ORDER
Gowri Shankar, Member (T)
1. The order of the Commissioner of Customs, Chennai, against which this appeal has been filed, was passed in pursuance of the order of the Tribunal passed on 9-1-1998. The questions before the bench in the appeal filed by the appellant against the earlier order of the Collector were the valuation of the plastic sheets that the appellant imported and its eligibility to exemption available in entry 32 of the table to notification 53/88. The Tribunal found in favour of the appellant as regards the value and referred the question as to the eligibility of the goods to the exemption to the Commissioner as it involved examination of technical literature and other aspects.
2. The relevant entry of the table to the notification provides exemption to plastic materials made out of scrap of plastic methyl falling in heading 39.01 to 39.14 on which customs duty has been paid. The Commissioner had declined to accept the contention on his finding that the goods were not made out of scrap of plastic. He says that no evidence had been produced to show that the goods were made out of scrap and on the contrary the evidence that was available showed the contrary.
3. The evidence that the counsel for the appellant says was produced before the Commissioner, consists of certificates issued by three suppliers of the goods in the United States of America, American Polyplastics Corp, Edison, New Jersey; Binaka Marketing Inc., also Edison, New Jersey; Lalasis Inc., Newark, New Jersey. Each of these certificates refers to the bill of lading and invoice issued and says, “The goods is manufactured out of scrap of plastics/waste. In reply to a question by us, the counsel for the appellant says that the suppliers were traders and not manufacturers of plastics. The question then arises as to the basis on which these traders have certified that the goods were manufactured out of scrap. To this, the only answer of counsel is “at this point of time this information cannot be furnished” because it was not asked of the importer earlier.
4. We find this argument strange. It is settled law that the benefit of establishing the eligibility to an exemption is upon the person who sets it up. This was the law when the goods were imported. It was therefore reasonable to expect of the importer that it substantiated the claim for exemption. It is not required that he be invited to do so. At no such stage therefore has the claim for the exemption been substantiated in satisfactory evidence. The certificates of the sellers are totally unacceptable. The claim for exemption therefore fails.
5. Appeal dismissed.