ORDER
G. Sankaran, Sr. Vice-President
1. The captioned appeal was heard by this Tribunal on 13-7-1987 and disposed of by Order dated 13-8-1987, 1987 (32) ELT 80 (Trib.). The present application has been moved by Shri Sudarshan Lal Aheja, Counsel for National Textile Corporation (the appellants) for review/rectification of the mistake pointed out therein. We have heard Shri S.L. Aheja, counsel for the petitioners and Smt. Saxena, Sr. D.R. for the respondent.
2. The mistake pointed out is this. Ground No. 5 in the Memorandum of Appeal, regarding which arguments had been submitted during the course of the hearing, has not been discussed and a finding recorded thereon in the Tribunal’s order. On checking up the records, we find that it is so. Accordingly, we have to rectify this mistake apparent from the record in terms of Section 129B(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.
On a consideration of the submissions of both sides, we direct that the following paragraph shall be inserted as paragraph 7 in our Order No. 633/1987-D dated 13-8-1987. This paragraph 7 should be inserted after the sentence :
“On 1-1-1979, the pre-existing exemption Notification No. 25 dated 31-1-1978 was not in force, it having lapsed on 31-12-1978”
and before the last two sentences of paragraph 6 (p. 5) as it exists at present :-
“7.1 Ground No. 5 in the Memorandum of appeal reads as follows :-
“Because the documents are to be deemed to have been filed on 31-12-1978 as the same was Sunday and the next day was to be taken to be the day of limitation for filing the documents.”
7.2 With reference to the above ground, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants was that if the date of filing of the bill of entry for clearance of the goods for home consumption was the relevant date for determination of the applicable rate of duty, then, the appellants would/could have filed the bill of entry on 31-12-1978. But it could not be done because that day was a holiday on account of it being Sunday. The submission of the learned Sr. D.R. for the respondent, however, was that the provisions of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act (on which the counsel for the appellants was placing reliance) were not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7.3 We have given careful consideration to the submissions of both sides. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads thus :-
“10. Computation of time – (1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open :
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877) applies.
(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.”
The master of the vessel (or his agent) is required to deliver to the proper officer of customs an import manifest within 2k hours after arrival of the vessel. This is in terms of Section 30 of the Customs Act. The Section also provides that in the case of a vessel the import manifest may be delivered to the proper officer before the arrival of the vessel. It further provides that if the proper officer is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not delivering the import manifest within 2* hours after the arrival of the vessel, he may accept it at any time thereafter. This shows that while the normal rule is that the import manifest shall be delivered within 2* hours after arrival of the vessel, there is provision for delivering such manifest either before the arrival of the vessel or after the expiry of the said period of 2* hours. In the present case, it is the appellant’s contention that the vessel entered the territorial waters on 18-12-1978 and that it got berthed in the Anchorage late in the evening of 30-12-1978. It further appears that the steamer agents got the necessary papers from the master of the vessel on 31-12-1978 but the papers could not be filed on that day since it happened to be a Sunday, a closed holiday. Accordingly, the agents filed the papers in the Customs House on 1-1-1979. As earlier noted, Section 30 of the Customs Act itself provides for delayed submission of the import manifest if there is sufficient cause for not delivering it within the stipulated 24 hours. The intervention of Sunday could perhaps be sufficient cause for not delivering the manifest within the stipulated 24 hours. In view of this specific provision, the question of invoking Section 10 of the General Clauses Act does not, in our view, arise because it is not as if the limitation for filing the manifest was expiring on Sunday and the statute (the Customs Act) did not provide for this contingency. In any event, the relevance of this to the appellants’ case has not been explained. Insofar as the appellant was concerned, he had nothing to do with the filing of the import manifest. What he was required to do was to present to the proper officer a bill of entry for home consumption or warehousing in the prescribed form in terms of Section 46 of the Customs Act. There is no limitation prescribed for the purpose. In fact, Sub-section 3 of Section 46 provides that the Bill of Entry may be presented at any time after the delivery of the import manifest, provision being also made empowering the Collector to permit filing of the bill of entry even before the delivery of the import manifest in special circumstances. It is not as if, in the present case, the appellants were under a statutory obligation to file a bill of entry before the period expiring on 31-12-1978, a Sunday. In these circumstances, we are of the view that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
7.4 As noted elsewhere in the order, the actual date of filing of the bill of entry is not clear from the record but it is not the appellant’s case that the Bill of Entry for clearance of the goods for home consumption was presented after the date of entry inwards of the vessel by which the goods were imported. The entry inwards of the vessel was admittedly granted on 1-1-1979. Therefore, in terms of Section 15 of the Customs Act, it is this date which is relevant for determination of the applicable rate of duty.”
We also direct that the last two sentences of the order as it reads at present shall form para 8 and reads as follows :-
8. “In the circumstances, we hold that the impugned order is correct and we uphold the same. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal.”