JUDGMENT
Jaspal Singh, J.
(1) Between the period 1967 and 1986 Mohd. Anis was involved in as many as nine cases out of which one was under the Arms Act while the remaining under the Indian Penal Code. He was acquitted in all excepting one under section 325 read with section 34 of the Penal Code which was registered in June 1986 and which is still pending disposal. He was also proceeded against twice under section 107 read with section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure firstly in the year 1989 and thereafter in March, 1992. He was discharged in both. However, in November, 1992 yet another proceeding under section 107/151 of the Code was initiated which is pending disposal. Thus, in the year 1992 he was facing trial in a ease registered in the year 1986 besides proceedings under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That very year an order was passed by which history sheet of the petitioner was opened and his name was entered in Register No. 10 of Police Station Chandni Mahal besides his being placed on surveillance. The petitioner seeks quashing of the said order.
(2) History sheet is opened under the Punjab Police Rules 1934. Rule 23.9 (2) provides: "A history sheet may be opened by, or under the written orders of, a police officer not below the rank of Inspector for any person not entered in the surveillance register who is reasonably believed to be habitually addicted to crime or to be an aider or abettor of such persons." (3) Can it be said, on the basis of the material placed before us and as referred to in the introductory paragraph of this order that the petitioner is "habitually addicted to crime."?
(4) The order of opening a history sheet and an order of surveillance is essentially a precautionary measure and has to be based on the past conduct judged in the light of surrounding circumstances. The past conduct must, however, be of such a nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn that the person concerned is habitually addicted to crime or to be an aider or abettor of such person. “Habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently” and implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. If this be the test, we fail to see how the past acts of the petitioner provide any index of his being habitually addicted to crime. He had been acquitted in six out of seven cases long before the impugned order. In the year 1992 he was facing trial in only one case and that too of the year 1986. We fail to see how one solitary case registered almost six years before the passing of the impugned order could possibly persuade any reasonable person to reach the satisfaction that the petitioner was habitually addicted to crime. There being no material to show that the petitioner was persistently engaged in a series of criminal acts and the cases in which he was involved being too remote in matter of time and having ended in acquittal or discharge, no inference of habit can be justifiably raised.
(5) The impugned order has the effect of impairing the image of the person and interfering with his dignity and honour. Rule 23.9 (2) thus must be applied with circumspection, rationally, reasonably and on relevant materials. Unfortunately, the impugned order does not stand up to this test. The writ petition is thus allowed. The history sheet and the entry of the petitioner’s name in the surveillance register is quashed.