ORDER
1. One acre 38 guntas of land comprised in Sy. No.363 and Sy. No.364 of Singareni village and Mandal is an inam land governed by the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’). Late Sri Kongara Naraycma was admittedly the inamdar of the subject land. The father of the first petitioner purchased one acre of land in the year 1969 under an unregistered sale deed and lie subsequently purchased the remaining 38 guntas of land by way of registered sale-deed dated 5-2-1970. The second petitioner herein subsequently purchased the entire land by way of unregistered sale-deed dated 18-12-1989, and the records placed before the Court disclose that from the date of the purchase of the lands, the father of the first petitioner and after his demise, the first petitioner had been in continuous possession of the subject land till the first petitioner alienated the subject land in favour of the second petitioner in the year 1989. The first petitioner made the application under the provisions of the Act claiming occupancy rights. His application was considered and rejected by the Revenue Divisional Officer in proceedings No. RC 100/1A/87, dated 31-7-1990. The validity of this order is assailed in this writ petition. It appears that as directed in the impugned order, the land was resumed by the Mandal Revenue Officer and subsequently the subject land was assigned in favour of the impleaded respondent Nos.3 to 5 by proceedings of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Singareni Mandal,
dated 18-8-1990. When the petitioners came to know about this development, the petitioners filed WP MP No.18671 of 1990 to implead the assignees of the lands and that application was ordered by this Court on 17-10-1990, and the assignees are accordingly impleaded as respondents 3 to 5 to the writ petition and they are also represented by Sri M. Surender Rao, learned Counsel.
2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the two grounds stated by the Revenue Divisional Officer to reject the application of the first petitioner, namely, that the inamdar did not have saleable right over the inam land and that the father of the first petitioner did not obtain prior permission from the competent authority are totally untenable. The learned Counsel would also maintain that the direction issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer to the Mandal Revenue Officer to resume the land by dispossessing the petitioner is wholly without authority of law, and the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder do no arm the Revenue Divisional Officer with the power to issue such directions.
3. On the other hand, Sri M. Surender Rao, learned Counsel for the impleaded respondents 3 to 5 firstly contended that the land having been vested in the State Government by virtue of the provisions of Section 3, the inamdar had lost title in the inam land to convey the land in favour of the father of the first petitioner and the father of the first petitioner did not acquire any title or interest in the inam land and therefore the application filed by the first petitioner before the Revenue Divisional Officer was not maintainable and liable to be rejected in limine. Sri Surender Rao, further contended that against the impugned order, alternative statutory appeal remedy is available and on that count also, the writ petition has to be dismissed.
4. It is well settled that when a statutory functionary’ makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by reasons in the shape of affidavits or otherwise as held by the Supreme Court in Mohindar Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, MR 1978 SC 851.
5. In that view of the matter, I do not think it necessary for the Court to go into certain contentions raised by Sri M. Surender Rao relating to the merits of the claims of the petitioners. The two reasons stated by the Revenue Divisional Officer to reject the application, in my considered opinion, are totally untenable. This Court, both the learned single Judges and the Division Benches, dealing with the similar question whether the purchaser of the inam lands from the Inamdars covered by the Act could maintain an application for occupancy rights, opined that the purchaser of the inam land covered by the Act could also make application for grant of occupancy rights, in Kodithala Keshavulu v. Government of A.P. and others, 1978 (1) APLJ 378 and in S. Veera Reddy and another v. Chellapalli Chendraiah and others, . Therefore, the first ground to reject the application is untenable.
6. Neither the learned Government Pleader nor Sri Surender Rao brought to my notice any provision of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder to show that when the father of the first petitioner purchased the subject land from the inamdar, he ought to have obtained prior permission from the authorities. In the first place, in the impugned order, who is the competent authority to accord such permission is not disclosed. No reference is made to any provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Of course, in the counter filed by the Official respondents, a reference is made in para 4 of the counter-affidavit to the Government Memorandum dated
8-12-1976. From a reading of para 4, I do not find anything in the said order that mandates that the purchaser of the inam land to obtain prior permission from the specified Governmental authority. In that view of the matter, the second ground given by the Revenue Divisional Officer should also be held to be untenable.
7. No doubt, against the impugned order a statutory appeal lies to the District Collector. The grounds stated by the Revenue Divisional Officer to reject the application of the first petitioner are ex facie untenable. This writ petition is coming up for hearing after roughly nine years from the date of presentation of the writ petition, and therefore, I do not think it appropriate at this distance of time to direct the petitioner to avail of appeal remedy. It is not that this Court inherently lacks power to entertain writ application filed by a person without exhausting alternative statutory remedies. It is a matter of discretion vested in the Court whether applications filed without exhausting alternative remedy should be entertained or not.
8. Lastly, it may be noted that the direction issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer to the Mandal Revenue Officer to dispossess the petitioner from the subject land and take over possession of the same is one without authority of law. The learned Government Pleader was not in a position to trace the power of the Revenue Divisional Officer to issue such directions, As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Revenue Divisional Officer ought to have rejected the application if there was no merit in the application, but ought not have directed dispossession of the petitioners from the land.
9. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed. The proceedings shall stand remitted to the Revenue Divisional Officer to consider the application of the first petitioner for
occupancy rights afresh after giving reasonable opportunity to all the parties interested in the land. It is further declared that in view of this order, the subsequent consequential assignments dated 18-8-1990 made in favour of the impleaded respondents 3 to 5 have become null and void. No costs.