ORDER
Jyoti Balasundaram, Member (J)
1. At the outset, the counsel for the appellants represented that the arguments in E/A 3102/84-D cover the arguments in two other appeals, namely E/2118/85-D and E/2119/85-D which were transferred from the Southern Regional Bench. On the basis of his representation, we proceed to pass a common order in all 3 appeals.
2. Under Notification No. 130/83-C.E., dated 27-4-1983, the Central Government exempted sugar produced from the sugar year 1980-81 and thereafter by a new sugar factory or an expansion project sugar factory and cleared as additional entitlement under the incentive scheme from excise duty leviable thereon as is in excess of the amount of Rs. 197- per quintal.
3. The appellants filed a claim for refund-of duty on 13-10-1983 in respect of clearances of sugar effected during the period 26-6-1981 to 27-4-1983, which was rejected on the ground that Notification 130/83 was prospective in effect and would not apply to clearances effected before the date of its issue. The appellate authority held that a major portion of the claim was barred by limitation and further held that the notification did not operate with retrospective effect.
4. We have heard Shri J.V. Suryanarayanan, for the appellants and Shri Jai Narayanan Nair for the respondents.
5. This Tribunal in the case of Gangapur S.S.K. Ltd. v. C. C.E. Aurangabad [1988 (33) ELT 505) , has held, while interpreting Notification 193/82-C.E., dated 11-6-1982 that retrospectivity if any, must be gathered, if such intention is manifest from the language employed or the “context”. The Tribunal relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. CCE Cochin [1978 ELT J-375] which held, with reference to a Central Excise Notification under Rule 8 (i) that the rule making authority was not empowered to make a rule with retrospective effect. Notwithstanding this, the learned counsel urges us to accept his argument that there is no prohibition on retrospectivity of a notification and wishes us to draw an inference that the notification being a piece of beneficient legislation, is operative with retrospective effect i.e. with effect from the date of production of sugar. He contends that retrospectivity is not ruled out provided rights are not affected and that the clear intention of the legislature in issuing the notification is to give retrospective effect. In support of this contention, he cites before us the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1970 S.C. 385 (Income-Tax Officer, Alleppey v. M.C. Ponnoose and Ors.) and draws our attention in particular to para 5 of the judgment, which according to the advocate, infers that, there is no bar on retrospective operation of a Notification provided rights are not affected.
6. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel and carefully perused the judgment of the Supreme Court (Supra). The Supreme Court held that “Now it is open to a sovereign legislature to enact laws which have retrospective operation. Even when the parliament enacts retrospective laws such laws are – in the words of Willes, J. in Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) 40 LJ QB 28 p. 37-” no doubt prima facie of questionable policy, and contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.” The courts will not, therefore, ascribe retrospectivity to new laws, affecting rights unless by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature. The Parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognised limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But where no such language is to be found it has been held by the Courts that the person or authority exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye-law which can operate with retrospective effect.”
7. From the above, there is nothing to indicate that, in the case of beneficient legislation, retrospective effect can be granted. Such an inference cannot be drawn especially in the light of the judgment of the SC reported in 1978 ELT J-375 (Supra). We see no merit in the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellants.
8. We uphold the order of the lower appellate authority and dismiss these appeals.