ORDER
Ramachandriah, J.
1. This is a transfer petition filed under Section 24 C.P.C. by the first respondent in H.R.C.No. 10842/83 on the file of the 4th Additional Judge, Court of Small Causes, Mayohall, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Judge’) praying for withdrawal of the said case from the file of the trial Judge and transfer of the same to any other Court of Small Causes in Bangalore City for trial and disposal in the interest of justice and equity. The ground on which the petitioner has sought transfer of the said case is that the learned trial Judge is biased against him and he has got a reasonable apprehension that he may not get justice at the hands of the learned trial Judge if the said case were to be tried and disposed of by him as he is doing business in the shop from which his eviction is sought by deceased – first respondent V. Jayaram and his brother second respondent V. Shanmugam by investing all his money in his business and he is entirely depending upon the said business for his livelihood.
2. Legal Representatives (a) to (f) of deceased first respondent and the second respondent have opposed the said prayer of the petitioner. Third respondent Moosa is only a formal respondent as he is a co-respondent along with the petitioner in the trial Court.
3. Remarks of the learned trial Judge in respect of the allegations of bias made against him by the petitioner in paragraph-5 of the petition were called for. Accordingly, the learned trial Judge has narrated in his 12 page letter of remarks dated 18-6-1990 the manner and method adopted by the petitioner and the third respondent herein for delaying the conclusion of the trial of the 7 year old eviction petition pending on his file and has stated in the concluding portion of his letter that the allegations of bias made against him are far from truth and has added that in view of the allegations of bias made against him, the case may kindly be transferred to any other Court.
4. Sri. S.A. Mujeeb, learned Counsel for respondents-1 and 2, submitted that the allegations of bias made against the learned trial Judge are very uncharitable as the Order-sheet in H.R.C.10842/83 would disclose that he has given maximum latitude to the petitioner and his co-respondent and added that the petitioner has stalled further proceedings in the 7 year old eviction petition by filing this transfer petition on 5-10-1989 and obtaining an order of stay of further proceedings in H.R.C. 10842/1983 with the deliberate intention of delaying the decision in that case as far as possible and that apart, there are absolutely no merits or bonafides in the prayer of the petitioner and, as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed with costs.
5. As transfer is sought on the ground of bias against the learned trial Judge, it is necessary to know what amounts to “bias”. After quoting the celebrated and often repeated saying of Lord Heward, CJ in R v. SUSSEX JUSTICES, EX PARTE McCARTHY: (1969) 1 QB 577
“It is not merely of some importance, but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”.
Lord Denning has observed at page 87 of his Book entitled ‘THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW”, 1979 Edition, as under:
“In considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the Court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the Chairman of the Tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The Court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand: Nevertheless there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough. There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the Justice or Chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The Court will not inquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: “The Judge was biased.”
6. The grounds on which the petitioner is entertaining the belief that the learned trial Judge is biased against him are:
(1) that the Judge had refused his prayer for the appointment of an Engineer as Commissioner for local inspection of the premises in his occupation as he wanted to satisfy the Court that the allegations made by respondents 1 and 2 in their eviction was that they intent to remove some of the walls and convert the building suitable for their business by demonstrating that no wall can be removed because if any one of the walls are removed, the whole building will collapse. Therefore, the petitioner had to question that order by filing a revision before this Court and this Court directed the petitioner to adduce necessary evidence by examining a technical person as his witness;
(2) Although the petitioner had paid process requesting the Court to issue summons to an Engineer, he proposed to examine as a witness on his side, the office had not sent the summons to that witness but, still the Court refused to issue summons to that witness till the petitioner paid costs of Rs. 50/- to the other side for the laches on his part although there were no such laches;
(3) summons issued to that witness were taken to the witness by the process staff of the trial Court only on the previous day of the hearing and by that time the witness had gone to Delhi, but, the trial Judge refused to issue summons again to that witness and closed the case. At that stage, the petitioner had to approach this Court with a Civil Revision Petition and this Court directed the trial Court to issue summons to that witness and permit the Court to examine him; and
(4) on the death of the first respondent V. Jayaram an application was filed in the trial Court for bringing his L.Rs. on record by showing all his L.Rs. as 45 years old and when that fact was brought to the notice of the Court by the petitioner, the learned Counsel for the respondents filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. to amend the application by correcting the age of L.Rs. and the said application was allowed by the learned trial Judge although it was submitted before him that amendment of pleadings only can be made under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. but not of an Interlocutory application, still, the learned trial Judge allowed that application.
In view of these circumstances, the petitioner is having a reasonable apprehension that the learned trial Judge is biased and he may not get justice at his hands.
7. Sri S. Shekhar Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, vehemently highlighted the above mentioned grounds and urged that the said grounds are sufficient to order transfer of the case in question “in the ends of justice”. He also placed reliance on the following decisions:
(1) LALITA RAJYA LAKSHMI AND ANR. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR.
(2) THOUNAOJAM NINGOL INDRANI DEVI AND ORS. v. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF IMPHAL AND ORS. ; AIR 1958 Manipur 27
(3) DR. G. SARANA v. UNIVERSITY OF LUCKNOW AND ORS.;
(4) JAGATGURU SRI. SHANKARACHARYA JYOTISH PEETHADHISWAR SHRI SWAMI SWAROOPANAND SARASWATI v. RAMJl TRIPATHI AND ORS., and
(5) DR. SUBRAMANIAM SWAMY v. RAMA-KRISHNA HEGDE ILR 1980 KAR 182
8. In my opinion, the last of the above mentioned five decisions cited by Sri S. Shekhar Shetty, has no direct bearing on the facts of the case on hand as transfer of a suit is sought in that case under Section 25 C.P.C. which empowers the Supreme Court to transfer suits from a High Court or a Civil Court in one State to any other State if the Supreme Court is satisfied that an order under Section 25 is expedient in the ends of justice. It is significant to note that the words “in the ends of justice” are not used in Section 24 C.P.C. under which the petitioner has sought the transfer of the eviction case referred to above. The principles uniformly laid down in the other four decisions referred to above is that a case has to be transferred if there is reasonable apprehension of a party to a suit that he might not get justice in the Court where the suit is pending and in order to decide whether the facts and circumstances of a given case are sufficient to raise such a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party applying for transfer the Court should put
himself in such a party’s armchair. It, is observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. G. Sarana that:
“One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that in case of quasi judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposing parties must be one without bias by which is meant an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious towards one side or the other in the dispute.”
9. In the light of the observations made and the principles laid down in the above mentioned decisions, Sri Shekhar Shetty urged that this Court has to sit in the armchair of the petitioner and appreciate his grievance that the learned trial Judge is biased against him and, therefore, he is having a reasonable apprehension that he is not likely to get justice at the hands of the learned trial Judge if the case were to be decided by him.
10. In order to appreciate that contention, I have carefully gone through the Order-sheet in H.R.C. No. 10842/83 as the entire records of the case are received for reference and also the above mentioned grounds urged by the petitioner in his petition and the remarks offered by the learned trial Judge in his letter. But, I find it difficult to persuade myself to uphold the grievance of the petitioner that the learned trial Judge is biased against him. On the other hand, it looks to me that the petitioner has made such an allegation in order to make out a ground for getting the 7 year old eviction case transferred to some other Court in order to get a fresh lease of life to the case.
11. As rightly observed by the learned trial Judge in his letter of remarks, the case has come up before him for the first time on 4-6-1987. By then, one witness had been examined as P.W.1 in part on the side of the respondent-landlords on 17-9-1986. When the case came up before the Judge for the second time on 18-6-1987, learned Counsel for the respondents (petitioner-herein) prayed for time and, therefore, the case was adjourned to 6-7-1987. Again on 6-7-1987 also, learned Counsel for the respondents (petitioner herein) prayed for time to cross-examine P.W.1. So, the case was adjourned to 14-7-1987 as a last chance. From 14-7-1987, the case was adjourned to 21-7-1987. P.W.1 was further examined-in-chlef on 21-7-1987 but time was sought for his cross-examination and, therefore, the case was adjourned to 4-8-1987. On 4-3-1987, both parties submitted that the matter was likely to be settled and, therefore, the case was adjourned to 18-8-1987. Adjournments were sought again on 18-8-1987, 21-8-1987 and 14-9-1987 for reporting settlement. Therefore, the case was adjourned to 19-9-1987 either for reporting settlement or evidence. Settlement was not reported till 8-10-1987. Although P.W.1 was present on 8-10-1987, there was none to cross-examine him. Hence, P.W.1 was discharged and the case on the side of the petitioner was closed and posted for respondents’ evidence on 17-10-1987 and adjourned from that date to 7-11-1987 as the Judge was on leave. On 7-11-1987, learned Advocate for the petitioner herein filed an application I.A.III under Section 151 C.P.C. for recalling P.W.1. It was allowed and P.W.1 was ordered to be re-called for cross-examination on 28-11-1987. On 28-11-1987, petitioner’s Counsel prayed for time to cross-examine P.W.1. Therefore, the case was adjourned to 7-12-1987 and from that date to 14-12-1987 and again to 4-1-1988 on which date also petitioner’s Counsel prayed for time and, therefore, the case was adjourned to 16-1-1988.
12. Although P.W.1 was present in Court on 5-2-1988, 19-2-1988, 25-3-1988, 7-4-1988 and 26-5-1988, petitioner’s Counsel prayed for time to cross-examine P.W.1 on all the said hearing dates and his request was granted by the trial Court. Same request was repeated again on 1-7-1988 also and the said request is granted subject to payment of costs of Rs. 20/- which was paid promptly on that very day. Still, the petitioner’s Counsel successfully obtained adjournments for cross-examining P.W.1 on 8-7-1988 and 20-7-1988 although P.W.1 was present in Court on the said dates also. P.W.1 is eventually cross-examined on 25-8-1988. Case of respondents-1 and 2 herein was closed on 5-9-1988 after P.W.1 was subjected to further cross-examination on 5-9-1988 also. It is thus seen that recording of evidence of P.W.1, who was first examined on 17-9-1986, has come to an end nearly two years later on 5-9-1988 on account of repeated adjournments taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to cross-examine P.W.1. Case has been adjourned from 5-9-1988 to 12-9-1988 for the evidence on the side of 1st respondent (petitioner herein) in the eviction case. But, petitioner’s Counsel obtained adjournment on 12-9-1988 and again on 26-9-1988 and has then filed I.A.VI under Order 26 Rule 1 C.P.C. on 3-10-1988 for examining the petitioner on commission on the ground that he was sick. I.A.VI was allowed by consent and Commissioner has filed his report on 21-11-1988. On 1-12-1988, I.A.VII is filed by the petitioner under Order 26 Rule 9 C.P.C. seeking appointment of an Engineer as Commissioner for spot inspection. It is dismissed by a considered order on 7-12-1988. Petitioner questioned the correctness of that order by filing a Revision Petition before this Court in C.R.P. 54/1989. The said Revision Petition was dismissed by this Court on 5-1-1989, with the observations that the order of the trial Court was a discretionary order which ordinarily does not call for interference and, in any event, there cannot be any impediment for the tenants to adduce necessary evidence to establish the relevant facts and, as such, there was no valid ground to interfere with the impugned order. Two days earlier to the dismissal of the Revision Petition by this Court, petitioner has filed I.A.VIII for re-opening the case. It is allowed on payment of costs of Rs. 20/-. Petitioner’s case is closed on 2-2-1989 after examining two more witnesses on his side. On 10-2-1989, petitioner has filed I.A.X requesting to re-open his case again and I.A.X under Order 16 Rule 1 C.P.C. to summon a witness. Both the said applications are allowed on 10-2-1989 itself and the prayer of petitioner’s Counsel for issue of summons to the witness is granted. As the said witness was not present on 22-2-1989, evidence on the side of the petitioner is closed and adjourned for arguments on 1-3-1989. On 1-3-1989, learned Counsel for the petitioner has filed another application, which is wrongly mentioned as I.A.X, praying for recalling the order dated 22-2-1989. It is allowed on 1-3-1989 itself subject to payment of costs of Rs. 50/-by the petitioner. The said order reads as under:
“Since it is alleged that no summons was issued as ordered by this Court, the case is ordered to be re-opened. But, however, learned Counsel for the respondent did not make any representation about the fact alleged in the affidavit dated 22-2-1989. I.A.X deserves to be allowed only on payment of costs. Hence, I.A.X is allowed on payment of costs of Rs. 50/- costs of Rs. 50/- paid. Petitioner’s Counsel reports receipt. Issue summons to witness and await by 8-3-1989.”
13. Before adverting to the other developments in the case which have taken place subsequent io 1-3-1989, it is necessary to mention at this stage itself that ground Nos.1 and 2 mentioned in paragraph-6 supra, for seeking transfer of the case do not stand the test of scrutiny as the order of the trial Court on I.A.VI is upheld by this Court by dismissing the Revision Petition filed by the petitioner against that Order I.A.X is allowed on 1-3-1989 subject to payment of costs of Rs. 50/- in view of the learned Counsel for the petitioner not making any representation about the fact alleged in the affidavit in respect of what had transpired on 22-2-1989. Therefore, petitioner cannot make any justifiable grievance against the order dated 1-3-1989 also.
14. Third ground urged in support of the transfer petition is that the witness summoned by the petitioner could not be produced on the subsequent date of hearing as the process staff had taken the summons issued to him just on the previous day of the hearing date and by then, the witness had gone to Delhi. The order-sheet on 8-3-1989 discloses that no witness was present on the side of the respondent (petitioner herein) and the respondent and his Counsel were absent. It is for this reason that the trial Court has closed the evidence on the side of the respondent and posted the case for arguments on 13-3-1989. On 13-3-1989, learned Counsel for the petitioner herein has filed an application wrongly mentioned as I.A.XI to recall the order dated 8-3-1989. The said application is allowed on 13-3-1989 itself subject to payment of costs of Rs. 50/- as the learned trial Judge was of the opinion that the petitioner was not diligent in prosecuting his case. In my opinion, no justifiable grievance can be made by the petitioner against that order in the background of the dilatory tactics adopted by him on the previous hearing dates. Therefore, the above mentioned third ground cannot also stand the test of scrutiny.
15. Regarding the 4th ground, what was sought to be amended by the respondents herein is the amendment of the ages of the Legal Representatives of deceased first respondent which had been by mistake mentioned as 45 years in respect of all the Legal Representatives. There was no justification for the petitioner to oppose that application as it was an inconsequential amendment. In my opinion, no grievance of bias can be made against the learned trial Judge on the technical ground that amendment of Interlocutory application cannot be granted under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. Therefore, the 4th ground urged in support of the transfer petition is also meritless.
16. It is seen from the passage in Lord Denning’s book “The Discipline of Law” extracted in paragraph-6 supra that it is only the apprehension which right minded persons entertain against a Judge that can be regarded as a ground for holding that the Judge is really biased, that mere surmise or conjecture is not enough and there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the Judge favoured one side unfairly at the expense of the other. So tested, I am of the opinion that all the four grievances complained of by the petitioner in the instant case against the trial Judge are baseless.
17. In my opinion, it would result in tarnishing the image of the Subordinate Judiciary in general and demoralising the Judicial Officer in particular if transfer of cases is ordered on unsustainable grievances of the nature aired by the petitioner in the instant case. Therefore, I am of the view that of the transfer petition deserves to be dismissed notwithstanding the request made by the learned trial Judge towards the end of his letter of remarks that the case may be transferred to any other Court in view of the allegation of bias made against the petitioner although there is no truth in the allegation.
18. However, I would like to caution the learned trial Judge to dispose of the eviction case purely on its merits without even unconsciously entertaining any bias or prejudice against the petitioner in the background of uncharitable allegations the petitioner has made against him in the transfer petition. It is also impressed upon the petitioner to enable the trial Court to dispose of the 7 year old case expeditiously without putting forth any further obstacles and to seek justice with clean hands on the merits of his defence.
19. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed with costs of respondents-1 and 2.