Court clearly suggest that the bar for a Court to lodge the complaint with regard to any kind of forgery, be it outside the Court or within the precincts of the Court, was not before if. it is conceded that it is neither desirable nor permissible to pick up a word or a sentence from the judgment of the Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete law declared by the Supreme Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. A decision of the Supreme Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of the Supreme Court.

25. As mentioned above, Mr. Sibal, learned counsel for the petitioner, besides relying upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Sachidanand’s case and a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Harbans Singh’s case (supra), has also relied upon other judgments. Time is now ripe to consider these judgments and to find out if the contention of learned counsel is supported by any of these judgments. The facts of Dr.S. Dutt v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 S.C. 523, relied by Mr. Sibal, reveal that Mr. Dutt as an expert witness by the defence in a Sessions Trial in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi. Dr. Dutt claimed to hold a diploma from the Imperial College of Science and Technology, London, to the effect that he had specialised in the subject of criminology. He was cross-examined, inter alia, about this claim by the District Government counsel. The Judge asked Dr. Dutt to produce all his academic diplomas and certificates for inspection. Dr. Dutt produced the aforesaid diploma and it was taken on file together with a statement. One Shyam Narain lodged a report at Police Station Hardoi alleging that Dr. Dutt had committed offences under Section 465/471 I PC in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi while giving evidence in Sessions Trial. On the facts, as have been mentioned above, it was held that “the offences of forgery of a document, as described in Section 463 Penal Code and of using such forged documents, if produced or given in evidence, by a person other than a party to a proceeding in a Court, did not require a complaint in writing of the Court concerned but prosecution in respect of offences under Sections 193 to 196, 199 and 200 committed in a judicial proceeding by a person (whether a party or not) required a complaint in writing of the Court before which the offence was committed or of the Court to which such Court was subordinate. Broadly, Section 465 deals with the offence of forgery by the making of a false document and Section 471 with the offence of using forged document dishonestly or fraudulently. Section 193 of the Code deals with the giving or fabricating of false evidence and Section 196 with corruptly using evidence known to be false. The gist of the offences in the first group is the making of a false document and the gist of the .offences in the second group is the procuring of false circumstances or the making of a document containing a false statement so that a judicial officer may form a wrong opinion in a judicial proceeding on the faith of the false evidence.” It was further held that “it was not permissible for the prosecution to drop a serious charge and select one which did not require the procedure under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the offence was under Section 196 IPC, a complaint in writing by the Court concerned was required. Before a complaint was made, the Court had to consider whether it was expedient in the interests of justice to order a prosecution. In the lesser offence no such complaint by the Court was necessary and obviously the lesser offence was chosen to by-pass the Court. As the offence in the present case did not fall within Section 465/471 IPC, the prosecution launched against Dr. Dutt could not be allowed to go on.” All that can be made out from the judgment relied upon by learned counsel is that the complaint in writing by the Court was necessary for prosecution of Dr. Dutt as the offence committed by him under Section 193 or 196 would certainly require launching of prosecution against him by the Court alone. Nothing as such is spelled out from this judgment which may even remotely suggest that the Court could not take cognizance and launch prosecution against Dr. Dutt with regard to forged documents, i.e., diploma and certificates etc.

26. The next judgment relied by Mr. Sibal is M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur and Anr., 1967 Crl.L.J. 528, in our view, does not deal with the question in hand at all. The appellant lodged a report with the police against the respondent charging him with commission of certain offences. During the pendency or the investigation by the police, respondent filed a complaint before the Magistrate against the appellant for commission of offence under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint of respondent. The evidence revealed that on the date of cognizance, no judicial order was made by any Magistrate in respect of report lodged by the appellant, though subsequent to cognizance respondent was arrested and charge-sheet was submitted to Court. The Apex Court held that “the question about legality of cognizance had to be judged in relation to date on which cognizance was actually taken and as on that date, there was no proceeding pending in Court or in relation to which offence under Section 211 was alleged to have been committed, the Magistrate was not barred from taking cognizance of complaint by the respondent by Section 195(1)(b). The said section contemplated only proceedings pending or concluded and not the one in contemplation.

27. Mr. Sibal has then relied upon Anr. judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 SC 1935. The question raised before the Supreme Court in the case aforesaid related to scope and effect of Section 195(1)(c) of the Old Code and its applicability to a case where a forged document had been produced as evidence in a judicial proceeding by a party thereto and prosecution of that party was sought for offences under Sections 467 and 471 I PC in respect of that document. The facts of the case would reveal that appellant Patel Laljibhai Somabhai had instituted a civil suit in the Court of Joint Civil Judge at Dholka against Vora Safakat Huseian Yusufali and his brother Vora Ahmed Huseian Yusufali for recovery of Rs. 2000/- on the basis of a cheque dated November 22, 1964 (alleged to have been given to him on June 27, 1963) under the signatures of the complainant Vora Safakat Huseian Yusufali on the Bombay Mecantile Cooperative Bank Ltd. Ahmedabad Branch. The defence in the suit was that the cheque in question and certain coupons which had been produced and relied upon in that suit, were forged and the suit was false. The suit was dismissed by the Joint Civil Judge, Dholka. The Court did not beleive the plaintiff’s story about the cheque. On November 16, 1965, the complainant filed a complaint in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Dholka against two accused persons for offences punishable under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. The two accused were Vora Saifuddin Akbarali and the appellant. Vora Saifuddin Akbarali was described in the complaint as the complainant’s sister’s husband, it was averred in the complaint that the complainant’s elder brother Ahmedbhai had started a business in milk in Ahmedabad and accused No. 1 was also dealing in milk. Ahmedbhai used to stay at the house of accused No. 1. The books, coupons and cheque books of the milk business had been kept at the residence of accused No. 1. That business was carried on till July, 1962 when it was closed and Ahmedbhai left Ahmedabad for Limbdi for staying there. The appellant had been appointed as the Commission Agent through accused No. 1 and milk was collected from various milkmen through him. When the business was closed on July 28, 1962, a sum of Rs. 231.10 remained to be paid to the appellant and nine cans of milk remained in balance with him A notice was given, in this connection after settling all the accounts and the appellant paid Rs. 200/- in cash to Ahmedbhai and thereafter nothing was due to the appellant. On November 30,1962 the defendants in the suit at the instance of accused No. 1 started a milk shop at Jamalpur and they used to stay at the house of accused No. 1 who was employed in the Mercantile Bank and through whom an account was opened with that Bank in the name of the defendants. Accused No. 1 used to utilise this account for himself and his brOrs.. Being a relative, accused No. 1 was trusted by the complainant and his brother and they used to act according to instructions of .accused No. 1. In June, 1962 accused No. 1 had come to Limbdi and asked for a loan of Rs. 15,000/- from the complainant’s father but this request was declined with the result that accused No. 1 got annoyed and threatened him with ruinous consequences. Thereafter, accused No. 1 conspired with the appellant to harm the complainant and his brother and father. Cheque books containing blank cheque forms but bearing the complainant’s signatures and all the books of accounts were at that time kept in the house of accused No. 1 where the complainant and the’ brother used to stay, It Is in this background that the accused No, 1 prepared a cheque for Rs. 2.000/- in his own handwriting on a blank cheque form bearing the complainant’s signatures and the appellant utilised that cheque. The appellant and accused No. 1 were, on these averments, alleged to have forged the cheque. Civil suit was then filed in which the cheque was used, knowing the same to be forged. The Magistrate found prima facie evidence that the appellant had fraudulently used in the civil suit the forged cheque in question. The Magistrate also found, prima facie evidence that accused No. 1 had committed an offence punishable under Section 467 IPC and appellant was liable under Section 34 I PC. The forgery of the cheque and the use of the forged cheque as genuine were considered by the Committing Magistrate to form part of the same transaction and the two charges could be tried together. The question of necessity of complaint by the Civil Court under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. was also raised in the committing Court but following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Mallappa, AIR 1937 Bombay 14, the Magistrate, held that provision to be inapplicable to the case. On behalf of the appellant, an application was then made in the Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge in which the trial was to be held praying for quashing the commitment proceedings because in face of Section 195(1)(c) no cognizance of the offence could be taken by the Court on a private complaint. As the Assistant Sessions Judge could not make any reference to the High Court, the case was withdrawn by the Sessions Judge to his own Court, who after hearing the application, referred the case to the High Court with a recommendation that the commitment order be quashed. The High Court, considering itself bound by the majority view in the case of Ali Bin Rajak, 1968(9) Gujarat LR 1 declined the recommendation and upheld the commitment order. In view of the conflict of judicial opinion amongst the various High Courts and even in the Gujarat High Court, leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court and that is why the matter came up before it. The Supreme Court observed that “the purpose and object of the Legislature in creating the bar against cognizance of private complaints in regard to the offences mentioned in Section 195(1) (b) and (c) was both to save the accused persons from vexatious or baseless prosecution spited by feelings of vindictiveness on the part of the private complainants to harass their opponents and also to avoid confusion which was likely to arise on account of conflicts between the findings of the courts in which forged documents were produced or false evidence was led and the conclusions of the criminal courts dealing with the private complaint. It was for this reason that the Legislature had entrusted the Court, whose proceedings had been target of the offence of perjury to consider the expediency in the larger public interest, of a criminal trial of the guilty party.” It was further held that “the offence about which the court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved private parties was clothed with the right to complaint might, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that Court, the-commission of which had a reasonably close nexus with the proceedings in that court so that it can, without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. Neither the facts of the case nor the law laid down by the Supreme Court in any way would support the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. As mentioned above, bar created under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is for a party and not for a Court. As per provisions of the unamended Section 195, the bar related to a document which had been forged by a party to any proceeding in any court and after amendment wherein the words “by a party to any proceedings” have been deleted, the bar operates even if a document has not been forged by a party to any proceeding.

28. Insofar as judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal and Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 299, next relied by learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, suffice it to say that all that was held therein was that “prohibition under Section 196(1)(c) was confined to a case where the alleged offence had been committed by a person’ after having become a party to the proceedings. “In order to attract Section 196(1)(c) it was further held that “the offence should be alleged to have been committed by the party to the proceeding in his character as such party, i.e., after having become a party to the proceedings.” It was further held that “if the forgery alleged to have been committed by the accused was prior to the commencement of the proceedings and not after they became parties to the proceedings, Section 195(1)(c) was not applicable at least in regard to offences under Sections 464, 467 and 468 and the Magistrate could take cognizance of the offences.”

29. In State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy and Anr., AIR 1981 S.C. 1417, 1981 Crl. LJ. 1019, then relied by Mr. Sibal, the accused had executed and got registered a sale deed in respect of certain mortgaged property by impersonating the real owner and thus committed an offence under Section 467 IPC. Anr. accused, the mortgagee, in whose favour the sale deed was registered, abetted the offence. The mortgagor filed a suit for redemption and subsequently filed a criminal complaint against both the accused. The fabricated sale deed was not put up in evidence at any stage of the suit for redemption filed by the complainant. On the facts, as have been mentioned above, it was held that “in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court was necessary under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. and an offence for which a complaint of a Court was necessary, under that sub-section, were committed, it was not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offence not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) should be upheld. But where an accused had abetted commission of forgery but the forged document was not produced in evidence in a suit against him, no cognizance could be taken against him under Section 193 Penal Code and, therefore, Section 195(1)(b) would not be attracted. The Legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. to the offences mentioned therein when committed by a party to a proceeding in that Court prior to his becoming such party.” From the facts of the said case, it is quite apparent that the same is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case.

30. The facts of Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, 1996(3) Recent CR 240, next judgment relied by Mr. Sibal, reveal that the respondent had laid the complaint for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section, 120B IPC with the allegations that the appellants had conspired and fabricated an agreement dated July 26, 1978 and forged the signatures of Smt. Dalip Kaur and on the basis thereof they attempted to claim retention of the possession of the remaining part of the house. The Magistrate had examined witnesses under Section 202 Cr.P.C. and ordered issue of process summoning the appellants to appear on September 23, 1983. The appellant filed a civil suit for an injunction to restrain Dalip Kaur from interfering with the possession of appellants and he produced the agreement dated February 21, 1984 which was said to have been executed and signed by Dalip Kaur. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application to quash the complaint on the ground of bar under Section 195 of the Code. The Magistrate and on revision the Sessions Judge dismissed the same. When the revision was filed in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, on a question of law ultimately the matter was referred to Full Bench which had answered the question against the appellant and remitted the matter to the referring Judge. The leaded Single Judge ultimately dismissed the revision, thus, leading the appellant to file an appeal in the Supreme Court. The only question that came up before the Supreme Court for consideration was as to whether the Magistrate was devoid of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. It was argued by learned counsel for the appellant that once the document had been produced before the Court, it was the civil Court that had seisin of the matter and it alone or an officer on its behalf had to lay the complaint in writing and the private complaint laid by the respondent was not maintainable. The criminal court, therefore, could not proceed with the trial. The appeal preferred before the Supreme Court was dismissed. It was held that “the bar against cognizance gets attracted only when original document was produced in Court and since the cognizance had already been taken, criminal court could not be debarred from proceeding with the trial.”

31. Mr. Sibal has also relied upon a Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Raja Kushal Pal Singh, AIR 1931 Allahabad 443. Raja Kushal Pal Singh was alleged to have conceived certain schemes and in pursuance of those schemes, brought into existence certain documents in order that he might establish a claim to the estate. His effort was to prove that he had been adopted by Lali Jas Kaur. Some documents were stated to have been brought into existence in 1898 and in 1905 Raja Kushal Pal Singh obtained by a gift the Kotla Estate from Lali Jas Kaur. The gift was supported by documents executed by all the persons believed to be next reversioners at the time. A suit, out of which two appeals arose, was instituted by one of the step-brOrs. of Raja Kushal Pal Singh and it was for partition of the estate. It was contended by Joginder Pal Singh plaintiff that the estate was really the property of his late father Umrao Singh and the deed of gift was really meant for Umrao Singh and Kushal Pal Singh was a benami holder for the whole family. An attempt was made to file these documents by summoning them through the defendant Mahendera Pal Singh, and these were brought into Court by the defendant Bhawanpal Singh. Learned Subordinate Judge who was trying the case, rejected the documents as being irrelevant. The documents were again put in when Raja Kushal Pal Singh came into the witness box but the Subordinate Judge again rejected them. The suit was decided and the parties to the suit filed separate appeals. When the appeals were heard, an application was made on behalf of Joginder pal Singh appellant in one case and respondent in Anr., for permission to file the documents sought to be produced in court below together with four Ors.. After some difference of opinion between the learned Judges, who heard the appeals, the documents were allowed to be put in. As the documents had not been proved by any handwriting of Raja Kushal Pal Singh and because it had not been proved that they or some of them had been brought about or procured by him, a question of taking further evidence in the appeal arose. However, with a view to avoid delay in the matter, the documents were admitted for the purposes of appeal alone.

It was admitted by the contesting counsel that the documents which were said to be in the handwriting of Raja Kushal Pal Singh were in his handwriting. The appeals were decided but no reference was made to the documents relied on for the purposes of the appeal by the party who produced them. However, Kushal Pal Singh was issued two notices to show cause as to why he should not be prosecuted for committing certain offences in respect of the documents. Learned Judges came to the conclusion that the proceedings should be dropped with respect to one document. But in respect of the other documents, which had been produced in the appeal and which purported to be certified copies of certain depositions, there happened to be a difference of opinion. Learned Judges, however, agreed that they could not proceed under Section 476 Cr.P.C. One of the learned Judges expressed the opinion that it was not open to him to proceed under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code independently of Section 476. The other learned Judge thought that these documents came within the purview of the said provisions of law, i.e., Section 195(1)(C) and except for a complaint filed by the Court, no prosecution could be entertained by a Magistrate. Owing to this difference of opinion the matter was put up before the larger Bench. The Full Bench, on the facts, as have been mentioned above as also difference of opinion between two Judges, observed that “if their answer to the question put before them be in the affirmative, it would be necessary for the Division Bench which issued the rule, to consider whether it would be in the interest of justice to lodge complaint under Section 195(1)(c). But they had nothing to do with that portion of the case nor had they anything to do with the question whether it was open or not to the learned Judges to proceed under Section 476 Cr.P.C. as on that point learned Judges were unanimous and that was, again, a matter not before them. The only question that the Full Bench was to answer was as to whether Section 195(1)(c) was applicable so as to render a complaint of a Court necessary before a prosecution for abetment of forgery could be lodged in respect of High Court Exs. 4 to 7 (documents referred to above) or any of them. It was held that “Clause (c) Section 195 would apply only to cases where the offence is committed by a party as such to a proceeding in any Court in respect of a document which has been produced or given in evidence in such proceedings”. To the contention of the party that Section 476 (340 of the new Code) may not be exhaustive and it may be open to a Court to file a complaint, although it may not be possible for it to file a complaint, the Full Bench commented that the same did not appeal to it and for various reasons. After so observing, the Full Bench held that “the power to file a complaint is given by the Criminal Procedure Code and this did not indicate existence of any inherent jurisdiction, except that of a High Court under Section 561-A (482 of the new Code)”.

The Full Bench also observed that “it was tolerably clear that a complaint, outside the provisions of Section 476, could not be filed by any civil, revenue or criminal court under its inherent jurisdiction”. The Court then observed that “as per Clause (c) of Section 195(h) the offence should be one which has been committed by a party to a proceeding and any offence which has already been committed by a person, who had not become a party till, say, 30 years after the commission of the offence, could not be said to have been committed “by a party” within the meaning of Clause (c)”. From reading of the judgment of the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, to the extent it has been relied by learned counsel for the petitioner, as mentioned above, we are of the opinion that all that can be said is that Section 195 and Section 340 of the Code have to be read together and if the offence is not the one which may affect the administration of justice, the Court should not take cognizance of the same and lodge a complaint. That apart, if the observations, as relied by learned counsel, by stretching the same, may mean that the Court shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever to hold the enquiry and lodge a complaint, whatever be the offence alleged against a person and even though it may straightaway affect the administration of justice, the observations of the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court are only an obiter as the precise question being dealt by us was not before it. A Division Bench of the Allabahad High Court itself in Channu Lal and Anr. v. Rex, AIR 1949(36) Allahabad 692, so held while dealing with the observations of Full Bench of Raja Kushal Pal Singh’s case (supra). Brief facts of Channu Lal’s case (supra) would reveal that “the Liquidation Officer, after rejecting the application of the applicants, ordered them to show cause within three days why they should not be prosecuted under Section 422 Penal Code. As no sufficient cause was shown, the Liquidation Officer ordered that the applicants be prosecuted. -He sent a complaint to Sub Divisional Magistrate. Against the order of Liquidation Officer, the applicants appealed to the Commissioner, who dismissed their appeal. The complaint was taken cognizance of by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. It was transferred and ultimately tried by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate who found the applicants guilty under Section 422 of the Penal Code. The applicants appealed to the Sessions Judge and the appeal was also dismissed. In the revision filed by them, one of the contentions raised was that the complaint could not be filed by the Liquidation Officer as a Court because the offence under Section 422 did not fall within the purview of Section 476 read with Section 195 Cr.P.C. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held that “it may be true that an offence under Section 422 is not included in the offences mentioned in Section 195(1) (b) or (c) and, therefore, the liquidation officer, acting as a civil or revenue court, could not under the provisions of Section 476 make a complaint for an offence which fell under Section 422. This circumstance, it was further observed, however, did not conclude the matter. Under Section 190 a Magistrate was competent to take cognizance of any offence”. While dealing with the Full Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court in Raja Kushal Pal Singh’s case (supra), the Division Bench observed that “the observations made by Mukerji, J. delivering the Full Bench judgment, that a court could file a complaint only under the provisions of Section 476 Cr.P.C. and that it had no inherent jurisdiction to file a complaint otherwise than in accordance with provisions of that section, even though may be binding upon them, was obiterdictum”. The question for decision before the Full Bench was whether Section 195(1)(c) was applicable so as to render a complaint of a Court necessary before a prosecution for abetment of forgery could be lodged in respect of High Court Exs. 4 to 7 or any of them. Exs. 4 to 7 were alleged to have been forged by a party to a proceeding long before the proceeding had started. The Full Bench held that “Clause (c) of Section 195 applied only to cases where an offence had been committed by a party as such to a proceeding in any court in respect of a document which had been produced or given in evidence in such proceeding and this being the law, the documents did not fall within the purview of Section 195(1)(c). Mukerji, J. expressed his view about Section 476 Cr.P.C., as quoted above, in answer to an argument that Section 476 was not exhaustive.”

32. Learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in Re: V. V L Narasimhamurthy, 1955 Cri.L.J. 716, last judgment relied by Mr. Sibal, has held that “where on the facts disclosed in the complaint two offences are made out, one, under Section 193 I PC, for which a complaint by Court is necessary and the other under Ss. ^467 and 471 IPC for which a complaint by Court is not necessary, the party should not be allowed to evade the provisions relating to a complaint by Court. In such a case the Court should not take cognizance of the complaint unless there was a complaint by a court as required by Section 195(1)(b)”.

33. Learned counsel representing the respondent-High Court, Mr. Lamba, has relied upon number of judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner to canvass that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) creates a bar for a party to lodge a complaint or prosecute an accused if the forgery is with regard to a document which has been forged in the precincts of the Court. To such kind of forgeries, the court alone, to the exclusion of the party, would have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and lodge a complaint against the accused. No bar for the Court to take cognizance and launch prosecution of a document forged outside the precients of the Court can possibly be spelled out from the language employed in Section 195(1)(ii), contends the learned counsel. He has also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Channu Lal’s case (supra) as also Emperor v. Nanak Chand, AIR 1943(30) Lahore 208 and Mehr Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Lahore 884. In Channu Lal’s case (supra), the Division Bench, by assuming that a court may not have jurisdiction to make a complaint otherwise than as provided in Section 476, further held that “the Liquidation Officer, in his capacity as a public officer, was not prevented by any rule of law from making a complaint if he considered that a party in a proceeding pending before him had committed an offence. As a public officer, it would be his duty to bring it to the notice of the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. With exception -to certain specified cases in which the law requires complaint to be made by particular individuals, any person may lodge a complaint about an offence having been committed by a person or may give an information to a Magistrate competent to try the same. The fact that the Liquidation Officer could not have taken any action under Section 476 in his capacity as a Court did not, in the opinion of the Division Bench, debar him from taking any action in his capacity as a public officer or authority. The complaint, therefore, could be validly taken cognizance of by the Magistrate concerned”. It was further held that “under clause (c) of Section 190 of the Cr.P.C., the Magistrate could have treated an invalid complaint, if the same was invalid, as an “information”. If a complaint was not a valid one, it did not cease to be an information and, therefore, could be treated as such under Cl. (c) of Section 190(1) and there was no bar for a Magistrate to treat an invalid complaint as an information under Section 190(1)(c) of the Code”. The Division Bench for its aforesaid observations, relied upon an earlier decision of the Allahabad High Court in Bilas Singh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925(12) Allahabad 737, yet Anr. judgment of the same High Court in Tara Singh v. Emperor, 1938 ALJ 528 and still an other judgment of the same High Court in Har Prasad v. Emperor,” 1947 ALJ 1.

34. As discussed above, neither the plain language employed in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) nor the purpose for which the said section was enacted by the Legislature, creates any bar for a Court to take cognizance and launch prosecution of a person who might have committed forgery of a document or of the offences as envisaged in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in his endeavour to canvass that a bar was created for the Court as well, as referred to above, placed reliance exclusively upon judicial precedents which have since already been commented upon. We find no bar for the Court to take cognizance and launch prosecution from the observations made in the judicial precedents which have been relied by learned counsel. That apart, Chapter XIV of the Code deals with conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings by the Court. Section 190 authorises the Court to take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer; or upon its own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. True, Section 190 of the Code is subject to the provisions of Chapter XIV which consists of Sections 190 to 199. Section 191 places a restriction on the power of the Court to proceed with the case, if the Court has taken cognizance of the offence under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 190 till such time the accused is informed that he is entitled to have the case inquired into or tried by Anr. Magistrate.

If the accused objects to further proceedings before the Magistrate taking cognizance, the case shall be transferred. If, therefore, a Magistrate has taken cognizance under Section 190(1)(c), it shall be subject to the right of the accused to be informed and his choice to go the case transferred to Anr. Magistrate. Chief Judicial Magistrate, by virtue of Section 192, after taking cognizance of an offence, may make over the case for inquiry or trial to any competent Magistrate subordinate to him. By virtue of Section. 193 of the Code the Court of an Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge shall not take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code and the Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge shall have to try the cases as the Sessions Judge of the division may, by general or special order, make over to him for trial. Section 195 has since already been discussed thread-bare. No clog is placed upon the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance of an offence, be it with regard to offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) or other offences. The clog is on the right of a party to lodge complaint of the kind of offences mentioned in Section 195, if the document as such has been forged in the precincts of the Court. Section 195 in other words, is an exception to the general rule that any one can move a criminal court for any offence committed against him or Ors.. Of the offences enumerated in the section, the Court alone, to the exclusion of the party, can take cognizance and prosecute the accused. Section 196 of the Code creates a bar for the Court to take cognizance of the offences punishable under Chapter VI or under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code, or criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, or any such abetment as described in Section 108-A of the Indian Penal Code till such time previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government has been obtained. The court also cannot take cognizance of an offence under Section 153-B of sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code, or a criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government or District Magistrate in writing to the initiation of the proceedings under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upward. Section 197 of the Code also places a restrain on a Court to proceed against any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, till such time previous sanction of the Central Government or State Government has been obtained. Section 198 also placed some restrains on the Court in respect of the offences punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence, with some exceptions mentioned in the said section itself.

By virtue of Section 199 of the Code no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code except on a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Some exceptions to this rule have, however, been provided. From the reading of Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that deals with the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings by the Court, we find no bar placed upon the Court as such to take cognizance of an offence or offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii). Section 190, as mentioned above, is only subject to the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Code. The Court cannot possibly read any fetters imposed upon it to take cognizance, not enumerated in Chapter XIV as that would completely negate ,the very purpose of Section 190 which in terms gives power to the Court to take cognizance upon an information received from any one or even on its own knowledge with regard to commission of any offence. Besides taking cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(c), the Court can also take cognizance upon an information received from any person other than a police officer as also upon receipt of a complaint of facts which constitute an offence. A “complaint” has been defined in Section 2(d) of the Code to mean “any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report”.

In the present case, the Registry of this Court, while checking the RFAs, had noticed tampering in the certified copies of the Award. There was, thus, a complaint before the Court, or in any case an information which amounted to commission of an offence. Section 190 of the Code was, thus, applicable and the Court was not debarred from taking cognizance of the offence which had come to its notice either on the complaint or on information given to it or by its own knowledge. In Bilas Singh v. King Emperor (supra), an Election Commissioner had sent a complaint purporting to act as a Court under Section 476 (340 of the new Code) and the validity of the complaint was questioned.

It was held that “although the complaint could not have been validly made under Section 476, nevertheless the Magistrate, who received the complaint, had jurisdiction to proceed under Section 190(1)(a) or Section 190(1)(c) of the Code”. In Tara Singh v. Emperor (supra), it was held that “although complaint in that case could not have been filed by the Civil Judge, as the offence was not covered by the provisions of Section 476 Cr.P.C., yet the Sub Divisional Magistrate, who took cognizance of the offence, could do so under the wide ambit of Section 190 Cr.P.C.”. It was further held that “such a complaint could be treated as a complaint by a public officer”. Har Prasad v. Emperor (supra), was a case in which a Commissioner, sitting as an election Judge under the Municipalities Act, had made a complaint. The election Judge was not a Court within the meaning of Sections 476 and 195 of the Code. It was held that “a complaint could nevertheless be entertained by the Magistrate under the provisions of Section 190(1)(a) of the Code”. In Emperor v. Rasool Ahmad, AIR 1947(34) Allahabad 173, similar view was expressed. In Ambika Sahi v. King Emperor, AIR 1948(35) Allahabad 80, it was held that “although a complaint made by a Small Cause Court Judge was defective, as it was found that the Judge had no jurisdiction to make it, yet it could be treated as information within the meaning of Section 190(1)(c) of the Code”. In Emperor v. Nanak Chand (supra), a person had put in an application for refund under Section 49 Stamp Act and subsequently had sworn an affidavit in support of the application. On finding that the application and affidavit were false, the additional District Magistrate, who was also the Collector, took proceedings against the person under Section 476 and made a complaint under Sections 193/420/511 IPC to the Magistrate. The Sessions Judge set aside the order on the ground that, the Additional District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to act under Section 476. While allowing the revision, the High Court held that “a complaint is defined in Section 4(h) Cr.P.C. as an allegation made to a Magistrate that an offence has been committed with a view to his taking action about it and on receiving such a complaint the Magistrate has full power under the law except in a few specified cases to take cognizance of any offence disclosed thereby. It does not appear to me that the Magistrate’s jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence on a complaint can in any way be affected by any illegalities which may have been previously committed by the person making the complaint. It is true that the learned District Magistrate as a Court is a creature of the statute and could only act under the Statute. That is why his proceedings under Section 476 in this case are illegal because there is no warrant for him to take them under the law. But it seems to me, the illegalities are confined to whatever could only be done under Section. 476, and cannot extend, as I have said above, to the acts of the trial Magistrate L Banwari Lal who had full jurisdiction to take cognizance on an allegation made to him in writing by Mr. Izzat Rai that an offence had been committed”.

35. From the discussion made above, we hold that, as mentioned above neither the plain language employed in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) nor the purpose for which the-said section was enacted by the Legislature, creates any bar for a Court to take cognizance and launch prosecution of a person who might have committed forgery of a document or of the offences as envisaged under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. We further hold that while taking cognizance of the offences of the type mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii), i.e., the documents that were forged in the precincts of the Court and not outside the precincts of the Court and then produced, and holding an enquiry as envisaged under Section 340, the Court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made. The forgery of a document has to be such that may affect the administration of justice. If the parameters contained in Section 340 are in existence, there will be no bar for the Court to take cognizance of the offences as mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) and launch prosecution against the accused. We further hold that there is no bar placed upon the Court, even remotely, to take cognizance of the offences that are spelled out in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code if the document has been forged outside the precincts of the Court and then produced in the Court. It may be desirable in such cases to still see as to whether prosecuting an offender would be expedient for the administration of justice but it is not sine qua non for initiation of proceedings against an accused that all parameters mentioned in Section 340 must be strictly meeted. We further hold that while holding an enquiry as envisaged under Section 340 of the Code, it is not necessary for the Court to observe in writing that it is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest, of justice that the enquiry should be made. Once the source of power to initiate the enquiry Is in existence, non-mention of the Section empowering the Court or recording in writing the reasons forming an opinion as shall, shall not be essential.

36. Before we may conclude this judgment, we would like to deal with Criminal Misc. Application No. 8628 of 1998 which has been filed during the course of arguments. The criminal misc. has been filed under Section 482 of the Code praying therein that the reference has become infructuous and, therefore, appropriate orders in that regard may be passed by this Court. After making reference of the orders passed by the learned Single Judge for deciding the matter by Full Bench as also order of Full Bench of three Judges, it has further been pleaded that the matter had been heard by five Judges and at one stage the judgment was reserved. Thereafter, Anr. Bench of five Judges was constituted and the judgment was again reserved. It his further been pleaded that since a Full Bench of five Judges is considering the correctness of judgment in Harbans Singh’s case (supra), which has, in turn, been approved by a judgment of the Supreme Court in Sachidanand Singh’s case (supra), no occasion at all now arises to consider the correctness of the Full Bench judgment in Harbans Singh’s case.

37. We need not have to make any comments on the constitution of Full Bench of five Judges on earlier occasions and judgment having been reserved by the said Bench. All that needs to be mentioned is that before, perhaps, judgment could be pronounced, some members of the Bench were not available having retired or otherwise. It is true that during the pendency of this matter, judgment of Supreme Court in Sachidanand Singh’s case (supra) has come wherein a part of the judgment rendered by Full Bench of this Court in Harbans Singh’s case (supra) re: narrower/wider scope, vis-a-vis unamended and amended Section 195 has been approved, it may be mentioned that it is only while dealing with the principle that there was no reason as to why the safeguard should not apply to the witnesses also, the Supreme Court approved the judgment of the Full Bench in Harbans Singh’s case. Besides, relying upon earlier judgments of the Supreme Court, 41st report of the Law Commission was also taken into consideration while dealing with the principle aforesaid.

38. It is also true that there is no need to examine the correctness of the judgment of Full Bench in Harbans Singh’s case (supra) as the question mooted in this case is not the one that was before the Full Bench in the said case. Even though such is the situation, would it be appropriate at this stage, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, to refer this case to a Single Bench, in a way declining the reference made by the three Judges of this Court to a larger Bench of five Judges. As mentioned above, the case has remained pending in this Court for over a decade at its very initial stages. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. came to be filed only when charges were framed against the petitioner by the concerned Magistrate. As per the case of the petitioner himself matter was heard by Full Bench of five Judges twice over and judgment reserved earlier. Before us, as well, full throttled arguments have been raised by learned counsel for the parties. Further, the question that has been raised in this case is of great importance and even if the Full Bench consisting of three Judges would have not thought of referring it to a larger Bench, with a view to examine the correctness of Full Bench judgment in Harbans Singh’s case, yet it was a case which should have been heard by a larger Bench. As has been elaborated above, there is no direct-precedent on the issue under discussion and such a question is likely to arise in number of cases. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not think that it is a stage when the reference made by three Judges to a larger Bench should be declined and it should be sent to the learned Single Judge.

39. Mr. Sibal, learned counsel for the petitioner, endeavoured to press into service other points taken in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the complaint and charge framed against the petitioner. We, however, do not wish to go into any other point as all other points taken by the petitioner in his petition can well be taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge before whom this case would now come up for final decision. It will be open for the petitioner to raise all other points before the learned Single Judge. We only hold that on account of ground that has been pressed into service before us, the complaint and charge framed against the petitioner cannot be quashed. As the matter has remained pending, as mentioned above, at very initial stages, for about twelve years by now, we order the office to list this petition before the learned Single Judge immediately.