JUDGMENT
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. The writ petitioners in these proceedings seek a direction that there was no amendment in the recruitment rules, for appointment to Assistants, in the Respondent (hereafter ‘DDA’), requiring those in the feeder cadre of Upper Division Clerks (UDC) to qualify in a written test; they also seek a declaration that the amendment introduced through the resolution no 135/96 is contrary to provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (hereafter called ‘the Act’).
2. The petitioners were appointed to DDA as Lower Division Clerks (LDC) in 1976; they had qualified in an examination held in 1975. Both were promoted as UDCs in 1981, and they have been working ever since in that post. Both the petitioners had originally sought for promotion as Assistants, when they approached the court, in 2000; they were promoted to that post in 2003.
3. It is the common case of the parties that in the year 1992, certain regulations were formulated, and approved, by resolution No. 102/92. They were styled as ‘proposed recruitment rules’; they provided, inter alia, that the post of Assistants was to be filled in the following manner:-
PROMOTION
1. 50% of the post shall be filled from such of the UDCs, who are graduates and have put in five years of service in the grad.
2. 50% of the posts shall be filled up from such of the UDCs, who have put in 8 years of regular service in the grade.
TRANSFER ON DEPUTATION.
Officials holding analogous posts under the Government of India/Delhi Administration
4. It is averted that the Recruitment Rules were ‘alleged to be amended’ by the DDA, through Resolution No. 135/96. The material part of the impugned regulations are as under:-
‘X X X X X X
Assistants (Rs.1640-2900)
i) 50% by way of promotion from UDCs having 5 years service.
ii) 50% by way of departmental examination from UDCs with 5 years service.
5. A committee, known as ‘TIKOO COMMITTEE’ was constituted to recommend on Cadre Review in the D.D.A’s. The report of the Tikoo Committee dated 22.08.1997 was sent to Central Government on 16.11.1998. The approval of the Central Government to the report was communicated to the D.D.A. by vide letter dated 23.02.1999. The petitioners allege that the recruitment regulations, which were in existence prior to the amendments were considered by the Tikoo Committee and duly recommended to the D.D.A. to the Central government for acceptance; the Central Government accepted the same. The petitioners allege that in the said recommendations there is no mention of the written test. Reliance is placed on the approval of the Central Government, which was reproduced as under:-
D.D.A. has 251 posts of Assistants Accepted. Since the against a total of 1134 posts of UDCs, posts of UDCs will be i.e. in the ratio of 1:5. As per practice being followed in the Central Secretariat, the ratio of the posts of Assistants and UDCs should be 1:2. In D.D.A. there is acute stagnation in the Cadre of UDCs and more than 1/3rd of the UDCs are stagnating without promotion even after completing double the qualifying service. An attempt should be made ultimately to come to a stage where the number of posts of Asstts. are roughly 50% of the posts of UDCs. The Committee recommends that, for the present, the ratio should be fixed as 33% of the post of UDCs. Since the posts of UDCs will be 1254, the Committee recommended that the strength of the cadre of Asstt. should be fixed at 418.’ 1253, the strength of the Cadre of Assistants may be fixed at 417.
As per RRs for the post of Asstts, 50% of the posts are to be filled up from such of the UDCs who are graduates and have put in five Years’ regular service in the grade and the remaining 50% of the posts are to be filled up from UDCs who have put in 8 years’ of regular service in the grade. The RRs also provides for appointment by transfer on deputation. The RRs should be in line with the RRs in the Central Sectt. They have already been given the same pay scale earlier. The Committee recommends that the existing provision which permits transfer on deputation on the post of Asstts. should be deleted because there is no justification for bringing officers on deputation on these posts. Accepted
6. The petitioners allege that Resolution No. 135/1996 cannot amend the Recruitment Regulations to the post of Assistants and introduce a quota for limited Departmental Examination. It is alleged that the procedure envisaged in Section 57 and 58 of the Delhi Development Act, for amendment of the Regulations has not been followed.
7. It is alleged that the effect of the approval of the Central Government to the recommendations of the Tikoo Committee, vis–vis the Resolution No. 135/96, is only in respect of the pay-scales, the agenda (for the resolution) is only in respect of the revision of pay-scales, the discussion relates only to the revision of pay-scales; the petitioners also allege that at no point of time did DDA discuss and take an informed decision to introduce the written test.
8. The Petitioners have placed before the Court the amendments/modifications to the Recruitment Regulations carried to the Recruitment Regulations; they allege that from a perusal of the same it would be seen that an Agenda Item, was prepared on the basis of the discussions in the file. It is stated that the Recruitment Regulations have not been amended vide Resolution No. 135/96 and what has been approved by the Central Government is the existing Recruitment Regulations, vis.-
1. 50% of the posts shall be filled up from such of the UDCs, who are graduates and have put in five years of regular service in the grade.
2. 50% of the posts shall be filed up from such of the UDCs, who have put in 8 years of regular service in the grade.
9. The petitioners also allege that there was no acceptance of the Recruitment Regulations with the written test by the Central Government in terms of the requirement of Section 57 and 58 of the Delhi Development Act. The procedure in the amendment to the Recruitment Regulations has to be the same procedure, which is required for the purposes of the formulation of the Recruitment Regulations. The Respondent authority has not followed the said procedure.
10. During pendancy of these proceedings, the DDA notified, in the Gazette Notification, in 2004, the amendments approved by resolution 135/96. The petitioners allege that this has no relevance, as it was not issued with prior approval of the Central Government as per Sections 57 and 58 of the Delhi Development Act, moreover, the Resolution No. 135/96 was not placed before the Central Government for its approval or before the Parliament, as envisaged under Section 57 and 58 of the Delhi Development Act. Further, what has been approved is the Recruitment Regulations, as above.
11. The DDA has refuted the allegations in the petition, and averred that the Resolution is in consonance with the provisions of the Act. It is also alleged that the Tikoo Committee recommended, apart from the revision in pay scales, that recruitment norms for the post of Assistants ought to be in line with the Central Government pattern, where a certain quota has been earmarked for departmental examinations. It is also alleged that the Committee had recommended that the cadre strength of Assistants be increased from 251 to 417, which was done.
12. It is also alleged that pursuant to the recommendations, which were accepted by the resolution No. 135/96, an order was issued on 14-5-1997, notifying the change, and introducing the quota for departmental examinees.
13. The DDA has also refuted allegations that the documents placed in the meeting leading to the resolutions did not contain the proposal to introduce the 50% examination quota. It is averred that the proposal was contained in the annexures, and it denies that there was any replacement of the annexures, as alleged by the petitioners. The DDA also alleges that the proposal of the Tikoo Committee was approved by the Central Government.
14. Both parties have produced copies of the DDA’s agenda, for the resolution (No. 135/96). The DDA produced the record. The material portion of the Agenda, and the Resolution, reads as follows:
A-6.9.96 Sub: Revision of pay scales on the pattern of Govt. of India F. No. F.1(1)95/PB-III P R E C I S
A. xxx xxx xxx
B. xxx xxx xxx
C. Assistants
DDA’s Assistants are in the pay scale of Rs. 1400-2300/- whereas, assistants in the Government, have been in the pay scale of Rs. 1400-2600/- after the 4th Pay Commission Report. Pay-scale of Assistants has been revised in the Govt. vide O.M. No. 2/1/90-CS IV dated 31.7.90 to Rs. 1640-2900/- w.e.f. 1.1.86 (Appendix ‘A’ page 5-6). Qualifications for promotion as Assistants in DDA are the same as for promotions in the Government UDCs in DDA become eligible for promotion as Assistants after 8 years, whereas, period prescribed for similar promotions in the Govt. is 5 years. It is, therefore, proposed to bring DDA’s Assistants at par with those in the Government and give them the scale of Rs. 1640-2900/-.
4. Comparison of the existing and the proposed pay-scales in DDA vis–vis the pay scales in Govt. of India is given in (Appen. ‘B’ and ‘C’, pages 7 and 8). Proposals given in para 3 and in columns 3 of Appen. ‘B’ and ‘C’ are submitted for kind approval of the Authority. These scales are proposed to be given w.e.f. 1.1.96.
R E S O L U T I O N
Resolved as follows:
i) Proposals contained in para 4of the Agenda item be approved;
ii) Recruitment Regulations of these posts shall stand amend accordingly.
15. The relevant portion of the Central Government’s letter referred to in the Agenda, reads as follows:
New Delhi, Dated the 31st July, 1990 OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject: Revision of Scale of Pay of Assistant Grade of Central Secretariat Service and Grade ‘C’ Stenographers of Central Secretariat Stenographers Service The undersigned is directed to say that the question regarding revision of scale of pay for the post of Assistants in the Central Secretariat etc., has been under consideration of the Government in terms of order dated 23rd May, 1989 in OA No. 1538/87 by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi for some time past. The President is now pleased to prescribe the revised scale of Rs. 1640-60-2600-EB-75-2900 for the pre-revised scale Rs. 425-15- 500-EB-15-560-20-700-EB-25-800 for duty posts included in the Assistant Grade of Central Secretariat Service and Grade ‘C’ Stenographers of Central Secretariat Stenographers Service with effect from 1.1.1986. The same revised pay scale will also be applicable to Assistants and Stenographers in other Organisations like Ministry of External Affairs which are not participating in the Central Secretariat Service and Central Secretariat Stenographers Service but where the posts are in comparable grades with same classification and pay scales and the method of recruitment through Open Competitive Examination is also the same.
2. Pay of the Assistants and Grade ‘C’ Stenographers in position as on 1.1.1986, shall be fixed in terms of Central Civil Service (Revised Pay) Rules 1986. The employees concerned shall be given option to opt for the revised scale of pay from 1.1.1986 or subsequent date in terms of Rule 5 ibid, read with Ministry of Finance O.M. No. 7(52)-E.III/86 dated 22.12.1986 and 27.5.1988 in the form appended to Second Schedule of the rule ibid. This option should be exercised within three months of the date of issue of this O.M. The option once exercised shall be final.
3. Formal amendment to CSS(RP) Rules, 1986 will be issued in due course.
4. This issues with the concurrence of Ministry of Finance, (Department of Expenditure) vide their U.O. No. 7(43)/IC/89 dt. 30.7.90.’
16. The letter dated 19th March 1986, which is also found along with the resolution, and has been produced is as follows:
‘Sub: Proposal for revision of pay scale of Grade-I Officers of DASS Cadre.
Sir,
I am directed to refer to Government of NCT of Delhi’s letter No. F.55/29/91- S.I. Dated 12.1.96 on the above mentioned subject and to convey the approval of the Central Government for revising the pay scale of Grade-I Officers of Delhi Administration Subordinate Service from Rs. 1640-2900/- to Rs. 2000-3200/- from the date of issue of this sanction order.
2. The expenditure involved will be met out of the budget grant of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi and no assistance would be provided by the Central Government for meeting the expenditure on account of revision of this pay scale.
3. This issues with the approval of the Integrated Finance Division of this Ministry vide their Dy. No. 636/96-Fin-I(US) dated the 15th March, 1996 read with Ministry of Finance, Deptt. Of Expenditure’s Dy. No. 5(40)/E-III/95 dated 14.3.96.
17. The Appendix ‘C’ to the resolution in question, reads as follows:
APPENDIX ‘C’
AS IN GOVT. OF INDIA AS IN DDA (AT PRESENT) AS PROPOSED IN DDA
Assistants (Rs. 1640-2900/-)
50% through promotion from UDCs with 5 years service. 50% by way of Direct recruitment Assistants (Rs. 1400-2300) By way of promotion from Graduate (UDCs) with 5 years of service and from Non- Graduate (UDCs) with 8 years of service Assistants (Rs. 1640-2900) i) By way of promotion from Graduate UDCs having 5 years service ii) By way of promotion from Non-Graduate UDCs with 8 years service.
18. The relevant part of the circular of 14-5-1997 issued by the DDA, reads as follows:
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (PERSONNEL BRANCH)
CIRCULAR No. 108 Dated: 14.5.97
It is notified for information of all concerned that the Authority vide its resolution No. 135/96 dated 6.9.96 has approved the following amendments in the recruitment regulations in respect of the category of posts mentioned below which was approved earlier vide Authority’s Resolution No. 61/92 and 102/92:-
1. xxx xxx
2. xxx xxx
3. Assistants (Rs. 1640-2900)
i) 50% by way of promotion from UDCs having 5 years service.
ii) 50% by way of departmental examination from UDCs with 5 years service.
19. Mr. Sumeet Bansal, appearing for the petitioner, contended that the resolution of 1996 could not affect the rights of the petitioners to be promoted after they rendered 5 years service. It was urged that the Resolution, insofar as it sought to introduce a quota of 50% to be filled through departmental examination, could not be enforced, since the DDA had not taken recourse to the procedure prescribed under the Act, namely to amend the recruitment rules, after approval from the Central Government, and to notify them, in accordance with Section 57 and 58 of the Act. It was contended that the Act provided only one mode of framing recruitment regulations, i.e. as per Section 57; it mandated approval of the Central Government, and notification in the Gazette. Both the said procedures were not followed; the fact that the regulations were notified in 2003 could not make them retrospective; at best, they could operate from the date they were so notified. All selections and appointments as per the departmental examination quota, prior to that time, were without authority of law.
20. It was contended that that when a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all. Reliance was placed upon the dictum of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253, in support of the submission, to say that Section 57 provided the only lawful mode of framing regulations.
21. Counsel also submitted that the proposal before the DDA was merely to revise the pay scales, and not to introduce any changes in the method of recruitment, as was eventually done. It was submitted that the DDA had never placed the annexures relied upon in these proceedings, before the authority when it took the decision in resolution 135/96. It was also urged that the Central Government had not approved the amendments which led to introduction of the departmental examination. The counsel also contended that the Central Government in any case could not have lawfully delegated its function vis–vis approval of the regulations to the DDA.
22. Counsel for the petitioners also urged that the Regulations took statutory shape in 2004 after they were notified, according to the Act; they could never have retrospective effect to impair the petitioners’ rights to promotion as per the previous pattern, which did not prescribe departmental examination. He relied upon the decision in Bahri Brothers v. Delhi Development Authority to say that the Act does not authorize retrospective delegated legislation.
23. Ms. Salwan, appearing for DDA, refuted the allegations that the resolution was not enforceable, as contrary to Section 57. It was submitted that the DDA had resolved, as per Resolution No. 135/96 to change the recruitment pattern, to improve the overall efficiency of the cadre of Assistants; it was an administrative policy that could not be interfered with in judicial review. Counsel submitted that the allegation that the Tikoo committee, and Central Government recommendations pertained only to increase in pay scales was not correct; the DDA was also advised to increase the cadre strength, as well as effect changes in the recruitment policies. Counsel contended that the petitioner’s rights were in no manner affected because the policies adopted, and implemented, increased their chances of promotion, since the cadre strength was increased, and their pay scales too were enhanced. It was submitted that the previous regulations, of 1992 too, were non-statutory.
24. The Delhi Development Act, 1957 (‘Act’ for short), was enacted for providing for the development of Delhi in a planned manner. The composition of the Authority is set out in Sub-section (iii) of Section 3. Amongst others, Administrator of Union Territory of Delhi would be an ex-officio Chairman and a Vice-Chairman to be appointed by the Central Government. The Vice-Chairman may be either a whole-time or part-time officer as the Central Government may think fit. Section 4(2) and 4(3) empowers the DDA to appoint such members of staff and employees, as are necessary to carry on its activities; the appointments shall be subject to such regulations as may be framed. Section 5 contemplates the constitution of an Advisory Council for the purpose of advising the Authority on the preparation of the master plan and on such matters relating to the planning of the development or arising out of or in connection with the administration of the Act. Section 6 enacts the objects of the Authority. Chapter VI provides for finances and audit of the accounts of the Authority. Chapter VII provides for supplemental and miscellaneous provisions. Section 57 confers power on the Authority with previous approval of the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette to make regulations consistent with the Act and the rules made there-under to carry out the purposes of the Act. This includes the power to make regulations, as per clause (c) in respect of the conditions of service, of its employees and officers. Sub-section (2) provides that until the Authority is established under the Act any regulation which may be made under Sub-section (1) may be made by the Central Government and any regulation so made may be altered or rescinded by the Authority in exercise of its powers under Sub-section (1). Section 58 makes it obligatory to lay every rule and regulation made under this Act before each House of Parliament in session for a period of 30 days and subject to any alteration or modification therein the rule or regulation shall after expiry of the prescribed period mentioned have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect as the case may be, so however that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the rule or regulation.
25. The first issue to be addressed, is whether the prescription of departmental examinations, by providing a quota, through the resolution No. 135/1996, was valid, in as much as the DDA did not follow the procedure of framing the regulations as per Section 57 of the Act, by seeking approval of the Central Government, and notifying the amendments, in the Official Gazette.
26. The proposition that when a statute prescribes one mode of doing something, all other methods are forbidden, is well known. The question is, however, whether it has application in the facts of this case. Admittedly, the 1992 regulations, relied upon by the petitioners, were also not notified as per Section 57; however, no umbrage has been taken by them, in respect of those. The dichotomy in this stand is immediately apparent. One more factor which has to be seen is that the petitioners are not aggrieved by the increase in salary brought about by the impugned amendment. It is well settled that a person securing or availing benefit from a circular or administrative instruction cannot assail or question its legitimacy on other grounds. That is what the petitioners have done here. They do not have any quarrel with the 1992 regulations, which too were not notified; they in fact want it to continue. However, the same kind of non- statutory norms, through regulations of 1996-97 are attacked as contrary to provisions of the Act. These contradictory stands, in my opinion, are not permissible.
27. The above reasoning is by no means dispositive of the issue of legality of the regulations. In the absence of notification of the regulations, they become administrative instructions, as they are part of the norms or policies of the DDA. The DDA is a public authority, empowered to carry out several statutory duties, including management and disposal of properties, and using certain coercive powers. The powers under Sections 4 and 6 are of widest amplitude. They authorize the DDA to carry out all the objectives outlined in the Act, and also to employ or appoint such staff as are necessary. The question is whether, in the absence of regulations, the conditions of service can be validly framed, through non-statutory norms or regulations that are not in conformity with Section 57.
28. The issue is not res integra. It has been often held that in the absence of statutory rules, or regulations, framed in accordance with provisions of law, or proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, non-statutory administrative instructions can be validly made, and would bind the authority concerned, and its employee. In Nagpur Improvement Trust, Appellant v. Yadaorao Jagannath Kumbhare and Ors., Respondents. the Supreme Court held as follows:
It is, no doubt, true that under Section 21 of the Act, the State Government is required to make rules prescribing the conditions under which members of the staff requiring professional skill could be appointed by the Trust. But when the State Government has not made any such rules even if the rules can be held to be of mandatory nature as has been held by the High Court, then it is difficult to comprehend that the Board is denuded of its general power of appointing and promoting people to different posts as provided under Section 22 of the Act. If the view of the High Court under the impugned judgment is taken to be correct then all appointments to different posts ever since 1936 have to be held to be invalid inasmuch as no rules have been framed by the State Government in exercise of the power under Section 21 of the Act. While interpreting the provisions of Section 21 of the Act, the High Court has lost sight of the general principle of service jurisprudence that in the absence of any statutory rules governing the service conditions of the employees, the executive instructions and/or decisions taken administratively would operate in the field and appointments/promotions can be made in accordance with such executive instructions/administrative directions. In this view of the matter and concededly, no rules having been framed by the State Government in exercise of power under Section 21 of the Act, the Trust/Board was fully empowered to take administrative decisions in the matter of appointments and promotions to different posts including the posts requiring professional skill and consequently the resolution of the Board taken in accordance with Sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Act deciding to promote the employees to the post of Assistant Engineer cannot be said to be invalid or inoperative. The High Court, therefore, in our view fell in error in holding that the appointments made to the posts of Assistant Engineer are invalid in law.
In Dr. Krushna Chandra Sahu and Ors., Appellants v. State Of Orissa it was held as follows:
power to make rules regulating the conditions of service of persons appointed on Government posts is available to the Governor of the State under the proviso to Article 309 and it was in exercise of this power that the present rules were made. If the statutory rules, in a given case, have not been made, either by Parliament or the State Legislature, or, for that matter, by the Governor of the State, it would be open to the appropriate Government (the Central Government under Article 73 and the State Government under Article 162) to issue executive instructions. However, if the rules have been made but they are silent on any subject or point in issue, the omission can be supplied and the rules can be supplemented by executive instructions (See: Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan.)
In Abraham Jacob and Ors., Appellants v. Union of India, Respondent. the Supreme Court was concerned with the legality of the practice of following draft rules, that had not been notified. The court held as follows:
It is undisputed that prior to 1969 no Junior Engineer was being promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer. From 1969 after formulation of a set of draft rules promotion was being given to the Junior Engineers to the post of Assistant Engineer in accordance with the provisions contained in the draft rules even before such draft rules were approved by the governmental authority and became statutory rules, by virtue of an administrative decision of the Government. It is too well settled that the service conditions of employees, in the absence of a statutory rule could be governed by administrative instructions. There was, therefore, no illegality in giving promotion to the Junior Engineers to the post of Assistant Engineer because of the aforesaid administrative decision of the Government.
29. It therefore emerges that in the absence of statutory rules, the authority or state concerned, can frame policies or non-statutory regulations, in the exercise of its general executive powers, and administer them uniformly. In the case of DDA, such general powers can be located in Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The condition for exercise of such power is that they cannot supplant, or be in conflict with existing statutory regulations, or rules, framed under Section 56. In this case, admittedly there are no rules; indeed the regulations relied upon by the petitioners are of 1992; they too are non-statutory. No exception can be legitimately taken for the regulations notified in 1997 pursuant to Resolution No. 135/96.
30. The second issue is whether the DDA took an informed decision, while issuing resolution No. 135/96 to introduce the quota of 50%, for departmental exams. The agenda item in question, No. 4 talks of the proposal for Assistants at ‘C’. No doubt a bare reading of the agenda might lead one to conclude that only revision in pay scales was proposed; yet there is a specific reference to two Central Government letters, and also proposed changes to the amendment rules, as per Annexure C. This Annexure, read with the two Government letters indicates that the pay issue was not to be seen in isolation; it was connected with the qualifying service in the feeder grade for promotion to the post of Assistant; also the pattern prevailing in the Central Government was consciously proposed, in Annexure C, as can be seen from a juxtaposition of the second and third column. These proposals were adopted, and approved by the resolution. They were notified for information of all concerned in 1997.
31. Apart from the above facts, there is one more important aspect. The Tikoo Committee had recommended cadre review, which led to increase of 166 posts. This led to a benefit in favor of all those stagnating in the feeder grades. This fact has not been disputed. In view of this, and the approval of the proposal to increase the pay for Assistants, which has acceptance of the petitioners, and in view of the discussion in the preceding paragraph regarding the conscious decision to introduce the departmental examination quota, in the lines prevailing in the Central Government, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in the submission that the Annexures to the agenda did not propose the introduction of the 50% quota for written examination from amongst those who put in 5 years regular service as LDC.
32. It has been held often that in the absence of a right to promotion, the recruitment or promotion policies or rule, at best confer chances of promotion upon a public employee; a change in such policies per se does not affect the rights of existing employees. (See K.B. Shukla and Ors. v. Union Of India and Ors. and Reserve Bank Of India v. C. N. Sahasranaman 1986 (SUP)SCC 143). In Kuldeep Kumar Gupta v. HP State Electricity Board: 2001 (1) SCC 475, the Supreme Court, dealing with a challenge to introduction of a new quota providing channel for promotion, in a fresh manner, held as follows:
Providing a quota is not new in the service jurisprudence and whenever the feeder category itself consists of different category of persons and when they are considered for any promotion, the employer fixes a quota for each category so that the promotional cadre would be equibalanced and at the same time each category of persons in the feeder category would get the opportunity of being considered for promotion. This is also in a sense in the larger interest of the administration when it is the employer who is best suited to decide the percentage of posts in the promotional cadre, which can be earmarked for different category of persons. In other words this provision actually effectuates the constitutional mandate engrafted in Article 16(1), as it would offer equality of opportunity in the matters relating to employment and it would not be the monopoly of a specified category of persons in the feeder category to get promotions.
The introduction of the 50% quota, does not ipso facto hurt the petitioners, or affect their chances of promotion in such a shocking or arbitrary manner, as to warrant exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
33. In view of the above findings, I am of the opinion that these writ petitions are lacking in merits; they are accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs.