JUDGMENT
A.P. Chowdhri, J.
1. This is a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing a complaint under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code dated 9-6-1988 and the summoning order dated 10-9-1988 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ferozepur.
2. Brief material facts are that Asha Rani deceased was married to Pardeep Kumar, petitioner No. 1 on 5-7-1987. Petitioner No. 2 is mother of petitioner No. 1. Asha Rani died an unnatural death on 4-5-1988. A case under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code being FIR No. 187 dated 4-5-1988 was registered against four persons including the present petitioners. It was subsequently cancelled. Thereafter, the aforesaid complaint was filed by Dharampal, brother of the deceased, which is still pending. After recording preliminary evidence, the petitioners were summoned. The sister and maternal uncle of petitioner No. 1 were not summoned. The petitioners seek quashing of the said complaint and the summoning order.
3. The primary contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that petitioner No. 1, husband of the deceased, was the sole heir of-the deceased Asha Rani because admittedly Asha Rani did not leave behind any child. For this conclusion, reliance is placed on the provisions of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act as interpreted in Ajit Singh and others v. The State of Punjab, 1983 C.C. Cases 116 (HC). The view taken therein was that the husband being heir of the married woman he could not possibly be charged with or found guilty of an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code with regard to items of dowry after the death of such a woman. It was further observed that the non obstante clause in Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act was not of any avail in so far as items of dowry are concerned because it could not be said that items of dowry were “inherited” by the woman from her father. The aforesaid authority was followed in 1988 (2) Recent C.R. 349.
4. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 disputes the contention and points out that the attention of the Court was not drawn to the provisions of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the aforesaid provision was in the nature of an exception to the rule laid down in Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 6 ibid, in so far as material reads as under:
“6. Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife on her heirs :–
(1) Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the woman–
(a) .... .... .... .... .... (b) .... .... .... .... .... (c) .... .... .... .... .... (2) .... .... .... .... .... (3) Where the woman entitled to any property under Sub-section (1) dies before receiving it, the heirs of the woman shall be entitled to claim it from the person holding it for the time being. Provided that where such woman dies within seven years of her marriage, otherwise than due to natural causes, such property shall,-- (a) if she has no children, be transferred to her parents, or (b) if she has children, be transferred to such children and pending such transfer, be held in trust for such children."
The proviso to Sub-section (3) has been brought into force by notification of the Central Government dated November 5, 1986 and the date of enforcement of the said provision is November 19, 1986. If the above quoted provision is taken as an exception to the general rule contained in Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, there is no doubt that in the facts of the present case where the death of Asha Rani occurred other wise than due to natural causes within seven years of her marriage, the dowry items are required to be transferred to her parents instead of going to her husband.
5. Faced with this difficulty, learned counsel for the petitioners referred to Section 8-A of the Dowry Prohibition (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1976 which lays down that no prosecution shall be instituted against any person in respect of any offence committed under the said Act without, the previous sanction of the District Magistrate or of such officer as the State Government may by special or general order appoint in this behalf. On the basis of the material available on the record no such previous sanction appears to have been obtained before filing the present complaint. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that in the absence of compliance of Section 8-A aforesaid none of the provisions of the said Act could be availed of. I am unable to accept this proposition. Section 6 for the present purposes consists of two broad parts, one is contained in the proviso to Sub section (3) which is in the nature of an exception to Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act in so far as items of dowry are concerned. The other part is the criminal offence which is made punishable. In the absence of the sanction, undoubtedly, the petitioners cannot be punished under the second part of Section 6 but this fact does not detract from the first part operating an exception to Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. For the above reasons, I do not find any inherent infirmity in the case instituted by Dharampal and, accordingly, there is no reason to quash the proceedings or the summoning order. The petition is dismissed.