JUDGMENT
Nand Lall Untwalia, C.J.
1. There are four petitioners in this writ application. Although the statement in the petition is not very clear, on instructions from junior counsel, Mr. Jagdish Sahay, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, informed us that petitioner No. 2 is the mother of petitioner No. 1 and they are carrying on business in partnership under the name and style of Kanhaiya Industries, to the benefits of which petitioners 3 and 4, who are the minor sons of Yogendra Prasad, brother of petitioner No. 1, have been admitted. According to the petitioners’ case made out in the writ application which was filed on 19th January, 1973, respondents Nos. 2 to 6, who are Assistant Superintendents of Commercial Taxes attached to the Intelligence Branch of the Commercial Taxes Department, Bihar (hereinafter to be called the respondents, respondent No. 1 being the State of Bihar), suddenly raided the factory and office (shop) of the petitioners’ firm, Kanhaiya Industries located at Begusarai at about 2.30 p.m. on 5th January, 1973. In the petition they had made out a case that the raid was unauthorised–not with the sanction of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes–but, in view of the statements made in the counter-affidavit, this point was not pressed and, therefore, I am leaving out the details of statement in that regard.
2. In the writ application it is stated that “the petitioner was not present at the time of raid nor was any member of his family present and at that time one Sidheshwar Prasad, an employee of the petitioner, was present”. In argument, by “petitioner” was meant to convey petitioner No. 1. The case made out in the writ application is that the respondents entered the office (shop) of the petitioners and informed Sidheshwar Prasad that they had come to examine the ledger and account books whereupon Sidheshwar Prasad immediately produced before them all the bahi-khatas, accounts, registers, cash memos, files, etc., in all 64 or 65 in number. And some other papers were also produced by him. The respondents did not examine the account books, stock registers, cash memos or other papers but seized them and directed their orderly to take all those papers in his possession and put them in the jeep which they had brought with them. Sidheshwar Prasad’s request to the respondents to examine the account books on the gaddi was turned down. He asked them to issue a receipt which they refused to do. The respondents took away all the papers with them. Sidheshwar Prasad, therefore, filed an informatory petition, according to the case made out in the writ application, at about 4 p.m. on 5th January, 1973, before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Begusarai; a copy of this informatory petition is annexure 1 to the writ application. The attack on the action of the respondents is on very many grounds, on the basis of which certain points were urged on behalf of the petitioners by their learned Counsel, which will be stated and dealt with at the proper place in this judgment. The petitioners have further made out a case that when the respondents came to know that Sidheshwar Prasad had made an application before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Begusarai, against them, they, in self-defence and as a counterblast, lodged a first information report at Begusarai Police Station at 6 p.m. on 5th January, 1973, a copy of this first information report is annexure 2. The petitioners stated that they had received a notice from Shri R.N. Shukla, Additional Superintendent, Commercial Tax Intelligence Branch, Bihar, to appear before him on 2nd February, 1973, for verification of entries in the seized books. A true copy of this notice is annexure 3. Attacking the action of the respondents as being illegal and without jurisdiction, the prayer made in the petition is for a writ of mandamus “commanding the respondents to return forthwith to the petitioner all the account books, registers and other documents seized by them from his shop (office) on 5th January, 1973”, and not to use, inspect or look into the account books, registers and other papers seized by them from the shop of the petitioners.
3. A counter-affidavit sworn by respondent No. 2 was filed on behalf of the State of Bihar and the other respondents on 30th March, 1973. Besides controverting the very many statements made in the writ application, it was stated in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit that the surprise inspection of the mill and the office (shop) of the petitioners was conducted simultaneously in pursuance of the programme drawn up at the headquarters. In paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that at the shop, when the raiding party inspected it, were present Yogendra Prasad, father of petitioners Nos. 3 and 4, and Sidheshwar Prasad, an employee of the petitioners. Jib Narain Sao, petitioner No. 1, was present at the mill. The account books produced by Yogendra Sah at the shop were duly inspected and an inspection report dated 8th January, 1973, was submitted by Shri S. Ojha, respondent No. 3. No account or any other paper from the shop was seized. The account books produced at the mill premises were also inspected and when a prima facie case of attempt of evasion was suspected, respondent No. 2, after recording the reasons in writing, seized the account books and the papers under Section 37(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act). A copy of the order recording the reasons in writing and seizing the account books and papers is annexure A to the counter-affidavit. In regard to the receipt, the statement in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit is :
It is not a fact that anybody had asked for a receipt of the books; on the other hand the partner Jib Narain Sao, who produced the books at the mill premises refused to acknowledge the receipt of the aforesaid annexure A when it was made over to him.
The filing of the informatory petition by Sidheshwar Prasad or its existence is denied and, consequently, it is also denied that the first information report lodged was a counterblast to the said petition.
4. A supplementary affidavit was filed by the petitioners on 10th July, 1973, stating that a final report had been submitted by the police on 4th May, 1973, in the case instituted upon the first information report lodged by respondent No. 2. A copy of this final report has been marked annexure 3 (this is by mistake duplicate annexure 3). A copy of the order dated 20th June, 1973, passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Begusarai, accepting the final report is annexure 4.
5. An affidavit-in-reply, sworn by petitioner No. 1, to the counter-affidavit of the respondents was filed on 26th September, 1973. The assertion in the counter-affidavit that the respondents examined the account books in the business premises of the petitioners has been denied and the fact of submission of the report has been challenged. The time of inspection given in the first information report as 3.30 p.m. has been asserted to be wrong. Petitioners assert that the time of raid was 2.30 p.m. They again assert in this affidavit-in-reply that only Sidheshwar Prasad was present and none else at the time of the raid and inspection. Curiously, however, it is not explained in the affidavit in reply as to whether the raiding party had simultaneously gone to the shop (office) of the petitioners as also to the mill premises. In the writ application at one place it has been stated that raid was at both the places and it was asserted that only Sidheshwar Prasad was present at the shop. The examination of the accounts and the seizure, according to the case of the petitioners made out in the writ application, were all at the shop. In the affidavit-in-reply to the statement in the counter-affidavit, it is not made clear whether the seizure was at the mill or not; if so, who was present there on behalf of the petitioners. Again, there is a reiteration of the fact that petitioner No. 1 was not present, but neither the presence of Yogendra Prasad is asserted nor is it stated who else was present in the mill premises when the seizure took place. The statement in the counter-affidavit that Yogendra Prasad was present in the shop is also not denied in the affidavit-in-reply.
6. A further reply to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the petitioners has been filed by the respondents on 16th November, 1973. Since the factum of submission of an inspection report dated 8th January, 1973, by respondent No. 3 was challenged on behalf of the petitioners, a copy of this inspection report has been annexed as annexure D. On behalf of the petitioners, a further reply has been filed on 27th November, 1973.
7. The following points have been urged on behalf of the petitioners to persuade us to follow the course adopted in some of the cases cited by their learned Counsel: (i) That the condition precedent to exercise of power under Section 37(3) of the Act was not fulfilled. (ii) That no search or seizure list was prepared. (iii) That no receipt of the documents seized was issued and it was contrary to the mandatory requirement of Section 37(3).
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, in support of his argument, placed reliance on the following decisions: Income-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle ‘B’, Meerut v. Seth Brothers [1969] 74 I.T.R. 836 (S.C.), Senairam Doongarmal Agency (P.) Ltd. v. K.E. Johnson [1964] 52 I.T.R. 637, Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver [1967] 20 S.T.C. 453 (S.C.), N.K. Textile Mills v. Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi [1966] 62 I.T.R. 58, Motilal v. Preventive Intelligence Officer, Central Excise and Customs, Agra [1971] 80 I.T.R. 418, Laxmipat Choraria v. K.K. Ganguli [1971] 82 I.T.R. 306, Shri Shambhu Nath v. Sales Tax Officer, Jaunpur [1962] 13 S.T.C. 211, and Harikisandas Gulabdas and Sons v. The State of Mysore [1971] 27 S.T.C. 434. Learned standing counsel I for the respondents added to that list the decision in S. Natarajan v. D. Samson, Joint Commercial Tax Officer (Central Intelligence Wing), Madras-5 [1971] 28 S.T.C. 319.
9. It will not be necessary for me to deal with the cases cited at the Bar in any detail. Suffice it to say that in some of the cases the question of constitutional validity of similar or identical provisions was canvassed; in some it was found that the action taken by the authorities was wholly illegal or mala fide and in some it was noticed that the conditions precedent for the exercise of the power were not fulfilled. Most of the cases relate to the interpretation of, and exercise of power under, Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which confers a very drastic power on the authorities and, consequently, the rigours attaching to such power have also been made strict. The Supreme Court in the case of Income-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle ‘B’, Meerut v. Seth Brothers [1969] 74 I.T.R. 836 (S.C.) directed the Allahabad High Court to take oral evidence for determination of the disputed questions of fact, which were necessary to be determined and could not be so determined only on affidavits for disposal of the contentious questions. After having noticed the law engrafted in Section 37(3) of the Act, I shall proceed to determine some of the questions of fact which, in my opinion, can adequately be determined in this case on the basis of the various affidavits filed and, thereafter, if necessary, I shall briefly refer to one or two cases out of many cited at the Bar.
10. Section 37 of the Act provides for procedure and power for production, inspection and seizure of accounts and documents and search of premises. A dealer may be required to produce accounts or documents under Sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) is meant for keeping the documents and goods open to inspection of any authority appointed under Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act. Sub-section (4) empowers any such authority to enter and search any place of business of any dealer for the purposes of Sub-section (2) or (3) of Section 37. Since in this case there was no occasion for exercise of power under Sub-sections (1), (2) and (4), it is not necessary to read them in full. The instant case is concerned with the action taken or purported to have been taken under Sub-section (3) only. It reads as follows :
If any authority appointed under Sub-section (1) of Section 8 has reason to suspect that any dealer is attempting to evade the payment of any tax, such authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, seize such accounts, registers or documents of the dealer as may be necessary and shall grant a receipt for the same. Such seized accounts, registers or documents shall be retained for so long as may be reasonably necessary for examination thereof or for a prosecution under Section 38 and shall thereafter be returned to the dealer in the prescribed manner:
Provided that if the seized accounts, registers or documents are retained by any authority other than the Commissioner, for more than ninety days, the reasons for doing so shall be recorded in writing and the approval of the Commissioner obtained by the authority so retaining them.
The first requirement for the exercise of the power is that the authority must have reason to suspect that any dealer is attempting to evade the payment of any tax. Coming in possession of reason to suspect may be assumed to be the subjective act of the authority, but it becomes objective and justiciable when we come to the second requirement for the exercise of the power and that is the recording of reasons in writing. I have no doubt in my mind that while recording the reasons in writing whatever else, which can be said to be a reason justifying seizure, may have to be recorded, the authority surely will have to record its reason to suspect that any dealer is attempting to evade the payment of tax. The reasons to be recorded in writing may include other reasons but surely they have got to include the reasons of suspicion. That is the sine qua non for the exercise of the power. And, thus the reason to suspect has got to be decided from an objective standard and it becomes justiciable. The authority exercising the power cannot give an absurd or arbitrary reason which may not satisfy the court that it has justification for seizing the account books and other documents of the dealer but only such account, register or document as may be necessary for the purpose of inspection or investigation. Accounts, registers or documents or any other papers which are not relevant for the purpose of making inspection or investigation obviously cannot be seized. I am, however, of the opinion that recording of reasons in writing and the act of seizure of accounts, registers or documents may be simultaneous and may be contained in the same paper. The last requirement of the law is that a receipt has got to be granted by the authority enumerating therein the various accounts, registers or documents seized by it. As observed by the Allahabad High Court in Shri Shambhu Nath v. Sales Tax Officer, Jaunpur [1962] 13 S.T.C. 211 at 213, such a receipt has got to be granted whether a request for it is made or not. The Allahabad High Court was considering the provisions in the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, similar to those contained in Section 37(3) of the Act.
11. Having thus enunciated the law, I now proceed to examine in this case how far it has been complied with or violated and what is the consequence of the violation, if any.
12. In this case, it is immaterial whether the raiding party had gone to the premises of the petitioners, namely, the shop and the mill at 2.30 p.m. on 5th January, 1973, as asserted on their behalf, or at 3.30 p.m., as is the case of the respondents. For the purpose of disposal of this writ application, it is not relevant– and I do not consider it necessary–to investigate whether an informatory petition, a copy of which is annexure 1, was filed by Sidheshwar Prasad before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Begusarai, on 5th January, 1973, at 4 p.m., as asserted on behalf of the petitioners or whether there was no such petition filed. I shall assume in favour of the petitioners that such a petition had been filed. Admittedly, however, a first information report, a copy of which is annexure 2, was lodged at the thana at 6 p.m. by respondent No. 2. In annexure 1, Sidheshwar Prasad stated that on 5th January, 1973, at about 2.30 p.m., the four persons named therein, who are respondents Nos. 2 to 5, came to his malik’s shop. The malik was not there and had gone out. They wanted to check the bahi-khatas. He produced bahi-khatas and registers, totalling about 60-65 in number, before them and other documents for their inspection. Instead of inspecting and examining the papers at the gaddi, they directed their orderly to take them. Thereupon Sidheshwar Prasad asked them to grant a receipt but they refused to do so. In the informatory petition, therefore, the event which had taken place at the shop is related. In the first information report it is stated that the raiding party had gone to the business establishment of Kanhaiya Industries and there, during the course of inspection of many lekha bahis, it was detected that there was no satisfactory explanation in relation to many entries and, therefore, there was seizure under Section 37(3). When Jib Narain Sao was asked to sign the seizure list, he refused to do so. Allegations were made in the first information report to show that the accused, named therein, namely, Jib Narain Sao and his brother Yogendra Prasad had committed an offence punishable under Section 353 of the Penal Code.
13. The first question for determination is whether the raiding party had simultaneously visited both the places, namely, the shop and the mill permises of the petitioners. The distance between the two is not known nor the petitioners have asserted that they are very close. On the statements in the various affidavits, which I have briefly narrated above, there cannot be the least doubt that both the places were raided simultaneously by the raiding party. Sidheshwar Prasad, therefore, could not be present at both the places. Admittedly, he was present at the shop. Believing the statement in the counter-affidavit, which is not controverted in the affidavit-in-reply, I hold that Yogendra Prasad was also present at the shop. I also hold that whatever documents were produced those were inspected and a report dated 8th January, 1973, was submitted by Shri S. Ojha, respondent No. 3. The confusing statements made on behalf of the petitioners in their various affidavits in that regard are not sufficient or convincing to detract from this position. As a corollary, therefore, I have got to hold–and reasonably I can infer–that at the mill premises was present Jib Narain Sao, petitioner No. 1. As I have said above, the informatory petition recites the incident at the shop. It does not refer to the seizure which took place at the mill. Seizure, as is clear now, was at the mill. In their confusion and attempt to cast cloud on the raid which took place at both the places simultaneously, the petitioners could make out no clear-cut case and, in my opinion, have landed themselves in difficulty in this regard. It was not a case where some members of the raiding party had exercised their power under Sub-section (4) of Section 37 of the Act, made any search, broke open any lock, even assuming they had power to do so, and then seized the account books or the papers. It was clearly a case where somebody was present on behalf of the petitioners in the mill premises and he had produced the various documents and registers which were later on seized by respondent No. 2. And, since it is not asserted on behalf of the petitioners who that somebody was, I can safely and legitimately infer that it was none else but Jib Narain Sao.
14. Under Section 37(3) of the Act, it is not necessary that the reason to suspect must exist before any raid is made. During the course of inspection by the raiding party if materials are found, which lead the authority to suspect that the dealer whose business premises have been raided was attempting to evade payment of any tax, then also during the course of inspection, after recording the reasons in writing, seizure can follow under Section 37(3). Here, the case of the respondents is that in due course–3 days ago–at the headquarters in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax raiding parties were deputed. During the course of inspection at the mill premises respondent No. 2 suspected that the dealer was evading payment of tax. He, therefore, recorded his reasons, a copy of which is annexure A. It would be better to quote the preamble which records the reasons from annexure A at this stage :
Whereas on an examination of books of account found at your place of business during the course of a surprise visit paid by me today, I have reason to suspect that you are maintaining your accounts with a view to conceal the true transactions in order to evade payment of tax due from you.
Thereafter in the second paragraph it is stated:
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers vested in me under Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, I hereby seize the books of account detailed below for proper examination and hereby grant receipt.
The details of the account books and papers seized are enumerated in items 1 to 14. Various kinds of rokar, khata, bahi, dakpatti and stock registers are mentioned in those items and the 14th item is “loose account sheets numbering 382 (three hundred eighty-two only)”. If respondent No. 2, on examination of the books of account found that they were maintained with a view to conceal the true transactions, it is difficult to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners that the first two requirements, namely, reason to suspect and reasons to be recorded in writing were not fulfilled in this case. Reading the statement in annexure A per se, which I will not have justification in law to doubt, in the context of the various statements made in the various affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, it is clear that the authority could have been justified in suspecting that the dealer was attempting to evade payment of any tax. Whether actually he had evaded or not was not a question to be decided at the stage of seizure; only suspicion about the attempt of the dealer to evade was sufficient. Apart from the other account books, if loose account sheets numbering as many as 382 were found at the mill premises, it could not but lead the authority to suspect that there was an attempt on the part of the dealer to evade the payment of tax.
15. I may, however, mention one fact at this stage. On our asking for the original, a copy of which is annexure A to the counter-affidavit, it was produced before us from the Guard File by learned standing counsel I. We found from the original that paragraphs 1 and 2 were cyclostyled copies and were filled up by respondent No. 2 and the details of account books and papers seized were necessary to be filled up and were surely filled up by respondent No. 2. Since on the facts of this case the reason mentioned in paragraph 1 of the cyclostyled copy, which probably is a reason in many such cases, was aptly fitting in, we could not persuade ourselves to believe that respondent No. 2 mechanically filled up the form without applying his mind to the reason for seizure. It is, however, for the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes concerned to consider whether he would allow his authority to use such cyclostyled copies in future or whether he would ask it to put down the reasons in its own hand as and when occasion arises.
16. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that annexure A is not a genuine document for the following reasons : (1) It does not bear any date or time. (2) It is not referred to in the first information report (annexure 2). (3) The time at the disposal of the raiding party was too short to do all that is mentioned in annexure A. (4) Details of loose sheets are not given in annexure A, their identity cannot be fixed up and they can be replaced at any time.
17. The first comment made on behalf of the petitioners with reference to annexure A was justified. But in the original, however, we found the date mentioned was 5th January, 1973, and on its inspection and examination we could not get anything to doubt the veracity of the date put below the signature of respondent No. 2. It is, however, unfortunate that the copy annexed with the counter-affidavit did not bear the date. Time was not necessary to be mentioned in annexure A; that is not the requirement of the law. But in future any authority exercising its power under Section 37(3) of the Act would be well advised to put down the time also as disputes are bound to crop up in regard to the time of inspection or seizure, as in this case it did crop up.
18. It is not quite correct to say that there is no reference to the seizure detailed in annexure A at all in the first information report. A detailed statement in that regard was not necessary to be made in the first information report. After having stated the fact which led the first informant to suspect the attempt of evasion of tax by the dealer, the fact of seizure made under Section 37(3) is recited and then it is stated that when Jib Narain Sao was asked to sign the seizure list, he refused to do so. Reference to a seizure list in the first information report, in my opinion, is a reference to seizure list, copy of which is annexure A.
19. Actually the time of seizure is not known. If the statement made on behalf of the petitioners is to be believed then inspection, as I have said above, of both the places started at 2.30 p.m. In annexure 1 no time is given. But I shall assume in favour of the petitioners that it was filed at 4 p.m. Then the seizure must have been made surely before that and the time of making any inspection or seizure, which on that calculation will be about an hour or so, was quite sufficient. Petitioners cannot have it both ways–fix up 3.30 p.m. as given in the first information report and take 4 p.m. as the time of lodging the inforrnatory petition.
20. The details of loose sheets were not necessary to be given in annexure A. Only their number was sufficient to be mentioned and it has been mentioned. It is difficult to appreciate the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioners that the loose sheets can be replaced. Surely if they are to be replaced, they cannot be in the handwriting of petitioner No. 1 or his brother Yogendra Prasad or his molazim Sidheshwar Prasad or anybody in the employ of the petitioners’ establishment. What gain will be made by the department by replacing the loose sheets is difficult to understand.
21. I now come to the question whether the last requirement of the law, namely, the granting of the receipt was fulfilled in this case or not. In this connection, I find on the statements made on behalf of the respondents that they did not grant any receipt. The statements in the first information report and in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit lead, in my opinion, unmistakably to this conclusion that respondent No. 2 either asked petitioner No. 1 to sign the seizure list in token of the fact of seizure which he refused to do or at best he (respondent No. 2) asked him (petitioner No. 1) to grant a receipt in token of a copy of the seizure list having been given to him but the latter refused to grant this receipt. There is no statement, as I read the first information report, the counter-affidavit or further affidavit-in-reply, showing that copy of annexure A or a receipt in any other form was given to petitioner No. 1 and he refused to acknowledge receipt of a copy of annexure A or any other receipt or that a copy of it was left at the mill premises. It appears to me that respondent No. 2 merely wanted petitioner No. 1 to sign the original of annexure A and did not grant any receipt to him. Therefore, in that regard, according to my conclusion, there was a violation of one of the requirements of the law engrafted in Section 37(3) of the Act. The question is: What is the result of this violation ?
22. When the vires of Sub-section (3) of Section 41 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, similar to Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act was attacked before the Supreme Court, it was repelled by Wanchoo, C.J., in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver [1967] 20 S.T.C. 453 (S.C.), inter alia, on the ground mentioned in paragraph 2 at page 468. The relevant passage reads thus :
Next we come to Sub-section (3), which as we have already stated, is complementary to Sub-section (2). It provides in addition to the safeguards which have to be complied with when a search is made under Sub-section (2), that the officer may seize accounts, etc., if he has reason to suspect that any dealer is attempting to evade the payment of any tax, etc., due from him under the Act. It also provides that the officer has to record his reasons in writing and we are of opinion that these reasons have to be recorded before the accounts are seized. It further provides that the dealer shall be given a receipt, and this means that the receipt must be given as and when the accounts, etc., are seized. Finally, it provides that these accounts, etc., shall be retained by such officer so long as may be necessary for their examination and for any enquiry or proceeding under the Act. These, in our opinion, are sufficient safeguards and the restriction, if any, on the right to hold property and the right to carry on trade by Sub-section (3) must therefore be held to be a reasonable restriction.
The Supreme Court, therefore, opined that the dealer shall be given a receipt and this means that the receipt must be given as and when the accounts, etc., are seized; this is stated to be one of the safeguards. In no case, however, a view has been taken or possibly could be taken that for the failure of the authority to grant a receipt, the whole seizure should be held to be illegal. If the first two conditions are not fulfilled, the entire action will be illegal and ultra vires, it will have to be quashed and a writ of mandamus will have to be issued directing the return of the documents or, in a given case, even of the copy made, as was done by the Mysore High Court in Harikisandas Gulabdas and Sons v. The State of Mysore [1971] 27 S.T.C. 434. It may well also be that, in the context of other facts and circumstances of a case, failure of the authority to grant a receipt under Sub-section (3) of Section 37 may justify the quashing of the whole action or the proceeding. But, in the instant case, such a course will not be justified. The petitioners in their affidavit-in-reply or further reply do not assert that the accounts, registers or loose account sheets enumerated in annexure A were not recovered or seized from their business premises. Even if a receipt was not granted to them at the time of seizure, they were made aware of the list of account books, documents and papers which are said to have been seized by respondent No. 2 as per annexure A. Yet they did not challenge the correctness of that list. On inspection of the papers seized, as mentioned in annexure C to one of the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, very many discrepancies prima facie have been detected. In such a situation, I do not think that this Court would be justified in knocking down the whole action of the respondents for their failure to grant a receipt to the petitioners, as required by Section 37(3) of the Act. To complete the formality, they would be directed to grant a formal receipt to the petitioners which may be in the form of a copy of annexure A, of course, showing the date also in that.
23. For the reasons stated above, this writ application is partly allowed. Respondent No. 2 is directed to send a receipt to the petitioners or, to be more accurate, to petitioner No. 1, which may be in the form of a true copy of the original of annexure A. The petitioners, in my opinion, are not entitled to any other relief in this case. In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs.
Nagendra Prasad Singh, J.
I agree.