ORDER
V.K. Jhanji, J.
1. Ejectment of the petitioner has been ordered from the shop in dispute on the ground that the building in dispute has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation.
2. Shop is possession of the petitioner is an integrated part of a building which is constructed in an area of less than 200 Sq.yards. There are three shops on the ground floor and two rooms behind the said shops. Four rooms are on the first floor of the building. Both the Authorities below on the basis of evidence on record, including that of building expert, have found that substantial and integrated part of the building has already fallen down and the rest is likely to fall at any time. It has come in evidence that two rooms on first floor and a room on the ground floor have already fallen down. It has further come in evidence of building expert that the building has several cracks and several leakage points. The battons of the roof have been eaten up by white ants causing loss of strength and leakage through the roofing. Building expert has also found that through these cracks, water was leaking, causing further damage to the structure. The batton of back-room on ground floor are bending downwards and can fall at any time. Report of the building expert produced by the petitioner was not believed by the Authorities below as the Authorities found that he had not given his report in regard to the shop of the petitioner. However, in his cross-examination, he admitted that there are some holes on the back-portion of the building and there are big holes which have resulted in fall of 2/3 rooms. He admitted that the stair-case was in a bad condition. The appellate Authority also took into consideration the notice issue to one of the landlords for demolition of part of the building which was lying in dangerous condition. Notice served by the Municipal Corporation has revealed that side and back walls of the first floor are in dangerous condition. Joint between ceiling and wall is full of cracks and the wall of the stairs-case is in dangerous condition. The appellate Authority thus found that there is massive evidence on the file to show that the building as a whole is in a dilapidated condition and three rooms have fallen down. As the file of the Rent Controller has summoned at the motion stage, I have gone through the report of the building expert relied upon by the Authorities below and also the photographs which have been exhibited and placed on the file and find that the finding recorded by the Authorities is not to be interfered with.
3. Faced with this situation, counsel for the petitioner cited a judgment in M/s Sant Ram Das Raj Kalka v. Karam Chand Mangal Ram, (1962)64 P.L.R. 758 (F.B.), to contend that the definition of word ‘building’ in Section 2(a) of the East Punjab Urban rent Restriction Act only concerns the building which has been let. In other words, if the shop in occupation of petitioner has not become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, then ejectment of the tenant cannot be ordered. In M/s Sant Ram’s case (supra), definition of ‘building’ was considered in the context where the premises were required by the landlord for his own use and occupation and thus, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. The proposition put forth by the counsel for the petitioner was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sampran Kaur and Anr. v. Sant Singh and Anr., AIR 1982 P&H 245, and it was held that “the word ‘building’ in Section 2 is not in terms absolute but is subject to contextual limitations. The very opening part of the said section makes it explicit that the definition is to apply only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or the context. Consequently the use of the word “building” in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) has to be viewed in its particular textual context and not with any inflexible absoluteness of the literal terms of cl.(a) of Section 2. Therefore, it is possible to construct the word “building” as used in Section 13 (3)(a)(iii) to include the integrated larger “building as a whole rather than the part thereof demised to a particular tenant alone.” The judgment in Sampran Kaur’s case (supra) was noticed by the Apex Court in Piara Lal v. Kewal Krishan Chopra, AIR 1988 SC 1432. Counsel for the petitioner also contended that in the case before the Apex Court in Piara Lal’s case, the order of the High Court whereby ejectment was ordered on the ground that building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, was set aside and so, this judgment in a way supports the case of the petitioner and not of the respondents. On going through the judgment, I find that the order of the High Court was set aside by the Apex Court as it was found that in the entire building, the roof of one room in the rear side had fallen down and that too had been replaced by the tenant after obtaining orders under Section 12 of the Act. It was in these circumstances that ejectment was not ordered. In the present case, the substantial portion of the building has already fallen down and the finding in this regard by the Authorities below being in consonance with evidence on record is not to be reappreciated in revisional jurisdiction. The scope of High Court in revisional jurisdiction was considered by the Apex Court in Dev Kumar (Died) through LRs. v. Smt. Sworn Lata and Ors., (1996-2)113 P.L.R. 391 (S.C.). Their Lordships of the Apex Court opined “the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 15(5) would entitle the Court to examine the legality and propriety of a conclusion of the Appellate Authority and is thus much wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it has to be exercised subject to the well known limitations inherent in all revisional jurisdiction and cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. This being the position, unless there is a perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority or unless the Appellate Authority has arrived at a conclusion which on the materials, no reasonable man can come, the High Court will not interfere with the same.”
4. Consequently, this revision petition is to be dismissed. It is so ordered. However, petitioner is allowed three months’ time to vacate the premises provided he deposits the entire arrears of rent, including that of three months, within one month from today and continues to deposit the future rent by the 10th of each month.