ORDER
B. Sudershan, Reddy, J.
1. This is an application filed under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash all further proceedings in C.C.No. 255 of 1999 on the file of the IXth Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The petitioner is shown as the fourth accused. He is a Police Officer.
2. Before adverting to the question as to whether the proceedings of the criminal Court can be quashed by this Court, it may be necessary to notice few relevant facts.
3. One Ch. Sudharshan Gupta the de facto complainant filed complaint Section 190(c) read with Section 200 of Cr. P.C. before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad against the petitioner and six others. In the said complaint, it is inter alia stated that accused Nos. 1 and 2 are the proprietors of M/s. Raki Industries situated at Kakinada, the third accused is the employee of the industry owned by accused No. 1 and 2. Accused No. 4, 5 and 6 are the Police Officers attached to Sarpavaram Police Station, Kakinada and accused No. 7 is the Car driver of Ambassador car bearing No. AP-16-D-5533 who is alleged to have driven the vehicle at the time of commission of the offence.
4. The de facto complainant was appointed as Representative-cum-Commission Agent of the said Industry manufacturing plants protection equipments for collecting orders for the sale of products of the Industry. Some differences arose between the de facto complainant and accused 1 and 2 with regard to payment of commission and other payments. On 3-10-1994 the accused Nos. 1 and 2 issued a letter of cancellation of services of the de facto complainant and the complainant having received the same sent reply demanding settlement of issues. It is alleged that an amount of Rs. 16,00,000/- is due from accused No. 1 payable to the complainant. In order to avoid the payment, the accused are alleged to have hatched a criminal conspiracy and pursuant to the same, the accused planned to kidnap the de facto complainant. It is alleged that on 31-10-1994 at about 10.30 p.m. while the complainant was proceeding to his house, accused No. 3, 4 and 6 surrounded the complainant and by putting pistol to the point of his head, threatened the complainant not to raise any noise and follow them. The de facto complainant was pushed into the back door of the Ambassador car and all the accused 3, 4 and 6 also got into the car and locked the doors and directed the accused No. 7 to start the car and drive the same. The car proceeded towards Vijayawada high way. The de facto complainant was told by Accused No. 3, 4 and 6 that he would be taken to Kakinada to the house of accused Nos. 1 and 2. Accused. No. 4 is alleged to have threatened the de facto complainant saying that the complainant should agree and accept for the settlement of accounts with accused Nos. 1 and 2 as per the terms directed by the accused Nos. 1 and 2. Accused No. 4 further threatened the complainant saying that he should follow them without creating any problem or else they will implicate the complainant in serious criminal cases and they even go to the extent of killing him 011 the pretext of Encounter. On the way of Kakinada, the vehicle was stopped at different places in Vijayawada town and the de facto complainant managed to contact a stranger passer by and gave his identity card and Rs. 100/- and asked the stranger to inform to his house on phone that he was kidnapped by the accused. The said stranger gave message to the complainant’s house about the kidnapping.
5. The de facto complainant is alleged to have been taken to various unknown places in that night and to police guest house, Kakinada. On 2-11 -1994 the accused No. 1 along with accused Nos. 3, 4 and 5 came to the guest house and demanded the complainant to execute a letter stating that he has settled the amounts with the company of accused Nos. 1 and 2 and that there are no further claims whatsoever. The de facto complainant refused to execute the said letter. Then the accused No. 5 threatened the complainant that if he did not oblige them, the complainant has to face serious consequences. It is alleged that the complainant was in confinement and shifted to different places on 2nd, 3rd and 4th November, 1994. He was shifted to Police Station, Sarpavaram, Police Guest House and the house of accused 1 and 2 and also to other places. It is alleged that on 5-11-1994 he was taken to Sarpavaram Police Station and in the police station, on the instructions of Accused No. 5 the accused Nos. 4 and 6 and other constables physically tortured the complainant. Apprehending danger to his life, the de facto complainant finally agreed to do whatever the accused wanted in the matter. In the mid- night, the complainant was taken to the house of accused Nos. 1 and 2 and in the presence of Accused Nos. 4, 5 and others the complainant, on dictation of accused No. 1 under threat and coercion drafted a document on a stamp paper furnished by Accused No. 1 stating that the complainant is due a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- to accused Nos. 1 and 2 company. The complainant signed the said document. He was again taken to Police Guest House. It is alleged that unable to bear the physical and mental torture and agony of those six days, the complainant in desperation attempted to commit suicide in the Police Guest House by cutting his blood vessels on his right hand and wrist, and due to the bleeding, the complainant developed giddiness and went into semiconscious condition. He was shifted to a private clinic near Police Station, Sarpavaram and after treatment the complainant was shifted to Sarpavaram Police Station. On 6-11-1994 the accused Nos. 4 and 5 in collusion with accused No. 1 fabricated a false case against the complainant under Section 420 of I.P.O. and produced him before the Judl. Magistrate of First Class, Kakinada and subsequently the complainant was enlarged on bail. The relatives of the complainant, namely, Raja Kishan, Sharma and others went to Kakinada and found the complainant in the police station on 4-11-1994 and they approached a local Advocate and got issued a Telegram to the Station House Officer, Sarpavaram Police Station and the accused No. 1, one G. Purushotham Rao a friend of the complainant is. alleged to have reached Kakinada and met accused Nos. 1, 4 and 5 and enquired about the complainant and the accused No. 1, 4 and 5 have admitted that the complainant is in their custody and unless the complainant settles the dispute as per their directions, they would not leave him. The said Purushotham Rao thereafter met the Superintendent of Police, Kakinada and submitted a representation requesting the Superintendent of Police for release of the complainant.
6. In the meanwhile, the relations of the complainant reported the matter to Police Marredpally about the missing of the complainant from 31-10-1994 upon which the police registered a crime under the heading “a man missing”. On 9-11-1994 after returning to Secunderabad the complainant approached the Police of P.S. Marredpally and lodged a complaint narrating the entire facts against the accused from the date of kidnapping till his returning back to Secunderabad. The Police, Marredpally refused to take action. In the circumstances, the de facto complainant filed a complaint before the learned Magistrate which was referred to C.B.C.I.D. for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C..
7. The C.B.C.I.D. upon receiving the, reference from the learned Magistrate registered a case in Crime No. 57 of 1995 on the file of Marredpally Police station and took up the investigation. The Police having investigated the crime filed the charge sheet against A1 to A6 for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 343, 365, 368, 384 and 387 of I.P.C. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the same in C.C.No. 255 of 1999. It is that proceeding, which is sought to be quashed.
8. Indeed, if the allegations are true, they reveal the commission of any serious crime by the accused punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. It is true, it is neither possible nor desirable at this stage to make any comment about the truth or otherwise of the allegations levelled against the accused in the charge sheet, lest it may cause avoidable prejudice.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the prosecution initiated against the petitioner is barred by limitation under Section 53 of the A.P. (Andhra Area) District Police Act, 1859 (for short ‘the Act’). According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the prosecution shall have to be commenced within three months after the act complained of against the Police Officer for having done or intended to be done, under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code.
10. Learned Senior counsel Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy appearing on behalf of the de facto complainant submits that by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the peitioner herein was doing or intending to do under the provisions of any law; the commission of crime and taking the law into one’s hand cannot be treated as doing anything or intended to be done under the provisions of the Act or under the provisions of any other law. No law confers power upon any police officer to take the law into their own hands and commit the crime. This precisely is the submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the de facto complainant. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel that the prosecution initiated against the petitioner also does not suffer from any legal infirmities. In fact, Section 53 of the A.P. (Andhra Area) District Police Act, 1895 has no application to the facts on hand.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a Judgment of this Court in R. Meeraiahv. State of A.P., 1997 Cri LJ (NOC) 258. A learned single Judge of this Court held that Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 when read in light of Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 certainly applies to the prosecutions under Penal Code.
12. In K. Venkararamana Reddy v. A. Radha, (1990) 2 Andh LT 500 : (1991 Cri LJ 498), This Court in categorical terms held that Section 53 of the Act would not be applicable when the act complained of against the Police Officer do not relate to discharge of their official duty. Therefore, the decision does not support the case of the petitioner.
13. However, there is no further need to dilate on the subject, in view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court in The State of A.P. v. N. Venugopal, AIR 1964 SC 33 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 16). It is observed by the Supreme Court as follows (Paras 12, 13, 14 and 18) :
The effect of Section 53 of the Police Act is that all prosecutions whether against a police officer or a person other than a police officer (e.g., a member of the Madras Fire Service, above the rank of a fireman acting under Section 42 of the Act) must be commenced within three months after the act complained of, if this act is one which has been done or intended to be done “under” any of the provisions detailed above. The protection of Section 53 is not confined however only to acts done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Police Act. It extends to acts done or intended to be done under the provisions of any other law conferring powers on the police. One such law is the Code of Criminal Procedure which confers numerous powers on the police in respect of arrest, search and investigation. Among other laws conferring powers on the police may be mentioned the Opium Act, the Excise Act, the Petroleum Act, etc.
Any prosecution in respect of any act done or intended to be done under the provisions of any of these laws has also to be commenced within three months of the act complained of. It is clear that if in any of these cases the prosecution is commenced beyond three months after the act complained of, it will be the duty of the Courts to dismiss the same. But it is equally clear that unless the act complained of appears to have been done or intended to be done “under” the provisions of the Police Act or of the other laws conferring powers on the police the protection of Section 53 will not be available. Thus, if the prosecution is for an offence under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code said to have been committed by the act of closing a street or passage in or near which a fire is burning in exercise of powers under Section 42 (b) of the Police Act, or for an offence under Section 426 of the Indian Penal Code said to have been committed by the pulling down of a house for the purpose of extinguishing a fire, under Section 42(c) of the Police Act, the prosecution must fail unless brought within three months of the act complained of. So also if a Police Officer is prosecuted for an offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code said to have been committed in making an arrest, the prosecution must fail unless commenced within three months of the act complained of.
It is easy to see that if the act complained of is wholly justified by law, it would not amount to an offence at all in view of the provisions of Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code. Many cases may however arise where in acting under the provisions of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police the police officer or some other person may go beond what is strictly justified in law. Though Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code will have no application to such cases, Section 53 of the Police Act will apply. But Section 53 applies to only a limited class of persons. So, it becomes the task of the Court, whenever any question whether this section applies or not arises to bestow particular care on its decision. In doing this it has to ascertain first what act is complained of and then to examine if there is any provision of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police under which it may be said to have been done or intended to be done. The Court has to remember in this connection that an act is not “under” a provision of law merely because the point of time at which it is done coincides with the point of time when some act is done in the exercise of the powers granted by the provision or in performance of the duty imposed by it. To be able to say that an act is done “under” a provision of law, one must discover the existence of a reasonable relationship between the provisions and the act. In the absence of such a relation the act cannot be said to be done “under” the particular provision of law.
The High Court fell into the error of thinking that whatever a police officer does to a person suspected of a crime at a time when the officer is engaged in investigating that crime should be held to be done in the discharge of his official duties to investigate and as such under the provisions of the law that imposed this duty on him. This view is wholly unwarranted in law (Emphasis is of mine)
14. Thus the question that arises for consideration is not res integra. In the instant case if the allegations levelled against the peittioner are true, it cannot be said that those acts complained of were done by the petitioner herein in discharge of his duties. It is not as if the act complained of was intended to be done by the petitioner in discharge of his duties. Those acts have no reasonableness with the official duties of the petitioner. It cannot be said that the act complained of are integrally and inexorably connected to the discharge of official duties. None of the allegations levelled against the petitioner could be said to relate to the official duties of the petitioner.
15. In my considered opinion, the prosecution iritiated against the petitioner is not hit by Section 53 of the A.P. (Andhra Area) District Police Act, 1859 and the proceedings herein cannot be quashed. I do not find any merit whatsoever in this petition and the same shall stand accordingly dismissed.
16. However, I hasten to add that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of this petition. None of the observations in this order shall have any basis on the pending proceedings and the trial shall have to be uninfluenced by any of the observations, if any made is this order. The inquiry and trial shall have to go on in accordance with law and the truth or otherwise of the allegations leveled against the petitioner and other accused is to be determined in accordance with law and only after the inquiry and trial.
17. The petition fails and shall stand accordingly dismissed. The stay earlier granted by this Court shall stand vacated.